

PREFACE

Distant Probabilities of Persons
Presently¹ Going Home Together
in Transcendental Process

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"I thought I saw the fallen flower
Returning to its branch
Only to find it was a butterfly".²

To envisage with foundational adequacy that butterfly, the remote third stage of meaning to be called forth slowly by emergent probability, is quite beyond present communal talent. The transposed academy, mediating enriched patterns of commonsense kindness and sincerity through the incarnation of the tandemness of its sufficient differentiations,³ can be at present only the object of concrete fantasy and religious hope. So it is that the key word and mood of our present title is Searching.

The volume represents, incompletely, the sharing of personal searching by the five authors, and to indicate, in particular, the incompleteness in question is, I think, important, if others are to benefit from our efforts in their own attempts at creative collaboration.

The possibility of collaborating on the issue of foundations was envisaged by us in the summer of 1981. Beginning in that autumn, our group came together at different locations, each time focusing attention on the published work and the personal search of a member of the group. Preliminary to each meeting was the task of entering into another person's search through his published expression. That task was doubly difficult. There was the more evident difficulty of finding time and energy, through an ordinary academic year, to work through material that might seem to be unrelated to the day-to-day struggle to teach and survive the various hindrances to teaching and survival that make up present university life. But the deeper difficulty relates to a meaning of the challenge of searching. That meaning has its ground in what I may call our foundational immaturity.

There is, in fact, no such thing as specialist foundations. Certainly, there are special categories and general categories: but even these can be only delicately distinguished and only mistakenly separated.⁴ Specialized categories are no more viable than the engine or the front half of a ship.⁵ Now the demands of this position are too much for present theological and philosophical culture. In the first, unpublished, preface to *Insight*, Lonergan defends the work against possible reproach for excessive ambition: "if I may borrow a phrase from Ortega y Gasset, one has to strive to mount to the level of one's time". He goes on to indicate the urgency, complexity and difficulty of that strife, and moves to a stand on the central nucleus of creative collaboration:

If the extent and complexity of modern knowledge preclude the possibility in our time both of the uomo universale of the Renaissance and of the medieval writer of a Summa, at least the collaboration of many contains a promise of success, where the unaided individual would have to despair.

Still a collaboration has its conditions. It supposes a common vision of a common goal. It supposes at least a tentative idea that would unify and coordinate separate efforts in different fields. It supposes a central nucleus that somehow could retain its identity yet undergo all the modifications and enrichments that could be poured into its capacious frame from specialized investigations.

The reaching of that central nucleus with its capacious frame, identifiable in its maturity as the Praxis, the ongoing use, of the general categories in all functional specialties, is the terrible solitary beauty of Lonergan's achievement. His achievement is a peak; our task is a climb beyond present muscles.

Lest the plain truth of that metaphor be missed it may be well to ponder, by way of illustration, that metaphysics is sublated by foundations, and that an adequate contemporary metaphysics contains an explicitation of the cultural invariants of economic dynamics. In this respect, of course, Lonergan stands uniquely "with it"

in this century, and I may recall here at length (since it is unpublished) Lonergan's interesting comment on two of the experts who were scheduled to have essays in the third volume of the Florida Papers:

Both ... complain that I am not with it. The former would have me align myself more with Marx and Freud and Norman Brown. The latter would want me to think with Marx and Sartre. Neither seems to be aware that I am a child of the depression of the thirties and that I have an as yet unpublished paper on economic analysis as the premise for moral precepts. I agree with Marx inasmuch as I find intrinsic to the developing economy a surplus; I disagree inasmuch as I have no doubt that it is a blunder to conceive this surplus as surplus value; it is to be understood and conceived, not in terms of marginal analysis, but in terms of macroeconomics. Again, I agree with Marx inasmuch as he finds the fact of surplus a source for moral indignation, but I disagree with him on his interpretation of the fact of surplus and on the moral conclusions he draws. Further, I agree with Marx inasmuch as he wants philosophers not only to know but also to make history, but I feel he made a very incomplete rejection of the mistaken efforts of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel to restore the hegemony of speculative reason that had been attacked by Kant. After all, Marx is only a left-wing Hegelian. He does not really belong to the company of a Kierkegaard who took his stand on faith, of a Newman who took his stand on conscience, of a Dilthey who wanted a philosophy of action, of the personalists and many existentialists of the present century, and of Paul Ricoeur's still unfinished philosophie de la volonte. With such men I am more easily in sympathy than with Jean-Paul Sartre or Norman Brown.

I have digressed on the question of the large difficulty of foundational immaturity, because it was a difficulty that was communicated continually to the group through our collaboration, and so it is a fruit of our search that cannot be sufficiently emphasized, especially in

an academy which is endlessly tempted towards the Joycean norm, "sufficient for the day is the newspaper thereof".⁷ The first and lesser difficulty, that of the concrete circumstances of our work, remained unchanged after our meetings so that, while glimpses of enlarged foundations were reached through our dialogue, building such glimpses into each of our contributions was beyond immediate time and energy. The five chapters, then, represent substantially what each of us brought to our effort at collaboration. However, I had the advantage, as organizer and editor, and through the circumstances of sabbatical leave, of more prolonged personal effort towards enlargement and integration, and I am venturing in this preface to give what hints I can regarding further personal and collaborative searchings for the foundational implementation of the eightfold Wendung Zür Idee adequate to the initiation of a culture of the third stage of meaning. Here it is appropriate to include an indication of the direction taken by each of us in his contribution.

The order in which the essays appear represents the order of our meetings. My own first chapter was an effort to supply a large heuristic context. It is in open continuity with my previous reachings for a fuller foundational perspective,⁸ its central novelty being a conception of modernity as the long phylogenetic period of problematic fragmentation - which has an ontogenetic counterpart significant for an adequate view and achievement of adult growth - between the first and second time of the temporal subject.⁹ This heuristic conception resolves the issue of axiality discussed by people like Jaspers, Toynbee, Mumford and Voegelin, in a manner that throws light on Lonergan's composite treatment of the second and third stages of meaning.¹⁰ There is an incidental focus on China in this chapter, related to Voegelin's interest in the Chinese Ecumene: Voegelin's The Ecumenic Age,¹¹ as will be seen, was inspirational in moving me towards the fuller heuristics of history contained in the chapter.

The fact that the heuristics of the chapter, and indeed of the volume, seem to centre on the northern hemisphere is, of course, merely an accident of focus and of interests. So, for instance, the ancient Roman view, "semper aliquid novi ex Africa", is more profoundly true in our times. Davidson Nicol writes

of "...a continent intensely personal, filled with wonderful things, larger than life, only dimly and partially grasped".¹² Moreover, that dim grasp in its depth is closely related to Robert Doran's search in chapter two, and we may enlarge the context of the searchings of our first two chapters by adverting to the vigorous challenge of Leonard Barnes' Africa in Eclipse:

Because African communities suffer from underdevelopment, the contemporary type-African is a proto-human whose psycho-social evolution has been arrested at a preliminary stage. Because NATO communities are denatured by overdevelopment, the contemporary type-European is an ex-human who, by overshooting his mark, has regressed into sub-humanity. Having squandered his civilized inheritance, he has lost both motive and aptitude for conducting Africans on to the higher ground he has himself deserted.¹³

Regarding African freedom, Barnes remarks:

There is not much of Locke or Rousseau in it; it owes little to French Revolution or Italian Risorgimento ... They instinctively apprehend that one does not enter society from the outside ... Hence Africans are untouched by the shallow cant of liberal individualism. Formulations such as freedom = absence of restraint, or freedom = presence of opportunity, astonish them by their empty abstraction. They perceive by the light of nature, without having to be told, that human freedom can exist only as a co-operative phenomenon, a group product of a special kind of social order.¹⁴

Our concern throughout is with a mediating cooperative foundational phenomenon, grounding a transposed and novel kind of social order, and the second chapter focuses on a key feature of what Mumford calls world-cultural humanity. Fr. Doran's concern is to develop a depth psychology integral with Lonergan's intentionality analysis which would make possible an appropriation of religious and moral conversion within the third stage of meaning. His work points towards

a humility that is reflectively and psychically possessive of its own nescience, thus grounding the foundational dynamic of an authentic post-modern culture, a central mediation of the search for direction in the movement of life, be that life in the African bush or in Boston. Fr. Doran's invitation is to a difficult integral search for refined personal genuineness constitutive of foundational post-modern adequacy. Both the invitation and the genuineness rest within the "startling strangeness"¹⁵ of critical realism, the primary achievement of which is already no mean task.

Michael Vertin's contribution centres on that primary achievement of intellectual conversion, articulating that conversion in such a thorough fashion as to provide a comprehensive schema of sets of basic suppositions about cognition. He thus articulates not only the fundamental components of the critical realist position but also the varieties of the absence of such components. The essay is an uncompromising acceptance of Lonergan's invitation to "make conversion a topic",¹⁶ spelling out with discomfoting precision the possibilities of falling short of the learning, identification and orientation¹⁷ involved in luminous control of the meanings of cognition.

While Lonergan writes explicitly of only three conversions and five generic differentiations of consciousness it is plausible to suppose that there are five generic types of conversion and of differentiation that can be put in loose correspondence. By happy coincidence the five chapters of the volume can also be put into loose correspondence with these generic types of foundational personality development. Michael Vertin, clearly, focuses on intellectual conversion. Fr. Doran's energies have been devoted to thematizing the conversion of the psyche. My own stress is on that shift to authentic nescience that relates to the second level of consciousness which I call theoretic conversion. Frederick Lawrence's essay can be seen as centering on religious conversion. Finally, Fr. Crowe's chapter calls for, and points to, authentic scholarship, and it has occurred to me that such scholarship can be related to refinements of moral conversion. For, authentic scholarship would seem to be a sympathetic openness to the village strangeness of a universe of differentiated persons cradled in sin yet rocked¹⁸ by Divine Love.

Such scholarship is called forth by the pain of oratio obliqua in the presence, however opaque, of infinite conversation. Finally, I would note an asymmetry. Moral conversion and religious conversion are prior to their related refinements. Carmelite mysticism, for instance, presupposes Christian conversion. On the three lower levels of consciousness, however, differentiation is prior to basic conversion: so, for example, one has to devote oneself with lengthy seriousness to understanding electrons, or stones - whatever - before one is moved to theoretic conversion.

Lawrence's chapter seeks a perspective on the mediation by Christian conversion of the reality and the foundational thematic of the human good. He uses Lonergan's structuring of the ongoing dynamics of community as heuristic structure and as newly naming what we are looking for when we ask, "What's the right way to live?". Within that heuristic he locates the contribution and disorientation both of ancient philosophy and of the waves of modern political thought identified by Leo Strauss, to reveal how these orientations have engendered pervasive languages subtly reductive of meaning and value. He sees entry into the conversation that is third-stage repentant Christian conversion as central to the dynamic of appropriating a new foundational language and thus generating a new life-story redemptively beyond the distorting success stories of modernity. Under the dynamic of the Spirit of the Risen Jesus a shift in probabilities is called forth to displace the dominant liberal languages of achievement in favour of the story of one who suffers, dies, rises, befriends. This shift in probabilities is mediated by a third-stage self-luminous Christian foundational framework revelatory of divinity and community as intrinsically conversational.

There is a biographic dimension to these essays which deserves attention in relation to elderhood and the incarnation of general categories in the third stage of meaning. It was a dimension to which we adverted early in our discussions. The basic issue is the dialectic genesis and incarnation of a luminosity of anamnesis and prolepsis in one's odyssey within the Iliad of history. A closely related issue is the nature of discipleship, and we spent some time on the varieties of resentments, biases, neuroses, which

exclude open critical discipleship.

One moves towards serious foundational interest, and one reaches a positional ship-shaped adequacy of personal foundations only through discomfiting adult growth. That movement is not the call¹⁹ of many: one of our twentieth century difficulties is the assumption of a well-populated democracy of first-rate thinkers; there are, in fact, few Beethovens, and there is nothing wrong with being a second-rate fiddler. But in so far as the movement occurs, that reach and reaching can be expected to take on the character of a multiply-differentiated sensitized search for direction in the movement of biography and history that, in third stage realization, is integrally open, incarnate, poetic. Harold Bloom notes of Yeats: "Yeats most characteristic kind of poem could be called the dramatic lyric of internalized quest ... as though the poet himself as quest-hero undertook continually an odyssey of the spirit".²⁰ Yeats himself remarked: "why should we honor those who die upon the field of battle; a man can show as reckless a courage entering into the abyss of himself".²¹

Foundations persons, and through their mediation all functional specialists, are called towards, into, and beyond positional authentic subjectivity: the calling is a central life-story, paradoxically both personal biography and total history, and the luminous ingestion of both. So, though it is deeply solitary, it is not the solitariness of "the state of being Blake named Ulro, the hell of the selfhood-communer. The Solitary is in negative quest, in vain flight away from his own creative potential".²²

In Lonergan one may come to recognize a profound converse of Blake's Ulro, and it is as an aid to this recognition of fidelity to the inner creative potential that Fr. Crowe's essay fittingly concludes our volume. Fr. Crowe does not enter into personal biography, a story of unique dedication to discovering and promoting the discovery of Lonergan and his enterprise.²³ He seeks rather to signpost Lonergan's own slow climb to cognitional foundations. Beginning with Lonergan's studies within the Thomist context, he indicates the manner in which Lonergan moved beyond the language of that context to refine the Thomist solution

and move fully into a contemporary context. Fr. Crowe identifies Insight as an invitation to exercises, a pragmatic engagement, calculated to yield the core of foundations, and he notes, with Lonergan, that "the foundation to be reached will be no more secure or solid than the inquiry utilized to reach it".²⁴ He goes on to indicate the emergence both of a deeper interest in the existential subject and of foundations as a theme after the completion of Insight, and the manner in which Lonergan envisaged foundations in the late fifties. The foundations of 1959 are not those of 1972 or later, but Lonergan had reached a plateau, a high base camp, which contains his secure cognitional foundations.

At the beginning of his chapter, Fr. Crowe notes that work in this volume "is an effort in a sense to go beyond a point we have not yet reached", and, as I have indicated, his view was a common ground of our collaboration. But I do not think that it is a common assumption among readers of Lonergan's works, and so I am led to prolong this preface first with some reflections on the slow personal growth in foundational meaning, then with some considerations of the remote and massive transformation of science and commonsense²⁵ that can be mediated only by academic commitment to such slow growth. The first reflections will, I hope, encourage younger people towards a patient critical heartfelt nescience in their search for wholesome meaning, but the reflections will also, I suspect, call forth resentment from some of those belonging to what might be called the Lonergan establishment who may feel that they are in essential control of Lonergan's meaning. What is at stake is a deep discontinuity in the meaning of philosophic growth mediative of cultural discontinuity, and in such a cultural crisis there is, to use Fr. Crowe's words, "need for a measure of bluntness".²⁶ The brief considerations of transformation with which I conclude aim at giving some concrete impressions of the rich remote discontinuity: hopefully, they will serve as encouragement in the refusal of half-measures. "What will count is a perhaps not numerous center, big enough to be at home in both the old and the new, painstaking enough to work out one by one the transitions to be made, strong enough to refuse half-measures and insist on complete solutions even though it has to wait".²⁷

Let me begin by reflecting on the lecture just quoted.

I can still recall the shock of hearing Lonergan deliver it in the summer of 1965. It intimated a massive shift in the meaning of the man. Later, in the early seventies, my wife and I undertook to make typescripts of lectures given earlier in the sixties relating to meaning. One could hear, sense, from the tapes over those years, a change of tone, of embodiment, in Lonergan's expression of his meaning of meaning. Later came the various versions of chapter three of Method in Theology. It is a chapter on which I have lectured for some weeks in perhaps twenty courses during the past decade. I still find its meaning elusive: but then, after twenty-five years of reaching for the meaning of Insight, I find it also elusive.

Now in this discovery and self-discovery I seem to be an oddity. I recall meeting a scholar, after I had grappled with Insight for nearly a decade, and in the course of conversation he claimed that after a year with the book he felt he had a comfortable grasp of its essentials. Again, I was once both amused and surprised at a leading "Lonergan specialist" when I found him disconcerted at my efforts to disclose the meaning of "a flexible circle of ranges of schemes of recurrence"²⁸ in terms of the descriptive zoology of rabbits in burrows and fields, eating, mating, fleeing etc., within various patterns of sensibility. He had, it seemed, settled for "the plain meaning of the text". Then there was the learned fellow who reacted to my claim that I found metaphysics altogether more difficult than quantum electrodynamics or relativity by asserting that, on the contrary, metaphysics was much easier than physics. And there was the solemn comedian at the Florida conference who asked Lonergan whether he had discovered feelings by reading Scheler: to which Lonergan replied, "I've got feelings too". And so on: anecdotes could be multiplied, for I fear that I write not of exceptions but of a rule. So that I have wondered regularly, in these past decades, what can be going on in these minds, these bones, these lives?²⁹

A first level of answer to the question is in terms of nominalisms, fragmentations and sub-differentiations of consciousness, scotomae, anxieties, resentments, biases. A deeper level locates these in genetical-dialectic system as a central feature of the second

stage of meaning: primitive and post-modern linguistic meaning have discontinuously better schemes and schedules of probability than the axial millenia of forked tongues. And, of course, that system must be a praxis: the solution to the problem is not a treatise on its expression but a therapy of its roots. Such a praxis is remote. Doran's work pushes forward in one major direction, but gradually a larger enterprise will call on orthomolecular medicine,³⁰ transcultural reflexology, biorhythmic analysis - including the larger rhythms of water, walkabout, space-poetics - the redemptive transposition of dream and fantasy, sexuality and friendship,³¹ the admission of the centrality of theoretic conversion and the mediative thematization of existential metaxic plausibility.

Let us turn from envisaging such remote possibilities of the epiphany and discouragement of nominalism in history to some lighter comments that may help us to discourage the nominalist in ourselves.

Besides anecdotes of tragic individuals there are anecdotes of conference comedy. I resist the anecdotal urge regarding the latter, however, preferring to make one discomfiting suggestion. It seems to me that, of those who attend Lonergan conferences, much fewer than 10% have been moved to theoretic conversion and to the strangeness of the contemporary intellectual conversion that it providentially³² may mediate. The peculiarity of such gatherings, however, is that there lurks in the group the unexpressed assumption that somehow not a few have seen the light of a contemporary critical realism. This, of course, may well be an unwelcome observation: but at least it makes conversion a topic! And I may further decrease my popularity by suggesting that there is a fruitful parallel to be made between The Finnegans Wake Experience³³ and what I would call the Lonergans Wake experience, that there is a lesson to be learned from Roland McHugh.

McHugh's book describes his odyssey with Joyce, and includes some delightfully relevant satirical asides on the rocks and sirens of Joycean studies. So, writing from his background as a specialist in grasshopper acoustics, he remarks, "grasshopper sexuality is primarily acoustic: a female will walk away from a silent male towards a loudspeaker emitting male song.

So each male surrounds itself with a fluid territory which it keeps saturated with its own song. I eventually discovered that professors at James Joyce Symposia behaved similarly".³⁴ Of a week-long conference in Trinity College, Dublin, consisting largely of papers by American professors with roots in "the early Joycean industry", McHugh writes: "I could smell ignorance of the text ... It was impossible to get down to intelligent discussion of FW at any point during the week".³⁵

McHugh later tried a different strategy: the examination of particularly difficult passages by a competent study group. Certainly it is a strategy that those who come together with serious interest in Lonergan's writings might take up: what, for instance, is the praxis called for by the lines and paragraphs of Insight, page 464 or Method in Theology, page 250?

In writing thus about the reading of, or failure to read, Lonergan or Joyce, I am not putting the men and their achievements on a par. For one thing, they operate in different fields of meaning and expression. More important, however, for my present points regarding Lonergan's Wake is Lonergan's heuristic containment, in lagging expression, not only of Joyce but of meaning and expression in its second stage. To Lonergan's writings, Walter Benjamin's law of history, "there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism",³⁶ applies in a unique fashion. For Benjamin's law applies with particularly high schedules of probability to the second stage of meaning, and Lonergan's documents are documents of a transition of civilization, a leap forward beyond those schedules. If professors, then, can maul a literary genius of the second stage of meaning, one can expect a massive industry of shrunken linguistic meaning when a genius points to a stage of meaning the glimpse of which requires the discomfiting leaps named conversions and the dialectical growth of refining differentiations and feelings.

I would conclude these cautionary notes with two reflections: the first on Lonergan's lagging expression, already mentioned; the second on what I may call Lonergan's Way.

I have noted that Lonergan's writings are documents of cultural, indeed axial, transition. I would further

note, however, that his astonishingly cared-for and controlled expression is not the language of that later origination of meaning. Plato's glimpse of the problematic mediated by theoretic conversion led Plato only to "a highly literate dialogue".³⁷ As Lonergan's Verbum articles show, in their subtle turn to the subject, "neither Aristotle nor Aquinas handled the matter in a triumphantly definitive fashion".³⁸ By the 1970's, Lonergan could write: "at a higher level of linguistic development, the possibility of insight is achieved by linguistic feedback, by expressing the subjective experience in words and as subjective".³⁹ But the language of Lonergan's writings was not mediated by an enlargement of such insight into possibilities of expression. It suffers the normal lags of abnormally creative intelligence. It lacks the sting of a linguistic envelopment and confinement⁴⁰ in a clearer statistics of authentic or inauthentic subjectivities. It is merciful to, and at the mercy of, the second stage of meaning.

Finally, there is the issue of Lonergan's Way. "Does Lonergan offer a theory or a way?" was a regular topic at the Florida conference in 1970. Perhaps the problem may be better focused by noting that the issue centres on the fact that "it is quite difficult to be at home"⁴¹ in one's odyssey in history. If it is possible to illuminate the home and the homegoing, then "that is something that each one, ultimately, has to do in himself and for himself".⁴² Lonergan established the possibility by incarnating its actuality and detachedly documenting its dynamics. Both the incarnation and the documentation called for the thematic of the fully contemporary operative integral heuristic structure of being at home⁴³ that is a metaphysics sublated by foundations. The thematic certainly can be called a theory if one stretches the meaning of theory. But the thematic can be possessed only by going the way "to discover oneself in oneself".⁴⁴

Lonergan's Way is not Lonergan's nor is it for everyone. It would seem, however, that it is normative for authentic academic living in the third stage of meaning. The later stages of modernity are an epiphany of its need. It is a "vast undertaking ... that calls for years in which one's living is more or less constantly absorbed in the effort to understand"⁴⁵ understanding

and meaning. At the centre of that lifestyle is the darkness of mystery, focused by inverse insight,⁴⁶ and the way remains a climb, so that "late in life, with indomitable courage, we continue to say that we are going to do what we have not yet done: we are going to build a house".⁴⁷

From these few remarks on adult academic growth we move to some illustrative considerations of the transposition of science and commonsense to be mediated by that community's growth in the next millenium and beyond. It is a matter of history moving dialectically forward out of a fragmented and neurotic adolescence. We will consider in turn the transposition of journalism, management, education and logic. The considerations, and their sequence, are not arbitrary, but draw attention to what may be called the vacuum of the functional specialties of oratio recta.⁴⁸ Up to this point in the preface I have stressed the remote foundational achievement of Lonergan as expressed particularly in the oratio recta of Insight and Method in Theology. My illustrations intimate, I hope, the wider gap between personal foundational achievement, great or small, and the richness of the implementation essential to metaphysics.⁴⁹ Thus, journalism's entrapment helps to lend distant perspective to the heuristics of the specialty of communications; theories and activities of management draw forth the vacuum for a new systematics; massive doctrinal alienation in education helps call us out of a simpler age's view of doctrines. Finally, logic and its still undiscovered foundations in the subject may lift us to a suspicion of the fragmented and truncated logics of foundations operative not only in every other field of human endeavour but tragically in that Queen of Science where self's luminous ultimacy is central.

In my pursuit of some grasp of schemes and patterns of government, education, oppression in present mainland China, it was inevitable that I should rely heavily on varieties of journalism. But the reliance can be sufficiently tutored to lead one to suspect that there is a need for a Chinese Chesterton or Kraus.

In its broadest sense, journalism has genera and species that owe their distinctiveness to different realms of meaning, different art forms, different cultures and sub-cultures. Here I wish only to make some few points

regarding printed linguistic meaning informedly oriented to relatively undifferentiated consciousness. The Gutenberg galaxy includes, of course, a massive flow of uninformedly oriented print: even Einstein had the uninformed urge to communicate a mythic essential of relativity that seemed to by-pass the burden of theory, and present theology is regularly doubly uninformed in taking Aquinas less seriously than Einstein did: "cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam: et sic in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur".⁵⁰

Present journalism in its usual limited sense, however highly regarded, cannot fall within the third-stage meaning requirement of informedness. So, John Fraser can write, "I do not take the orthodox approach to journalism in China. By instinct and training, I had a predisposition to push beyond observable facts: to me, as a theatre and dance critic, the creative well-spring of any action seemed as important to understand and report as the manifestation of the action itself".⁵¹ But such an interest and a predisposition are a far cry from a painful reaching towards an epochal shift to "the profounder meaning of the name, intelligible"⁵² which would call forth slowly the new twists, turns, and tensions of expression that would lift the community into its own mysterious presence.

The difficulty is fortunately⁵³ deeper. Fr. Crowe has remarked that the twenty-fifth century will look back on our newspapers as we look back now on fifteenth-century slavery. Roger Poole calls, in our philosophic darkness, for new "hieroglyphs" to manifest "counter-objectivity" and deep subjectivity.⁵⁴ Karl Kraus, the Austrian Chesterton,⁵⁵ gave life-witness to his epiphany that "the shouts of newspaper-boys announcing in mysterious vowels latest editions, became monstrous threats to man's spiritual safety or shrieks of anguish from the lowest deep",⁵⁶ and his Last Days of Mankind⁵⁷ bears massive testimony to the "black magic" of our times:

Its heroes are troglodytes living in the skyscrapers of history, barbarians having at their disposal all the amenities and high explosives of technical progress, fish-mongers acting the role of Nelson, ammunition

salesmen crossing Rubicons, and hired scribblers tapping out the heroic phrases of the bards. And there are, on the more passive and pathetic side, their victims on active service: farm laborers with a few weeks of battle training, honest-to-goodness little people with pensionable salaries and paid holidays, decent folk whose imagination is unable to grasp even a fragment of the horror which they are commanded to inflict upon the world by faithfully serving machines, pulling levers and pressing buttons. And the effects are registered by men whose imagination is blunted and whose moral judgment is corrupted by the insidious poison of journalistic language which has emptied the word of all its reality and meaning.⁵⁸

So it is that "never has adequately differentiated consciousness been more difficult to achieve. Never has the need to speak effectively to undifferentiated consciousness been greater".⁵⁹

My task here, however, is the modest one of calling attention to the dimensions of the journey of labour towards the slow emergence in later centuries of a new journalism, mediated by the complex executive reflection of Communications under the eightfold dynamic of method. That labour and dynamic will reach for and promote a quite new literary presence⁶⁰ of transposed originating meanings,⁶¹ a carefilled luminous presence speaking biography to biography within history in a language beyond "Oxen of the Sun".⁶²

The second illustration of transposition focuses on management. Since the early days of founding father Drucker it has blossomed into a host of specialized fields and journals. Yet there is a sense in which Drucker, almost unknowingly, specifies its study as essentially flawed: "a man who knows only the skills and techniques, without understanding the fundamentals of management is not a manager; he is, at best, a technician".⁶³ As in journalism, so in management, there is need for the mediation of luminous interiority if it is to escape from being a nominalist technique, a technique moreover at the mercy of the complex of

disorientations of modern culture. "As long as one is content to be guided by one's commonsense, to disregard the pundits of every class whether scientific or cultural or religious, one need not learn what goes on in one's black box. But when one moves beyond the limits of commonsense competence, when one wishes to have an opinion of one's own on larger issues, then one had best know just what one is doing. Otherwise one too easily will be duped and too readily be exploited. Then explicit intellectual self-transcendence becomes a real need".⁶⁴

Certain directions of Japanese management, looking to a principle of vagueness,⁶⁵ and grounding a "7 - S framework"⁶⁶ for reflection on management, may seem to open new doors. But what is needed is the quite different implementation of the transpositional possibilities of what I have elsewhere called the 7 Pillars of Wisdom,⁶⁷ and the transformation of the principle of vagueness into a perspective on subsidiarity and authority.⁶⁸ Again, the authors of In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America's Best Run Companies have it right when they say "treating people - not money, machines, or minds - as the natural resource, may be the key to it all".⁶⁹ And they locate the basic clash involved in apparent optimization: "it is in essence the co-existence of firm central direction and maximum individual autonomy".⁷⁰ The issue is luminous personal control: "The necessity of rational control has ceased to be a question, and the one issue is the locus of that control. Is it to be absolutist from above downwards? Is it to be democratic from below upwards? ...".⁷¹ Where Adolf Lowe would speak of capitalized Control⁷² I would focus on microautonomy, and the need for an epochal shift in the subtlety of personal control. "Changes in the control of meaning mark off the great epochs in human history".⁷³

Yet the above comments are indicative only of the transposition of management from the elementary perspective of Insight. There is the deeper perspective of Method in Theology and functional specialization. Despite a growing awareness in the literature of management as culture-specific, and an increasing problematic of specialized studies much as has emerged in other fields,⁷⁴ there is little ground for optimism regarding

the early adoption of that deeper perspective. Management is as ancient as building a pyramid or a phalanx, and the late modern period has left it narrowed into a web of conceptualisms, welfarisms, centralisms, illegitimate authoritarianisms. What is needed is not some single contemporary systematics grounding management technique, but a genetical-dialectic Pragmatics between which and actual management in any culture there would lie the mediating specialty of executive reflection. This creative symbiosis of Pragmatics and Communications would concretely contextualize future management within a perspective of third-stage culture that would relativize management structures to particular cultures and stages of development in cultures. Such Pragmatics and Communications have very low schedules of probability of emergence in this century.

From the comments on the transposition of journalism and management it should be evident that the more fundamental shift in education to be envisaged cannot be in simple continuity either with traditional humanist, scientific and technical educational structures or with anti-traditional perspectives that stress ecstasy, openness, non-oppression, crap-detection, deschooling, whatever. Nor are the educational structures of the third stage of meaning manifest from the viewpoint of Lonergan's remote foundations. In a seminar on education, Lonergan, in speaking of art, remarked: "What I want to communicate in this talk on art is the notion that art is relevant to concrete living, that it is extremely important in our age when philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on economics, politics and education, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make human life unlivable".⁷⁵ But what might be the methodological doctrines of educational transposition that would mediate the specialties of planning and executive reflection, grounding novel schemes for different cultures and different age-levels in structures of open livabilities? One is made deeply aware of tasks still to be envisaged and undertaken when one pauses, with such questions, over the vacuum that is the oratio recta of the last three functional specialties.

But one may pause helpfully over descriptions of present established counterpositional schemes of education in

China, Canada, Chile: marxist exclusion of the concrete quest of child and adult is matched in the so-called free world by the systematic truncation of educator and educated. Indeed I may usefully recount my experience and short-term strategy in my own small university, no exception to free-world truncation. The university has various departments with child studies as a basic interest that have also in common a far-from-subtle systematic disinterest in the question as datum. Recently I managed to introduce a one-semester course having as title The Child as Quest. Its content conflicts directly, needless to say, with that of the departments mentioned - which at least says something for academic freedom. Early in that course I invite my students - as I invite my readers now - to do an elementary exercise: a "descriptive noticing" of the absence, in the indices of bulky textbooks on Child Psychology etc., of any entry under "Q" (some textbooks do have entries under questionnaire!). Such a descriptive noting is scarcely a beginning, and my strategy is only a thumb in a dyke against the waters of truncation. How does one break the established schemes of recurrence of the self-neglecting educators of educators?

The distant goal is an ongoing genesis of schemes of education with focus not on content in the educated but on quest in all, so that the central educational achievement is a felt epiphany of odyssean grounds in history.

We turn, fourthly, to the transposition of logic: for what locks academics, educators, out from themselves is a massively fragmenting logic of self-neglect.

Lonergan, in his lectures on mathematical logic, notes that Hellmut Stoffer distinguishes six types of logic needed to classify expressed forms of thinking: (1) Plane, (2) Dialectical, (3) Existential, (4) Magical, (5) Mystical, (6) Hermeneutical.⁷⁶ Elsewhere, Lonergan draws on Susanne Langer to speak of a logic of aesthetics which would seem to deserve a separate classification.⁷⁷ What Lonergan aims at in his lectures on mathematical logic is a foundation of that logic which, as one might expect, grounds logic in the subject luminous to self. But that foundation, Lonergan goes on to say, "is sufficient not only for traditional and mathematical logic, but also for

considerations of dialectical, existential, magical, mystical and hermeneutical logic".

Here I wish only to make some concluding comments on what might be called culture-relative eclectic confining logics. An adequate heuristic of such logics would call for the heuristic of the full transposition of logics that Lonergan points to in his notes and lectures on logic, and one may suspect that the corresponding transposition of all logics is remote. The remoteness perhaps becomes more plausible and acceptable through some reflection, both on Lonergan's interest in and discussion of logic, and on logic in relation to the stages of meaning.

Lonergan's interest in logic developed in the late twenties, and I suspect that the article "The Form of Inference",⁷⁸ published much later, was a product of this period. It represents a remarkable foundational shift, revealing "the quite different basis of valid inference"⁷⁹ which, grasped by the subject in his own performance, can initiate the transposition of plane logic. There is little evidence in the literature that such a beginning is occurring: incompleteness theorems and decision problems in modern logic relate more to mechanization than to mind.⁸⁰

The refinements of Lonergan's view on logic through the decades to follow have still to be traced, but one main point may be made that is centrally relevant to our topic. There occurs a deepening appreciation of the pressure, even within plane logic itself, towards the shift from logic to method: what the history and the metahistory of human searching bring forth is the partially luminous ongoing genesis of methods. Being reflectively at home in transcendental method is simply the integral effort to render that ongoing genesis of procedure luminous, in existential degrees, to proceeding subjects.

Lonergan's fuller perspective makes possible a new contextualization of the development of plane logic in the West. In the conclusion of their standard treatise on that subject, Kneale and Kneale note the necessity in our time "to strive for greater precision in the characterization of logic".⁸¹ But the striving is blocked by truncation. What is needed is the

larger perspective, possible only through procedural analysis, of stages of meaning in which the development of logic as it is described by Kneale and Kneale becomes a phenomenon of the second stage of meaning calling for its contextualization by, and characterization in, method.

From the envisagement of such a remote task let us come to a closing comment on eclectic logics, relating them not to the present and future of commonsense, but to present theological and philosophical commonsense, thus closing this preface on the issue of academic searching with which it began.

Commonsense, with its incomplete set of insights and its variety of likely disorientations, operates within a framework of overlapping logics. Insights added to its set are contained by the operative logics and involve no basic horizon shift even when there is manifest cultural shifting: driving a Cadillac instead of a cow is not a leap into theory or interiority. Unless consciousness is compact, it is rarely integral. If it is academic, it cannot be relatively compact without living under subtle mutiny, in anxiety, taking refuge in post-scientific technical literacy or in eclectic scholarship. In theology, despite the less subtle presence as topic of mutinous transcendence, it can settle massively in such refuge in the manner described by Frederick Lawrence: "the paradigm of correlations almost universally adopted by theologians who are not just historians today".⁸² So it can generate, with second-stage-meaning obstinacy, "sets of terms and relations that ... do not differ in any fundamental way from the symbol systems that have been characteristic of process theologies within that venerable trajectory that stretches back at least to Pythagoras and comes through the early Christians, gnostics, and Fathers, right down to the speculations of the Kabbalah, Boehme, and Schelling".⁸³

We arrive, then, at the scandal of theology's foundational contribution to the inert schemes of opposition to the emergence of the third stage of meaning. What is lacking in the logic of such theological foundations is precisely the foundations of logic. Later transpositions of journalism, business, government, education, logic, will make that lack ever more manifest.

Before concluding, I wish to thank my colleagues in this volume, and those who helped us toward some light on our times. In particular, to the Jesuits of Upper Canada, sponsors of a fund to promote Method Institutes, we send warm thanks for financial support in bringing us together and making this work available.

What I have stressed in this preface is my suspicion that we are only at the beginning of history, that the next million years is on the side of the epiphany of quest and goal. Still, might we not end soon in a nuclear holocaust?

Part of the glory of history is man's envisagement of its schedules of probabilities and possibilities. If the sapling of history is cut down from within, still it can have, within, a vision of the temporal noosphere that, paradoxically, redeems God. The envisagement is the core of future academic growth: its opposite is an elderhood that is the fraud of being in reality "not old folk but young people of eighteen, very much faded".⁸⁴ Our molecules, "our arms and legs filled with sleeping memories",⁸⁵ passionately demand that we fly after the butterfly.

"There the butterfly flew away over the bright water, and the boy flew after it, hovering brightly and easily, flew happily through the blue space. The sun shone on his wings. He flew after the yellow and flew over the lake and over the high mountain, where God stood on a cloud and sang".⁸⁶

CHAPTER ONE

Middle Kingdom: Middle Man

(T'ien-hsia: i jen¹)

Philip McShane

Introduction

"Your Lord Jesus was na Chinese, heya? Then he is barbarian. And wat for you tell me this Jesus God is na new, when only he was na even born two thousand years ago, heya? This is plenty werry new. Ayee yah, our gods are five, ten thousand years old".²

Our topic is "Mind and the Mystery of Christ". From an adequate categorical perspective the topic is equivalently the ongoing discovery of mind and Mind and the Mystery of the Trinity in history. For, the heuristics of Foundations are concrete, providing the inner word of a worldview³ by which one thinks of the realities of mind and grace⁴ within the fullness of the emergent probability of meaning. Nor is the normative demand for such thinking solely an issue of Foundations. "The use of the general categories occurs in any of the eight functional specialties".⁵ So, for instance, one is not contemporary in research and interpretation if levels and sequences of expression are not reached for heuristically within the universal viewpoint,⁶ itself sublated by the subtleties of functional specialization. The dodging of that heuristic reaching constitutes "a sin of backwardness"⁷ in theology.

Backwardness in theology has been my concern since 1960, when I moved, from a contemporary world of teaching such elementary science as relativity theory, into a ghetto of common-sense eclecticism where I began my study of the Queen of the Sciences. Serious thinking was no longer required, nor, indeed, encouraged.

I write with that measure of bluntness which Fr. Crowe allowed himself in 1964, and I feel that his rhetorical question has more bite now: "Is there not room for a measure of bluntness at this stage?".⁸ So I would hazard that the discontinuity warranted by Lonergan's

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1. The intent of the preface is to give an intimation of the future communal academic heuristics towards which the spiralling of foundations through eight specialties turns subjects. See n.85 of the preface.
2. "Rakka eda ni / Kaeru to mireba / Kocho Kana". The haiku is quoted from L. van der Post, A Portrait of Japan, (photographs by Bert Glinn), William Morrow & Co., Inc., New York, 1968, 107.
3. See Lonergan, Method in Theology, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1972, 258-62, 273-76, 302-05; McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", Creativity and Method, ed. M. Lamb, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1981, 545.
4. See Lonergan, Philosophy of God and Theology, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1973; "The Natural Desire to see God", Collection, Herder and Herder, New York, 1967, 84-95. I will take the liberty of abbreviating the references, particularly to Lonergan's works, as the volume proceeds.
5. "In constructing a ship or a philosophy one has to go the whole way", Lonergan, Insight, Darton, Longman & Todd, London, 1957, xiii.
6. Of six projected volumes of Florida Conference papers, two were published. Lonergan wrote replies to the first three volumes.
7. James Joyce, Ulysses, 129.
8. In particular see McShane, "An Improbable Christian Vision and the Economic Rhythms of the Second Million Years", Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy, University Press of America, Washington, 1980, 92-111; "Authentic Subjectivity and International Growth: Foundations", The Shaping of the Foundations, UPA, 1976, 119-140.
9. Lonergan, De Deo Trino II, Pars Systematica, Gregorian University Press, Rome, 1964, 196-204.

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10. Method in Theology, 93-99.
11. E. Voegelin, The Ecumenic Age, Louisiana State University Press, 1974, 289.
12. Africa: A Subjective View, Longmans and Ghana U.P., 1964, 80.
13. Africa in Eclipse, London, Victor Gollancz, 1971, 19.
14. Ibid., 299-300.
15. Insight, xxviii.
16. Method in Theology, 253.
17. Insight, 558-60.
18. See Method in Theology, 19, n.5.
19. A theoretic of call requires a transposition of western and eastern spiritualities of discernment coupled with contemporary reaches into personality dynamics.
20. Harold Bloom, Yeats, Oxford University Press, 1970, 5-6.
21. Quoted in Richard Ellman, Yeats: The Man and the Masks, Dutton, N.Y., 1948, 5.
22. Bloom, op. cit., 10.
23. See F. E. Crowe, Method in Theology: An Organon for our Time, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1980.
- 24.
25. Insight, 393.
26. F. E. Crowe, "The Exigent Mind: Bernard Lonergan's Intellectualism", Spirit as Inquiry, Herder and Herder, N.Y., 1964, 27.
27. Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning", Collection, 267.

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28. Insight, 468.
29. It seems to me that there is a "terror of biography" that is analogous to what Eliade calls the "terror of history" (The Myth of the Eternal Return, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, 1955, 139-162), giving rise to "a precocious weariness, a fear of movement or spontaneity" (ibid., 155), cloaked easily in steady rhythms of some conventions of encounter, morality, recreation and research, cutting off a dialectic refinement of feelings (Method in Theology, 32-34, 66, 245). But I would add my conviction that growth into theoretic conversion is a key contemporary academic issue, in particular that theoretic conversion that can be mediated by the most elementary science, physics: I would consider this mediation to be a central message of Insight. See also notes 31, 60 below.
30. "Significant improvement in the mental health of many persons might be achieved by the provision of the optimum concentration of substances normally present in the human body". Linus Pauling, "Orthomolecular Psychiatry", Orthomolecular Psychiatry, edited by D. Hawkins and L. Pauling, W. H. Freeman & Co., San Francisco, 1973, 11.
31. A praxis of friendship requires not only a full metaxic context (see Insight, 731 n. Special categories have a context from De Deo Trino II, Pars Systematica, on the historical reality of divine missions) but refinements of general categories inclusive of odysseic differentiations and tensions of interpersonal resonances. A start might be made by thus contextualizing and complexifying Lonergan's "Finality, Love, Marriage", (Collection, 16-53).
32. Lonergan's general and special categories point towards a massive transposition of the contemporary descriptive thesis regarding "history as revelation". The immediate issue, however, is the particular fact that such realities as

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- electrons and the understandings of them in these last centuries are part of history. They, like the mysteries of Christ, can lead us "ad amorem invisibilium".
33. Roland McHugh, Irish Academic Press, 1981.
34. Op. cit., 57.
35. Ibid., 59.
36. Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, edited with an introduction by Hannah Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn, New York, 1968, 258.
37. Insight, 572.
38. Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. D. Burrell, University of Notre Dame Press, 1967, ix.
39. Method in Theology, 88 n.34.
40. Insight, 484, 522, 571. The sting refers both to the shift in expression and to the related shift in statistics.
41. Method in Theology, 14.
42. Ibid.
43. Insight, 391.
44. Method in Theology, 260.
45. Insight, 186.
46. De Deo Trino I, 274.
47. Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, 61.
48. Method in Theology, 133.
49. See McShane, The Shaping of the Foundations, 140. The transposition and differentiations of the

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task of implementation is a further complex question.

50. In Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 1.
51. John Fraser, The Chinese, Portrait of a People, Collins, Toronto, 1980, 17.
52. Insight, 647.
53. I think here of the foundations person's need of post-modern general categories of "the normality of suffering" (Eliade, *op. cit.*, n. 29 above, 95-102) and the realities of basic sin, to contextualize the special categories of absolutely supernatural justice (De Verbo Incarnato, theses 14-17). Such general categories are needed for the transposition not only of the language to which Lawrence draws attention, but also of the languages of Christian asceticism.
54. R. Poole, Towards Deep Subjectivity, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1972, 16.
55. Kraus and Chesterton died in the same week, at the same age, 1936. An obituary essay on Kraus by Aurel Kolnai speaks of them as "the two magicians of common sense" (quoted in "Karl Kraus and the struggle against the modern gnostics" by Bela Menczer, The Dublin Review, 1950, Vol. 224, 37).
56. Erich Heller, "Karl Kraus: Satirist in the Modern World", The Disinherited Mind, Bowes and Bowes, London, 1975, 243.
57. Karl Kraus, Die letzten Tage der Menschheit, Teil 1, 2. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munchen, 1975. Unfortunately, little of Kraus is available in English. See the essays cited in notes 55, 56.
58. Heller, *op. cit.*, n.56, 243.
59. Method in Theology, 99.

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60. Integral presence, to self and others, is a remote possibility in this late modern period. An abundance of technical language constitutes an absence (Method in Theology, 73) even of professors in classrooms. The retreat from differentiation of sexual intercourse (Method in Theology, 58-9), a pinnacle of presence in modern media, is haunted by fragmentations and isolations of consciousness. The "series of zones from the ego or moi intime to the outer rind of the persona" (Insight, 470) are venerated by roles of spoken avoidance (see p.88 above with Lawrence's chapter as context). Jaspers' "Existenz encountering Existenz", (see n.73, chapter one) ceases to be a comprehensible topic. Integral mutual presence, biography meeting biography by speaking and listening and acting with scholarly delicacy within history, stands deeply elusive, not just in journalism or politics or theology, but even in marriage.
61. The context is Method in Theology, 47-52.
62. See p.16 below.
63. Peter Drucker, Management, Harper and Row, New York, 1974, 17.
64. From a lecture Lonergan delivered at Hobart and Williams Colleges, October 10, 1974, entitled "Self-Transcendence: Intellectual, Moral, Religious".
65. Richard Tanner Pascale and Anthony G. Athos, The Art of Japanese Management, Penguin, 1983, 90 ff., 110 ff.
66. *Ibid.*, 202 *et passim*.
67. McShane, Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations, University Press of America, Washington, 1978, chs. 2 and 6.
68. See Lonergan, "Dialectic of Authority", Boston College Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 3, 1974, 26-30.

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69. T. J. Peters and R. H. Waterman Jr., Harper and Row pb., New York, 1982, 39.
70. Ibid., 318.
71. From an unpublished typescript of Lonergan on economics. More fully, P. McShane, "Lonergan and the Actual Context of Economics", Creativity and Method, ed. M. Lamb, 557-58.
72. See notes 86, 89 and 90 of chapter one.
73. Lonergan, "Dimensions of Meaning", Collection, 256.
74. See e.g., McShane, The Shaping of the Foundations, ch. 2 on musicology's needs and Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy, ch. 4, on the ferment towards functional specialization in literary studies.
75. See n. 93 of chapter one.
76. Hellmut Stoffer, "Die moderne Ansätze zu einer Logik der Denkformen", Zeit. f. phil. Forschung 10, 1956, 442-466, 601-621. Fr. Crowe describes Lonergan's notes on logic below, 126-27.
77. Susanne Langer, Feeling and Form, Scribner, New York, 1953, index under logic, non-discursive. Lonergan's comments are in the lectures referred to in n.93 of chapter one.
78. Collection, 1-14.
79. Insight, 576.
80. On this topic, see Judson Chambers Webb, Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics, Reidel Publishing Co., Holland, 1980.
81. William Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978, 739.

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82. F. Lawrence, "Method in Theology as Hermeneutical", Creativity and Method, 82.
83. Ibid., 83.
84. M. Proust, Remembrance of Times Past, Random House, New York, Vol. 2, 1042.
85. Ibid., 2, 874. I would enlarge the meaning of "memory" here beyond Proust. Enlist St. Thomas' meaning of memoria (see Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 92-94). The incarnate subject can move to remember, re-member, the intentio entis et valoris that subjects are and might be, can remember differentiatedly the eightfold spiral of anamnesis and prolepsis. Add the pointers of notes 29, 31, 60 above. At this stage, perhaps, the compendious meaning of the title word "presently" has been noticed. A psychological presence in history is envisaged that presents, aims, with a transposed differentiated prudentialia, towards the movement of history in its relevation of presences and presents (see Method in Theology, the index, under gift).
86. Hermann Hesse, Wandering, translated by James Wright, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1972, 89.