

Before concluding, I wish to thank my colleagues in this volume, and those who helped us toward some light on our times. In particular, to the Jesuits of Upper Canada, sponsors of a fund to promote Method Institutes, we send warm thanks for financial support in bringing us together and making this work available.

What I have stressed in this preface is my suspicion that we are only at the beginning of history, that the next million years is on the side of the epiphany of quest and goal. Still, might we not end soon in a nuclear holocaust?

Part of the glory of history is man's envisagement of its schedules of probabilities and possibilities. If the sapling of history is cut down from within, still it can have, within, a vision of the temporal noosphere that, paradoxically, redeems God. The envisagement is the core of future academic growth: its opposite is an elderhood that is the fraud of being in reality "not old folk but young people of eighteen, very much faded".⁸⁴ Our molecules, "our arms and legs filled with sleeping memories",⁸⁵ passionately demand that we fly after the butterfly.

"There the butterfly flew away over the bright water, and the boy flew after it, hovering brightly and easily, flew happily through the blue space. The sun shone on his wings. He flew after the yellow and flew over the lake and over the high mountain, where God stood on a cloud and sang".⁸⁶

CHAPTER ONE

Middle Kingdom: Middle Man

(T'ien-hsia: i jen¹)

Philip McShane

Introduction

"Your Lord Jesus was na Chinese, heya? Then he is barbarian. And wat for you tell me this Jesus God is na new, when only he was na even born two thousand years ago, heya? This is plenty werry new. Ayee yah, our gods are five, ten thousand years old".²

Our topic is "Mind and the Mystery of Christ". From an adequate categorical perspective the topic is equivalently the ongoing discovery of mind and Mind and the Mystery of the Trinity in history. For, the heuristics of Foundations are concrete, providing the inner word of a worldview³ by which one thinks of the realities of mind and grace⁴ within the fullness of the emergent probability of meaning. Nor is the normative demand for such thinking solely an issue of Foundations. "The use of the general categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties".⁵ So, for instance, one is not contemporary in research and interpretation if levels and sequences of expression are not reached for heuristically within the universal viewpoint,⁶ itself sublated by the subtleties of functional specialization. The dodging of that heuristic reaching constitutes "a sin of backwardness"⁷ in theology.

Backwardness in theology has been my concern since 1960, when I moved, from a contemporary world of teaching such elementary science as relativity theory, into a ghetto of common-sense eclecticism where I began my study of the Queen of the Sciences. Serious thinking was no longer required, nor, indeed, encouraged.

I write with that measure of bluntness which Fr. Crowe allowed himself in 1964, and I feel that his rhetorical question has more bite now: "Is there not room for a measure of bluntness at this stage?".⁸ So I would hazard that the discontinuity warranted by Lonergan's

shift of theological meaning has not yet occurred in a way that would parallel the shift in physics inaugurated by Galileo or that in chemistry associated with Mendeleev. The common-sense eclecticism has changed: instead of Suarez and St. Thomas we have Schillebeeckx and Schoonenberg,⁹ and, of course, Lonergan — or Lonerganism.

Generalized empirical method is no more tied to Lonergan than modern physics is Galilean. It is a precise method that hopefully will liberate theology in the next three centuries as Galileo's method liberated physics in the past three.¹⁰ In the second part of this paper, some aspects of the Chinese search for meaning will be considered, but I cannot resist inviting the reader, at this stage, to sublimate one of Mao Tse-tung's strong statements regarding the search for a Chinese Way: "In the social sciences and in Marxism-Leninism, we must continue to study Stalin diligently wherever he is right. What we must study is all that is universally true, and we must make sure that this study is linked with Chinese reality. It would lead to a mess if every single sentence, even of Marx's were followed. Our theory is an integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution. At one time, some people in the Party went in for dogmatism, and this came under our criticism. Nevertheless, dogmatism is still in evidence today. It still exists in academic circles and in economic circles too.

In the natural sciences, we are rather backward and here we should make a special effort to learn ... We must be ready to learn even ten thousand years from now. Is there anything bad about that?"¹¹

The Christian, surely, is ready to listen to the natural sciences, part of the history that is revelation, for ten thousand years or more? Or is theology to settle for a metastatic imagination¹² that liberates it from serious worldliness and prolepsis? There is no doubt that the present century has witnessed a shift in the schedules of probability of global non-survival. But the adequate theologian is committed to envisage possible and probable serialiations in his or her collaboration with divine providence.¹³

The title of this two-part paper is multiply ambiguous.

Middle Kingdom traditionally means China, but it also means the horizontal metaxy discussed in Part One. Middle Man means Christ, but it also means the Mandarin, the Sage, the Sargawit,¹⁴ the Foundations person. Related to that meaning of Middle Man as sage there is the notion of the Academy, normatively caring for being,¹⁵ as a Middle Kingdom, with its middle men and women mediating the meaning of life and of history to the masses of New York, Nanking, Nairobi. In that context I recall, and will recall later, William Cobbett and his book Advice to Young Men and (incidentally) to Young Women in the Middle and Higher Ranks of Life.¹⁶

Cobbett sought to mediate larger life to those without leisure by advising those better placed: and so would I. And my summary advice is to seek, over the next decades, the noetic and incarnate presence in history of the foundational categories; not to be caught in the present cult of scared non-knowers,¹⁷ hurriedly scanning the baggage of every theological journal. Mao Tse-tung makes the point well in a speech entitled "Get Rid of the Baggage and Start up the Machinery": "'To get rid of the baggage' means to free our minds of many encumbrances¹⁸ ... 'To start up the machinery' means to make good use of the organ of thought. Although some people carry no baggage and have the virtue of close contact with the masses, they fail to accomplish anything because they do not know how to think searchingly or are unwilling to use their brains to think much and think hard. Others refuse to use their brains because they are carrying baggage which cramps their intellect".¹⁹

Finally, the title has a personal and less significant meaning: "middle kingdom" refers to a halfway house in a personal search for foundations, named in 1974, Process: A Paideiad²⁰ and to be articulated in the late eighties. At this halfway stage it seems, as will appear more fully in the conclusion, that I am playing Mao to Lonergan's Marx.

In a related and curious way the paper also focuses on the century ending in 1964, a period of the genesis of new mandarins both in China and in Christian theology. In 1964 Lonergan reached a personal pinnacle in the understanding and sublation of Aquinas' theology of God and Christ, expressed in the Latin treatises.²¹ In January of that year, Jen-min jih-pao (People's

Daily) carried an editorial asserting the existence of a middle world between Western imperialism and the Communist bloc, a view revised and matured by Mao Tse-tung in 1974: "in my view, the United States and the Soviet Union form the first world. Japan, Europe and Canada, the middle section, belong to the second world. We are in the third world ... With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to the third world. The whole of Africa belongs to the third world, and Latin America too".²²

While the staggered differentiations of consciousness of the globe are clearly an object of the heuristics of Praxisweltanschauung, this essay restricts itself to those components of the dialectic genesis of meaning that concern Eric Voegelin in the fourth volume of Order and History:²³ the achievements and fragmentations of the West; the undeveloped Chinese Ecumene. The first part of the paper deals with problems of the truncated West. The second part enlarges on these problems with an eye on the East, and moves to the question, "What have the subtle and sublime insights into the subjectivity of God, expressed in Lonergan's 1964 writings, to do with a Great Leap Forward in third millennial China?". But within that question is a more precise and uncomfortable question: "When will theologians take seriously the challenge to contemporary Elderhood in Lonergan's Great Leap Forward,²⁴ which oddly²⁵ coincided with the Great Leap Forward (1957-62) in China?"

Even from this short introduction it should be evident that this essay does not move on a steady front. Rather, it forays, noting spoils to be caught by an eight-fold theology that would meet later times as Thomas sought to meet medieval times. It has unity, however, as a foundational enterprise: by random dialectic it seeks to enlarge the meaning and challenge of Method in Theology, 286-91.

PART ONE

The Fundamental Disorientation of Modern Inquiry

Goethe's remark, "He who cannot account for three thousand years lives only from hand to mouth",²⁶ will hopefully be a recognized norm in the academy of the

twenty-first century. Our present century will then be revealed in its horrors, its pettiness, its decay: these, not just in the visibility of Germany in the thirties, or America in the sixties, but in the now-hiddenness and massiveness of what Eric Fromm characterizes as necrophilia, the spirit of which was first expressed in literary form in 1909 by F. T. Marinetti in his Futurist Manifesto.²⁷ In his last great book, in the thirties, Edmund Husserl argued that all significant ideals had vanished from science to be replaced by the conventions of a clique.²⁸ Eric Voegelin, whose work we will turn to regularly in this paper, recently remarked: "I knew ten years ago that our universities, not only in America but in Europe, were completely rotten: brothels of opinion, no science, nothing",²⁹ and elsewhere he has noted that when he enters a department in a university he always takes stock of the number of people in it who would condemn him to death in a totalitarian society.³⁰ The sickness, clearly, is not just a professional disease. Voegelin has spoken of "the murderous grotesque of our time",³¹ of the "public unconsciousness"³² of these past centuries, of the universality of contemporary paranoia.³³ Bernard Lonergan writes of "the monster that has stood forth in our time".³⁴ Karen Horney's early work deals with the genesis of the neurotic personality of our time,³⁵ a genesis not unrelated to what David Riesman has to say about other-directedness as an American sickness.³⁶ Laurens van der Post writes of contemporary schizophrenia;³⁷ the Greek scholar Victorina Tejera considers our times as anaesthetized;³⁸ Hans-Georg Gadamer speaks of "narcotized receptivity".³⁹ Furthermore, that necrophilia has not totally numbed either the popular aesthetic or common sense. Paul Simon's lyrics of the sixties raise the issue of the viability of "people talking without speaking, people hearing without listening", in "dangling conversations". And the question written on a wall in Belfast in the seventies could be raised in many a city West, East or South: "Is there a life before death?"

So, it would seem that our busy banal times increasingly invite the emergence of two types noted by the elder Carl Jung: the "emphatically normal".⁴⁰ and the "optionally neurotic".⁴¹ The emphatically normal jog their way through a busy busy life, cloaking loneliness and lunacy. Flaubert's last great novel, published just over one hundred years ago, Bouvard et Pecuchet, who "look on themselves as

serious persons engaged in useful work",⁴² caught them perhaps in an anticipatory stride. As Ezra Pound noted, "messrs. Bouvard and Pecuchet are the basis of democracy".⁴³

Deep in each of us there is a Don Quixote or a Madam Bovary reaching, as Joyce would say, "to read the book of himself",⁴⁴ or herself. Deeper still is the inner Penelope or Flying Dutchman of adult growth.⁴⁵ But these reachings and these depths are layered over by a cultural swamp of self-neglect: the sociologist Peter Berger notes that "we become what we are addressed as by others", and we are addressed by truncated subjects, as truncated subjects. "The neglected subject does not know himself. The truncated subject not only does not know himself but also is unaware of his ignorance and so, in one way or another, concludes that what he does not know, does not exist".⁴⁶

Clearly, we have only named the problem, and furthermore, it is paradoxically only a named problem in so far as one begins to try to come to grips personally with the solution.

The massive contemporary truncation has deep historical roots. The roots are not easy to characterize nor is the sickness something easily cured in coming centuries. Voegelin speaks of ideologies as generally persisting for 250 years⁴⁷ and here we have the result of an aggregate of ideologies. Jung speaks of the next six centuries as a period of the sprouting of subjectivity.

My catalogue of dark critical response to our present world undoubtedly sounds strange, and indeed some of my readers may add that it rings hollow. Nor is there any sure remedy for this. Fichte once wrote an article entitled: "Sun-clear statement to the Public at large concerning the true nature of the Newest Philosophy. An attempt to force the reader to an understanding".⁴⁹ Fichte's hope expresses a basic illusion of modernity:⁵⁰ clear statements no more generate understanding than maps generate mountaineers. The point is of central importance and an analogy may help.

In his biography of Beethoven, George Marek writes of the amazing climb into subtlety of musical meaning that was Beethoven's life, and remarks of the

last quartets: "The quartets carry music to a summit of exaltation and to the deepest depth of feeling ... To probe their variety of mood, sweetness, power, intensity, humor, compassion, assertion of life, a book by itself is needed, one which it would be beyond my ability to write".⁵¹

Great beauty is a remote height which is perceived as ordinary to unrefined sensibility. Many may find Mozart tuneful but Gustav Mahler's last word was "Mozart!". It would seem, however, that great ugliness too is remote: doubly so, indeed, if that ugliness - as recent psychology suggests - conventionalizes even our childhood dreams⁵² so that we emerge as deeply crippled adults. What, then, does the contemplative elder Voegelin mean when he writes: "The perversion of Reason through its appropriation by the mental cases that had already worried Chrysippus has grown, in the modern period of deculturation, into the murderous grotesque of our time?"⁵³ We may suspect that we have little clue.

We are dealing, then, with a remotely characterizable issue of subjectivity both in its deep aspirations and its modern truncation, meshed into the large weave of historical process. That characterization can be reached only by a quite novel type of reading of history, a reading mediated by heuristic interiority. Here we can only hope for an impression of the novel challenge.

My impressionistic treatment will begin with some comments on what has been named the scientific revolution, moving from there in an enlargement of perspectives to come to some envisagement of the historical process, not, however, in the fullness of eschatology, but sufficiently to characterize a period of more than three thousand years conveniently called modernity. Following this I would like to touch briefly on problems of contemporary inquiry, problems emerging more particularly in recent centuries, in relevantly illustrative areas such as economics, musicology, criticism, and, finally, psychology.

First, then, let us recall aspects of the scientific revolution. Herbert Butterfield in his book, The Origin of Modern Science, remarks that "since the rise of Christianity there is no landmark in history that is worthy to be compared with" the seventeenth

century revolution in science.⁵⁴ Immediately after that remark Butterfield begins a chapter entitled "The Postponed Scientific Revolution in Chemistry".

From an adequate heuristic perspective it is not surprising that chemistry emerges as scientific in the late eighteenth century - for chemical reality is more difficult to understand than physics. The shift of the biological sciences into explanatory perspective was a nineteenth century achievement, but it is noteworthy - and I am not entirely jesting - that Konrad Lorenz got a Nobel Prize in the seventies for discovering that zoology was about animals.

My point, then, is that the scientific revolution did not happen; it is happening, and it is only beginning. Moreover, the beginnings in our time are locked within fragmentations of consciousness, that leave the lower sciences of physics and chemistry troubled with paradoxes and confusions regarding subjectivity, objectivity, imaginability; the middle sciences of botany and zoology committed to a naive reductionism that, instead of explaining, explains away; and the higher sciences in a positivist eclecticism that gives edge to the remark "sociology is the science where people count". Moreover, the technological output from the hierarchy of sciences adds further distortions. So, for example, the lucrative successfulness of the easier sciences, physics and chemistry, leads to the identification of technology solely with their advance, and to a narrow perspective on the significance of objectifications of future insights in the vital sciences, and these sciences, in turn, are so heavily disoriented in their present objectification by profiteering aggrabusness that Colin Trudge titles his recent book on the subject, The Famine Business.⁵⁵

These fragmentations and disorientations of the scientific and technological revolutions lead us to enlarge our context. In the wake of the medieval philosophical development which ended with the deaths of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great, there emerged sequences of systematizations of truncation which contemporarily blinker the entire academic enterprize. The research of Lonergan led him to the view that Kant's unsuccessful struggle was with the mind as conceived by Scotus,⁵⁶ and Rene Wellek notes that the range of modern views on criticism derives from Kant.⁵⁷ Again, Leo Strauss has documented the influence of Machiavelli, and

Professor Lawrence of Boston College has commented: "Isn't it a shock to discover that the trajectory of political thought stretching in one wave from Machiavelli through Hobbes, Locke, Smith, and in a second wave from Rousseau, through Kant, Hegel and Marx is rooted in the Machiavellian option to develop 'realist' views in which theory is adjusted to practice and practice means whatever happens to be done?".⁵⁸

Scotus systematically excluded understanding's generative role in concepts and thus distorted both man's view of the Eternal and man's metaprocedures in these past centuries. Machiavelli systematically excluded transcendent values from historical practice and so set the stage for contemporary political theory and practice. Modern structurings of education devotedly merge both oversights.

In the second part of this paper the place of Christianity in the historical process will be considered. Here, however, I wish to move to the problem of envisaging total history as posed by Karl Jaspers. It is the much larger context which would envisage 2,000 million more years of our biosphere,⁵⁹ a context which can ground Jasper's remark, "We are just setting out".⁶⁰ It is a context in which the sorry state of modern economics can be seen in the new light of the inevitable presence and pedagogy of the economic rhythms of the next million years.⁶¹

Jaspers, in his The Origins and Goals of History, places a basic axis of history in the period between 800 and 200 B.C. when man reached significant differentiation in Greece, Persia, Israel, India and China.⁶² In the context of a later discussion of contemporary culture, he raises the question of a second Axial Period.⁶³ Toynbee took issue with Jaspers in his last work, Mankind and Mother Earth: "It would be misleading to set a chronological limit to the Axis Age that excluded those two mighty epigoni (i.e., Jesus and Muhammad) of Zarathustra and 'Deutero-Isaiah'. Thus the Axis Age expands from a period of about 120 years to one of about seventeen centuries running from c.1060 B.C., down to A.D. 632, which is the date of the Prophet Muhammad's death".⁶⁴

In the fourth volume of his projected six-volume work, Order and History, entitled The Ecumenic Age, Eric Voegelin moves to a fuller view of the historical

process which broadly resembles the one presently proposed. A central feature of Voegelin's view is his emphasis on the "In-betweenness" of human existence, to which he gives a Platonic name, the Metaxy. The emergence into consciousness of that tension of "In-betweenness" he associates primarily with the noetic differentiation of consciousness in the Greek tradition and the pneumatic differentiation of consciousness in the Hebrew tradition. For reasons that will appear shortly, I am led to rename this "In-betweenness" of historical reality, constitutive of its mysteriousness,⁶⁵ the Vertical Metaxy.

Clearly, Voegelin would consider this emergence into consciousness as in some sense axial, but it seems to me that the key to the resolution of the debate regarding axiality lies in his recurring questioning of the meaning of modernity. So, in noting the parallel falsifications of history in the Sumerian King List and Hegel's Philosophy of History, Voegelin is led to query: "And what is modern about modern mind, one may ask, if Hegel, Comte, or Marx, in order to create an image of history that will support their ideological imperialism, still use the same techniques for distorting the reality of history as their Sumerian predecessors?"⁶⁶ In a later context he remarks: "A 'modern age' in which the thinkers who ought to be philosophers prefer the role of imperial entrepreneurs will have to go through many convulsions before it has got rid of itself, together with the arrogance of its revolt, and found the way back to the dialogue of mankind with its humility".⁶⁷

I might bring his remark nearer our academic home by noting Leo Strauss' related view of contemporary academics as liontamers.⁶⁸ The liontamers and imperial entrepreneurs cannot indefinitely dodge the convulsions of adequate differentiation of consciousness.

To give sufficient meaning to the word "modernity" I would recall the meanings of the classical Latin word "modo", "merely", "just", "directly", and the derived medieval word "modernitas", "present-dayness". I would recall, indeed, the extreme presentmindedness quipped at by Joyce in Ulysses: "sufficient for the day is the newspaper thereof".⁶⁹ What is going forward, I suspect, in a period of fragmented consciousness that I would call modern, is a transition between what Lonergan calls the two times of the temporal subject:

a prior time dominated by a spontaneity found best in compact consciousness, a later time with at least a dominant authority⁷⁰ of the mediation of generalized empirical method.⁷¹ The prior time, too, can be associated with Lonergan's first stage of meaning; the later time with the third stage of meaning. Then one may expect the transition period to be one of fragmentation and specialization of consciousness in opaque forays into the second stage of meaning, with concomitant unlightened displacements of the control of meaning out of historical compactness. Within such forays and displacements is the problematic that invites a mediating integration of hard-won genuineness in the noosphere.⁷²

This middle kingdom of historical reality needs to be mediated to academic subjectivity by something resembling what Jaspers would call Existenz in communication with Existenz.⁷³ It leads to a psychological presence in what I would name the Horizontal Metaxy. Psychological presence in the Vertical and Horizontal Metaxies would be the modern counterpart of the reaching of the Classic experience of reason, as described by Voegelin, towards man as self-appreciatively social and historical wonderment.⁷⁴

Presently, we will relate these reflections, in an enlarged context, to the future both of China and of Christology. But it seems good at this stage to take stock of some fragmented and opaque academic forays in the recent West, lest it appear that there is nothing more here than a new Sumerian King List.

Alfred Eichner, in the preface to a recent book, introduces the issue in current economics with discomfortingly homely realism: "late in the day, after they have had two or three drinks, many economic professors will begin to admit to their own reservations about the theory which forms the core of the economic curriculum. The Theory, they will acknowledge, is at odds with much that is known about the behaviour of economic institutions. 'But what else is there to teach our students?' they will ask".⁷⁵ Nicholas Kaldor looks back in history to locate with remarkable precision where economic theory were wrong. In the Economic Journal of 1972 he writes: "The difficulty with a new start is to pinpoint the critical area where economic theory went astray ... I would put it in the middle of the fourth chapter of Vol. I of The Wealth of Nations ... in (that) chapter, after

discussing the need for money in a social economy, Smith suddenly gets fascinated by the distinction between money, price, real price, and exchange value and from then on, hey presto, his interest gets bogged down in the question of how values and prices for products and factors are determined. One can trace a more or less continuous development of price theory from the subsequent chapters of Smith through Ricardo, Walras, Marshall, right up to Debreau and the most sophisticated present-day Americans".⁷⁶ Leon Walras' economic statics of the 1870's,⁷⁷ influenced by a notion of general equilibrium derived from an engineer,⁷⁸ dominates economic thinking in this past century. Whatever was of value in Marshall and Keynes evaporated in the simplification, the IS/LM analysis, proposed by John Hicks in 1937.⁷⁹ Hicks' view is the backbone of modern textbooks in economics, especially in Canada and the United States.⁸⁰

There is, indeed, another tradition of economic thinkers interested in economic dynamics: one may recall Clement Juglar,⁸¹ Karl Marx,⁸² Wesley Mitchell,⁸³ Joseph Schumpeter,⁸⁴ Michael Kalecki,⁸⁵ Adolph Lowe.⁸⁶ Currently accepted economic dynamics, however, is not related to this tradition: it is, rather, a complex mathematics of fairyland assumptions that calls not for well-behaved people but for well-behaved functions. It has been solidly criticized by Joan Robinson for decades,⁸⁷ but such luminaries as Samuelson and Solow still hold the chair of Moses in a way that will eventually make those who clung to the phlogiston theory two hundred years ago appear open-minded.

I have dealt with the needed transformation of economic theory at some length elsewhere.⁸⁸ Here I can only note its continuity with the present issue of adequate psychological presence in history. The main body of present economic theory is trapped in a conceptualist systematics not uninfluenced by Scotus and locked within a larger Machiavellian axiomatics of successful procedure and within a still larger neglect of the pedagogy of history and of the possibilities of an innovative human future. Adolph Lowe, preoccupied for fifty years with the problem of economic growth, recently produced The Path of Economic Growth, which contains some elements of a concrete economic dynamics, but with a focus on the need for Control⁸⁹ to implement it, a control continuous with the power-structure of the Ecumenic Age. Nor can one foresee

alternate structures of control without the personal transition to luminous microautonomy⁹⁰ to which the historical process modernly invites. Moreover, the powerstructures of truncated modernity ground the practical impossibility of the communal analysis and implementation of Humanomics⁹¹ with its mesh of rhythms of creativity, innovations, take-offs, and dynamic equilibria within the conditioned schemes of recurrence of an emergent probability of standards of human meaning. Negatively speaking, only within the perspective of a subtle appreciation of the self in history can there emerge a clear-eyed critique and dismantling of power, centralization, welfarism, monopolies, paternalism, planning, empire. The total issue is massive in its challenge to the entire academy to rise out of a present necrophilia which systematically cultivates truncation. But it is also massively personal in its elemental invitation to ask with felt scientific seriousness, "Who am I?"

However, broad neglected features of economic dynamics need not rest in obscurity even for truncated subjects, and so I am led to a homely illustration. Envisage, then, an isolated island community, with a non-horsepower technology. Envisage some sub-group grasping the innovative idea of the plough, with horse, oxen, whatever. Insofar as the sub-group carries the community towards the realization of a plough culture, there occur definite fluctuations in the exchange economy (inclusive of banking, etc.) of the island. The fluctuations are associated with the fact that, for a period, energy and money are being devoted to the carpentry, tannery, horse-training, etc., which is to make concretely possible the plough culture. What is evident is that the community is building towards a period of higher consumption, greater leisure. Less evident are the fluctuations in the flow of finance on the island required to make the innovation possible and eventually to make increased consumption a reality. But, clearly, one may note an initial period of reorientation of present resources preparatory to the emergence of a new aggregate of capital ventures associated with horse-ploughing; there is a following period when production of horse-ploughs is underway, accelerating, gradually levelling to the demands of maintenance and replacement; there is the later period when the benefits emerge in consumption goods and better times.

Of course, this rhythm of evolution internal to the productive process calls for human adaptation, ideally human adaptation grounded in microautonomy, educated to an unusual perspective on what constitutes success.⁹² The human adaptation can be lacking: the sub-group may want the Linus blanket of extra money mistakenly called profit. They may add woodworms to the plough; they may advertise the myth of the necessity of a new plough every year; they may turn to persuading neighbouring islands of fruit-gatherers that they too need ploughs; they may find ways to benefit from taxes imposed on origin or destination principles; they may eventually have the fruit-gatherers making cheaper ploughs; and so on. More profoundly evil, they may generate an economic theory which gives their mistaken notions of profit and success an axiomatic status.

I have been drawing attention here to rhythms of economic progress within the larger passion of a history governed from below by an emergent probability of complex schemes of meaning and from above by the dynamics of Absolute Transcendence. Let me turn now briefly to human inquiry into other rhythms, those of music. I do not wish to speak directly of music, although I would note in passing its present importance. Especially true of it is what Lonergan once expressed in a talk on art in a seminar on education: "What I want to communicate in this talk on art is the notion that art is relevant to concrete living, that it is extremely important in our age when philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on economics, politics and education have been trying to remake man and have done not a little to make human life unlivable".⁹³

I wish here only to indicate summarily a previous treatment of the need to move scientifically from truncation in the field of musicology if that field is to rise out of its present confusion.

Writing in the journal Perspectives of New Music, David Levin remarks: "What is needed to clear the air is first an exposition of the nature of and relations among theory, analysis and criticism, then secondly, an examination of the pertinence of all this to compositional procedure".⁹⁴ The journal I have just quoted from is typical of the confused searchings and incomprehensions of contemporary

musicology. In another volume, in an article entitled "Some Current Terms", Ernest Krenek writes of his failure to penetrate the meaning of an essay by Babbitt on "Twelve-tone invariants" and says, "I am afraid that the use of this language in Perspective has reached a point of diminishing returns: the possible increment of scholarly prestige (not to speak of snob appeal) is compensated by the loss of communicability".⁹⁵

Again, Alan P. Merriam points to the need, in the field of ethnomusicology, to "revise our own thinking"⁹⁶ if the apparent gap between anthropology and musicology is to be bridged, and elsewhere he touches on the deeper question: "It is clear that only through the fusion of these aspects of knowledge, and probably in single individuals, that the problem will be solved. If this is the case, and if the fusion is the goal, are not the problems insurmountable? Is there any hope of putting together the humanities and the social sciences, areas of study which are considered poles apart? Is there any means of treating the social sciences humanistically, or the humanities in terms of social science?".⁹⁷

Illustration of confusion and conflict could be multiplied indefinitely, in compositional theory, in music history, in criticism. But the core issue throughout is the issue of procedure. If one has no foundational appreciation of what it is to compose, to do history, to adequately appreciate, then one is allowing a central opaqueness to persist in one's enterprise. It is the same opaqueness which makes most interdisciplinary work a nominalist endeavour. It is the central opaqueness whose root is truncation. The neglected musical subject does not know himself; the truncated musical subject not only does not know himself but does not know that the musical subject is unknown.

Still, the crises and disorientations here, as in economics, have the positive aspect of inviting the blossoming of music and musicology in the third stage of meaning. Pierre Boulez, in an article in which he asks the Sonata to tell him what it wants from him, draws on the self-reading oddity of Mallarmé and Joyce, and seems to grope towards a glimpse of such a transition when he writes, regarding Finnegans Wake: "It is not only that the way the story is told has

been upset, but also that the novel, if one dares to put it this way, observes itself as a novel, reflects on its own image, becomes aware that it is a novel; and this results in a logic and cohesion of this technique that is constantly on the alert, creating new universes. It is in this way that music, as I see it, is not destined solely to 'express' but must become aware of itself, become an object of its own reflection".⁹⁸ If art is normatively the objectification of metaxically-released experiential patterning, then third-stage meaning art will reach for metaxic echoes of luminous subjectivity beyond present fantasy. Joyce's episode in Ulysses, entitled "Oxen of the Sun", symbolizes the reality of our immaturity as human in its movement through the history of English to end with a babel and a birth: in some profound sense we have not yet begun to speak.⁹⁹

I have already indicated a grounding in subjectivity of a criticism of economics, and now an apparently quite different field of music criticism has been touched on. But the profoundly discomfiting feature of these issues in our times is that they must merge in a total concrete dialectic if any one of them is to be adequate, and that dialectic is integrally theological and philosophical.

Churchmen and theologians find this an inconvenience, for it seems legitimate, and certainly it is easier, to criticise and advise on the basis of vague moral and religious principles. Again, philosophers of science regularly prefer to criticise science in abstraction from science. And so, Margaret Masterman, in a volume entitled Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, rightly remarks: "the one thing working scientists are not going to do is to change their ways of thinking because they have Popper and Feyerabend pontificating at them like eighteenth century divines; particularly as both Popper and Feyerabend normally pontificate at even more than eighteenth century length".¹⁰¹ Again, aesthetic criticism tends to be specialist, sometimes moreover with such a degree of detachment as to exclude the relevant aesthetic experience. So, perhaps, it is not without grounds that an Irish playwright remarked when asked what he thought of critics, "does a lamppost like dogs?".

More seriously, in a recent essay entitled "Fear and Trembling at Yale", the Chairman of Northwestern's English Department, took to task the Yale critics with some quotably spicy words: "Most of us do not associate the practice of academic literary criticism with intense suffering. We think of the professor-critic as a man reasonably well paid for a life of teaching ... writing ... going on sabbaticals, drinking Chivas Regal etc., etc ... But we have little idea of the pain and anxiety, the risk and torment that the serious literary critic has to live with. Some of these critics themselves feel that reading ranks in risk and danger with race-car driving or airplane hijacking".¹⁰²

However, I would note that literary criticism in recent decades is rich in drawing attention to a need for fundamental reorientation. So, Crane's Chicago School pushes for methodological reflection, the Geneva School draws attention to the centrality of consciousness, and Paul de Man indicates the basic need in his book Blindness and Insight: "From the start, we have at least four possible and distinct types of self: the self that judges, the self that reads, the self that writes, the self that reads itself. The question of finding the common level on which all these selves meet and thus of establishing the unity of a literary consciousness stands at the beginning of the main methodological difficulties that plague literary studies".¹⁰³

I would like now briefly to illustrate that problem of the self that reads itself by drawing attention to a particular instance of literary study, the study of Flaubert's Emma Bovary.

Eric Auerback in his study of Bovary concentrates on the key paragraph where Emma and Charles are at table and "... all the bitterness of life seemed to be served to her on her plate". Of this latter phrase Auerback remarks, "Flaubert does nothing but bestow the power of mature expression upon the material which she affords, in its complete subjectivity".¹⁰⁴ But what does Auerback mean by Emma's complete subjectivity? George Poulet finds Auerback "not completely satisfactory", and tackles the same paragraph with a metaphorical notion of consciousness as concentric circles unifying interior distance. Neither critic is adequately reading the self. Neither

critic is taking with sufficient seriousness Flaubert's statement: "La Bovary, c'est moi". Without serious self-attention the structure of Emma's consciousness remains opaque. Emma's consciousness, unrevealed to her, but spontaneously operative, was an immanent structured reach for "her dreams dropping in the mud",¹⁰⁶ for the fragrance of the eau-de-cologne that Bovary Senior used up at the Christening,¹⁰⁷ for the "I understand",¹⁰⁸ however, mistaken, in relation to Rudolfe, for the twisted truth reached when "She knew now the littleness of those passions that art exaggerates",¹⁰⁹ for the clouded value imprinted in those late words to Charles, "You are a good man".¹¹⁰

Finally, however, the challenge of this paper and of modernity is not to discuss Emma Bovary's consciousness but to discover our own by a slow discomfoting process which might be characterized by Camus' statement "It takes ten years to get an idea".

Such a slow discomfoting process is as remote from fashionable consciousness-raising, or nominalist Lonerganism, as turning on a light is from inquiry into the self-energy of the electron. It is a shift into a third stage of meaning and authority and control that is beyond present fantasy.¹¹¹ It is a shift that is especially blocked by an academic culture which tolerates the systematic exclusion by the human sciences and their educational offshoots of scientific interest in the conscious questing self, so that a substantial academic contribution to present deranged schemes of living is made by those, to use Voegelin's words, who "aggressively claim for their mental disease the status of mental health",¹¹² and who maintain a distinction of human studies from physics or chemistry only by smuggling across the borders of their apparently objective method inadequate descriptions of their own data of consciousness.

Voegelin is modestly optimistic when he remarks: "Man cannot live by perversion alone. Parallel with the culmination of the grotesque in Hitler, Stalin, and the orgy of the 'liberation rabble' after the Second World War, there has also grown the awareness of its pathological character.

In the nineteenth century, it is true, Schelling had already coined the term 'pneumopathology' when he had to deal with the Progressivism of his time, but until

quite recently it would have been impractical to treat the 'opinions' which dominate the public scene as psychopathological phenomena ... It would not be surprizing if sooner or later psychologists and social scientists were to find out about the classic analysis of noetic existence as the proper theoretic basis for the psychopathology of the 'age'.¹¹³

But with a profoundly disoriented political, economic, military and academic establishment short-term optimism is unfounded. What prevails is Maslow's statistic "less than 1% of adults grow",¹¹⁴ so that we will come into the twenty-first century without Elders of authority to oppose the neurotic elders of Global Reach. Maslow's disciple, A. R. Aresteh, has remarked: "Unless the psychologist has himself experienced the state of quest for final integration in the succession of identities he will hardly acquire an understanding or incentive for doing research on it".¹¹⁵ The quite different dynamic of personal development needed can only emerge with the shift from the sparkle of public power to the preciousness of private authority, a shift requiring a recklessness so well focussed by W. B. Yeats: "Why should we honor those who die in battle? A man can show as reckless a courage entering into the abyss of himself".¹¹⁶

PART TWO

"Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom"¹¹⁷

"He tore the flower gravely from its pinhold smelt its almost no smell and placed it in his heart pocket. Language of flowers. They like it because no-one can hear".¹¹⁸

In 1864, Li Hung-chang addressed a memorial to Prince Kung in Peking, of which the central message was "We should create a special branch of the mandarinat".¹¹⁹ What was at issue was the opening of Chinese traditional education to Western technical, military, legal and political structures. The century since has been, in the main, a dialectic and superficial absorption of European varieties of truncated development. In 1964

the Chinese disciples of Marx could write of the drive towards full Communism: "Success requires anywhere from one to several centuries. On the question of duration, it is better to prepare for a longer rather than a shorter period of time. On the question of effort, it is better to regard the task as difficult rather than easy".¹²⁰ In the same year, a quite different manifesto appeared in Rome, De Deo Trino and De Verbo Incarnato, pinpointing the two times of the temporal subject and locating the autonomy of that subject radically beyond the power of the party, the planner, the profit-seeker, in the Vertical Metaxy: "subordinata quidem est autonomia conscientiae humanae, non tamen omnibus et quibuscumque objectis, sed subjecto infinito ad cuius imaginem facto est et quod imitari tenetur".¹²¹ Not Control within transient empire but microautonomy within historical Mystery is the normative reality of humanity.

I have raised the issue of new mandarins, Foundations persons, before, and the present discussion is continuous with those previous searchings.¹²² The Foundations person is one who strives to climb the mountain to elderhood named on pages 286-91 of Method in Theology. That striving involves the crossing of bridges.¹²³ In particular, there is the bridge of Imps, inviting the Sargawit, the Foundations person, and mediately every theologian and academic - since these are normatively committed to the movement of life within the general categories - to an envisagement of Total Process. "Only when and where the higher rational culture emerged did God acknowledge the fullness of time, permitting the Word to become flesh and the mystical body to begin its intussusception of human personalities and its leavening of history".¹²⁴ The present concern is to enlarge the challenge of the bridge of Imps, the challenge to envisage with heuristic adequacy the possible, probable and actual seriations of intussusception on the global scale. "Theologians, let alone parents, rarely think of the historical process",¹²⁵ and so an invitation to so think may be an "unwelcome message. Foundations persons are mischievous, trouble-makers. They 'make conversions a topic': or bridges. But they may also appeal to the archaic meanings of the word 'imp': to implant, graft; to repair; to furnish with wings. This bridge cannot surely be too far if its grafting into the vortex of method could furnish with wings the task of transforming the global network of neurotic

aggressions and greeds with larger novel patterns of kindness and success and hope".¹²⁶

One undoubtedly has to flex one's molecules and mind to envisage within emergent probability the disappearance of the dinosaurs 65,000,000 years ago and the demise of the American Empire's centralized business and government.¹²⁷ One requires, for instance, a shift in geographical and historical perspective. "The habitable dry land surface of the biosphere consists of a single continent, Asia, together with its peninsulas and off-shore islands ... The three largest of Asia's off-shore islands are Africa and the two Americas".¹²⁸ Again, "the temptation to hypostatize historically passing societies into ultimate subjects of history is strongly motivated. At its core lies the tension, emotionally difficult to bear, between the meaning a society has in historical existence and the never quite repressible knowledge that all things that come into being will come to an end. A society, one might say, has always two histories: (I) the history internal to its existence and (II) the history in which it comes into and goes out of existence. History I is greatly cherished by the members of a society; History II encounters emotional resistance and preferably should not be mentioned".¹²⁹

Voegelin's volume, The Ecumenic Age, raises magnificently the issues of History II, and in his concluding chapters he moves through a consideration of the Chinese Ecumene to a reflection on the problem of Universal Humanity. He is at present working on a fifth volume of Order and History. In this short essay I can make no attempt at summary presentation: I can only assume either that the challenge of Voegelin's volumes has been taken, or that the concern for general and special categories expressed here will lead the reader to undertake it. What I seek immediately is to give pointers towards the sublation of Voegelin's work into the larger heuristic of what I have called elsewhere an adequate Praxisweltanschauung. For that Praxisweltanschauung, the skeletal structure of whose eight-fold way is generalized emergent probability, it is not true that "a plurality of ecumenes presents formidable problems to a philosophy of history".¹³⁰ The empire of the t'ien-hsia belongs

to probable seriations, and is evidently actual.

Voegelin contrasts the completeness of the Hebrew-Christian pneumatic breakthrough and the noetic breakthrough of the Greek tradition with the incompleteness of the Chinese breakthrough into the fundamental tension-in-existence. The contrast is legitimate but refinements are in order. I will first make some points regarding the Western tradition before turning to possibilities and probabilities within the Chinese tradition in the context of a noetic Trinitarian theology.

If Voegelin breathes Lavoisier's oxygen into Hegel's upsidedown phlogiston history, then Lonergan stands as Mendeleev. Recall the issues raised in Part One of this essay: Butterfield's comments on the scientific revolution; the genesis in these early days of science of the problematic of the opaquely proceeding subject invited by science to ask the meaning of "what" and "is" and of the total self proceeding modernly; the pointers in modernity to the grounds in self of an eight-fold "interpretative reconstruction of the constructions of the human spirit";¹³¹ the question of the mediation of the passing of the middle kingdom of modernity through the luminous abyss of neuro-aspirative self-appropriation. Such issues find heuristic system within an open foundational space-time tabulation of differentiations of consciousness. Voegelin does not live noetically within that heuristic system, but manifests his greatness in the shift of elder perspective of his fourth volume, a shift involving a recognition of differentiations of consciousness.

Later I will have something to say about the psychopathology of common-sense eclecticism, drawing on Voegelin and Lonergan. However, prior to further comment on elements of an adequate heuristic, it would be well to raise briefly the question of living noetically and incarnately within that heuristic system.

Just as a first-year chemistry student can learn to name and order the hundred odd elements using Mendeleev's system, so a year's reading of Method in Theology can leave one comfortable in naming four levels of consciousness, thirty-one generic types of differentiation of consciousness, eight more

subtle differentiations underpinning functional specialization, and so on. But can the first year chemist present pedagogically the relativistic quantum analysis of the spectrum of hydrogen? Is the budding dialectician capable of talking with any precision of the ordered aggregate of books anticipated by page 250 of Method in Theology? The parallel is telling but it does not bring out the deeper human and cultural difficulty: a few more years will leave the brighter chemist capable of teaching recent understandings of chemical realities, but "being at home in transcendental method"¹³² seems a task for elders of a later age. And even what may appear to be initial steps in that task generally take more than a few years for the brightest.

I wish now to turn to such initial steps of the task in relation to a central topic of Voegelin, the tension-in-existence mediated by noetic and pneumatic differentiations of consciousness. My purpose is to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, though my suggestions, if taken up seriously, will prove exhausting.

Voegelin returns to these illuminating events of the Hebrew-Christian and Greek traditions in his concluding chapter, where he again raises the issue of Absolute Epoch or Axis-time: "The 'absolute epoch', understood as the events in which reality becomes luminous to itself as a process of transfiguration, is indeed the central issue in the philosophy of history".¹³³ I have already qualified the notion of axial time by introducing the empirically-plausible notion of a horizontal metaxy. Further qualifications are now in order. First of all, the core source of tension-in-existence in material finitude is the presence of the dynamism of mind. Secondly, the central issue in a philosophy of history is the ongoing discovery and incarnation of mind. That ongoing revelation and molecularization of intelligible processions and their source is what underpins the variety of differentiations of consciousness with their mediation of the movement both towards the eccentric emergence of Foundations persons uncomfortably at home in increasingly refined ranges of schemes of modern existential tensions and towards the later genesis of adequately reflective elder communities of third stage meaning grounding integrity in lesser differentiated consciousnesses. The flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence

in which the cultured modern lives, can include any or many of a variety of dialectically and genetically related existential tensions relevant to personal and communal growth, and Voegelin's "tension-in-existence" can be considered a generic description calling for a genetical-dialectic systematics of such modern tensions.

A present envisagement of such a systematics would seem to require fantasy, since the systematics would sublimate, on the skeleton of the general categorial explanatory structure of emergent probability, both the history of psychology and the psychology of history, and include not only the subject's own growth, but the growth of the subject's own view of personal and historic growth in the measure of the differentiations of the subject and history. The challenge of such a future systematics is towards integral detached personal search into a search for psychic wholeness and for an ever-larger but never adequate psychic presence in history. Never adequate, and perhaps sensed as such: for there is a bridge of Straws; yet ever gently open to surprising growth in meaning and meaning history: for there is a bridge of Oxen, genetic in fantasy of a grounded Futurist Manifesto which bone-wisely but darkly acknowledges that one's molecules resonate in the symphony of history. It results in the enlarged humility within history of which Voegelin writes, and it turns academic power into academic authority, reversing the delusions which Leo Strauss identified: "The facile delusions which conceal from us our true situation all amount to this: that we are, or can be, wiser than the wisest men of our past. We are thus induced to play the part, not of attentive and docile listeners, but of impressarios or lion-tamers".¹³⁴ One is invited to a post-modern movement of life in integral heuristic attention to nature, man and God, for "man is nature's priest and nature is God's silent communing with man".¹³⁵

I wish shortly to consider in strategic order four basic tensions-in-existence and three related psychopathologies. Before doing so, however, an enlarged impression of the varieties of tension-in-existence may invite in the reader a more vibrant response to the concreteness of the personal challenge.

So, there is the tension-in-existence, in developed

or incipient form, which may be called mystical. It is normally genetic of other tensions: "There's the effort to say what's happening, to find out what's happening: 'Am I going nuts?'. People with that experience are profoundly disturbed and they can be very apprehensive".¹³⁶ The secondary tension can be aesthetic or dramatic, but with a noetic core. That core noetic tension can lead contemporarily to issues of transcultural interiority, as in William Johnston's The Inner Eye of Love.¹³⁷ In an earlier culture it reached for a theoretic theology, as in St. Theresa of Avila's preference for a learned rather than a pious director. In a simpler culture, the incarnate noetic drive may blossom in telling metaphor: so, Dame Julian of Norwich could claim, "He shewed me a little thing the size of a hazel nut, in the palm of my hand, and it was round as a ball. It is all that is made. It lasteth for ever and ever shall, because God made it: God loveth it: God keepeth it". But the blossoming may remain, especially in community, in the silence of enlivened repetition, so that They Speak By Silences.¹³⁸ It may have the primitive expression of Akhenator (14th century B.C.) or of a communal compact consciousness' magic circle dance.¹³⁹

This tension-in-existence of mysticism is one to which the Sargawit, the Foundations person, must be open and may be invited, for the Sargawit seeks to see, or be shewed "all that is made", "a little thing the size of a hazel nut in the palm of my hand". But it is incommunicably beyond the stuff of Foundations.

While I have already raised the issue of aesthetics in the third stage of meaning with regard to music and literature, it seems worthwhile, in this more complex context, to make some suggestive comments on the tension-in-existence of modern sculpting and modern dance.

Henry Moore's words magnificently anticipate the challenge of sculpting in the third stage of meaning: the sculptor "gets the solid shape, as it were, inside his head - he thinks of it, whatever its size, as if he were holding it completely enclosed in the hollow of his hand ... he identifies himself with its centre of gravity, its mass, its weight".¹⁴⁰ One may note an echo of Aristotle's "sense in act is the sensible in act",¹⁴¹ and further add the context of

Insight, chapter 8. For the sculptor of the third stage of meaning, the real statue is not already-out-there. The symbolic presence within subjectivity is appropriated within interiority and mediated by that appropriation. Just as the Foundations persons, Jack and Jill, become differently present to one another, so too does Jill's statue for Jack: or Jill's dance.

Susanne Langer stresses the fundamental nature of dance as an art of movement or power: moreover, "the dance often reaches the zenith of its development in the primitive stage of a culture when other arts are just dawning on its ethnic horizon".¹⁴² Later, in her discussion of primitive dance, she remarks on "the great trauma that Western civilization has of necessity inflicted on all the arts - secularization".¹⁴³

The emergence of a third stage of meaning with its mediation of integral subjectivity places issues concerning Sacred and Profane in a new context, and one may be led to ask in what sense the dance is secular. Of Nijinsky's famous leap in Le Spectre de la Rose Jean Cocteau wrote: "He evaporates through the window in a jump so poignant, so contrary to all the laws of flight and balance, following so high and curved a trajectory, that I shall never again smell a rose without this ineffaceable phantom appearing before me".¹⁴⁴ Dame Marie Rambert expressed herself more simply: "I don't know how far from the ground it was, but I know it was near the stars".¹⁴⁵

In what sense was Nijinsky's leap a leap in being? Certainly it was not a leap in non-being, and one might say that it was a profane leap only by abstraction. In the conclusion of his work, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, Mircea Eliade noted that "in the presence of any tree, symbol of the world tree and image of cosmic life, a man of the premodern societies can attain to the highest spirituality, for, by understanding the symbol, he succeeds in living the universal".¹⁴⁶ Refined modern sensibility can still echo such premodern response to a tree, dance, sculpting. So, the dance critic Marcia Siegel could write of a performance of Drumming by Laura Dean's dancers: "With my western eyes and my lingering Romantic need to comprehend everything, I often wished there were less going on in Drumming."

But there came one moment of transcendence, when, during the second - marimba - section of the music, Dean abandoned rhythmic compliance altogether. Listening, perhaps, to a sustained ringing created by overtones in the percussive sound, the dancers spun in different tempos, in two concentric orbits around Dean. As they whirled and lifted their faces and palms to the resonating space above them, I thought of some great celestial orchestra made up of vibrations, energies, a universal pulse, not any single artist's tune at all".¹⁴⁷ But, as Eliade would have it, the rule is other, the community of modern man is doubly fallen: after the first fall religious sense remained with fragmented consciousness and secularization; in the second fall, within truncated consciousness and secularism, religious sense is forgotten, hidden, clamouring in the unconscious.¹⁴⁸ To recall a significant title, there is now The Empty Space.¹⁴⁹ We may have Happenings, in art or in liturgy, but they cannot systematically get beyond a primal scream. "A holy theatre not only presents the invisible but also offers conditions that make its perception possible. The Happening could be related to all of this, but the present inadequacy of the Happening is that it refuses to examine deeply the problem of perception. Naively it believes that the cry 'Wake up!' is enough, that the call 'Live!' brings life. Of course more is needed, but what?".¹⁵⁰ Elsewhere Brooke notes, "... if we pretend there is such a source readily at hand we will go on cheating ourselves with rotten imitations. If we recognize how desperately far we have drifted from anything to do with a holy theatre we can begin to discard once and for all the dream that a fine theatre could return in a thrice if only a few nice people tried harder".¹⁵¹

Brooke notes some eccentric moderns with a sacred aim: Merce Cunningham, Samuel Beckett, Jerzy Grotowski; "the invisible made visible is of sacred nature, and as he dances Merce Cunningham strives for a holy art".¹⁵² Certainly it is true that since the 1890's in St. Petersburg and the innovations of Duncan, Fuller and St. Denis in America at the same time, modern dance has moved towards non-representation, towards subjectivity, even towards the symbolization of the shift from Control to microautonomy. The Rise and Fall and Rise of Modern Dance¹⁵³ are only oscillations above the deeper issue of the crippled

infrastructure of modernity. "By the social infrastructure is meant simple prolongations of prehuman achievement ... What once I described as intersubjective community, may be identified, I believe, with the infrastructure of some sociologists. It is any set of social arrangements that goes beyond prehuman attainment but does so with a maximum of obviousness, directness, simplicity".¹⁵⁴ So we are led, like Twyla Tharp,¹⁵⁵ out of the prescribed space of the dance into everyday space, from aesthetic tension to everyman's madness.

So: Here Comes Everybody!¹⁵⁶ There is the daily tension-in-existence of each Penelope and Ulysses in the modern grotesque chapter of the Illiad of history, Bloomsdames and Finnegans Knights, plastic-cased seeds of speaking, touching, embracing, cast with hourly news that chokes aspiring lungs. Subway walls in the Jungle of Cities clutch the train, so that business eyes narrow beyond recognizing the woman opposite or the man within: "Theodora heard the difference between doing and being. The corn could not help itself. It was. But the man scabbled on the surface of life, working himself into a lather of perspiration under his laundered shirt ... The man said that the population of Chicago had risen from 2,701,705 in 1920 to 3,376,438 in 1930. The population was being raised all the time. But in Chicago also, Theodora had seen the nun who danced along the sidewalk, unconsciously, for joy, and the unnatural natural face of the dancing nun had sung some song she had just remembered. The nun's feet touched grass. So that Theodora smiled now. And the man in the perfect shirt was encouraged. He leaned forward to tell the population of Kansas City, St. Louis, Buffalo, and Detroit".¹⁵⁷

Marinetti, multinationals, military academies and MBA's move to "convert everything private and fugitive and driven in Nietzscheanism into the hearty noonday bustle of optimistic Milanese enterprize",¹⁵⁸ so that Dinosaurs with small truncated heads crib the core private fugitive drive of Everybody in the hearty biophobic bustle of university, hospital, government, business, war: all the structures of laws and profits. Each Hua or Bloom, Leopold or Molly, an ocean of survival, can stay seed-strangled, and still be thin-Tao-tunneled to Eternity. But the seed may take the white apocalyptic name as a beckoning: Bloom, A Hundred Flowers Bloom! Then refining splits

- ego, shadow, persona, anima - or more delicate multiplicities, are admitted as rites of passage.¹⁵⁹ The tension is admitted into total consciousness, so that anima may breath shadowed bedwords leading to Yes-saying,¹⁶⁰ the daybreak of ego and persona may close in the strategic solitude of a bath,¹⁶¹ and doubly-fallen Finnegan may be waked, regressed,¹⁶² redressed, to rise to larger living.

How large? The question of course is yours and mine. The beckoning may well lead to view with larger heart "distress of nations and perplexity whether on the shores of Asia, or in the Edgeware Road".¹⁶³ The largeness may be that of Mother Theresa. But if the largeness aspires to being academic in a contemporarily normative sense then - and this is the central issue of the paper - the four tensions-in-existence to be named shortly must be faced in personal discomfort. The issue is that of "the use of the general categories" as normative in functional specialization. How else is one to view adequately the present 600,000,000 stephens and stephanies under thirty, and the many more to come, in The Central Flower People's Republic, lacking a hundred foundation Blooms? How else can one tear that Chung-hua, that Central Flower, from the penhold of power and nominalism, if not by placing that flower in heuristic heart pocket, to hear the hidden language of those blooms?

I have been trying to give some impression of three human tensions that are both transcultural and available to common sense.¹⁶⁴ The four tensions-in-existence to be considered immediately, however, are all beyond the horizon of common sense: indeed they are tensions that I would relate¹⁶⁵ to the pursuit of generalized empirical method.

There is the tension-in-existence mediated by the epiphany, through theoretic answers, of the what-question: mediated to Plato by geometry, mediated to the contemporary thinker, if he seriously reverences history as revelation, by the centuries of science since Galileo. It grounds with present adequacy the second tension.

The second tension-in-existence is that mediated by the epiphany of the is-question in the appropriation of the meaning of its answers; mediated to Aquinas by the incomplete position of Aristotle and the facticity of the Incarnation; mediated to Lonergan

by Aquinas and the first tension. It is a prerequisite for the third tension. The focal expression of that tension occurs in Insight, 388, but it has enlargements in the tension of mere facticity,¹⁶⁶ in the tension of the mystery of Is,¹⁶⁷ in the tension of the mystery of evil.¹⁶⁸

The third tension-in-existence is mediated by the intussusception of other tensions into total consciousness, into nerves and bones and molecules. It is a third-stage-meaning tension that has preoccupied Robert Doran during the past decade.¹⁶⁹

The fourth tension-in-existence is that of Praxisweltanschauung in the fivefold differentiated consciousness of the Sargawit. Clearly, its genesis and mediation are our present concern. It is a liberation of the Question that Voegelin discusses in his final chapter, and it escapes his criticism of doctrinal positions in being metadoctrinal. Central to its reality in the subject are the precised darkneses of nescience and mystery. HCE needs a story, an Odyssey within an Illiad, but the Foundations person's story normatively stretches flesh round a noetic possession of the heuristics of Total Process. The adequacy of future stories for everyman, bushman, chinaman, depends on the fidelity of a theological community to the intussusception of that Weltanschauung in their contribution to the emergence of an adequate genetical-dialectic systematics, a mark of the latter's adequacy being its incommunicability to common sense. From that systematic transposition of history, telling in remote vision stories of stories "better than it was", communications specialists would labour to select elements, symbols, stories, that would mesh, in dynamic gentleness, with cultures, communities, media.

Just as Voegelin's treatment of tension-in-existence calls for more adequate differentiations so does his identification of pathologies require enlargement through the heuristic specifications made possible by generalized empirical method. The topic is enormous, but some suggestions may enlarge perspective on both pathology and therapy.

A full heuristic consideration of tension and pathology would require the understanding of man, mediated by modern science, sublated by procedural analysis, as a

six-levelled hierarchy¹⁷⁰ symbolically named

$$f(p_i, c_j, b_k, z_l, u_m, r_n),$$

where each of the variables denotes a level of conjugate forms, and the coincidental acts of one level (e.g., the level of physics, p_i : i ranges over the properties of fundamental particles and multiparticles) are aggregatively¹⁷¹ related to the level above (e.g., chemical, c_j : j ranges over the periodic table relations, inclusive of the compound molecules that occur in chromosome, muscle and brain structures). Substructures (organs of digestion, of seeing etc.) can be similarly specified.¹⁷² The level of wonder, u_m , has the familiar complexity of levels of consciousness as well as the openness to the supernatural of r_n . Such a heuristic structure is a necessity for serious interdisciplinary efforts to adequately specify, for example, claustrophobia, chemotherapies, biorhythms, thirst,¹⁷³ psychoneuroses, insight, serenity, mysticism.¹⁷⁴ This interdisciplinary collaboration belongs to the future, but some suggestive comments on the three main pathologies that Voegelin touches on may throw further light on the enterprise.

Voegelin's main concern is with the withdrawal from the reality of the Vertical Metaxy, but two related pathologies emerge: the scared non-knower can cloak that state in nominalist rationalism or in mere power.¹⁷⁵ So, the noetic tension is expressed by Plato or Aristotle, the challenge is dodged, but the names become a Greek tradition. Again, "the principle of force, represented by Kuo swallows up the ecumene and its order. The foundation of the empire can be defined, therefore, in Chinese terms, as the victory of the Kuo over the t'ien-hsia: the empire was an inflated Kuo without spiritual legitimacy".¹⁷⁶ And in the West, long before Machiavelli, the terms Praxis and pragmatic history, received their technical meaning from Polybius:¹⁷⁷ "the attempts at ordering society by the truth of existence, be it the revealed love of God or the philosopher's love of wisdom, appeared to have come to their end".¹⁷⁸

Voegelin's suggestions admit sublation into the heuristics of the transcendental dynamisms of the human spirit in their privations by atheism, common sense eclecticism and power seeking.

Heuristically, atheism is a complex pathology involving

unstable or closed¹⁷⁹ integrations of the various levels of human intentionality. Clues to its transcendental varieties can be found in Lonergan's reflections on the tones of aesthetic consciousness,¹⁸⁰ on the genesis of scotosis,¹⁸¹ on the manners in which the question of God arises,¹⁸² manners, then, in which the question can be locked. Atheism can be as elemental as the spontaneous adulthood rejection of early guilt. It can be as precise as a philosophic failure to come to grips with the experience of is-saying. It can be as subtle as the elder Jung's move past the anagogic in a dream that called for a different Answer to Job.¹⁸³ It can be as evil as the emphatic moral and religious normality of a righteous persona cloaking an egophanic core. It can be as pathetic as the response of human ordinariness to such righteousness. Many of its varieties are taken as sanity in the Horizontal Metaxy, and so I would note in conclusion that the issue here is not the relative authenticity or the cultural viability of atheists: there are many relatively authentic people, some locked up, some at large, who are lunatic. The issue is the specification of a predominant lunacy of the Horizontal Metaxy.¹⁸⁴

Like atheism, common-sense eclecticism is a complex pneumopathology, but its central sickness is the avoidance and obscuring of the conversion to serious understanding. Socrates' discomfiting challenge is echoed by the remark of Samuel Beckett, "I think anyone nowadays who pays the slightest attention to his own experience finds it the experience of a non-knower".¹⁸⁵ Common-sense eclecticism is a disease both of theology and of Marxism. In response to the threat of larger horizons, such as are required by a contemporary elitist Foundations or Systematics,¹⁸⁶ it can be belittlingly hostile,¹⁸⁷ or passionate, or ice-cold.¹⁸⁸ It breeds most comfortably in a scholarship of post-systematic meaning where it criticizes, corrects, or "lauds the great men of the past":¹⁸⁹ Lenin or Leo I. Through the gap "between an understanding of verbal usage and an understanding of what names denote"¹⁹⁰ it can march "with an air of profundity".¹⁹¹ It stands for "sound judgment",¹⁹² regularly with emphatic normality. It is too busy with the flow of current opinion "to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view".¹⁹³ And, while common sense would wish to do the world's work, common-sense eclecticism would guarantee that the work

be done badly.

It is perhaps necessary to note that the previous paragraph has only the appearance of common sense. It points, in fact, to a heuristic sublation of common-sense eclecticism continuous with Lonergan's discussion of common sense: "while common sense relates things to us, our account of common sense relates it to its neural basis and related aggregates and successions of instances of common sense to one another".¹⁹⁴

Finally, there is need for an explanatory and therapeutic heuristics of the lunacy of mere power. It is a predominant lunacy of the Horizontal Metaxy, with its focus in a sickness of the dynamic of responsibility. It can have religious and theoretic trappings, but in its more vigorous forms - as in Mao Tse-tung's politics - it is supported "from above" by the lunacy of atheism and "from below" by common-sense eclecticism. And, as Karen Horney's book, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, would suggest, it can have further dynamic components from below due to early disorientation of feeling. From a therapeutic heuristics, meshed into formal and informal education, one would hope for a discontinuous shift in its statistical disorientations in the third stage of meaning, so that what the eccentric Mo Ti marvelled at in Plato's day might become a marvel of common meaning: that a man who steals a pig is universally condemned and generally punished, while a man who invades and appropriates a kingdom is a hero to his people and a model to posterity.¹⁹⁵ That shift in common meaning would be a shift in power, for "the carrier of power is the community",¹⁹⁶ and in so far as the shift springs from the transcendental dynamisms, the shift is authentic, and there is progress. "Authenticity makes power legitimate. It confers on power the aura and prestige of authority. Unauthenticity leaves power naked. It reveals power as mere power".¹⁹⁷ The adequate therapeutic heuristics of power and authority lie in the future: Lonergan's short article, in the context of his foundational efforts, invites that future work.

We have been placing Voegelin's work in the larger context of Lonergan's Foundations, and perhaps some light has been thrown on aspects of those Foundations. So, for example, "the longer cycle of decline"¹⁹⁸ may

take on larger meaning when it is associated with the fragmentations of compact consciousness and the dynamics of the Horizontal Metaxy. One final enlargement remains which the reader may usefully relate to the problem of specifying Cosmopolis.¹⁹⁹ The specification carries us beyond the general categories to the special categories of Christian Theology. My present interest is in the systematics mediated by Lonergan's general and special categories. The collaborative functional specialist effort required to generate the genetical-dialectic systematics that would include, as one recent stage in man's noetic reach for the Mystery of God, Lonergan's 1957-64 writings on the subject, is in the future. I turn then to the systematics of the ongoing discovery of mind and Mind, not in the genetic fullness that transposes the historic search,²⁰⁰ but in the richness of the operative component that has emerged in our time. I began part two by noting the two apparently unconnected challenges of 1964, Lonergan's and Chinese Communism's, and I will link them shortly. Lonergan's challenge, it seems to me, has scarcely been noticed. The issue is the subjectivity of God, and the reality of history as absolutely²⁰¹ participative in that conscious fellowship. Or, as Lonergan notes "the issue may be put differently. One can ask whether God revealed his love for us by having a man die the death of scourging and crucifixion? Or was it his own Son, a divine person, who became flesh to suffer and die and thereby touch our hard hearts and lead us to eternal life?".²⁰² Or one may bring the issue into the present context by asking what this oriental²⁰³ Person of the Horizontal Metaxy, who so died at the hour of the monkey, means in the fullness of elite meaning²⁰⁴ - for the orientals, and us?

The issue, then, is our Eternal Relations' design and achievement of personal presence in history, and I can be brief here only by writing in the rhythms of an invitation to elements of a larger view.²⁰⁵

Earlier, two metaxies in history were identified. Is it plausible that the metaxies are related intimately to the subjectivity of God? Certainly the Second Person is Middle Person in God: is the Second Person not also Middle Man in history, whose secondary existential act wraps²⁰⁶ history in essential sacredness,²⁰⁷ the sacredness of a real participation in the Divine Paternity.²⁰⁸ Is this not the axis of

the Vertical Metaxy? But is not the sacredness of history a reality of all human time through the related²⁰⁹ gift to men of a soulfilling²¹⁰ participation in the originating energy of Speaker and Son with a concomitant gift of participative Alertness to the togetherness of Speaker and Son?²¹¹ The fullness²¹² of the Sacredness of Christ is the mediating actuality in history of the promise of adoption: the blighted spring of history is meshed in hope into the Second Person's bright spring from "Light and Love".²¹³ His reality of participation in all four Divine Relations contrasts²¹⁴ with our dark participation in the originating fellowship of Speaker and Word and the listening openness to them that is the Spirit. In the Is-answer of Faith, our What-question is an openness for eternal participation in Him as Word, for an adoption by Hidden Call. By His presence the ongoing discovery of mind and Mind is radically changed. His coming seeds truth, never essentially enlightening, but genetic of most fruitful understanding and larger kindness. Through His talk and His dangling we have a peg of hope on which to hand our metaxic hats. A Care absolutely beyond nature surrounds with mysterious personality the suprazoological. The fundamental tension-in-existence is the Trinitarian tension of Abundant Care, lifting the darkness out of history. And 600,000,000 young Chinese become 600,000,003 persons living in darkness and a great light.

"In accordance with the above views, I would like to make the following proposals:

1. We should place before the whole Party the task of making a systematic and thorough study of the situation around us ...
2. As for China's history in the last hundred years, we should assemble qualified persons to study it, in co-operation and with a proper division of labour, and so overcome the present disorganized state of affairs. First it is necessary to make analytic studies in the several fields of economic history, political history, military history and cultural history, and only then will it be possible to make synthetic studies.
3. As for education ... a policy should be

established of focussing such education on the study of the practical problems of the Chinese Revolution and using the basic principles of Marxist-Leninism as the guide, and the method of studying Marxism-Leninism statically and in isolation should be discarded".²¹⁵

This quotation from Mao's essay brings us to our final topic: China and The Man.²¹⁶ I am evidently making my own Mao's proposals, where for "Party" one may real "Christian Theologians". The situation around us is history, its systematic study being a reach for adequate categories. Their adequacy will concern us shortly.

Mao's second proposal may be put in the context of Lonergan's dialectic, in particular, the task of Method in Theology, 250. The history that is revelation is not just the history of religious debate. "What is good, always is concrete",²¹⁷ and the "assembly"²¹⁸ of dialectic has reference to events and movements that are candidates for progress.

The third proposal can be considered in relation to the last four functional specialties, and I wish to dwell on it in these concluding pages, with China as focal problem.

It seems to me that the problem of these four specialties is intimately related to grasping adequately the intention of the general categories. That intention is a reach towards the future in the full vigour of the personal perspective of the generalized emergent probability of meaning and Faith. It envisages world history in its concrete emergence in terms of possibilities and probabilities. Whether its use is in Foundations or in Communications it is never abstract; on the other hand, neither is it ever obvious. So, for example, Communications is not popular theology: it requires sophisticated selections from a genetical-dialectic elitist systematics that would mediate larger life to diverse communities. Some particular instances of the relevant attitude would perhaps be useful.

Within the perspective of the general categories, the probability schedules of schemes of transcendental aliveness or alienation in China certainly include Voegelin's sober perspective: "Periods of

great establishment, such as a Communist government in China or a Communist government in Russia, have a habit of running for two hundred and fifty years".²¹⁹ However, the inclusion involves the sublations that have been indicated throughout this paper, and would lead to a more optimistic statistic, pivoting however on a creativity in the West that also is being envisaged here. There is Chinese theatre, opera, dance. There is an even longer stable tradition of poetry and painting. There is the more recent pressure towards a new mandarinism of science. All these, within a creative global context, mediate the problematic of a third stage of meaning. But the emergence of the creative context is delayed by the necrophilia of the Western academy, so that instead of the Trojan horse of transcendental method being available to Chinese universities there is just another version of truncated subjectivity. Yet history has habits grounding hope. Of a Chinese, as of an American, it can be said that "within the walls of his individuality, there is more than a Trojan horse. He has no choice about wanting to understand; he is committed not by any decision of his own but by nature to intelligent behaviour; and as these determinants are responsible for the emergence of social orders in the past, so they account for their development, their maintenance, their reformation".²²⁰ Moreover, history pushes towards an epiphany of understanding as data through the problem of emergent science. One may well speak of The Coming Convergence of World Religions, but one should also reverence the noosphere of what-answers, including foundational economics, that are invariant over nations.²²¹

Mao Tse-tung wrote extensively on varieties of contradiction among the people²²² and moved away from Marxist-Leninism in asserting the continued presence of non-antagonistic contradictions that can be resolved within socialism through the formula unity-criticism-unity.²²³ He discussed, at length, the need to identify, at each stage of revolution, the principal contradiction.²²⁴ But his truncated subjectivity excluded him from envisaging the principal contradiction noted above, the tension between truncation and transcendental dynamics in the people. In this, of course, he differs little from Western government, economics, education. But he adds to it the blunt strength of a "totalitarian integration of common-sense practicality"²²⁵ which guards, with

emphatic normality,²²⁶ Party thinking from discovering the major principles of decline in general bias, and the minor principle of decline in group bias. So, the truncated analysis protects itself from discovering that the "confusing error of Marx was to lump together both progress and the two principles of decline under the impressive name of dialectical materialism, to grasp that the minor principle would correct itself more rapidly through class war, and then to leap gaily to the sweeping conclusion that class war would accelerate progress".²²⁷

But in the break with Russia in theory and practice, during the Great Leap Forward, lies a hope of a different statistics for Chinese Communism. However party-lined the slogans, ("Carrying out the policy of letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend will not weaken but strengthen the leading position of Marxism in the ideological field"²²⁸), Mao opened the way to levels of democracy and dialogue.²²⁹ Instead of declaring "that all new ideas are taboo",²³⁰ he quotes Mencius, "The office of the mind is to think",²³¹ and speaks, without knowing it, the fundamental law of history: "much thinking yields wisdom";²³² the second stage of meaning mediates the third: the dialectic of the three plateaus of minding, and dialogue, reveal the transcendental reality of poet and peasant: "While the dialectic of history coldly relates our conflicts, dialogue adds the principle that prompts us to cure them, the natural right that is the inmost core of our being".²³³

The adequate heuristic envisagement of poet, peasant and dialogue is a requirement of the use of the general categories in the functional specialties of the second phase. What is needed are a hundred foundation Blooms, twentieth-century Leopolds who would envisage China as William Cobbett envisaged England in the nineteenth century on his Rural Rides,²³⁴ and as many Mollys who would see the cities like Jane Jacobs²³⁵ with a larger perspective. Moreover, the envisagement entails, in Communications, strategies of mediating transcendental expansiveness in cottage and commerce. So, for instance, criticism in the Yangi Commune of the use of canteens in Ten Mile Inn generated a consensus regarding six advantages of canteens " ... (2) They take a great load off the minds of those people who don't know how to plan and budget properly and so are always finding

themselves in a fix ...".²³⁶ This advantage, of course, echoes the orientation of centralization and planning in the West: one unburdens the mind and cultivates the pneumopathologies. Indeed, the Chinese Commune lunacy seems somewhat saner than much Western government and planning. History must educate, or reeducate, the globe to acknowledge that "the principle of progress is liberty, for the ideas occur to the man on the spot, their only satisfactory expression is their implementation, their only adequate correction is the emergence of further insights".²³⁷

But, again, I must insist on the concreteness, and the theoretical adequacy,²³⁸ of the envisagement of possible and probable schemes of recurrence. So, I recall schemes of recurrence involving pigs. William Cobbett once remarked that what he most liked to see was "a pig in almost every cottage sty; that is the infallible mark of a happy people".²³⁹ Emergent Chinese writing indicates parallel insights: "In the olden days the Chinese thought a pig under a roof was home ... A 'roof' with two 'pigs' under it means 'contentment'".^{239a} The Communists missed the point and its related schemes of recurrence, but through the correction of oversights the family pig reappeared.²⁴⁰ "During the Great Leap Forward certain industrial crops, like cotton, had done spectacularly well, but not everywhere, mainly because of the lack of fertilizer. The small communal industries did not produce enough fertilizer and there was less natural manure because there were fewer privately owned pigs. Certain orders did not take into account what the peasants knew from first-hand experience: for example, birds were exterminated on a large scale in 1959 because they devoured seeds, and this left the land defenseless against insects".²⁴¹

Both East and West in these late modern times are massively and madly committed against the transcendental structure of man's dreams, feelings, insights. The madness can extend to discussion of that transcendental structure. There is a call at present for Theology to be empirical: if the call is not to be yet another ideology, it must become a boned-up²⁴² inner opening to people as they actually are and as they could probably or possibly be in the next year, in the next million years. It would perhaps be significant here to sum up the task in the words of the neglected Mo Ti:

These are what I call the Three Laws of Reasoning:

1. Where to find the foundation. Find it in the study of the experiences of the wisest men of the past.
2. How to take a general survey of it? Examine the facts of the actual experience of the people.
3. How to apply it? Put it into law and governmental policy, and see whether or not it is conducive to the welfare of the state and the people.²⁴³

To take that task seriously is to question present theology and present theological education. No doubt some will echo the complaint of a man in the Yangi Commune: "All this leaping forward takes it out of you".²⁴⁴ But perhaps some will share the slogan on the Commune mudbrick walls "Three years of bitter struggle, ten thousand years of joy".²⁴⁵

I have commented on the orientation of general categories in relation to Voegelin's sober perspective. That sober perspective is sublated by the special categories, factualized through Doctrines²⁴⁶ and fleshed out by a Christian Systematics. I conclude by drawing on Lonergan's systematics to ask of the Trinity's relation to the future of China. Before doing so an aside is necessary on the issue of "drawing on systematics", indeed in a foundational manner.

By "drawing on systematics" I mean, not doing the functional specialty Systematics, but profiting from its achievements. The functional specialties are tasks, and to continually enlarge Systematics is, indeed, a lifelong task. To profit from the enlarging is the privilege, obligation, and need of every theologian. One may be helped by a simple parallel. Anyone in the creative entertainment business knows the effort and the luck of discovering a new joke; but we can all enjoy the joke. I spoke of privilege, obligation, and need. The theologian is privileged and obliged by profession; if he or she has no need to understand God then he or she is pneumopathological. In the present context it is not irrelevant to recall Marx: "Take the case of Marx. He says he is fully aware that the question

of the Divine Ground of all things must be asked. But were he to ask it, he couldn't insist that material conditions are the base of that question and of everything else he thinks. Therefore socialist man must not ask it. Now what goes on in the mind of a man who makes such statements? Is it a case of schizophrenia or of something entirely different?"²⁴⁷ A theologian may say that biblical conditions or historical research or dialectic issues are the preoccupying base. But can you sanely be in love with a Divine Ground without the itch to ask Who?²⁴⁸

Frederick Crowe's insights within Trinitarian Systematics provide a suitable starting point. In discussing the stages of the Trinity's entry into history which were mentioned above, he remarks: "This seems relevant to our missionary activity. The Risen Jesus told his disciples, 'As the Father sent me, so I send you' (John 20:21), so surely we can learn from the Father's procedure. If, then, our apostolate is analogous to his, it will be accomplished in word and love, the love will always be total, while word will be according to the condition of the time and place. If in primitive times the Spirit came incognito and did his work in secret while he awaited the time when the fullness of the Word could be manifested, the idea occurs that our own missionary activity may consist for a long time in bringing our charity to the missionary country while we help with agriculture, housing, education, hospitals, etc., and bring conditions to the point where they can receive the revelation we would transmit".²⁴⁹

Let us, briefly, relate the point to some further elements of Lonergan's Latin Works.

The Word proceeds from an understanding of history.²⁵⁰ Eternally²⁵¹ and solely²⁵² spoken is the understanding of all the "concrete patterns of diverging series of scattering conditions",²⁵³ that leave us groping for light through emergent probability. History slowly reveals to us the schedules of God's patience but we are slower still to learn.²⁵⁴ In 781 A.D. the Nestorians raised a monument to Chinese tolerance, and a short time later Rome raised a hullabaloo to Ricci's tolerance; should we not try again?

As Fr. Crowe reminds us "the Son and Spirit were not

sent until 748 and 781 A.U.C.".255 Further, the Son is graced as head of all men 256 (t'ien hsia: i jen), history is eternally spoken as absolutely supernatural,257 laced with an invitation to a friendship without a Name: the Hidden Perfection of Order invites a finite order to the limits of intimacy.258 The invitation constitutes a state of Eternal and historical being:259 the Globe, and China, are in that state of grace. In that state there is the image of the Divine Lovers that is private but also public,260 and may even be identified as reality, yet not as image.261 But that state is changed by the walk and the talk of the Man from the Middle East, among his own, "doing his own thing":262 the Lowers are darkly263 revealed to a group in simile, stride and suffering, and the group are invited to a new justice.264

Here we pass over the group's history of impatience, law, power, empire: there is the large task of future dialectic to reveal the goodness of the goings-on of the Christian West.265 It is the focal normative element that is of immediate interest.

The Word in conscious hypostatic union,266 cherishes us, known and loved, both in the Divine Nature and in the human nature,267 in the complexity of Eternal Order and of his human graces.268 The Word is with us, as a Person who shared global air, sensibly drawing us to inaccessible light.269 In explicit Christian faith, we are drawn to speak interiorly our word of the Word, for the Word came in processional reality to be with us in graceful processional image.270 And the graceful processional image for the theologian includes the present reach of Christian systematics.271

What of the non-Christian Chinese? I recall the quotation from Fr. Crowe regarding missiology, and I add to it the context of Lonergan's discussion of the two times of the temporal subject.

First, there is the Western challenge, and ours, of fostering the transition to generalized empirical method and the third stage of meaning in all fields and in our concrete living. It is a challenge to go beyond the madneses of Western capitalism, of University life, of conventional Theology. Only thus can we adequately invite the Chinese into the third stage of meaning, into a larger presence of the Unnamed

Trinity. To Christ's admonition "tell no man that I am the One",272 we might oddly add "Tell no one that We love them". Fr. Crowe has written of help in charity: I am complexifying the issue of help to require a help towards self-help grounded in Chinese insights. Further, the help is authoritative only through the collaborative achievement of the goal of help in the helpers.273 Finally, there are three basic ways of bringing a subject to that second time which opens the road to integrality and hope: through understanding, through belief, through love.274 The last leads to belief and to understanding.275 It would seem to be God's way. It is not the way of an arrogant Christianity, pathologically intent on the 11th Commandment: "make sure that the others keep the first ten" (even perhaps adding "according to our culture and creed"). Help is genuinely given in the shedding of pseudo-theism, power and eclecticism. It is given in the Mystery of God, with limited authority and reverence for liberty, withdrawn from the sinful backwardness of common-sense eclecticism. Perhaps, after all, Christianity has not been tried. The Middle Man said: "if I be lifted up I will draw all things to myself".276 "The cock crows today".277 Might we not weep, repent,278 reflect, leap forward?

"The night was long and the
crimson dawn cracked slowly;
For hundreds of years demons and
monsters danced frantically;
Our five hundred million people
were disunited.

Once the cock has crowed and all
beneath the sky is bright,
Music rises from Khotan and a
thousand places
To fill the poet with unparagoned
inspiration".279

(Mao Tse tung, 1950)

1. "Above the min and the jen there rises the King, distinguished as the i jen, the One Man ... The King ruled over all 'below Heaven', tien-hsia". E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana State University Press, 1974, 289. I was originally led to the topic by an invitation to speak at the Boston Conference of 1982, under the general title, "Mind and the Mystery of Christ".
2. James Clavell, Tai-Pan, Dell, New York, 1966, 194.
3. Praxisweltanschauung: See McShane, Lonergeran's Challenge to the University and the Economy, University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1980, 93 ff. Add the perspective below, 41 ff.
4. Method in Theology, 288-89, 352. Relevant here also is a transposition of his unpublished De Ente Supernaturale.
5. Ibid., 292.
6. Ibid., 288, 153 n.1; Insight, 462 ff.
7. Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority", Boston College Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3, 1974, 27.
8. F. E. Crowe, "The Exigent Mind: Bernard Lonergan's Intellectualism", Spirit as Inquiry, Herder and Herder, New York, 1964, 27.
9. For a survey of recent Christology see B. Cooke, "Horizons on Christology in the Seventies", Horizons 6, 1979, 193-227; I do not think that much of it belongs in the third stage of meaning. Relevant here is F. E. Crowe, "Christologies: how up-to-date are yours?". Theological Studies 29, 1968.
10. See McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method and the Actual Context of Economics", Creativity and Method, ed. M. Lamb, Marquette University Press, 1981.

11. Mao Tse-tung, "The Relationship between China and other countries", China and the Three Worlds, ed. King C. Chen, Sharpe, New York, 1979, 365-67. My references to Mao Tse-tung are not an indication of approval of his reign. The disastrous results of his policies are well documented.
12. E. Voegelin, op. cit., n.1, 240. The discussion there relates to a potential of distortion within Pauline Theology.
13. To the view of Insight one must add the perspective reached in Lonergan's Grace and Freedom.
14. Finnegans Wake, 294, "Sarga, or The Path of outgoing". Sarga is Sanskrit for "process of world creation or emanation".
15. For a discussion of this academic care see McShane, Lonergeran's Challenge to the University and the Economy, ch. 1.
16. Davies Ltd., London, 1926.
17. E. Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience", Southern Review, July, 1974, 248-50.
18. Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., n.11, 306.
19. Ibid., 308.
20. See the concluding page of McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1981.
21. Lonergan, De Deo Trino I, II, Gregorian University Press, Rome, 1964 (and De Verbo Incarnato).
22. Cited in King C. Chen, ed., China and the Three Worlds, Sharpe, New York, 1979, 3.
23. The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana State University Press, 1974.
24. I refer not only to the great leap forward of his Latin Treatises (including De Constitutione

- Christi, 1961) but his reflections on method expressed in various unpublished notes which brought him to his discovery at that period of the strategy of functional specialization. These unpublished typescripts and manuscripts are enormously rich in suggestions regarding the direction to be taken in the functional specialties of oratio recta.
25. The context is an understanding of "joss", fate or luck. See St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Ia. q.116, and add Insight, 664; Collection, 54-67. See also the Preface ns. 32 and 53.
 26. Cited in Isak Dinesen, Dageurrotypes and Other Essays, Heinemann, London, 1979, 18.
 27. See E. Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, Faucett Crest, New York, 1973, 31.
 28. E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press, 1970.
 29. Conversations with Eric Voegelin, Thomas More Institute Papers, Montreal, 1976, 110.
 30. The Question as Commitment, A Symposium, Thomas More Institute Papers, Montreal, 1977, 118.
 31. Op. cit., n.17, 251.
 32. The Ecumenic Age, 193; 195: "The strain of infantilism in the public unconscious of our time".
 33. In an interview during a conference on "Merging Horizons" at York University, Toronto, November, 1978.
 34. Method in Theology, 40.
 35. K. Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, Norbon, New York, 1937.
 36. D. Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, Yale, 1961.

37. L. van der Post, Jung and the Story of Our Time, The Hogart Press, London, 1976, 268 ff.
38. Victorino Tejera, Modes of Greek Thought, Appleton-Century-Crafts, New York, 1971, 2.
39. See n.33 above.
40. C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffe, trans. R. & C. Winston, Vintage Books, New York, 1965. A doctor who wished to become an analyst, who had "no problems", turned out to have a latent psychosis. "His emphatic normality reflected a personality which would not have been developed but simply shattered by a confrontation with the unconscious" (p.40).
41. Ibid., 144: "I am speaking of those who cannot tolerate the loss of myth and who can neither find a way to a merely exterior world, to a world as seen by science, nor rest satisfied with an intellectual juggling with words, which has nothing whatever to do with wisdom. These victims of the psychic dichotomy of our time are merely optional neurotics".
42. Flaubert, Bouvard and Pecuchet, trans. T. Earp and G. Stonier, New Directions, New York, 1954, 194.
43. Pound/Joyce: The Letters of Ezra Pound to James Joyce, with Pound's Essays on Joyce, Edited and with a Commentary by Forrest Read, Faber and Faber, London, 1967, 194.
44. James Joyce, Ulysses, 175.
45. J. Jacobi, The Psychology of Jung, Routledge and Kegan Poul, London, 1962, 112.
46. Lonergan, "The Subject", A Second Collection, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1974, 73.
47. Conversations with Eric Voegelin, Thomas More Institute Papers, Montreal, 1976, 19.
49. Fichte's Sun-Clear Statement was printed in the

- English translation of A. E. Kroger, in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol.II, 1868.
50. What is meant by "modernity" will emerge gradually.
 51. George Marek, Beethoven, Biography of a Genius, Kimber, London, 1970, 602.
 52. See E. G. Schachter, "On Memory and Childhood Amnesia", Psychiatry 10, 1947, 1-26.
 53. "Reason: The Classic Experience", Southern Review, 1974, 251.
 54. Bell, London, 1965, 190.
 55. Colin Trudge, The Famine Business, London, 1975.
 56. Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 25-26, n.122.
 57. R. Wellek, "Aesthetics and Criticism", Philosophy of Kant and Our Modern World, ed. C. Hendel, Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1957.
 58. F. Lawrence, "Political Theology and 'The Longer Cycle of Decline'", Loneragan Workshop, Vol. I, ed. F. Lawrence, Scholars Press, 1978, 240.
 59. A. Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth, Oxford University Press, 1976.
 60. K. Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History, London, 1953.
 61. McShane, "An Improbable Christian Vision and the Economic Rhythms of the Second Million Years", ch.6 of Loneragan's Challenge to the University and the Economy, University Press of America, 1980.
 62. Jaspers, op. cit., ch. 1.
 63. Jaspers, op. cit., 97.
 64. Toynbee, op. cit., 178.

65. The full foundational relatively invariant heuristics (see Insight, 392-94) will contain a sublation of De Constitutione Christi into a perspective on De Constitutione Mundi (see the suggestions of Insight, 734, 742-43). The fullness I am intimating here for foundations should give rise to probing questions regarding a future systematics. As I have suggested already (Preface, xviii), systematics may be foundationally envisaged as a genetical-dialectic understanding of understandings controlled by foundational categories in a way analogous to the manner in which a heuristic of psychic development controls the understanding of a dog from egg through puppyhood. It may be useful also to reflect on earlier comments regarding the sublation of the development of logics into a new methodological systematic understanding of systems (Preface, xx-xxi). Such a systematics represents the full transposition of the functional specialties interpretation and history.
66. E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, 68; see also 7, 27-28, 173.
67. Ibid., 192.
68. See n.134, and the related text.
69. James Joyce, Ulysses, 129.
70. Later we will touch on the nature of authority as distinct from naked power. The relevant text on the two times of the temporal subject is De Deo Trino II, 196-204.
71. "Generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects", Lonergan, "Religious Experience", Trinification of the World, eds. T. Dunne and J.-M. Laporte, Regis College Press, 1978, 84-96.

72. On the types of genuineness cf. Insight, 475. The view there is ontogenetic, the present effort is towards some phylogenetic indications. Chardin's nōosphere is now related to a post-modern third stage of meaning.
73. See Jaspers' "Reply" in A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, Library of Living Philosophers, New York.
74. E. Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience", 240.
75. A. Eichner, A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics, ed. A. Eichner, Sharpe, New York, 1979, vii.
76. N. Kaldor, "The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics", Economic Journal, 82, 1972, 1240-41.
77. Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics, trans. W. Jaffe, Irwin, Illinois, 1954.
78. See W. Jaffe, "A. N. Isnard, Progenitor of the Walrasian General Equilibrium Model", History of Political Economy, I, 1970.
79. J. R. Hicks, "Mr. Keynes and the 'Classics': A Suggested Interpretation", Econometrica, 5, 1937, 147-59.
80. W. Breit & R. Ransom, The Academic Scribblers: American Economists in Collusion, Holt Reinhardt and Winston, New York, 1971.
81. C. Juglar, Les crises commerciales et leur retour periodique en France, en Angleterre et aux Etas Unis, 1862, 1889.
82. See H. Smith, "Marx and the Trade Cycle", The Review of Economic Studies (iv), 1936-37, 202.
83. W. Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem and its Setting, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1927.
84. J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, A Theoretical,

- Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process, 2 Vols., McGraw Hill, New York, 1939.
85. M. Kalecki, Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy, 1933-79, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
86. A. Lowe, "A Structural Model of Production", Social Research, 1952, 135-76; On Economic Knowledge, Harper & Row, New York, 1965; The Path of Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
87. See e.g., J. Robinson, Economic Heresies: Some Old-Fashioned Questions in Economic Theory, Basic Books, New York, 1973.
88. See the works cited in ns. 10 and 15.
89. See The Path of Economic Growth and On Economic Knowledge: the under under Control.
90. See McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, ch.10.
91. The title of a book by Eugen Loeb1, which evolved during eleven years in a Czech prison. Random House, New York, 1976.
92. Driving a car steadily in first gear is to us manifestly not a success. Driving for profit against the rhythms of economic progress may eventually become manifest as pathological.
93. Lonergan in a lecture on art during an Institute on Education, 1959 (an edition of these lectures is in process of publication by John and James Quinn in Toronto).
94. David Lewin, "Behind the Beyond", a Response to E. T. Cone, Perspectives of New Music 7, 1969, 61.
95. Ernest Krenek, "Some Current Terms", Perspectives of New Music 4, 1966, 84.

96. A. P. Merriam, "Ethnomusicology Revisited", Ethnomusicology 13, 1969, 228.
97. A. P. Merriam, The Anthropology of Music, Northwestern University Press, 1964, 18.
98. Pierre Boulez, "Sonate, Que une veux-tu?", Perspectives of New Music (1), 1963, 32.
99. The concrete probabilities of conversations of the third stage of meaning are an underlying concern throughout the present volume. Michael Vertin's chapter specifies core chasms in methodological dialogue: "Empiricism, idealism and realism name three totally different horizons with no common identical objects" (Method in Theology, 239), and these genera invite extension and subdivision.
101. Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm", Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. Lakatos and Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, 1970, 61.
102. Gerald Graff, "Fear and Trembling at Yale", The American Scholar, 1977, 467.
103. P. De Man, Blindness and Insight, Oxford University Press, 1971, 39.
104. E. Auerback, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. W. R. Trask, Princeton University Press, 1953, 482.
106. G. Flaubert, Madame Bovary, trans. Alan Russell, Penguin Classic, 1977, 196.
107. Ibid., 103.
108. Ibid., 210.
109. Ibid., 236.
110. Ibid., 329.
111. See McShane, The Shaping of the Foundations, University Press of America, 1977, 117.

112. "Reason: The Classic Experience", 251.
113. Ibid.
114. A. Maslow, Towards a Psychology of Being, New York, 1968, 204.
115. A. R. Aresteh, Final Integration in the Adult Personality, Leiden, 1965, 18.
116. A remark of W. B. Yeats quoted in Richard Ellman, Yeats: The Man and the Masks, Dutton, New York, 1948, 5.
117. A slogan of the Great Leap Forward period in China: see below, at n.229.
118. James Joyce, Ulysses, 70.
119. Henry McAleavy, The Modern History of China, Prager, New York, 1968, 116.
120. Quoted in Harry Schwartz, China, Atheneum, New York, 1965, 145.
121. Lonergan, De Deo Trino II, 108.
122. McShane, The Shaping of the Foundations; also the work cited in n.15.
123. See the article cited in n.126 below.
124. Lonergan, "Finality, Love, Marriage", Collection, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1967, 21.
125. Ibid., 48.
126. McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method," Method and Creativity: Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, ed. M. Lamb, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1981.
127. McShane, Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy, 93-97.
128. A. Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth, 32.

129. E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, 173.
130. Ibid., 272.
131. August Boeckh (1785-1867), quoted in Method in Theology, 210.
132. Method in Theology, 14.
133. The Ecumenic Age, 309.
134. Leo Strauss, Liberalism: Ancient and Modern, Basic Books, New York, 1968, 3.
135. Lonergan: see n.93.
136. Lonergan, Philosophy of God and Theology, 39.
137. W. Johnston, The Inner Eye of Love, Harper and Row, New York, 1978.
138. A book by an anonymous Carthusian, Longmans, London, 1955, 59.
139. See Susanne Langer, Feeling and Form, Scribners, 1953, ch. 12. The staggered differentiations of consciousness in history allow a contemporary presence of such a dance: see L. van der Post, The Lost World of the Kalahari, Morrow & Co., New York, 1958, 264 ff., on Bushman dancing.
140. Quoted in Herbert Read, The Art of Sculpting, Princeton University Press, 1977, 74.
141. See Lonergan, Verbum, Word and Idea in Aquinas, 147-49, 184, 188-89.
142. S. Langer, Feeling and Form, Scribners, 1953, ix.
143. Ibid., 201.
144. Quoted in Jan Murray, Dance Now, Penguin Books, 1979, 112.
145. Ibid.
146. M. Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane. The Nature

- of Religion, Harper, New York, 1961, 212.
147. Marcia Siegel, Watching the Dance Go By, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1977, 312.
148. M. Eliade, op. cit., 212.
149. Peter Brook, The Empty Space, Penguin Books.
150. Ibid., 63.
151. Ibid., 53.
152. Ibid., 64.
153. Don McDonagh, The Rise and Fall and Rise of Modern Dance, Mentor, New York, 1970.
154. Lonergan, Donald Mather Lectures, 1975, "Sacrilization and Secularization".
155. Op. cit., n.153, 100-12.
156. HCE or Finnegan. To those of my readers who find my use of Joyce puzzling I recommend a short essay by Thornton Wilder, "Joyce and the Modern Novel", American Characteristics and Other Essays, edited by Donal Gallup, Harper and Row, New York, 1979, 172-180. His final paragraph is a relevant addition to the present context: "The terrible thing is to live in our twentieth century with nineteenth century mentality. To be "out of phase" - that's what is blighting. That's what starves and frightens and shipwrecks so many souls. The realizations of new dimensions and new obligations pour in on us from the world of science, but we would rather retreat into the accustomed and the soothing. Joyce and Pound and Eliot have advanced into the new territory; they have shown us how understanding can reduce fear. The difficulties they present to readers are the exact counterparts of the difficulties we experience in living at this time, and their triumphs are notification and guide to us as to where we may find clarification and strength", 180.

157. Patrick White, The Aunt's Story.
158. R. W. Flint (ed.) Marinetti: Selected Writings, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1972, at Introduction, 6-7.
159. On the heuristics of such fragmentations see Insight, 193-94, 456.
160. I am thinking of Molly's speech at the end of Ulysses.
161. St. Thomas' consideration, "whether a bath cheers you up", (Ia, IIae, q.38, a.5) requires the updating of modern psychology, including the contributions of M. Eliade and G. Durand.
162. R. D. Laing discusses a successful regression of a woman to apparent pre-natality in "Metanoia: Some Experiences at Kingsley Hall, London", Going Crazy, ed. H. M. Ruitenbeek, Bantam, 1972, 11-12.
163. From T. S. Eliot, "The Dry Salvage", Four Quartets.
164. The three tensions are related to the three lunacies to be discussed shortly in relation to the problems of mysticism and atheism, aesthetics and commonsense eclecticism, power and Everyman's distress.
165. Cf. "Features of Generalized Method", where I discuss seven bridges. "The image of the Bridge and the narrow gate - suggest the idea of a dangerous passage" (Eliade, op. cit., 181). The discussion of tensions here relates to some of the bridges and enlarges on that previous reflection.
166. Insight, 653-54.
167. Ibid., 686; De Deo Trino I, Thesis 5a.
168. For the relation of this tension to the mystery of God see E. & M. Morelli, Lonergan on Being, 1981, concluding question.

169. Most recently R. Doran, Psychic Conversion and Theological Foundations, University Press Of America, 1981.
170. See McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, Epilogue.
171. McShane, The Shaping of the Foundations, 113, n.120.
172. Ibid., 89-94.
173. Ibid., 86.
174. Insight, 741-42.
175. E. Voegelin, "Reason: The Classic Experience".
176. E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, 299.
177. Ibid., 125.
178. Ibid., 115.
179. While the dynamics of atheism are a central concern of Fr. Doran in his investigation of the psyche, there is the more evident relevance of Vertin's analysis of position and counterpositions to discussions of the corresponding dynamics of mind. Chapter nineteen of Insight was tiresomely discussed at the Florida Conference of 1970. I would say that the real issue is much earlier in the book, and one is invited to close that issue on p.388.
180. Insight, 185.
181. Ibid., 191 ff.
182. Method in Theology, 101-03.
183. On this see Doran, "Christ and the Psyche", Trinification of the World, 139.
184. Recall Peter Brook's challenge. The specification would transpose the history of Western Drama, giving a quite novel meaning to the statement "Remove Euripides and the modern Theatre ceases to exist" (D. C. Stuart, The Development of Dramatic Art, New York, 1928, 100). Perhaps

- the third stage of meaning will call forth a Yes drama to which the words of the Japanese poet might be transferred. "I always think that it would certainly be a great thing if the No drama could be properly introduced into the West. The result would be no small protest against the Western stage. It would mean a revelation", (Yone Noguchi, The Spirit of Japanese Poetry, London, 1914).
185. Quoted in the Introduction to Beckett in Masters of Modern Drama, eds. H. M. Block and R. G. Shedd, Random House, New York, 1972.
 186. Method in Theology, 351.
 187. Ibid., 273.
 188. Ibid., 237.
 189. Insight, 417.
 190. Ibid., 542.
 191. Ibid.
 192. Ibid., 417.
 193. Ibid.
 194. Ibid., 244.
 195. Hu Shih, Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, Shanghai, 1922, 69-70.
 196. Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority", Boston College Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3, 1974, 7.
 197. Ibid.
 198. Insight, 226 ff.
 199. Ibid., 238, 633, 690.
 200. See Lonergan, De Intellectu et Methodo, (unpublished notes, 1959).

201. Contexts of functional specialist discussion of this topic are indicated above at n.65.
202. Lonergan, "Theology and Praxis", Proceedings of the American Catholic Theological Association, 1977.
203. A background, in English, on the sensibilities of the Incarnate Person is found in Lonergan, "Christ as Subject", Collection.
204. Method in Theology, 351. As I have noted already (see n.65 above) the adequate systematic context is massive and remote from contemporary theology.
205. Technically, McShane; "The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God", Theological Studies, 1962: Pastorally, McShane; Music That Is Soundless, University Press of America, 1980.
206. 'Wrap', not 'constitutes'. The issue is complex: see Insight, 734; De Constitutione Christi, 1961, 51-82; De Deo Trino II, 217-22.
207. De Verbo Incarnato, 1964, 323.
208. De Deo Trino II, 234.
209. De Deo Trino II, 240-44: "Denique tandem cum ad tantum opus in toto mundo per se vel per alios efficiendum mittantur ipsae divinae personae, non brevi quodam vocabulo terminus missionum assignatur, sed maximi operis stadia successiva distinguendo", 244. Recall n.65 above.
210. De Deo Trino II, 249-59.
211. Ibid., 234.
212. De Verbo Incarnato, 324.
213. De Deo Trino I, 295.
214. On the vision of Christ and the evolution of his human knowledge see F. E. Crowe, "Eschaton in the Mind and Heart of Jesus", The Eschaton: A Community of Love, Villanova University Press, 1974.

- Lonerger deals with the topic in Thesis 12 of De Verbo Incarnato; the treatment in 1964 is more extensive: 1961, 333-61; 1964, 332-417.
215. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1971, "Reform our Studies", 206-07.
216. See n.1.
217. Method in Theology, 27.
218. Ibid., 250.
219. Conversations with Eric Voegelin, 19.
220. Insight. 215.
221. I have considered R. E. Whitson, The Coming Convergence of World Religions, Newman Press, New York, 1971, in a related context in The Shaping of the Foundations, 135 ff.
222. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings, 85 ff., and 432 ff.
223. Yung Ping Chen, Chinese Political Thought, Martinus Nyhoff, The Hague, 1966, 109.
224. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings, 109 ff.
225. Insight, 232.
226. Recall the text at n.40, p.5 above.
227. Insight, 235.
228. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings, 465.
229. See Joan Robinson, "China, 1963: The Communes", Collected Economic Papers, Vol. 3, Oxford, 1965, 192-206, reprinted in China in Revolution, ed. V. Simone, Fawcett, New York, 1968, 340-53.
230. Insight, 234.
231. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Readings, 308.

232. Ibid.
233. Lonerger, "Natural Right and Historical Mind-edness", conclusion. In this article Lonerger discusses the three plateaus of minding.
234. William Cobbett, Rural Rides, ed. Asa Briggs, Everyman's Library, New York, 1973 (2 vols.). Among the various biographies of Cobbett Chesterton's short William Cobbett stands out as inspired.
235. See The Economy of Cities, Vintage Books, N.Y. 1970.
236. Quoted in Isabel and David Crook, "An on-the-spot investigation of a People's Commune", China in Revolution, ed. V. Simone, Fawcett, N.Y., 1968, 362.
237. Insight, 234.
238. I would recall Insight 498, on knowledge of forms.
239. William Cobbett, Rural Rides (Vol. 2), Everyman's Library, New York, 1973, 104. I am indebted here to a Master's thesis in history by my wife Fiona: William Cobbett's Ideal England, (Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1981).
- 239a. James Clavell, Shogun, Dell Publications, New York, 1975, 528-29.
240. Joan Robinson, China in Revolution, 345-46.
241. Jean Chesnaux, China: The People's Republic 1949-1976, Pantheon, New York, 1979, 102-03.
242. See McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method": The Bridge of Bones.
243. Hu Shih, Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China, Shanghai, 1922, 72.
244. Quoted in op. cit., n.236, 354.
245. Ibid.
246. The key issue in Doctrines is intellectual conversion. See Method in Theology, 318 "only

- intellectual conversion can ...". See also McShane, "The Core Psychological Present of the Contemporary Theologian", Trinification of the World, eds. T. A. Dunne and J.-M. Laporte, Regis College Press, Toronto, 1978, 84-96.
247. E. Voegelin, The Question as Commitment, 20.
248. The itch in its full psychic openness is a central topic in ch. 2; the asking is a focus of Lawrence's attention in the conclusion of ch. 4.
249. F. E. Crowe, The Doctrine of the Most Holy Trinity, Regis College, 1965, 190-91.
250. De Deo Trino II, q.III.
251. The context is the 18th place, Insight, 661-63.
252. De Deo Trino II, 196.
253. Insight, 650.
254. Recall n.32 of the Preface, p.142 above.
255. F. E. Crowe, op. cit., n.249, 190.
256. Summa Theologica, III q.8, a.3.
257. Recall n.65 above.
258. De Deo Trino II, Assertum XIV, Assertum XVIII.
259. Ibid., Quaestio XXVI, Assertum XVIII.
260. De Deo Trino I, 276.
261. Ibid., Thesis 5a; II, 104-07.
262. De Deo Trino II, 244 l. 2.
263. De Deo Trino I, 274.
264. De Verbo Incarnato, Theses 15-17.
265. Not presenting "the past as worse than it really

- was", Method in Theology, 251.
266. De Constitutione Christi, 124-48.
267. De Deo Trino II, 255.
268. Ibid., 249-56.
269. Ibid., 244-48.
270. Ibid., 256 ll. 1-6.
271. I would note that a present addition to, or reach of, the functional specialty Systematics can become a relatively invariant component of foundations. See n.65 above.
272. The "messianic secret", a refrain of St. Mark.
273. De Deo Trino II, 200.
274. Ibid., 200, 202.
275. Ibid.
276. John 12, 32. In a relevant context: De Deo Trino II, 254.
277. Luke 22, 62.
278. Insight, 700.
279. Mao Tse-tung, one of 37 poems quoted in Jerome Ch-en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, Oxford University Press, New York, 1965, 344.