


# TRINIFICATION OF THE WORLD



A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF  
FREDERICK E. CROWE  
IN CELEBRATION OF  
HIS 60TH BIRTHDAY

Edited by

Thomas A. Dunne and Jean-Marc Laporte

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# The Core Psychological Present of the Contemporary Theologian

Philip McShane

"In both Barth and Bultmann, though in different manners, there is revealed the need for intellectual as well as moral and religious conversion. Only intellectual conversion can remedy Barth's fideism. Only intellectual conversion can remove the secularist notion of scientific exegesis represented by Bultmann. Still intellectual conversion alone is not enough. It has to be made explicit in a philosophic and theological method, and such an explicit method has to include a critique both of the method of science and of the method of scholarship." (B. Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 318).

The quotation from *Method in Theology* which I selected as focus of this paper<sup>1</sup> speaks of the revelation of the need for intellectual conversion, for intellectual self-transcendence. That quotation concludes the last of a series of sections on the discovery and ongoing discovery of mind which are distributed throughout the book,<sup>2</sup> and which perhaps take on new meaning now in the light of my discussion of contexts in Part one and of ongoing methodological contexts in Part two. The task of this third part is to contribute further to the revelation, the discovery, the epiphany,<sup>3</sup> of the need for intellectual self-transcendence in the contemporary theological community. Briefly, I am following through the elementary strategy of making intellectual self-transcendence "a topic,"<sup>4</sup> giving it its due place in public

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academic discourse. I will do so, moreover, not by reaching towards a more refined thematization of the psychological present of a theologian growing within that core self-constitution, but by entering into methodological dialogue with some theologians of process thought, in somewhat the same manner as Lonergan does when he comments on contentions of linguistic analysis in *Method in Theology*.<sup>5</sup> My methodological dialogue will fall far short of the subtle strategy of dialectic,<sup>6</sup> but at least it draws attention to that strategy.

Before entering into that dialogue I would like to add two comments. The first, on the importance for theologians of the topic, intellectual self-transcendence, supplements the concluding discussion of Part two. The second comment regards the unfairness of the strategy crystallized originally on page 388 of *Insight*.

The use of the general theological categories occurs in all eight functional specialties.<sup>7</sup> Unless intellectual self-transcendence becomes a topic, that use will predominantly remain at best opaque and archaic, at worst basically disoriented. Yet, at present, biblical theologians, pastoral theologians, historians, etc., are little more enthusiastic about the topic of intellectual self-transcendence than physicists of fifty years ago were about discussing tensor fields and eigenfunctions.<sup>8</sup> They may even echo in their hearts what Lonergan reports as spoken by a professor of philosophy, "'Would some one please tell me what is all this fuss about *ens*?'"<sup>9</sup> But even fundamental or foundational theologians can be reluctant to put forward precise views of their own on reality, knowledge and objectivity. There are those no doubt who would claim that the object — or subject — of their theological reflections transcends any finite view, or view based on the finite realm of reality, knowledge and objectivity. Still even those would surely acknowledge that clarity on the finite realm would throw light on its unacceptability. There are those, on the other hand, who admit some continuity. With those I would argue that clarity on the finite realm more evidently is to be sought.<sup>10</sup>

Again, intrinsic to the importance of making intellectual self-transcendence a topic is the manifestation of its difficulty and the concomitant manifestation or epiphany of our humanity. Lonergan regularly returns to the aspect of difficulty, perhaps most clearly in answer to a question during

the talk on "Consciousness and the Trinity" which I quote here at length:

"Unfortunately, some people have the impression that while Tertullian and others of his time may have made such a mistake, no one repeats it today. Nothing could be further from the truth. For until a person has made the personal discovery that he is making Tertullian's mistake all along the line, until he has gone through the crisis involved in overcoming one's spontaneous estimate of the real, and the fear of idealism involved in it, he is still thinking just as Tertullian did. It is not a sign that one is dumb or backward. St. Augustine was one of the most intelligent men in the whole Western tradition and one of the best proofs of his intelligence is in the fact that he himself discovered that for years he was unable to distinguish between what is a body and what is real."<sup>11</sup>

Far from the problem being solved in a course on epistemology, the real question regularly only emerges in a later existential context. In so far as intellectual self-transcendence and its difficulty do become topics, there can be a shift in the statistical distribution of those who rise to a *Praxisweltanschauung* which regards the real as completely intelligible, and, as well as this successful achievement, a shift towards an increased tonality of mystery in the theological community, concomitant with a discouragement of commonsense eclecticism.

My second comment regards the seeming unfairness of the strategy of *Insight*, pages 387-8. For instance, if I take my stand, as I do, with Lonergan, that "the formulation of cognitional theory cannot be complete unless some stand is taken on the basic issues in philosophy," that the position is as indicated on the following page, that any other view is a counterposition, it does not seem like playing the game. There is an evident unfairness in calling other views counterpositions; there is a more fundamental unfairness of introducing an undesirable topic — if you like, of changing the rules of the game.

The unfairness seems to fade when one places the dialogue within the context or dialectic. It is for each investigator to take his or her own stand on what he or she considers the roots of progress, where progress is discerned

oningly by the ongoing process of criticism. But all this makes the unfairness more evident: one may not want to talk about progress or criticism, no more than one wants to talk about being. But here we come to the fundamental unfairness: if one does not want to talk about being, what does one want to talk about — non-being? The fundamental unfairness of the strategy of *Insight*, 388 is its modern third-stage-of-meaning extension of the old dodge of getting the sceptic to talk.

I turn now to my reflections on such matters in process thought, not in general, but in dialogue with Schubert Ogden as he expresses himself in "Lonergan and the Subjectivist Principle"<sup>12</sup> and with David Tracy as he expresses himself in dependence on Ogden in his recent book, *Blessed Rage for Order*.<sup>13</sup> I will proceed through ten points.

1. I do not think that Ogden is clear about the meaning or strategy of Lonergan's work. For example, speaking of Lonergan's identification of the task of philosophy he remarks: "Presupposed by this identification is the view that there is a 'duality' in human knowing in that 'in each of us there exist two quite different kinds of knowledge.'<sup>14</sup> There is the kind of knowledge whose basis is 'the data of sense' and whose most refined and fully developed form is empirical science. But there is also the kind of knowledge whose primary object is not the known but the knowing subject and which is based, therefore, on the 'data of consciousness'."<sup>15</sup> Lonergan's strategy, however, does not presuppose the view mentioned; it arrives at it. Furthermore, the two kinds of knowing mentioned by Lonergan in the passage quoted are not at all the two Ogden goes on to speak about. Ogden proceeds to argue against Lonergan's derivation of categories resembling the substance-quality categories. But I doubt if Ogden is thinking of derivation as Lonergan does: "The derivation of the categories is a matter of the human and the Christian subject effecting self-appropriation and employing this heightened consciousness both as a basis for methodical control in doing theology and, as well, as an *a priori* whence he can understand other men, their social relations, their history, their religion, their ritual, their destiny."<sup>16</sup> Ogden's strategy and his expectation of strategies seems to resemble some type of concrete deductivism, as described and criticized by Lonergan in his discussion of metaphysical methods.<sup>17</sup> Lonergan's strategy is not a faulty

acceptance of the subjectivist principle; it is an open acceptance of generalized empirical method.

2. There is disagreement on the meaning of the word 'experience.' Ogden remarks: "I am not at all questioning that Lonergan holds experience to be presupposed by human understanding, at least to the extent that it extrinsically conditions such understanding. My point is simply that the experience of which he holds this to be true is not the experience we actually enjoy and undergo, but only so much of it as is focally understood, because it is given clearly and distinctly as consciousness."<sup>18</sup> Perhaps Lonergan may answer for me from his most recent writing, in the course of which he treats of the ambiguity of experience. There is the usual meaning of the word experience that occurs in such phrases as 'the man of experience,' he explains,

"But there is another meaning at times given to the word, experience, and it is this meaning that concerns us here. It occurs in certain analyses of the various components that together make up human knowing. It is employed to denote an infra-structure within knowing, and its significance resides in a contrast between this infra-structure and a supra-structure.

To take a first illustration, any scientist will distinguish sharply between his hypothesis and the data to which he appeals. To the data the hypothesis adds a supra-structure of context, problem, discovery, formulation. But the data, as appealed to, are not yet the infra-structure. For, as appealed to, the data are named. That naming supposes a scientific supra-structure of technical language and of the scientific knowledge needed to employ the technical language accurately. In turn, the technical language and the scientific knowledge presuppose an earlier ordinary language and commonsense style of knowing that were employed in learning the science in the first place. Only when one goes behind ordinary language and commonsense knowing does one come to the infra-structure in its pure form.

It is pure experience, the experience underpinning and distinct from every supra-structure. As outer experience it is sensation as distinct from perception. As inner experience it is consciousness as distinct not only

from self-knowledge but also from any introspective process that goes from the data of consciousness and moves towards the acquisition of self-knowledge."<sup>19</sup>

Obviously, the infrastructure is not "given clearly and distinctly in consciousness." Furthermore, while it can be admitted in more than one sense that Lonergan "starts from understanding to understanding experience,"<sup>20</sup> still these different senses need to be distinguished. First, one may note that *Insight* "was not a study of human life but a study of human understanding."<sup>21</sup> The experience, then, that was the focus of Lonergan's effort in *Insight* was the experience of understanding.<sup>22</sup> Second, the study of human understanding led Lonergan to an integral heuristic structure pertinent to any experience of "the man of experience."<sup>23</sup> Third, the study enabled him to determine "that the empirical residue lies in the individuality, the continuity, the coincidental conjunctions and successions, and the non-systematic divergence from intelligible norms, which are to be known by experiencing and only by experiencing."<sup>24</sup>

3. Ogden's further discussion<sup>25</sup> of experience and knowledge in Lonergan is clouded by the ambiguity of experience. Lonergan remarks in reply: "If Professor Ogden were to discover that Whitehead meant something similar (to the ongoing self-correcting process of learning) when he took his stand on experience, the distance that separates us would in some measure be reduced."<sup>26</sup> Still, Ogden's discussion gives a definite impression that he does not like the idea that objectivity is a matter of answering questions; such an idea would belong to a philosophic tradition that "wrongly looks to intellect for the objectivity that experience as we actually live it quite adequately provides for itself."<sup>27</sup> But it is the live subject, the man of experience, who asks questions.

I suspect that the basic issue here is one which Lonergan himself once posed as a question: "Is it a fact that our intellectual knowledge includes an apprehension, inspection, intuition, of concrete, actual existence? Or is it a fact that our intellectual knowledge does not include an apprehension, inspection, intuition, of concrete, actual existence?"<sup>28</sup>

4. "Finally, the limits of Lonergan's thought are indicated with particular clarity by the range of alternatives he considers in defining his cognitional theory."<sup>29</sup> The manner in which Lonergan considers the range of alternatives to his

own view is complex. That range of alternatives clearly entered existentially into his own search.<sup>30</sup> In *Insight* and in *Method in Theology* the alternatives provide the possibility of clarification by contrast.<sup>31</sup>

In Praxis the existential genesis of his own view, through ever widening *anamnesis*, becomes praxisthematized, and clarification by contrast is sublated into dialectic.<sup>32</sup> However, to return to Ogden's objection, even in *Insight* it is clear that Lonergan's considerations focused, not on alternatives, but on his own experience in the widest sense, as a modern subject in increasingly adequate *anamnesis*. Ogden would counter, perhaps, that Lonergan's focus on experience is abstractive, whereas Whitehead's is not; and so Whitehead moves "not to discover intellect, but to rediscover experience."<sup>33</sup> We are back at the question of experience, but we have added the issue of abstraction. It is a large issue, but of far wider importance than one might suspect. As in the previous point, so here, we have a basic issue which may be put as a question:

What is it to rediscover experience: What is to rediscover? Is rediscovery enriching or impoverishing? Is abstraction enriching or impoverishing? Is rediscovery not abstraction?

5. I am led to suspect that a thematization of Ogden's position would result in a view on reality, knowledge and objectivity which would be a sub-category of the general category of counterpositions:

- (1) the real is a subdivision of the 'already-out-there-now' and the 'already-in-here-now';
- (2) the subject is known prior to affirmation in an existential state;
- (3) objectivity is a property of vital anticipation, extroversion, satisfaction.

6. Ogden's view, as he notes, has its origin in Whitehead. Within an adequate dialectic, he expects that one of the "good things"<sup>35</sup> that will be made precise is Whitehead's rejection of the substance-quality categories of Locke, Hume, and others.<sup>36</sup> But Lonergan more radically rejects these categories.<sup>37</sup> The difference between Whitehead and Lonergan is that Whitehead's process theory is falsifiable in any instance of scientific knowing; whereas Lonergan's view of things, of central and conjugate forms, of genera and species and their emergence, of biological and zoological

development, etc., is verifiable in the operations of the widest range of scientific thinkers.<sup>38</sup>

7. Tracy, who shares Ogden's view,<sup>39</sup> has previously considered this problem; namely, Lonergan's rejection of a notion of substance involving "any confusion or mixture of elements taken both from the notion of a thing and from the notion of a 'body' in its primary sense."<sup>40</sup> On the distinction between 'things' and 'bodies' Tracy remarks: "The distinction (perhaps his best known one) is easy enough to grasp if the previous chapters have been understood."<sup>41</sup> I cannot agree. The heuristic notion of the notion of thing is extremely difficult to grasp, even if one is competent in all the fields alluded to in the first seven chapters of *Insight* and solidly initiated into intentionality analysis. I should say that the "grasping the grasp" involved here puts one well on the road to intellectual self-transcendence.

8. Tracy regularly associates Lonergan, Karl Rahner and Coreth as transcendentalists.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, in *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* he speaks of "the 'critical realism' of Lonergan-Coreth-Rahner et al."<sup>43</sup> Here again, I have to disagree. Neither Lonergan's strategy nor Lonergan's critical realism are shared by Rahner or Coreth. I have no doubt that Rahner and Coreth have struggled to move out of a deficient tradition of philosophy and theology. But neither have I any doubt that their struggle has not been successful. Such an assertion is broad, and an adequate dialectic would add precise qualifications. But my existential dialectic leads me to this component of *Praxisweltanschauung* regarding what is "going forward" in the twentieth century. Lonergan's strategy and achievement is not just a new ball game: it is on a new type of field with a "startling strange"<sup>44</sup> ball.

9. Tracy is indebted to Ogden, not only for the general Whiteheadian view of experience, but also for his "articulation of the need for the theologian to develop 'criteria of appropriateness' as well as 'criteria of adequacy' to common human experience"<sup>45</sup> which Tracy seeks to develop in his book.

Part two of this study has already addressed the nature of criticism and the search for criteria. My interest here is not in Tracy's development but in the position that he adopts on reality, knowledge and objectivity. No more than Ogden

does Tracy give a precise thematization of his viewpoint on these. One has to work from clues in expression. In so far as my interpretation of the clues is incorrect, I am subject to correction. But that is precisely the strategy to be sublated into dialectic, where it will lead both Tracy and myself and others "to ask themselves some basic questions, first, about others, but eventually, even about themselves."<sup>46</sup>

As in the discussion of Ogden's view, the ambiguity of the word "experience" creates problems of interpretation. Tracy remarks that "If one shifts one's focus away from the sense-perception of objects ('experience') as the paradigm case for reality to the self's full range of unconscious, conscious, and knowing experiences of the self as the paradigm case for reality, a change in basic metaphysical categories occurs. In place of the essentially non-temporal and non-relational categories of 'substance' and 'being' of the classical metaphysical tradition, the categories 'process,' 'sociality,' and 'time' emerge."<sup>47</sup> But "the self as the paradigm case for reality" suggests to me a rejection of the position that "the real is the concrete universe of being",<sup>48</sup> (where being has a definition genetically related to that expressed in chapter 12 of *Insight*), in favour of the view on the real that I attributed to Ogden. The difficulty of this interpretation is that the self's full range of experiences does, in the subtle sense defined by *Insight*, pp. 319-388, yield "the paradigm case for reality." Still, I do not think that Tracy is thinking in this sense, since this sense involves notions of 'substance' and 'being' which he seems to find no more acceptable than those of the classical tradition.

Again, Tracy speaks of the "immediate experience of the self-as-a-self."<sup>49</sup> Here one might with sufficient distinction regarding 'immediacy' and 'experience,' show that this represents what I would call a position. But its most evident meaning is a negation of the positional fact that "the subject becomes known when it affirms itself intelligently and reasonably and so is not known yet in any prior 'existential' state."<sup>50</sup>

Finally, I do not find any precise view on the third feature of the position, objectivity, in Tracy's book. Still, his general sympathy with Ogden, his rejection of classical categories, and his discussion of the objectivity of God, lead me to suspect that he would follow Ogden here also. The tone of his views does not seem consistent with an explicit position

that "objectivity is conceived as a consequence of intelligent inquiry and critical reflection."<sup>51</sup>

10. Both Tracy and Ogden have a good deal to say about Lonergan's view of God. It may be taken for granted that I find their own views unacceptable, but I prefer, on principle, to avoid entering into a discussion of them here. The principle involved is the Principle of the Dog, and it is worth spelling out. Briefly, it springs from my reluctance to discuss the philosophy of God with anyone who is confused about the philosophy of dogs. More precisely, there are sets of contingent affirmations about dogs which occur in the science of zoology: they are not mysterious, but they do require meta-zoological self-appropriation if they are not to remain opaque. If a thinker is content to leave them opaque and venture into a discussion of contingent affirmations about God, I follow the strategy of trying to lead him back to the topic of dogs.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the Principle of the Dog has an added refinement relating to generalized empirical method.

Dogs have their own objectivity: "dogs know their masters, bones, other dogs, and not merely the appearances of these things."<sup>53</sup> The investigation of that objectivity is a task within zoology which zoology now handles badly.<sup>54</sup> But there is the ongoing genesis of methods, and there is a set of pressure points in the relatively young science of zoology.<sup>55</sup> Eventually zoologists will be driven and drawn by empirical demands to face the problem of understanding animal objectivity and its genesis in a novel fashion less foreign to the third stage of meaning than their present strategies. The facing of that problem, in turn, will make the problem of intellectual self-transcendence a topic, a centrepiece of public zoological discourse, in a way that it is not a topic for physicists, chemists, botanists. And the light generated by that development will, it is hoped, shine revealingly through views such as Ogden's and Santayana's: "Ogden maintains that 'faith' or 'belief' is a fundamental factor in the life of every human being, not simply every explicit religious believer. On the first level, which human beings share with the other animals, there exists what Santayana named 'animal faith,' i.e., that instinctive confidence of an animal in the environment as permissive of its struggle to live and reproduce its kind. On a second, distinctively human level, one finds the phenomenon of 'self-consciousness,' i.e., the ability to understand and reflect upon that instinctive confidence."<sup>56</sup>

## CONCLUSION

We have been spiralling round the intention of the "is" of judgement and verification and worthwhileness and discourse. Praxis is such a spiralling round, and central to it is that focusing on "is." Like Crowe, "I take courage from the fact that God has planted a fifth column within them (those who in rejecting "metaphysics" practice metaphysics): they cannot stop using the word 'is'. Using it, they cannot forever refrain from asking what it means, not for more than five or ten thousand years anyway, much less if they are willing to learn with and from tradition."<sup>57</sup>

In this paper I have been spiralling round a focus of Crowe's concern, a concern regularly expressed, from his introduction of *Insight in Sciences Ecclésiastiques* in 1957, "The Origin and Scope of Bernard Lonergan's *Insight*," to his latest work on *The Word of God*. The appropriation of Lonergan's meaning of the little word "is" is not easy. Many have been taken by the richness of Lonergan's ideas without reaching that core clarity. It seems fitting, then, in this volume in honour of Crowe, to whose clear writing and continued friendship I owe so much, that I conclude with his suggestion regarding the point at issue:

"... I suggest to those who have had some success with the act of insight but are still critical of Lonergan's philosophy, that their own history with regard to insight may ground the question whether they have a similar history to enact with regard to judgment. That is, if they can find in the oblivion Thomist insight suffered for centuries and in their own initial hesitations about that act, some evidence of the difficulty of its appropriation, perhaps they can also be led to suspect a parallel and even greater difficulty to be overcome in appropriating the act of judgment. And might failure here account for their strictures on Lonergan's philosophy which so obviously centers on the nature of truth and of the mind's relation to being?"<sup>58</sup>

## Notes

1 This paper is the third part of a study of the psychological present of the academic community. It is, however, self-contained, dealing with a basic need of the contemporary theologian. The notion of psychological present is derived from Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, p. 177. What I mean by "core" emerges in the text: briefly, it is the habit of the "position on being" as indicated in Lonergan, *Insight*, p. 388. The first two parts of the present study have been published in the Boston Lonergan Workshop papers of 1976.

- 2 *Method in Theology*, pp. 85-99, 302-318. These in turn require the context of the classifications of differentiations of consciousness, pp. 81-85, 257-62, 271-76.
- 3 I think here of Narziss' intimation of the single word as epiphany (Hermann Hesse, *Narziss and Goldmund*, Penguin, London, p. 64), as well as the epiphany of Joyce's Ballast Office clock (Harry Levin (ed.) *The Essential James Joyce*, Penguin, London, p. 12), or of Marcel Proust's little madeleine (*Remembrance of Things Past*, Random House, N.Y., Vol. 1, 35). The little word of interest to us here is "is" (see the conclusion to this Part), but one must be mindful that the word is an expression of the incarnate subject. If it is to be uttered with new mindfulness in public discourse, one must expect, on the principle of dynamic correspondence (*Insight*, p. 532) resonant changes in the total subject and community. See also Part 2, nn. 23, 31, 65; also below, n. 34.
- 4 *Method in Theology*, p. 253
- 5 *ibid.*, pp. 254-262. See the comments in nn. 31, 32, below.
- 6 See Part 2, n. 52 and the text there.
- 7 *Method in Theology*, p. 292
- 8 *Insight*, p. 581
- 9 B. Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, p. 20
- 10 There is a strategy involved here related to Lonergan's restriction of discussion to proportionate being in a large part of *Insight* (*Insight*, p. 391). I will return in the conclusion to this topic under the rubric "The Principle of the Dog."
- 11 Lonergan, "Consciousness and the Trinity," a talk given at the Gregorian University, 1964.
- 12 Cited from *Language, Truth and Meaning* (ed. P. McShane), Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1972
- 13 *Blessed Rage for Order*, Seabury Press, New York, 1975, pp. 39 n. 42, 57 n. 4, 101, 103-4, 114 n. 44, 153-6, 166 n. 41, 179, 202 n. 101
- 14 *Insight*, xvii
- 15 *op. cit.*, p. 218-9
- 16 *Method in Theology*, p. 292. See n. 10 of Part 2 and the text there.
- 17 *Insight*, pp. 404-06. This point is worth lengthier considerations than are possible here. Ogden's subjectivist principle is "that the primary object of philosophic reflection is my own existence as an experiencing self" (*Foundations of Theology*, p. 225) and he remarks of it: "Logically this principle can imply nothing less than what he (Whitehead) speaks of as the 'deposition of substance-quality'." (*Foundations of Theology*, pp. 223-4). In so far as the idea of logical implication can be taken seriously here, the questions that Lonergan raises with regard to deductive methods in *Insight* pp. 402ff., can be raised. Even if Ogden claims that the phrase is used loosely, one may still ask for more precision regarding his metaphysical method.
- 18 *op. cit.*, p. 227
- 19 *Religious Studies and Theology*, 1976, the first lecture, in press
- 20 S. Ogden, *op. cit.*, pp. 226, 227
- 21 "Bernard Lonergan Responds," *Language Truth and Meaning*, p. 310
- 22 A relevant elementary context is *Insight* p. 274.
- 23 *Insight*, pp. 392-95
- 24 *Insight*, p. 432. Notice the new context given to this by the text cited at n. 19, above, and by the discussion of generalized empirical method in Part 2.
- 25 *op. cit.*, pp. 227-8
- 26 *Language Truth and Meaning*, p. 310
- 27 Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 228
- 28 B. Lonergan, "Insight: Preface to a Discussion," *Collection*, pp. 162-3.
- 29 Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 228
- 30 It would take at least a substantial article to handle this issue. Lonergan himself speaks of his passage through nominalism, Molinism, etc., and his debt to Aquinas. Moreover, that personal passage to Aquinas and beyond provided grist for the mill of growth to *Method in Theology*. One aspect of that is touched on in the immediately following text and footnotes.
- 31 In *Insight*, clarification by contrast occurs explicitly in chapter 4, section 3; chapter 11, sections 10 and 11; but also in shorter discussions of counterpositions,



as well as in the sifting through "The Dialectic of Method in Metaphysics" (*Insight*, pp. 401-30). In *Method in Theology* the same strategy is used throughout the book, most evidently in "The Dialectic of Methods" (pp. 253-65) which complements the treatment of this topic in *Insight*.

32 *Method in Theology*, p. 250, is the key description of the process. It should be noted that clarification by contrasting, in the ongoing genesis of method, normally involves the strategy of developing positions and reversing counterpositions.

33 Ogden, op. cit., p. 229

34 On abstraction see especially *Insight* pp. 87-89; *Method in Theology*, pp. 10-11. There is the larger question here of the mutual mediation of richer experience and enriching abstraction which we cannot enter into here. This is related to the comments made in n. 3 of this Part, and in Part 2, nn. 23, 31, 65.

35 *Method in Theology*, p. 250

36 The point has been made by Lonergan in *Philosophy of God and Theology*, Darton Longman and Todd, 1973, p. 64.

37 The basic texts for reflection are *Insight*, chapter 8, and the discussion of relations in *Insight* pp. 490-97 and in *De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica*, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964, Appendix 3.

38 For an introduction to the substantiation of the claim see my *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence*, Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1970. Obviously the strategy of verification or falsification involved should be that of the developed view on generalized empirical method.

39 See n. 13 above.

40 *Insight*, p. 254

41 D. Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan*, Herder and Herder, New York, 1970, pp. 121-2

42 *Blessed Rage for Order*, pp. 82 n. 12, 156, 168 n. 62, 172, 193 n. 14

43 *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan*, p. 153

44 See *Insight*, p. xxviii.

45 *Blessed Rage for Order*, p. 57 n. 4

46 *Method in Theology*, p. 253

47 *Blessed Rage for Order*, p. 173

48 *Insight*, p. 388

49 *Blessed Rage for Order*, pp. 65, 69, 71

50 *Insight*, p. 388

51 *ibid.*

52 See n. 10 above. The primary difficulties expressed in recent years regarding chapter 19 of *Insight* are difficulties which are rooted in an implicit unacceptability of earlier parts of *Insight*, especially pp. 348-88. Secondary difficulties are difficulties of religious and moral stance: see B. Tyrrell, *Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God*, Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1974.

53 Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, p. 7

54 Wyburn et al., *Human Senses and Perception*, spend the last 100 pages of their book on the senses surveying views of perception, present a further possible view, and conclude: "Even if the suggested solution is unacceptable, one thing at least is clear: the bankruptcy of the orthodox theories shows only that by some radical revision of fundamental concepts can success be obtained."

55 I have discussed some of these pressure points in "Zoology and the Future of Philosophers," chapter 3 of *The Shaping of the Foundations*, University Press of America, Washington, 1977.

56 *Blessed Rage for Order*, p. 153. Note that we are back to the questions posed in the text above at n. 28.

57 F.E. Crowe, "Christologies: how up-to-date is yours?," *Theological Studies* 29 (1968), p. 101. Crowe's thesis fits clearly into the view of ongoing contexts which I have been indicating here, not only in the main text but in a sequence of footnotes, such as Part 2, nn. 23, 31, 65; Part 3, nn. 3, 34. Adding Crowe's thesis to these suggestions gives the larger context including quasi-operators. History, generalized empirical method, praxis, lead towards a greater epiphany of the opaque usage of the word "is."

58 Crowe, "The Exigent Mind", *Spirit as Inquiry*, 1964, pp. 27-28

## Trinification and Phenomenology

W.F.J. Ryan

"Trinification" is a term Frederick Crowe uses in a section of his systematic theology to explain the presence of the Trinity in the world.<sup>1</sup> Trinification refers to the missions of the Word and the Spirit, and the origin of these missions in the First Person. The mission of the Word can be designated briefly as the presence of pervading intelligence in the world, while the mission of the Spirit can be called the presence of pervading love. The missions are the ultimate basis for the meaning and the acceptance found in human living. Countering meaning and acceptance are absurdity and rebellion.<sup>2</sup>

Trinification is a theological term, presupposing a certain theological method. Although Fr. Crowe develops the notion of trinification in the context of Aquinas' *imago Dei* and the psychological analogy based on the faculties of intellect and will, yet it is entirely harmonious with a theological method based on intentionality analysis. Fr. Crowe has himself adopted such a theological method.

The phenomenology of Husserl, a type of intentionality analysis, is an apt instrument for examining the trinification of the world. First of all, however, the term "phenomenology" should be specified since it is a term that can be used to describe a multitude of activities. The phenomenology meant here is 1) that of Edmund Husserl, 2) characterized by his concepts of the life-world, the world of cultural objects constituted upon the foundation of the life-world, and the epoche (transcendental reduction) in its relation to these two worlds. This is the late phenomenology of Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1934-1937). The notions of the life-world

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