1

## **SOFDAWARE 5**

## **Care** Reaching for *Completeness*

March 2004

Let us take our bearings.<sup>1</sup> We are still turning page 249 of *Method*, to arrive at page 250. We are still cherishing "*Assembly* includes". But now we make our first move to humble exercise in assuming some inclusion. There is a complex sense of humility involved here, related both to a minimal meaning for "foundations of starters" and to the fact that the whole process is in a starting state.<sup>2</sup>

Even were our foundations as rich or richer than those named by Lonergan, humble moving is something that demands establishing through a cultural rescue from myth in philosophy and theology. Very few doctorates in physics or botany represent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>I have a difficulty here. *Our* is ambiguous. I write to and with our small group but I must think of **our** in the fullest sense: that is the task of foundational fantasy. You shall find that most of my larger nudging goes into the footnotes, though I do allow myself to flash forward like a sunflower in the final pages here. Yet I would note that that is common in, say, a first year physics course. We are dealing with the massive problem of a commonsense *ethos* in philosophy and theology. In the developed sciences there is a culture of growth: simply wander into a class of the next year's subjects and sense it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>You might go to *Lack in the Beingstalk* ch. 4 for a context, but this is a complex issue that needs a book: or better, collaborative writing emerging from the Quodlibet series. In the present essay you will find us moving beyond "beginners' talk" near the end. This is, as I mentioned, not unusual in physics or chemistry: problems come up quite early that can only be solved in a third of fourth year course. The present desperate state of theology and philosophy is that there is no analogous *ethos*. Thomas regularly uses *sicut*, and Lonergan talks of parallels with successful sciences - a parallel between philosophy and physics dominates *Insight* - but the challenge of *Comparison* lifts these random asides into a central place, as we shall see. This, I know, is overload, but my writing here is both for our group as beginners and for the long trail of lifting theology out of its perennial general bias. A further contexts for reflection here is *The Redress of Poise*, chapter 7: "Grace: The Final Frontier", which points to the sad failure to bring the central substantial act of finitude, the grace of the Incarnation, into pastoral radiance. Are you beginning to sense that *assembly* is a massively remote project?! And are you ready for the eschatological overtones of *completion*?

massive paradigm leaps or even significant sub-paradigm advances. But beyond that humility there is a humility in recognizing, cognizing,<sup>3</sup> our common low foundational level. In SOFDAWARE 7 we shall see how that problem is to be handled efficiently in the functioning of the cycle of specialties, but here I think it as well to recall the tolerance expressed in assuming minimal foundational commitment: two foundational principles are suggested: [a] assume that we are trying to be sensable<sup>4</sup> [b] assume that we all acknowledge, however, vaguely, the need for the 8-fold division of labor.<sup>5</sup> And then there is the humility of being beginners in the entire cyclic process of specialization.<sup>6</sup>

Our problem now is to find a starting place, a starting book: each of us may go in a different direction. At present, while there are many books that express the author's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>I trust that in a first reading, in our present introductory effort, you are slipping past such notes as this. Yet it is vital to face this issue of cognizing and *completing* personally in these next few years. There is an ontogenetic problem that parallels the phylogenetic problem, both of which are final topics in this short essay. It is the crisis of an openness to growth literally beyond present dreams. At its simplest, there is the psychic battle against an assumed perspective on aging that cuts down on the probabilities of you noting e.g. that a week or a year of thinking at my age relates to larger growth of understanding than at your younger age: the gap between us increases. I appeal to the analogy of teaching physics: one moves much better in each later year of a course. The culture does not accept that this can be true of human meaning over a lifetime. So, the prospective elder is steadily battered to mental death in all of us, and "less than 1% of adults grow" (I am recalling Maslow's claim) in these brutal axial times.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The misspelling is deliberate. It points to the common usage of 'be sensible' but adds the suspicion that there is more to it than sense.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Chapter three of my *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism* (Axial Press, Halifax, 2002) points in this direction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The first three notes set a tone. But there are other complications e.g. the dodging of the question of the nature and content of *assembly*. Previous essays pointed towards its inclusion of assemblers, but did little else. Yet it is a zone of present crisis. See, e.g. note 17 below.

commitment to 'being sensable' there are few that lean on the principle that a division of labor is necessary, and none that cling to that principle in the writing.<sup>7</sup> So let us not bother about [b]. What about [a]?

I am being realistic yet somewhat twisted here: I am looking for, and inviting you to look for, one single book that I - and you - can assemble. But it must be an odd sort of book. Line 2 of 250 talks of "the histories written". What I have in mind is the sort of history that is relatively undifferentiated, that is a critical history but not in Lonergan's sense: more of a dialectic history. I have, of course, already picked out my book: Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, and I'll talk about that choice shortly. But what of your choice? You may have a zone of interest or competence that guides you: or simply a handy book on the shelf (as, frankly, MacIntyre in my own case). The book need not be huge: a possible book on my shelf was a short history of spirituality which has a bent towards "picking the good stuff". And this bent is important to the experiment, since what we need is a book that is doing dialectic is the usual undifferentiated way.

But let me use a particular area to illustrate a point that will eventually be important. Think of the history of economics. What are you thinking of? Some people may think of something like Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*<sup>9</sup>; others may think of something like Rostow's books on the actual events of economic progress. Which is the right direction: or are there two different sub-histories here? It would seem that in the new context one must think concretely of history in its set of mediations: the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>A leading candidate for such a clinging would surely be Frederick Crowe's work, *Theology of the Christian Word. A Study in History*, (Paulist Press, New York, 1978) in which he makes an explicit effort to enter the specialty of history. But his effort in fact rambles round in different specialties: see Cantower 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The copy to which I refer throughout is the paperback from Notre Dame Press, 1981. I will refer to it simply as MacIntyre.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Oxford University Press, 1954.

theories are the blossom of ideas, and the flow of economic reality includes not only these events, but all events are realizations of such ideas or their neglect. Does this not change the standard of the thinking and the writing of history? Think of what it does to the history of philosophy. But we don't want to get side-tracked here: I will only make the tantalizing comment that in the next millennium *Praxis*-thinking will refocus the history of methodology.

Back to our book-selection. I picked *After Virtue*. It has the form of a critical history in the broad sense that meshes history with dialectic thinking and it includes an effort to sift out grounds for progress, for what should come next. Does it not echo patterns of our page? We shall have a shot at seeing if it does on the next essay. Our present effort is the more elementary task - or elemental task, in the sense of focus on elements of caring - of extending the reflections of the previous section on the presence or absence of the assembler, or of assemblers generally, to a deeper presence pointed to by the word *Completion*.<sup>10</sup>

But I wish now to home in on a definite presence in a way that will illustrate a general, somewhat systematic, strategy of dealing with that vague business, "horizons". I am going to home in on the topic I raised in the previous essay,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>I am avoiding any semblance of systematic treatment of this large topic and task. I seek to intimate distant possibilities of it. One useful context for reflection here is *Quaestio* 11 of the *Summa, Ia Ilae, de fruitione*: Enjoyment, in Gilby's translation, from which I give a few random quotations. "There are two moments in pleasure, namely the awareness of seemly object, which is for the cognitive power, and the delighting in it, and this, which is for appetitive power, is its culminating meaning" (a.1, ad 3m)."Augustine says that we enjoy what we know when the delighted will is at rest therein. But the rest is not utter and *complete* except in our ultimate end" (a.3c). And some cautionary comments from Lonergan: "Theologians, let alone parents, rarely think of the historical process" ("Finality, Love, Marriage", *Collection*, 47); "History is a science... The development of speculative positions is to be studied in its perspective and not telescoped into a somewhat Homeric list of allies and adversaries" (*Grace and Freedom*, 449). The study here is a discerning heart-holding of good and evil. See further notes 12, 16 and 35 below.

symbolically indicated (in note 4 there) by the two versions of **mac** in the spelling of Gaelic names: *MAC* and *McA*. Notice what I am doing here. The diagram that I name W4, that blossomed into an elegant Chinese word for *caring* poorly represented by my ##I, is a basis<sup>11</sup> for handling distinctions between types, positions, temperaments. Here we are moving to reading whatever book we have chosen with the question in mind, How does he or she stand on the relation of insight to concept! But it might be encouraging to just notice a larger context, the context of temperament-analysis. The next paragraph might be skipped without loss of continuity in our exercise but on the other hand there is a handy doctorate thesis there!<sup>12</sup>

So, I recall Karl Jung being asked by Jolande Jacobi where he got his fourfold division which I write now in the form found convenient by his followers:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>It is an incomplete basis. Think, for instance, of how the dynamics of knowing is sophisticated by chapter 3 of *Insight* in which canons are developed. The dynamics of doing need sophistication, and some of us need to tackle that, drawing especially on *Summa Theologica*, Ia IIae, qq. 7-17. This opens up a larger perspective on the transcendental, Be Adventurous: and especially so if you take the pointer of Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, 287 (the paragraph with 'one can go on') which pushes us to lift **virtue** into the context of neurodynamics and psycho-chemistry. Quite a revision of the *Summa*! Further on this, Quodlibet 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Our central exercise in this reading is the self-reading of what is called *completion*, but you can certainly move at any stage to what I might call the **mac** exercise. We shall get into it in relation to MacIntyre in the next essay, but it is there as a permanent challenge in the reading of any present text. It is a sentence by sentence business, a tough climb into generalized empirical method. But the first fruit of the present reading is the beginnings of a shock in relation to the meaning of *completion*. The *assembly* business is a transposition into the hodic context of what I called the **Tomega Principle** in the Cantowers: "Theoretical understanding, then, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view" (*Insight*, 417, [442]). The business of *completion* is a fuller embrace: might one relate it to *assembly* as one relates the procession of the Spirit to that of the Word? Connect this question with note 10 above.

6

## Intuition

Feeling Sensing

## Thinking

Jung's reply: he found it handy. You can - I hope - connect this easily with the diagram and so with the ground of Jung's view, a commonsense muddled selection from the dynamics of care. Now add in the sophistication of this by Myers-Briggs: muddles are added to muddles but sufficiently connected to the ground to be applicable.<sup>13</sup>

Back then to our reading- strategy here. The problem is to "bear in mind" as best you can the distinction between MAC and McA as viewpoints. As I mentioned in the previous essay, even a first-year student can rise to sniffing out McA as operative in e.g. their text books in psychology, or in their readings in philosophy, economics, whatever. Try Hegel on this, if you fancy an adventure! But you might also try it on Lonerganesque writers, and be discomfortingly surprised. A key word to watch out for is *clarify*, but more broadly you will notice that English usage in most cultures is warped by a McA *ethos*. Think of the too-frequent use of the word *concept* in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>You are probably familiar with the Myers-Briggs tradition. I have to had a recent work: David Keirsey, *Understand Me II. Temperament, Character, Intelligence*, Prometheus Nemesis Book Company, 1998. Of courses, you can find the warp in other corners that may be closer to your interest: there is the field of education, so badly battered by **McA**. A recent research project produced the bent book, *Teaching for Understanding. Linking Research with Practice*, edited by Martha Stone Wiske, Jossey-Bass publisher, San Francisco, 1997. The conclusion is by Howard Gardiner, another possible candidate for our exercise of *assembly*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Years of "giving mental birth" to the distinction gives one the elder competence of recognizing not only varieties of related position and counter-position, but of reversing creatively the counterposition, "seeing the past as better than it was" (*Method in Theology*,251).

advertising business.

Recall my comments above on Schumpeter and Rostow, and now puzzle over the same problem in philosophy. Lonergan can write of Scotus' followers through centuries of philosophy and theology and within his comments there occurs the phrase "there is needed an explanation of Scotist influence." Do we not normally think of this as a piece of the history of philosophy or of a dialectic of philosophy? But now I am pointing to the concrete realization of an idea, warped or not. It might make it easier to think here of philosophy, in whatever form, as fundamentally method, a method that may flow through linguistic and non-linguistic meanings: the history of a method needs the flesh of its concrete realization, and certainly when one moves to dialectic analysis either one is concrete or one is just not dealing with good and evil. This is important to bear in mind if we are to break away from the tradition of thinking e.g. of the dialectic and foundations of mathematics or biology as concerned not with history but with some Platonic discipline-restricted tunneling through time.

So, here we are, with whatever book we select, ready to read something like McIntyre's English, but trapped in the same English, even perhaps comfortable with the same warps of usage that warp our perspective. Were not his reviewers, even some Lonerganesque reviewers, thus trapped? How else could they have come to sing his praises? The back-page blurb on my paperback copy is a page of praise by well-known

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas, 36, note 126.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>"What is good, always is concrete" (*Method in Theology*, 27). Useful contexts here are the early chapters of *Topics in Education* and the final section of *De Deo Trino. Pars Dogmatica*, on the psychological analogy in Scripture. This book should be appearing shortly in translation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>The foundations of a discipline are then simply foundations. How this works in the functional specialist context is discussed in Cantower 8. Note that the stand is a discomfort for contemporary theology: one does not leave out the "events" (line of p. 250 of *Method*) history. But that is part of the problem of assembly with which we have yet to deal.

people: "one of the most powerful and provocative works in moral philosophy to appear in recent decades", "a remarkable synthesis", "a striking work", and so on.

Some very bright people are trapped by the **signs** of the time: **signs** of the longer cycle of decline.<sup>18</sup>

Think now of **sign** in the most simplistic sense of **signpost**: "go this way", "look this way for the best view", and come with me into page 1 of MacIntyre's book, the beginning of a short first chapter titled "A Disquieting Suggestion". What is that suggestion? The book begins with it as an odd possibility in science:

"Imagine that the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a catastrophe. A series of environmental disasters are blamed by the general public on the scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories and burnt down, physicists are lynched, books and instruments are destroyed." And so on: only fragments remain and eventually in a counter-movement these fragments come into use. "Adults argue with each other about the respective merits of relativity theory, evolutionary theory and phlogiston theory, although they possess only a very partial knowledge of each. Children learn by heart the surviving portions of the periodic table and recite as incantations some of the theorems of Euclid. Nobody, or almost nobody, realizes that what they are doing is not natural science in any proper sense at all". "In such a culture men would use expressions such as 'neutrino', 'mass', specific gravity', 'atomic weight' in systematic and often unrelated ways which would resemble in lesser or greater degrees the ways in which such expressions had been used in earlier times before scientific knowledge had been largely lost".

MacIntyre, of course, is going to lift this disaster into the zone of morality and in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>One can track this through biographies of very sincere thinkers: Hannah Arendt, Jean Piaget, Kurt Goedel, whomever. One should not underestimate the molecular hold of the tradition. We are **signed into** truncation prior to toddling. See the next note.

the next essay we will note a disaster within his disaster.<sup>19</sup> But we move slowly. With a subtlety that I make no attempt to reproduce here he talks of the helplessness of phenomenological or analytic philosophies in dealing with such a culture. But you can get the drift: there is an entrapment in the language of the fragmented culture. What to do? Here I twist MacIntyre to suit our introductory needs: what we have to do, he might say, is *Assemble*.

MacIntyre has the learning to do quite an assembly, and this is an important first thing to note: dialectic work is not for beginners. What are we doing, then, if we think of ourselves as beginners - even if we have been round for a bundle of decades? Think of the analogy with Chemistry. A first year chemistry student gets an introduction to the whole periodic table - even inside the cover of the text book - in the first month. He or she has little more than a nominal sense tied in with sights and sounds and smells. So with us and assembly ... it is as familiar to us as water. The advantage of young chemists is that there exists a field of inquiry that intimates to them that they do not understand water. Here we are at the beginning of a new science that Aristotle failed to get started, that Thomas and Lonergan did on their own as best they could.

Let us skip on: is there something like *Completion* in MacIntyre's book? Think of *completion* as a sort-of feelingful taking of sides. But don't confuse feeling with heat: it can be the cool of disdain. I recall now one of those Oxford meetings where British and French philosophers came together to 'bury their difference' ... ho ho. One Frenchman raised the question of placing a particular discussion in the context of **Being** (L'Etre .... that sort of thing!). The Chair of the meeting, a plum-voiced Oxford man replied, "What could you possibly mean by being?" His question was not heated: it flowed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>The disaster, the catastrophe, is a truncated culture. "The truncated subject does not know that there is anything there to know" (*A Second Collection*, 72). That subjectivity dominates MacIntyre's book and his biodynamics. It can and does dominate those versed in the language of subjectivity: existentialists, phenomenologists, followers of Lonergan. See SOFDAWARE 6, the text after note 6.

spontaneously from the cool presence of superiority in the face of existentialist silliness, worthlessness. Moreover, the worthlessness at times is not even acknowledged to exist: I am thinking of a horror story of the South African judge of past times who didn't *see* the blacks on the street.

What then of MacIntyre in his picking of the good things and their opposites? Note that the picking has to be expressed, an objectification of evaluation. In the Chairman of my story it was in the tone, the hand gesture, the body language. MacIntyre's expression is a printed one. He doesn't write "I don't bloody like ethical meta-reflection that is detached from history", but does he have a cool conviction of this sort?

What is *completion*?

Well, think of your reading with me of page 250 of *Method*! Have I not been 'rubbing you up the wrong way' (I presume that old saying makes some sense in Australia]? Did you not spontaneously, if vaguely, identify the good pointers and the bad? Can you now, or sometime later, pause and assemble "the research performed, the interpretations proposed, etc..." since you got into this mess of reading? Has there been rhythm of resentment or delight, disdain or despair? Might you spell that out, spit out with type or tongue the threatened self?

And note that I am writing to you 'down-there' in my dawn light, and I confess that there is a little tickledness in my touch as trip along, tripping you into meeting yourself, with less than Zarathustrian elegance of prose, in events of my fantasy, my dream? What do you say, thus say to my Thus-Spoke in your life-wheel? Perhaps you are strangely with me in sensing that our human journey, down the days or down the page, is essentially darkness? "Your life itself interprets this dream for us, O Zarathustra. Are you not yourself the wind and the shrill whistling that tears open the

gates of the castles of death?" <sup>20</sup> The issue of *Completeness*, then, has an inner deepness of energy's loneliness, an ancient molecular challenge twining or whining round my exigence<sup>21</sup>: Where do I stand as a character?<sup>22</sup>

But I am leaping around and ahead, brushing through and past MacIntyre's question of his 18<sup>th</sup> chapter, "Nietzsche *or* Aristotle". So, best we pause, seemingly in lines 3-6 of page 250, to see where we really are on that page.

Where do you think?

Did you start this new paragraph without .... a thought, a stand? Would you have guessed that, no, we are not 'in' the early lines, we are way down the page, indeed in lines 3-6 from the end! And, perhaps, quite illegitimately so: for to join in that part of the program, one has to have personally done an assembly, completion, comparison, reduction, classification, selection. But there is a sense in which, for the beginner, the jump down the page is legitimate, and we return to that jump and that sense and that legitimacy in the next SOFDAWARE.

Meantime, I wish to wind to a conclusion of this short searching of the exigence for completeness by moving forwards within that sixth last line of the page. "There is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Part 2, "On the Land of Education". You might like to place our struggle in another context, the quest of the Black Tower that is a theme in Cantower 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>I point to the complex topic of Lonergan's *De Ente Supernaturale*, summarily treated in *Phenomenology and Logic* under the name *Exigence* (see the index).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Character is a complex topic. There is a wealth of significance in its inclusion in section 1 of Chapter 14 of *Method*, which meshes with the search for an integral embrace of the universe: place *Insight* 417[442] in the context of the search for existential harmony of chapters 15 and 20 of the book. It ties in with the full meaning of *Completeness* rooted in the attitude referred to at note 29. Put it in the context of the beginning of Aristotle's *Magna Moralia*: "We must first inquire of what character is a branch. To speak concisely, then, it would seem to be a branch of nothing else than statecraft.... "The hodic cycle spins towards a change for the better in the statistics of character-formation.

final objectification of horizon". Indeed, there is: but now I am thinking and feeling and talking like a Proustian Elder, not about the end of a book, where the elder might stand "on giant stilts"<sup>23</sup> but about the final objectification of horizon that is final, that does "not enter into the heart"<sup>24</sup> of the wayfarer, yet is there, faith-meshed "critical method with respect to the ultimate"<sup>25</sup>, the Ultimates. I am pointing within my elder heuristic of assembly and completeness to a fuller meaning, a fuller discernment, of completeness, a discernment which lives in a habitual discernment of the fluctuations of completeness, completings, in past millennia. After all, is this not "evaluative history"?

In the longer cycle of decline "the social situation deteriorates cumulatively" and you and I are end-products, only dimly capable of a little superficial completeness. I am not now talking about the final final: I am talking about our battered molecular refusals of the dreamway up to the beginning of the task of theology. Would it help if I drew attention to minimally-probable displacements<sup>27</sup> that Bob Doran and I thematized through the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century? Add evaluative history? Rather, let history embrace us in its lonely rhythms crippled by the axial period, where the *let* is as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>The final page of Proust's *Remembrance of Times Past*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>I *Cor* 2:9. The task of hodic metaphysics, with its "symbolic indication of the total range of possible experience" (*Insight*, 396[421]), cycling through Communications into cosmic molecules, is to transform human presence into a dark radiance of this absence. See *Insight* 17.1 and Cantower 17.1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Insight, 685[708].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Insight, 229[254].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>I am, curiously enough, talking about the two conversions of the five generic conversions that are not mentioned on page 250: what Doran calls psychic conversion, what I call theoretic conversion. There are indications, in Lonergan's scribbles of 1965, of the need to mesh these existentially in theology: human explanation in its normative *completeness* is symbolic. Indeed I would say that the meshing is vital in all human inquiry.

humbling as the task of bathing in a local pond<sup>28</sup> rather than in some distant Nietzschian dialectic ocean or in some stagnant pool of unassembled *comparison*.<sup>29</sup>

The local pond, of course, is the program of page 250 of *Method* which invites us to a fantasy-land "feeding of the soul of man" through "the glory of its deepening, in the pure deepening that adds to its aggregate leisure". <sup>30</sup> The fantasy-land is to be reached by replacing slowly, bone-wised, the **let** of the "secret police<sup>31</sup>" of expansive and articulate convention - "**let** evert weed glory in the sunshine of stupid adulation" <sup>32</sup> - with the **let** of little leisured steps.

But the little humble leisured steps, always beyond present fantasy, are destiny's Zen-Then road to a new completeness of adult response that would ground its daily climb in us, the ontogenetic and phylogenetic climb. Is this not something of the warm *completeness* expressed by Lonergan in May 1954, at the young searching age of fifty?

 $<sup>^{28}\</sup>mathrm{I}$  am thinking of Naaman, the Syrian Commander, who didn't fancy dipping in the Jordan: were there not better waters in Damascus?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>I have regularly commented on the futility of comparative writing. Lonergan lifts *comparison* into the context of the unity and beauty of an efficient metaphysics. Popular or technical comparison survives as an off-shoot of the specialty Communications.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>For A New Political Economy, 20. While Comparison of "affinities and oppositions" (line 7, p. 250) is a topic for the next essay I could not resist contrasting, sadly and privately, the volume of *Theological Studies* that arrived today - March 2004 - with the remote possibilities of theologians' *Imitatio Christi*. There is a study of the vocation of the theologian; there is a survey of fundamental moral theology; etc. But there is little sense of the massive betrayal of history and understanding by perennial theology. There is clearly a need for a re-cycling cosmopolis that would slowly bring us to embrace the universe in the molecular completeness mentioned in note 11 above. More on this in SOFDAWARE 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>*Ibid*. There is the context of Cosmopolis' exclusion of police force: *Insight* 238[263].

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$ Ibid.

"The Method in Theology is coming into perspective. For the Trinity: Imago Dei in homine and proceed to the limit as in evaluating  $[1 + 1/n]^{nx}$  as n approaches infinity. For the rest: ordo universi. From the viewpoint of theology, it is a manifold of unities developing in relation to one another and in relation to God".<sup>33</sup>

What is the growth curve of completeness? The limit of which Lonergan writes springs forth as  $e^x$ , and it is a measure of its own growth: d/dx [ $e^x$ ] =  $e^x$ . "Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company," <sup>34</sup> and this is an embarrassing doctrine for any version of satisfied *completeness*. The exigence buried in the battered heart of every serious axial theologian is to be increasingly a stranger to the present self-completeness through the rhythms of evaluation of each sacramental day. <sup>35</sup>

 $<sup>^{33}</sup>$ I quote from a letter of Lonergan to Fr. Fred Crowe of May, 1954 which he kindly made available to me.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Method in Theology, 299. The Context there is worth digesting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>I am recalling here the spirituality of the 18<sup>th</sup> century Jesuit, Jean Pierre de Caussade: his focus on the sacrament of the present moment, which I relate to moments of *Completion*. "Things, in fact, proceed from the mouth of God like words" (*Abandonment to Divine Providence*, B.Herder, St.Louis, 1921, 29). Recall now the points made in notes 10 and 12 above. But I am raising, in this conclusion, the much larger issue of accelerating growth throughout life, something massively opposed by the conventions of present education, culture, conversation. On this see the *Bacchus Page* at the conclusion of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.