THE REVOLUTION IN EDUCATION

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The important word in my title, the challenging word, is "the". History is full of large and small revolutions in education. One may think of the educational shifts of Greece and Rome, of the Carolingian period and the Renaissance, of the Reformation and the Enlightenment. And these have parallels in ancient China and India, in the medieval cultures of Arab and Jew, in contemporary third world surgings. The past century has seen massive shifts in patterns and strategies of higher and early Canadian education. John Henry Newman would find present Canadian universities quite odd, and my parents, village educated in Ulster, would not know what to make of our local village school in Riverside, New Brunswick. Are any of these the revolution that I wish to talk about? And if not, am I not just going to speak about some other revolution, a proposed or expected addition to the history of such revolutions? If so, should not the title simply be "a revolution in education"?

I had best spell out, then, as best I can, the meaning of the challenge in my audacious choice of the word "the" in my title.

Perhaps an initial focus on the phrase "spell out" would help us along, even at the expense of some audience irritation. Indeed, the irritation of this initial focus is strategic. It will be a

reality in you, and you may move beyond that to the reality being an irritating or relaxed question about your irritability. Optimistically, one may think of the irritation that generates pearls. So, I recall now a story from the first lecture I ever heard of Bernard Lonergan, the Canadian thinker who lurks behind the present lecture. The story was about a lady who invited the famous physicist; Albert Einstein, to tea. She was delighted to have him all to herself, she said, and thought that it was a wonderful opportunity to find out about relativity theory. Would he oblige? "But please", says she, "no mathematics, no questions: just in my own simple words".

The point of the story, heard thirty-five years ago, has not just stayed with me but grown, mustard-wise, in the decades between. The point, and the growth, brings to mind another cup of tea, Marcel Proust's tea and cake of *The Remembrance of Things Past*. Proust recognized - the slowness of the recognition twines into the meaning of the book - two quite different styles of living and remembering. There is a living, or partly living, that is a cataloguing, a diary of sameness disguised by busyness: I think of Flaubert's *Bouvard et Pecuchet*, a book which Ezra Pound considered as characterizing the twentieth century before it began. But there is also the type of living and remembering and anticipating that is creative, open, mystery-toned: and here one might think of that wonderfully extreme statement of Gabriel Marcel: "the thinker is continually on guard against the alienation (through inertia), the fossilization of his thought. He lives in a continual state of creativity and the whole of his thought is always called in

question from one moment to the next".[1]

I steal and twist one phrase of Marcel to carry forward in our struggle: "continually call in question". There is a sense in which all that I have to say is summed up in that phrase. To stay genuinely alive is to continually call, bone-call, in question, into question, and to be educated in later millennia will be to be drawn into that molecular call, that question, in its full luminosity. But what is the question into and from which I advocate continuous call? It is not the question of a parliamentary debate or that of a school examination. It is not the question of the conventional learned conference or the usual cocktail party. It is, rather, the incarnate human quest, so fossilized now in the adult West, expressed in the rhythms of the *Rig Veda* as desire, expressed by the yearnings of Arjuna in the *Bhagavad Gita*.

But have I not slipped away here from Proust and Marcel, Flaubert and Pound, into a distant past, a quite different topic? Not at all: for, from the perspective of my title that past is not distant, nor is the topic of ancient desire at all different. Whether one ranges across the ages or the continents, the problem of genuine human life and of authentic education is the problem of a cultivated passage to elderhood. This statement brings to mind, I hope, the gloomy estimate of Abraham Maslow when he claims that less than one per cent of adults grow. More resonantly, Proust describes, at the end of *Remembrance of Things Past*, an elderly group as really being only faded sixteen year olds. On the other hand there were and are traditions of genuine elderhood, for

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[1]Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having*, Fontana pb, 1965, 0.181.

example, across the nations of both generic Indian cultures, Asian and North American, and within the story-telling traditions of tribal Africa. Perhaps a present reach, within the West, for something of the Zen tradition shows a sense of the larger need, a wider break-up, a global task. But that reaching is not adequate to the present crisis.

Now what I am pointing towards here is some spelling out both of the crisis and of the task. And essential to that pointing, and to the revolution I am talking about, is the peculiar twist of our conversation that focuses on the conversation itself, that pauses over, poises in, the notion of spelling out.

I have just used the word "essential" regarding what is pointed to, to be needlepointed in crumbled soul-joints, and I'm sure that many of you are waiting patiently, or impatiently for me to get to the point, the essence. That expectation is not unusual. Indeed, it is the usual expectation of these past centuries, in brutal conflict with the dynamics of the human quest. So, we are back to the cunning of irritating you, of trying to twist that irritation into you challenging you to suspect your own cultural expectations, expectations that oppose the dynamics of your human quest. I already mentioned the Zen tradition and here, I think, is the place for my favourite Zen story. A disciple approaches the master with the question, "Master, when may I expect to reach enlightenment." The master replies, "Perhaps in ten years". The disciple's response: "But what if I try harder?" To which the master replies "Then, perhaps in twenty years".

The false expectation that I speak of is not merely found in

the person of commonsense: it is a disease of the learned community. A few instances of its academic form can help us along. In his best-selling book of 1988, *A Brief History of Time*, Stephen Hawking remarks at the beginning that "the basic ideas about the origin and fate of the universe can be stated without mathematics in a form that people without a scientific education can understand"[2]. That is simply not true, but to come to grips with his error requires that we boldly face questions, beyond our present *ethos*, about the nature of science and of understanding. Again, there is Fichte's illusion, nicely captured in the title of an article in which he purports to explain Kant: "Sun-Clear Statement of the Newest Philosophy to the public at large. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding."[3] Such illustrations abound, for it is our inherited mode of nominalist rationalism. Closer to home one finds it destructively present in our introductory texts in psychology and sociology, philosophy and economics, etc. That is an all too evident aspect of the present academy's commitment to necrophilia.

Spelling out, within the reality of the human heart and mind, is a slow humble searching and sharing, which clashes with the alienating presentments and resentments of our times. I recall a set of articles written by Bernard Lonergan during the forties in which he struggled, and struggled to share, some fundamental

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[2]Steven Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, Bantam Press, N.Y., 1988, p.vi.

[3]Fichte's "Sun-Clear Statement to the Public at large. An Attempt to force the reader to an understanding" was published, in the English translation of A.E. Kroger, in *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol.2, 1868.

insights of Thomas Aquinas. His readers, among whom was a large block of settled Thomists, asked him what he was at in his lengthy discussion of Aquinas. His reply is worth quoting substantially. "The relevant data for the meaning of Aquinas are the written words of Aquinas. Inasmuch as one may suppose that one already possesses a habitual understanding similar to that of Aquinas, no method or effort is needed to understand as Aquinas understood: one has simply to read, and the proper acts of understanding and meaning follow. But one may not be ready to make that assumption on one's own behalf. Then one has to learn. Only by the slow, repetitious, circular labour of going over and over the data, by catching here a little insight and there another, by following through false leads and profiting from many mistakes, by continuous adjustments and cumulative changes of one's initial suppositions and perspectives and concepts, can one hope to understand what Aquinas understood and meant"[4].

Within that reply is a blunt truth about each of us, one brutally dodged in most of our undergraduate courses and also, indeed, in graduate courses and graduate theses. What is the achievement of Stendahl or Beethoven? What is the essence of Einstein's theory, or of Pythagoras's theorem? Is Einstein's discovery summed up in the formula, $E = mc^2$, or Pythagoras' theorem available to all as $a^2 = b^2 + c^2$? These are just names for absent understanding, as available to student memory as the so-called definition of the circle, a rote-learned set of words. Of course,

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[4]B. Lonergan, *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas,* University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, pp.215-6.

these illustrations may strike my listeners as unimportant, so one closer to our economic hearts may ring a discomforting bell. What, then, of the famous IS/LM curves that are the so-called essence of our first-year economics courses? Here we have an instance not only of something repeated unintelligently by undergraduates, but something that is erroneous, that does not express any essence of economic activity. So, Alfred Eichner began his Preface to the book *A Guide to Post-Keynsian Economics*, by remarking "Late in the day, after they have had two or three drinks, many economics professors will begin to admit to their own reservations about the theory which forms the core of the economics curriculum. The theory, they will admit, is at odds with much that is known about the behaviour of economic institutions. 'But what else is there to teach our students?' they will ask."[5] So, I am not talking about apparently irrelevant erudition. I am talking about uncouth economists and politicians. I am talking about a massive incompetence, a barren leadership, an absent elderhood.

The way out is through a - the- revolution in education of which, paradoxically, I can communicate little in our evening together. Yet I have arrived here at the heart of the challenge of the new millennium, and perhaps Bernard Lonergan's remark, in an unpublished manuscript of 1944, would do as a slogan for our times. "Coming to grasp what serious education realizes, and, nonetheless coming to accept that challenge constitutes the greatest task of

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[5]Alfred Eichner, *A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics*, Sharpe, N.Y., 1978, p.vii.

the modern economy."[6] That slogan must be incarnately meshed with my basic point so far, that the incarnate reality of "coming to grasp" or "calling into question" is the deeper issue within the discovery of what serious education realizes. That deeper issue laces into the concrete possibility of a genuinely democratic economy.

But now it seems time to plunge into the heart of the matter in some vague indicative fashion. The revolution I am contemplating is a revolution relating to two distinct historical times of the human subject. There is a first time during which human spontaneity dominates. That spontaneity is not reflected on, questioned. Intelligence is used in fruit-gathering and fishing, in the emergence of settled communities with their primitive social structures, and gradually in the emergence of what is later identified as science. Questions regarding intelligence, its role and goal, gradually emerge: one may think here of the three great Greek tragedarians creating the ferment in which the Socratic tradition took shape. As we shall see, it is a gradual dialectic emergence, spanning millennia. Its fruit will be the second time of humanity, perhaps taking shape in the centuries of the new millennium that is upon us. Obviously, the problem of spelling out this reality is doubly difficult: it is not only difficult as a topic but it is also something of the future. Briefly, then, that future time is one in which intelligence is not only used, but appreciated. The human vocation will be seen, at least by a

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[6]B. Lonergan, From a work of 1944, *Circulation Analysis*, to be published as part 3 of *For A New Political Economy*, vol 21 of Lonergan's Complete Works, University of Toronto Press, 1997.

creative minority, as a calling in to question, a visiting of the quest that is oneself.

There may be some among my listeners who would tend to claim that I am speaking of a present reality. Has not this past century been the century of Freud and Jung and a surge of psychology? Again, you may claim that one can track back through previous centuries to Kant and Descartes, to Augustine, indeed to the Socratic view that the unexamined life is not worth living.

It would take more than a general lecture for me to make evident that the efforts of these thinkers are efforts of the axial period, the period in between the two times of the human subject, or what could also be recognized as the first and the third stage of meaning, thus identifying the second stage of meaning as that long axial period of fragmentation and fermentation that has lasted for several millennia.

It is helpful to recall here Karl Jaspers' view of axiallity, expressed by him in the book, *The Origin and Goal of History*. When I read Jaspers first in the seventies I was quite taken by his view of an axial period of human history that spanned the period from 600 B.C. to 200 B.C., when there was a general turn to subjectivity not only in the Greek tradition but also in mid-Eastern, Chinese, and Indian traditions. Jaspers then envisaged a further axial period in the ferment of our time. Neither Arnold Toynbee nor Eric Voegelin were content with Jaspers first axial period and I was gradually led to see the two axial periods as a limited perspective that could be moved into a larger view by considering the emergence of the quest for the human subject as a single axial period between

the two times I already mentioned. Toynbee argued against the shortness of Jaspers' first period, noting that it left out such figures as Jesus and Mohammed. I found Voegelin more telling here. What, he asked, can be so modern about Hegel when the same strategy of accounting for present history could also be found in the Babylonian king lists of 2000 B.C?[7]

So, I was led to consider modernity, with its root in *modo*, fashion, as coinciding with a large single axial period which began prior to the year 2000 B.C. and reaches beyond this millennium. Would I then consider present post-modernism as belonging to the second time of the human subject? By no means: post-modernism comes under the same condemnation of truncatedness as the movements it purports to replace. If I were to use 'modernism' in a title for the third stage of meaning I would settle for 'negomodernism', where the negative judgement of the prefix connotes a luminosity of the locating of self and selves in total history in a subjectively total fashion.

Finally, I would note the significance of emergent science in fostering and determining the axial transition. Herbert Butterfield remarked of the scientific revolution that it "outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, more internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christendom"[8]. The

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[7]The relevant text of Toynbee is *Mankind and Mother Earth*; that of Voegelin is *The Ecumenic Age*, Louisiana State University Press.

[8]H. Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, Free press, N.Y., 1965, p.vii.

emergence of science and its various refinements in the past few thousand years adds to the refinement of the axial crisis regarding education. The topic is complicated and contorted by the emergence not only of science - still only a beginning - but of so much pseudo-science and muddled reflections on science, so I swing away from it to do a little strategic geometry that, for all its simplicity, helps to expose a key element in the crisis in education.

In a circle of, say, unit radius, two diameters, perpendicular to each other, are drawn. From an arbitrary point P on the circumference two perpendiculars PR and PS are drawn to the two diameters. The problem now is, What is the ratio of RS to the radius? But there is the larger problem of us in conversation. Before I hoped for an irritation that would raise questions. Now what I need from you is a mood relaxation in the presence of this non-threatening puzzle. I would hope that your molecules be loose enough not only for a "coming to grasp" in the case of a simple puzzle, but for the strange "coming to grasp" of that grasp. I say the puzzling is non-threatening, but it certainly can be a threat. I recall once giving a like puzzle to an academic who became so uptight that it took us two hours to break through to the simple insight. Still, here, since you are hidden in a larger group, you at least avoid exposing your geometric incompetence. You may be the last one to solve the little puzzle, but who's to know? I am certainly not going to ask for a show of hands.

Let us continue with our puzzle. Spontaneously, we head for a diagram and begin to mess around. Of course, a teacher can help, but by giving clues, not answers. Well, what is the clue here?

Joining R and S is something that we do without much pause. But the key clue is when the centre, O, and P are joined. Have you "got it"?

It is important for us to note now how the solution can be formulated or thrown into syllogistic form. This helps towards key light on features of the syllogism which are often misrepresented, indeed I might say axially misrepresented. Our discovery can be expressed as follows:

RS = OP
and OP = Radius;
therefore RS = Radius.

Notice that the expression hides our procedure. We started, not with two premises, but with a statement that led to a diagram and to the conclusion in the form

RS ? Radius.

Our search, through and with the diagram, was for a middle term, and the middle term was supplied, an insightful, as soon as one adverted to the significance of OP. Only then can the syllogism be constructed. To coin an expression for this constructing, one might say that the insight is crystallized into a syllogism. This does not mean, of course, that somehow the insight has been pinned down on a page. What has happened is that the insight has been given explicit symbolic expression. There are also other relevant insights lurking here. Giving all the relevant insights expression is not easy: Euclid failed in this, and modern geometry has struggled to adequately thematize his geometry. But let us stick

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with our little illustration: you can suspect that there is more to it than could possibly meet your initial eye. Nor is that more, that certainly needs spelling out, part of our cultural heritage. Rather, it demands a recreating of the history of mathematics and logic that would tumble us towards the third stage of meaning. But we can glimpse the key point in noting a common axial problem of presentation familiar from Euclid's *Elements* and from Newton's *Principia* and from many a sorry classroom experience. I recall undergraduate and graduate lectures in mathematics that I suffered through, where the professor's brilliant axiomatic presentations were laboriously and mindlessly noted, to be struggled with later. Both Plato and Aristotle were familiar with the underlying problem here, with the distinction between a rhetoric and an axiomatics. Unfortunately, the deep messy rhetoric of Socrates and Aristotle bowed out of the Western academy in favour of the standards expressed in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, and those standards eventually faded into a relatively barren pseudo-conceptualism under the influence of Scotus.

Notice also how easy it is to fade into the barren nominalist sweep, how attractive the elegant survey. Best get back to our little illustration and its help through axiallity. The getting back, of course, is to ourselves in our quest, to the structure of that little achievement. The reaching back can be enormously difficult, especially if one is a settled scholar, a well-formed formulor. But it can be swiftly caught in a seven-point diagram:



What are the points of importance in the diagram and the activity? I would claim that they are those numbered 1,2,3,5,6. Now recall Karl Popper's famous title, Conjectures and Refutations: 4 is the zone of conjecture as considered by Popper; 7 is the zone of refutation or verification. Moreover, in contemporary philosophy and research, those zones tend to be thematically isolated from the other activities. What is needed to rescue education, the process of discovering and sharing discovery, from that systematic exclusion is, not some post-modern relativist shuffling of past and present achievements, but a post-axial luminous presence of the invariant dynamics of human discovery.

Earlier I talked about the spontaneity of the first time of subjectively, when the compact person's desires reached integrally, if also at times brutally, towards nature and person, towards discovery and survival and communication. That spontaneity survives axiallity, more slimly in its randomness in so far as truncated clarity calls the students' shots, sells the student short. So, I recall again my own education in mathematics when we were fortunate

to have a teacher who was, literally, orgasmic. The grounding insights of the differential and the integral calculus pirouetted off tongue and chalk into our cranial reach. But such radiant incarnate meaning, we all admit, is exceptional. What is standard is not radiant meaning but "the meaningless, the vacant, the empty, the vapid, the incipid (sic), the dull".[9]

I have been speaking of an absence and a presence in the teaching of mathematics, but of course the point needs to be made and considered with respect to all facets of subjectivity's quest and education, and its discussion should reach into the dynamics of transformations and displacements and their enriching cultural fallouts. Seamus Heaney, in a recent book titled *The Redress of Poetry*, writes of the role of poetic living in lifting time forward, and my own work, *The Redress of Poise*, locates that lifting in the axial shifting towards luminosity.[10] But the realists among us, even reluctantly, will be on the side of the establishment. Is there, then, a way beyond this staleness and shrinkage of human life? My talk of a revolution remains mere talk, or published book, if the shifting cannot take more pragmatic and efficient shape.

So I am led in conclusion to sketch that efficient shape, a cosmopolis of reflection, of *Die Wendung Zur Idee*, into which emergent probability is inviting, cajoling, forcing, the modern

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[9]Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, Darton, Longman and Todd, London, 1972, p.73.

[10]Seamus Heaney, *The Redress of Poetry*, Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, N.Y. 1995; the McShane work, *The Redress of Poise*, is with University of Toronto Press, 1997.

academy. We are again, of course, in the discomforting zone of impossibly spelling out what will take generations to concretize and thematize. I fall back, then, on an entertaining fable.

My fable is of a Toronto family that has a holiday cottage at some late north of the city. I wonder do you have something equivalent in Newfoundland, or do you just head south? Twenty years previously, Molly and Poldy, both in their early twenties, inherited the cottage, and it has been their July holiday spot ever since. At that time their children, Zack and Till, were toddlers of ages 2 and 3 years. Over the initial years, the holiday group grew to include Molly's mother, Moses, and Poldy's brother-in-law, Tseng. After twenty years the holiday group is now grandma Moses, aged 68, Uncle Tseng, aged 50, Molly and Poldy, both at 43, Zack at 22 and Till at 23. They regularly pack up and head for the cottage each July. And increasingly over the years the reality is that they are not happy campers.

You may already sense the direction that I am taking. Perhaps this piece of the story needs little elaboration: you may well have lived through this sort of thing. In my story, Grandma Moses' real joy has grown over the years to be bingo: it is left behind during "vacation". Uncle Tseng, a well-practised alcoholic, does not drive, and at the lake he is far from a liquor store. Zack and Till, at 3 and 10, were happy in isolated lake-play: now their interests are more in condoms than canoes. Molly and Poldy, of course, are caught in the conventional middle.

There comes, then, the crisis time, a February decision time regarding holidays, which never before was a real decision time,

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bursts into a communal neurotic need to pause, to take stock, to turn to the idea, the ideas of holidays and misery, of desperations and desires. What causes this burst? Perhaps someone like the orgasmic teacher I mentioned, a Socrates, an academic misfit.

The family, amazingly, decides to take serious stock. Instead of following the barren route of anecdotal accusation or monadic pretectiveness (sic) or groundless optimism or stoic continuity, they face structured reflection. They dig up diaries and souvenirs, accounts of weather and neighbourhood changes, etc. Till's diaries of 15 years reveal the frustrations of blossoming feminine freedom in the presence of paternalism; uncle Tseng's jottings to a Chinatown mate show a growing horror of mere water; etc etc.

The key element here is the notion of "structure", the notion of a sequence of distinct tasks properly done. So, collecting the old account, the quaint memento, whatever, is one thing. Interpreting these is another task: what did this doll mean then? And it is a further task to place this doll and that meaning into the story of the past twenty years. Here you must envisage an open struggling group, each with their own bent, putting together his or her story, the genesis of a set of histories.

There emerges a fourth task: not only the reach for something like the one correct story, but a critical grip on it. What was good about those years, and where were our desires squashed? This is a difficult dialectic task. What would the results of success here be? At its best, it would yield a foundational perspective from which the group might face the next July, grounding what can be identified as four forward looking tasks, foundations, policy-

determination, reaching possibilities of structured togetherness, turning towards the mesh of these with concrete circumstances.

My hastily-told fable certainly needs spelling out. What I am intimating is a structure that emerged originally out of the problem of theological method, solved by Bernard Lonergan through his ordering of the messy disunity of specializations in theology into a structure promising future creativity, somewhat like the messy family July might be turned to joy. The same structure can be shown, has been shown, to be desperately relevant to other areas of academic struggle, to law and musicology, economics and literary studies, and so on.[11] So, instead of the Toronto family, there is the academic family and the shambles of the present academy. What the structured "turn to the idea" offers is the possibility of a massive collaboration of anamnesis and prolepsis that would replace the mess of specializations. Again, I recall that first lecture that I heard delivered by Lonergan in 1961. He was still four years away from his discovery of the structure that I speak of, but he described the dimensions of the search in terms of Thor Heyrdahl's Kontiki expedition: instead of fragmentary searchings in isolated zones, there was a need for an integral approach that would face the task of discovery in fulsome fashion. Perhaps it is no harm to

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[11]Functional specialization was defined by Lonergan in chapter five of *Method in Theology*. Its relevance to other areas has been elaborated: to musicology, in McShane, *The Shaping of the Foundations*, University Press of America, 1976, ch.2; to literary studies, in McShane, *Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy*, University Press of America, 1979, ch.5; to law, Bruce Anderson, *Discovery in Legal Decision-Making*, Klewer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1996, ch.8; to economics, McShane, *Economics for Everyone. Das Jus Kapital*, Commonwealth Press, 1997, ch.5

give a skimpy indication of the full structure towards which my fable points, which was the end-product of decades of Lonergan's searching. The structure seems so simple: human history comes forth from the use or abuse of four levels of human reaching through experience, understanding, judging, deciding expressed in global sensibility. One must search that four-levelled past to detect use, abuse and desire; one must turn that discovery foundationally towards the future, with orgasmic creativity, to reach a continual renewal of policy, planning and executive reflection regarding government and games, buying and selling, poetry and pain. Yet it is not "one" but all, with a creative centre in the academy, that must so turn. The eight functional components of that turning are easily named and described: the first four represent the movement up in memory to decision and its grounds; the second four represent the community's viewing of the future.

1. *Research*: finding relevant data, written or other.

2. *Interpretation*: reaching the meaning of such data, the meaning of those that produced it.

3. *History*: figuring out the story, connecting the meanings of the writings and the doings, etc.

4. *Dialectics*: coming up with a best story and the best basic directions: think of the family problem of sorting out different versions.

5. *Foundations*: expressing the best fundamental (in the sense that they are not tied to age, time, etc) directions.

6. *Policies*: Relevant basic pragmatic truths, somewhat like the core of national constitutions or of tribal legends.

7. *Planning-Systems*: drawing correctively and contrafactually on the strategies of the past to envisage ranges of time-ordered possibilities.

8. *Communizings*: local collaborative reflection that selects creatively from ranges of possibilities.

Such, in brief listing, is the tricky task of each of us discovering where we stand in the salvation of our desires, our joys, our lands, cities, seas. Its simple brilliance comes to light well in the context of the recent report of the Club of Rome, titled *The First Great Global Revolution*, a book which is divided into two parts, "*The Problematique*" (pp.3-130) and "*The Resolutique*" (pp.133-259).[12] The analysis and the proposals are, in general, lightweight, but there is the odd statement worth stealing. On pg.218 the authors remark: "Today we have enormously greater amounts of information and knowledge about man and the universe than our forefathers had, but there are few signs that human wisdom has increased significantly over the last 5000 years. In these difficult and complex times we begin to realize that the pursuit of wisdom is the essential challenge that faces humanity." Lonergan's eightfold way concretizes that task of wisdom in a manner quite beyond the imagination of an Aristotle or an Aquinas. And then there is the briefer remark on p.210 which might be taken as summing up my pointers of this evening: "We see the most important task of education as learning how to learn".

I have indicated the nature of that task on its two levels, an

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[12]Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, *The First Global Revolution. A Report by the Council of Rome*, Pantheon Books, N.Y. 1991.

eightfold communal academic collaboration in redeeming the times; the solitary tasks of adult growth in concrete questing and guiding. Without the spelling out that is noticeably absent, both these tasks are scarcely imaginable. Yet the desperate need is there for the facing of such tasks in the signs of what Eric Voegelin called "the murderous grotesque of our time". Reading the signs adequately is another matter. It has been the matter of my talk, for it is the matter of each of us facing the challenge of spelling out, over months and years, the neuroses and the monsters and the desires and the hopes entwined on our molecules. Perhaps I might make the point now finally in homely fashion for my academic audience by claiming that until B.A. begins to mean, existentially, Barely Adequate, we will remain axially arrogant. If I were to pick out one single glaring example of such axial arrogance it would be the present established arrogance of economic pseudo-theories, with their simple-minded complexity of model-building, their irrelevant equations regarding interest and money, their deep inhuman impracticality disguised as a concern for employment. Yet that example stands within an entire culture of necrophilia. In the long-run what stands against that culture is the graceful solitary and communal turn to the idea that I have hinted at. In the short-run we must look to satire and humour, prayer and art, and the random emergence of creative academic misfits.