

## Chapter 29.

### The Question

The title to Part Three is wonderfully ambiguous. It has an obvious meaning relating to what went before: we now have a structure, where might it lead? And this certainly is a meaning for Part Three. But “Structure” and “Anticipations” happen also to be the titles of the two key chapters of Robert Doran’s new book, *What is Systematic Theology*, which came into my hands as I finished Part Two.<sup>1</sup> Part Three relates very directly to these two chapters of Doran’s work. Indeed, I wish to direct our attention to these two chapters of the book, and that in a variety of ways that aim at illuminating the structure and anticipations that belong with my own suggestions of Parts One and Two.

Why focus on these two chapters rather than attending to the whole book? The whole book, indeed, merits attention, and I intend to give it, or rather the chapters passed over here, detailed attention in *Joistings 15*, “*What is Systematic Theology?*”<sup>2</sup> The chapters that I am dealing with here are chapters 7 and 8, 27 central pages which focus on Doran’s Thesis regarding systematic theology. The following chapter of Doran’s book, with title “The Question of Ground”, opens up the topic more fully, and is the first of two lengthy concluding chapters. Prior to the chapters which I wish us to ponder over there are evidently six previous chapters and there too Doran starts with “The Question,” in which he establishes a context for his reflections on his central view of systematics. Obviously I cannot avoid altogether these bracketing considerations, yet the coherence of that central presentation allows for minimal reference.

Still, one may push that question, Why this focus on 27 pages? It is so, first, because Doran’s effort here gives us the opportunity to move forward creatively in our own effort to conceive of structure and anticipations as we have been pursuing that heuristic conception. The creativity is to be yours, and this is the second reason for the focus. The 27 pages of these two

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<sup>1</sup>I have modified some footnotes in those two parts to provide references: otherwise they remain unchanged.

<sup>2</sup>This work is to appear on the usual Website, [www.philipmcschane.ca](http://www.philipmcschane.ca) in September, 2006. The ongoing series is devoted to the cultivation of the cyclic collaboration dealt with directly in Part One.

chapters raise some very deep problems both in theology and in its method. Some of those coincide with problems that we have struggled with in the first two parts of this book. Those problems provide you with a challenge: can you recognize parallels, divergences, and especially can you see your way to an integral and integrating perspective?

The topic at the center of the two chapters, however, is a fundamental insight of Lonergan, called by Doran a four-point hypothesis, that is transformative of theology yet which has so far attracted little attention. Doran moves it up into center stage. He does so, however, in a way that connects it with the fundamental problem of systematic theology. The connection, and the questions Doran raises, are enormously enlightening, and become part of your challenge. But I would wish you to ingest the insight, the hypothesis, for its theological richness beyond the problematic of method and that wish is especially evident in the next chapter. There I lead you to ask, What would Thomas make of Lonergan's leap of insight?

But I must insist on the doctrinal character of my invitation in this regard. Ingesting the insight, cherishing existentially the hypothesis, that is a long task of patient contemplation. I do not expect any reader to practice that patience by postponing the reading of the next, 29<sup>th</sup>, chapter, where Doran presents the methodological problems associated with taking the insight as somehow central to theology. One can proceed thus because a descriptive grip on the hypothesis is enough to reach a sense of those problems, and indeed one can proceed thus to the end of the book. My invitation will then, I hope, remain with you, attracting you to this transformative hypothesis. It was presented by Lonergan, at no greater length than Doran does, in a work of 1956.<sup>3</sup> Although I wrote on Trinitarian theology in 1961,<sup>4</sup> I avoided this issue as too complex, but later in the 1960s I had occasion to use the insight pastorally and it can be noticed as

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<sup>3</sup>*Conceptio Analogica Divinarum Personarum*, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1956, 214-5. A revised version of the book appeared in 1964 from the same press: *De Deo Trino II, Pars Systematica*. The hypothesis remained unchanged (234-5). A translation in English is to appear in 2006 from University of Toronto Press.

<sup>4</sup>"The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God", *Theological Studies*, (1962).

symbolically present in the bottom of W3.<sup>5</sup> Still, my invitation here, and I would say also Doran's, is to give it pastoral centrality. It seeds a powerful lift to our personal relating to the Divine Three.

Chapter 29, then, points to that central detachable insight and, as I mentioned, links it with Thomas' spirituality. It does so in a manner that gives an elementary exercise in a style of work mentioned already, contrafactual work. This is to be a central activity of the new genetic systematics advocated by me, and as we shall see in chapter 35, by Doran. Working contrafactually with Thomas is not difficult: in the main Thomas fits into the genetic sequence of integrator-operator theologies in a positive genetic fashion. But think of the problem of "reversing the counterpositions"<sup>6</sup> in, say, his two contemporaries Bonaventure (1221-1274) and the Japanese Zenmaster Dogen (1200-53).

Other sections here point you to the style of future work in theology. I refer especially to chapters 32 and 33. They deal with problems of theology raised by Doran, but they do so in a fullness that makes difficult reading. They provide an introduction to contexts in Lonergan's thinking that need to be included, ingested, if we are to move forward. In line with my minimalist thesis of Part One, the character of that inclusion and ingesting is to be a slow cyclic in-spinning into theology and out-spinning into a cultural ethos.

Chapter 30 presents Doran's problems with the sufficiency of the fundamental insight or

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<sup>5</sup>The pastoral perspective is present in chapters 4-7 of my *Music That Is Soundless. A Fine Way for the Lonely Bud A*, Axial Publications, 2005; the book was first published in Dublin, 1968. The presentation there, and in the diagram, point towards an enormous theological expansion that would ground a later sophisticated trinitarian spirituality, strange interpersonal conversations that would lift us beyond reaching God as One.

<sup>6</sup>See *Method in Theology*, 250-54. On page 254 Lonergan remarks that "the theologian's strategy will be, not to prove his own position, not to refute counter-positions, but to exhibit diversity and to point to the evidence for its roots". This strategy, in a mature functional theology, will be clearly distinguishable from the strategy that the systematic theologians are to employ to arrive at what I might call a pure but pragmatic genetic system, a control of the products of past practical thinking about progress that would efficiently mediate the selective applications that emerge from the final specialty. See McShane, "Systematic, Communications, Actual Contexts", *Lonergan Workshop*, (7), 1987, edited by Frederick Lawrence, Catholic University of America, 143-74.

hypothesis as a basis for a new systematics, and there “The Question” that is our central interest in this Part should challenge you. How might you relate the two perspectives on systematics? Of course, you might push your question further, in line with the work of Part One, to ask how, within the cyclic collaboration, would that question be posed and answered effectively? I would hope that some version of the answer would emerge from your reflections on that chapter, but in fact the answer is to be given, to stare you in the face - as any good pedagogical diagram would do - in the diagram at the end of chapter 33.

Chapters 32 and 33, as I already mentioned, contextualize your efforts here and point to the context of future efforts: use them, read them, as best you can. It is in the final two chapters that we push for an answer. Chapter 35, with a title “Anticipations” that is shared with Doran’s chapter 8, the focus of my final chapter, show the two efforts as pushing hopefully for a theology that, as Doran would put it, is to do for the 21<sup>st</sup> century what the 13<sup>th</sup> did for the 12<sup>th</sup>.

## Chapter 30

### Doran's Thesis in Thomas' Context

We move now to an effort to present Doran's view in a form that is minimal, the desire being not to lose readers. I am presuming, then, nothing like the knowledge of physics that raises its disturbing head in chapter 32: indeed, I might claim that no knowledge of theology is necessary to get the main point. What is that main point?

Revelation in the Hebrew Christian tradition intimates a saving grace that is a divine achievement in human history. Part of that saving grace is the discovery that to the generic primitive suspicion that "God is personal"<sup>7</sup> there is to be added a triplicity of personality. The dynamic of New Testament meaning blossoms into identifying the saving grace as quite beyond the natural human, that the saving grace involves conjugates on a strange new level of being. What level is that? Well, the level that is due to a human nature that is existentially divine: so, "the minding relations" of that divinely-personed nature are, shall we say, divine-level.<sup>8</sup>

Put this in familiar terms: Jesus being God requires a suitable gifting of human nature in Him.<sup>9</sup> The most evident of those gifts is His gift of practical knowing, his visioning of His

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<sup>7</sup>*Insight*, 668[691]. This is the 26<sup>th</sup> point in Lonergan's brilliant deductive expansion of the hypothesis of God as Limitless Understanding. I like to point out that a 27<sup>th</sup> place would coincide with Thomas' 27<sup>th</sup> question in the first part of the *Summa*, "The Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God" (the title of my effort, in *Theological Studies*, 1962, to recycle Thomas' and Lonergan's perspective). In chapter 33 we ponder over oddities of deductive expansions that relate to the questions Doran raises regarding axioms, mappings, etc.

<sup>8</sup>The best entry into this zone, I would say, is Lonergan's Treatment of it in *The Incarnate Word*, (University of Toronto Press, in process of publication: a translation of *De Verbo Incarnato*, Gregorian University Press, 1964), Thesis 11. I would note that a deductive expansion (see the previous note) can be constructed where the gracing of humanity is treated independently of issues regarding an original fall. I am availing of that construction in the next paragraph above.

<sup>9</sup>The question of Jesus knowing who he is and what he is at in his hominization is perhaps the easiest entry point here. "Who am I?" cannot be answer adequately without an adequate What, nor would he know adequately what he was doing in His pilgrimage without that What. The possession of - and being possessed by - that What involves an instance of the grace-light named the light of glory. On the primary grace of the Incarnation as a pivot of history and on the failure of theology in its regard see "Grace: The Final Frontier," chapter 7 of *The Redress of Poise*, (1996: available on the usual website).

Relations. The visioning grounds, for instance, the words attributed to Him in John's chapters of supper-talk. The vision is a gift to His human nature, a glorious light, "the light of glory", that grounds a strange new piece of divine conversation. That gift to His human intellect is suitably paralleled with a gift of a due clinging of His will to divine friendship, commonly named in the tradition "*caritas*," charity in a technical sense. Is there more to the gracing of His human nature? Yes, there is not just this conjugate lifting of His humanity; the form of that humanity is also lifted by a form, strange in many ways, named sanctifying grace. Finally - but should I even mention this vastly difficult fourth-point? - there is a basic grace of fact. The fact is of God being human, a fact constituted by God, not constituted by the human nature of Jesus. Facticity means true, and with a hearty push on the meaning of historical truth one can arrive at some understanding of the presence of a fourth grace in Jesus, conveniently named "the grace of union". Don't get tied up in this: it involves months of contemplative climbing. Just hold on, contemplatively, to the four oddnesses that go with the nature of a divine human.

You'll find all that stuff in Thomas. Understanding it, by, say, sharing Thomas climb, is tough work. Did Thomas go further? Did he fantasize forward? He has some amazing fantasies that are, one might say, contrafactual, dealing with types of divine incarnation, that may well reach forward, though their aim was to throw light on the actual Incarnation by puzzling out other possibilities: might all three persons share one human nature, might one person have many human natures; what if the second coming was in a woman's nature?<sup>10</sup> But did he puzzle over these four graces, these personal linkings of Jesus with His two eternal Friends? Certainly Lonergan did and we might say that he did to Thomas what Maxwell did to Faraday and company: but that is the topic of chapter 31.

The puzzle that might occur to you is, Are these linkings of us or of Jesus somehow deeply personal? Unless you are seriously into the odd personal relating in your Triune Friends - for the graces of Jesus are visioned and achieved as an outrageous outreach to you, uniquely: "I will give to him [or her] a white stone, and a new name written on the stone which no one knows

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<sup>10</sup>Caught you there! That final puzzling is my own, but it does fit in with Thomas' reaching.. You find that reaching in Thomas' puzzles in the beginning questions of the Third Part of his *Summa Theologiae*.

but the one who receives it”<sup>11</sup> - you are going to have to go back a bit in your thinking, starting with a puzzle about three persons and four graces, and perhaps get bogged down.

This is the invitation that I mentioned in chapter 29, to be followed up contemplatively. Where might one start in one’s puzzling? There is the grace of vision, beyond seeing in a glass darkly, a face-to-face reality: it seems connected with adoption, Son to Father-Mother: might that be a lead?

But now let us hear from Lonergan, quoted by Doran at the beginning of his second section in chapter 7, “The Four-point Hypothesis”.

“There are four real divine relations, really identical with the divine substance, and so four special ways of grounding an imitation or participation *ad extra* of God’s own life. And there are four absolutely supernatural created realities. They are never found in an unformed or indeterminate state. They are: the secondary existence of the Incarnation, sanctifying grace, the habit of charity, and the light of glory.

Thus it can be maintained that the secondary act of existence of the Incarnation is a created participation of paternity, and so it has a special relation to the Son; that sanctifying grace is a [created] participation of active spiration, and so that it bears a special relation to the Holy Spirit; that the habit of charity is a [created] participation of passive spiration, and so that it has a special relation to the Father and the Son; and that the light of glory is a [created] participation of filiation that leads perfectly the children of adoption back to the Father.”<sup>12</sup>

I cannot venture into the subtle interpersonal twists of that hypothesis that would bring it alive as locating Jesus’ nature and ours in a cosmic adventure - a project that in its fullness looks

<sup>11</sup>*Revelations*, 2: 17. I think of this quotation as symbolizing the scope of an adequate metaphysics, as sketched in *Insight* chapter 16, and sublated by the perspective of *Insight* chapter 19, section 7. Add the pointers of the following note.

<sup>12</sup>**Doran**, 65-66. I repeat here, not I hope *ad nauseam tuam*, my urging towards slow contemplative questing. It is not a matter “merely” of personal spirituality, but of reaching for a meaning of these relations and their finite participations that would solve the problems to be raised in the next section. I put the word *merely* in quotes to indicate a problem in thinking in terms of **merely**. *Cantower 21*, “Epilogue,” (the *Cantower* parallels the Epilogue of *Insight*) deals with the question of developing a kataphatic theology grounded in contemplative questing. More on this questing in chapter 32 below.

very much like a theology of history! All I wish to do in this chapter is give you a handle on Doran's thesis. Recall his question, from the beginning of this chapter seven, "What determines the overall structure of a systematic theology?" His answer, his thesis, contextualized densely in a way that we must consider later, is that "the principal specifically theological element in the unified field structure now at hand is a four-point hypothesis proposed in Lonergan's systematics of the Trinity."<sup>13</sup>

I cling to pedagogy in a dual sense here, both direct and reflective, by using the strategy of contrafactual history, a strategy that is a subtle part of the cyclic functional collaboration that was our concern in the first two parts of this book. So, I ask you to entertain the suggestion, the supposition, that Thomas had pushed his work and his luck in the *Summa*, either in the beginning of the Third Part or somewhere in the First Part: say, around question 93, or back there in his classic Trinitarian questions, somewhere after question 30?<sup>14</sup> Suppose he did jump to Lonergan's four-point hypothesis. What would it have done to his *Summa*? That calls for an astonishing heave-ho of fantasy, a global business for a decade or three! Can you push yourself to suspect a leap of all Three Parts of the *Summa* into an account of a subtle interpersonal intimacy in grace-growth? Stuff that would give quite new meaning to what he would have meant by the top line of our metagram W3:

$UV[(V....)] = \text{Universal Viewpoint on } 3P + HSf(p_i ; c_j ; b_k ; z_l ; u_m ; r_n)$

Pause now, and take note of the place of that piece in the metagram. It comes above and before the diagramming of the functional specialties. Thomas might have written it, though he did not have more than the beginnings of the aggregism that lurks in what you recognize in the symbolism that is W1. Indeed, he might have written, in his own way, what Bernard Lonergan wrote at age fifty:

"The method in theology is coming into perspective. For the Trinity: Imago De in homine and proceed to the limit as in evaluating  $[1 + 1/n]^n$  as  $n$  approaches infinity. For the rest: ordo

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<sup>13</sup>Doran, 64.

<sup>14</sup>Or one might focus on the single article, Q. 45, a.7, that asks about vestiges of the Trinity. What would Thomas have thought and written on the matter in the new context?



universi. From the viewpoint of theology, it is a manifold of unities developing in relation to one another and in relation to God."<sup>15</sup>

Thomas would not have understood the mathematics of this - not too many present readers would - but he would recognize the perspective on growth, personal and communal?<sup>16</sup> Had he made the leap that I suppose about him here, to Lonergan's four-point insight, he would have delighted in the change, the lift, from his prior theological perspective.

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<sup>15</sup> I quote again from a letter of Lonergan to Fr. Crowe, May 1954, kindly made available to me by Crowe, with permission to quote. This is a pivotal text of the book *ChrISt in History*. Recall Part Two, note 61, regarding this present book's task of merging the perspective with that of functional specialization. The contextualizing is reached at note 91 here.

<sup>16</sup>In the first section of chapter 2 of *Process. Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*, (1989: the book is available on the Website) I tell of my own leap in the autumn of 1958, from a text in Thomas, to my first serious puzzling about adult growth. The text in Thomas asked how an infused virtue increases: *Quaestio Disputata, De Virtutibus in Communi, a.11: quaeritur quomodo virtus infusa augeatur*.

## Chapter 31.

### Doran's Problems with the Thesis

I seem to be suggesting that the lift of Lonergan's four-point hypothesis would have provided a new context for Thomas, permitting him in our odd contrafactual world to rewrite his *Summa*. Do Doran's reflections lead him to a different view? One cannot say from this chapter, since he is not writing of Thomas or of a contrafactual world, but of present problems central to which is the problem of historical consciousness and its thematization in theology. But in that context he finds that the four-point hypothesis is not adequate.

I do not think that it would be either profitable or possible to weave through the details of Doran's work - and his colleague's, Danny Monsour - on testing the adequacy of the hypothesis as a basis of a fresh theology. Doran opens up the problem at the beginning of section 4 of his seventh chapter and elaborates on it in that chapter's fifth section, titled "History and the Special Categories". His considerations lead us into massive difficulties in present theology and push him forward into the complexities of his later chapters. Those complexities must await later discussion, but the difficulties require attention here.

In the task of testing Doran takes off from Monsour's follow-up on the thesis.<sup>17</sup> The testing ground for the thesis is that area of *Method* which deals with the special categories of theology, where Lonergan spells out five sets of categories. These are listed and described in both *Method in Theology* and in Doran's chapter.<sup>18</sup> A brief noting is sufficient here: [1] a first set of categories derived from religious experience; [2] categories of community in history; [3] a categorial expression which I may symbolize as 3P + H; [4] Categories of differentiations; [5] categorial structurings of progress, decline, redemption.

Before entering into the topic of adequacy and testing for it let us return to the pedagogical perspective, and this within the context of my previous discussion of the special

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<sup>17</sup>See **Doran**, note 10 on page 216 and 3 on page 220, where he lists four unpublished papers by Monsour. See also note 11 on page 218. Doran is quite clear on the important place in all this of their dialogue and of the ongoing meetings of the Lonergan Research Institute Toronto.

<sup>18</sup>*Method in Theology*, 290-1; **Doran**, 72-3.

categories of theology in *ChrISt in History*.<sup>19</sup> Returning to that perspective here throws further light on the structure and writing of *Method in Theology*, indeed that helps towards answering questions about *Method* that Doran raises right through his book. I shall deal with these in later efforts of *Joistings*. Here we only homing in on the testing ground, which provides an illustration of one aspect of that basic problem of *Method in Theology*.

Recall now my suggestion in that earlier discussion that we might conveniently add a sixth set.<sup>20</sup> I would note my suggested sixth grouping separates off “future destiny” from [3] to give it a special focus but I would claim further that such a suggestion goes to indicate a view that there is nothing sacred about the number of sets.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, the view already developed is that this entire section of *Method* is very much a descriptive pointing, on a par with much else in the book. We are back at the puzzle that Lonergan shared with me in the 1960s: what to do in the writing of *Method* regarding the achievement of *Insight*. I discussed elsewhere the cunning, and the personal convenience, of his answer.<sup>22</sup> While the general categories that he lists look very much like the table of contents of the book *Insight*, the special categories give no such pointers to other writings of Lonergan. What, then, for instance, does he mean by *religious experience* or *religious interiority*? What did he intend to mean? There are two useful leads here that are worth your following up. First, what do **you** mean by “religious experience”? How do you read those paragraphs in *Method*? How did you, do you read, the earlier paragraphs of chapter 4? How did you, do you, read, the first half of the book?

Now this could lead you into all sorts of tortuous questions, indeed, into that terrible

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<sup>19</sup>Chapter 4, “Foundations,” focuses on the special categories. Also there is an indication - against Rahner, in the article cited in the Preface above - of how mystery is properly located in systematics. This provides a context for the consideration of **Doran** chapter 3, “Dogma and Mystery”.

<sup>20</sup> Chapter 4 of *ChrISt in History*.

<sup>21</sup>Chapter 33 has more pointers on this topic. The number of sets can be a matter of convenience, but one can also aim at a minimal set of sets.

<sup>22</sup>Roughly, one can say that he leaned towards description, which is something that he did regularly in his semi-popular lectures. But he also, in his tiredness, used old material without shifting it into the functional context.

section of *Insight*, “*The Sketch*”, where Lonergan typed a mercilessly dense version of his view on adequate interpretation.<sup>23</sup> So, one asks about context and content and intent. One can twist back to ask those same questions about *The Sketch*, all the while trying to pin down the meaning of “religious experience” as he wrote about it earlier in the book or in the special categories. But, as you may recall from our previous reflections, the big clue here is the central paragraph of page 287 of *Method*. The clue is worth repeating here. Lonergan has just listed his 9 sets of general categories, to which - such is my claim - it is necessary to add a tenth regarding functional specialization.<sup>24</sup> However, the addition or non-edition does not effect the meaning of the next paragraph, which in fact refers quite clearly to the first four chapters of *Method*: think again of the paragraph as his cunning way round the puzzle of building *Insight* into *Method*.

“Such differentiation vastly enriches the initial nest of terms and relations. From such a broadened base one can go on to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning, to the question of God, or religious experience, its expressions, its dialectic development.”<sup>25</sup>

The discomfiting issue, of course, is can you do that developing, so as to move to an explanatory heuristic of religious experience such as Lonergan was secretly envisaging? The question of that capacity is focused in the following two chapters here. But the immediate issue is that, bearing this problem of descriptiveness in mind, Doran and Monsour are correct: the sets of special categories are a decent testing ground for the hypothesis. This should become somewhat more evident from the two chapters to follow. What is important is to seek to be luminous on what is going on in the envisagement of the testing. Becoming thus luminous require that major detour sketched in those two discomfiting chapters.

For the moment let us follow Doran’s search in a simple fashion. “Is the four-point

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<sup>23</sup>In chapter 9 of *ChrISt in History* I present an enlightening way of relating *The Sketch* to the canons of hermeneutics given later in the chapter.

<sup>24</sup>The addition is: (10) that functional specialization is foundational. I would note that such an addition lifts the meaning of the book considerably.

<sup>25</sup>*Method in Theology*, 287.

hypothesis adequate on its own as a unified field structure for systematics?”<sup>26</sup> In his view, it does not, and he has two sets of reasons, one associated with the special categories, the other with the general categories. It is the first set of reasons that interest us here, and I quote Doran’s identification of them. “While the four-point hypothesis does provide a specifically theological element in our unified field structure, still there are other specifically theological realities, and so other special theological categories, that a unified structure must integrate, and they cannot be mapped adequately onto the four-point hypothesis or reduced to it.”<sup>27</sup> We pass over those other realities for the moment.<sup>28</sup> Our focus is on the testing associated with the special categories, where Doran is quite precise.

“In my view only the third set of special categories can be adequately mapped onto the four-point hypothesis. The mapping of the third set will resolve the initial problem with which Monsour began, namely, the divorce between Trinitarian theology and the theology of grace and the imbalance and loss of perspective in the relations between the theological conceptions of uncreated and created grace. But, I propose, any attempt to map the other sets onto the four-point hypothesis is really an attempt to reduce the other sets to the third set. Any if the other sets cannot be mapped without remainder only to four-point hypothesis, then clearly more is needed if we are to arrive at a unified field structure for the functional specialty ‘systematics,’ and this on Monsour’s test itself.”<sup>29</sup> Doran concedes that the first set of categories mesh into the hypothesis, “but mapping the other three sets onto the hypothesis is not only more difficult; it the last analysis, it is, I believe impossible.”<sup>30</sup> What is the basic problem? “The categories that detail the relation of these supernatural realities to history are required if we are to have a systematics of

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<sup>26</sup>Doran, 69.

<sup>27</sup>Doran, 70.

<sup>28</sup>They will be a concern in *Joistings 15* and later *Joistings*.

<sup>29</sup>Doran, 73.

<sup>30</sup>Doran, 73-74.

creation, revelation, redemption, the church, the sacraments, and Christian praxis.”<sup>31</sup>

I find large problems here relating to the meaning of testing, mapping, and indeed in relation to the meaning of relation in general, and the meaning of the supernatural relations in particular. As I mentioned in the second paragraph of this chapter, and repeated just now, they merge with massive difficulties in present theology. Can they be handled here? Not at all: in my view they can be handled efficiently only by the cyclic collaboration that I have discussed in the previous two parts. But is there something that I might say here, brief doctrinal directions that might help?

Obviously I think there is, for I now invite a detour through two chapters. It is a detour which focuses in the next chapter on the problem of the “unified field structure” and its analogue in physics. This will not leave many readers happy, but if you hang in there even as a non-physicist you should get a sense of what is at stake. I am having a shot at making the stuff palatable, and I would note that such a shot lurches towards a new philosophy of popularization that is to replace the disorientations of *haute vulgarization*: but that, too, would be a difficult distraction in our present context and ethos. Chapter 33 is probably more palatable, where I deal with problems of axioms, testing, mapping, etc in a more direct fashion. But behind that chapter lurks the cloud of unknowing that is Lonergan’s view of logic and geometry.

In a first reading you may certainly find it easier to pass immediately to chapters 34 and 35, but what we tackle in these next two chapters is a major piece of the challenge to present theology, strengthening the case for the need to shift the community’s efforts towards cyclic collaboration.

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<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*

## Chapter 32.

### A Context for Considering The Thesis

Putting together these next two short chapters has been quite a challenge for me. Doran's thesis is meshed into a major advance in theology that might be thought of as parallel to the shift in electrodynamics achieved by Maxwell. Indeed, the advance begs to be thought of through such a substantial development of the parallel, of the development within the parallel, and then of the testing of that development.

So, one can go back in time to ask, How might one manage to pull together, in a higher and controlling synthesis, the work of Faraday and company? How might one connect the fact that a magnet moved around a wire cause current to flow in the wire, with the fact that a current in a wire causes magnetic effects, etc, etc? So, amazingly, one ends up with a four-point hypothesis that is the four equations of Maxwell, a shocking integrative achievement that still stands and stimulates progress, its own refinement, larger structures that contain it and point towards further advances within a glorious invariance.

The parallel is magnificently suggestive and indeed goes quite a way to solving some of Doran's problems regarding the relation of Lonergan's four-point hypothesis to the heuristics that is presented descriptively as five sets of special categories given by Lonergan in *Method in Theology*. But the magnificence and the suggestions are the stuff of post-graduate contemplation in present physics. Might I go on about Maxwell's achievement a bit, in incomprehensible fashion? I would suggest that you stay with me, good-humouredly. But you may also just skip to chapter 33, or even to chapter 34, and still follow vaguely, popularly, the drift of the dialogue about Doran's Thesis. Still, what I add here is important for the future of Lonergan studies and for the future of theology: graduates will need to get to grips with such searchings.

So, I quote section 2 of *Joistings 2*, "*Insight and Method: Beginner's Books?*"<sup>32</sup> *Joistings* is a website series that, as I remarked already, is to contain the continuation of the present effort. The aim of the series is collaboration towards cyclic collaboration. The quotation serves to invite you into my context: but, as I say, you can by-pass that invitation either for the present or

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<sup>32</sup>I leave the quoted section and its notes untouched, even though some of the books referred to have been mentioned and recommended already.

permanently. The title is “Minding Maxwell”. Whether you push into it or not, at least ponder over what the equivalent challenge would be of “Minding Lonergan” and muse over my claim that Lonergan’s four-point hypothesis is a vastly more difficult business: indeed you might muse, however vaguely, over my claim that Lonergan’s hypothesis includes and sublates Maxwell’s four point hypothesis in a minding of Maxwell that is meshed into a full theology of history. You may further note that such a power of inclusion is immediately relevant both to sublating Doran’s view of the hypothesis as paralleling the “a unified field structure” sought by contemporary physics and to solving his problems regarding testing.

### Joistings 2.2 Minding Maxwell

In a wonderful week of collaboration in December of 2004, Conn O’Donovan and I ranged around, like beginners, in the writings of Lonergan. Since our work together in the 1960s I had been luckier in my opportunity to pursue Lonergan’s meaning, especially in physics, so some of the exchanges were questions from Conn. One regarded Maxwell’s Equations occasionally mentioned in *Insight*: Conn would like a better glimpse of them.

He had two definite advantages in this asking. First, he had no illusions about *haute vulgarization*:<sup>33</sup> secondly, he had a sound year, at one stage in his academic career, in physics, mathematics and mathematical physics. He would not be baffled by differential equations or difficulties of nominalist desire.<sup>34</sup>

But what might one say of Maxwell, or Maxwell’s Equations, in *Insight*? There is the

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<sup>33</sup>I would note that this is a very difficult achievement. The next footnote illustrates the role of luck and education in the development of this complex differentiation. It is massively difficult in present theology, crippled by subtle patterns of general bias. The drive of these essays is towards grounding a remedy for this. On *haute vulgarization* I regularly give three references in Lonergan, *Collected Works*, vol. 6, 121, 155; vol. 10, 155. But his more vigorous pointing is in *Insight*: 417[442], 542[565-6]. One of the tragedies of Lonergan’s life is that he was called on so regularly to slide into the pattern of popularization.

<sup>34</sup>One must think of this O’Donovan luck in terms of one’s own unluck or one’s possibilities of breaking out of general bias.. In terms of one’s teaching: it is too easy, in the present *ethos*, to slide into the illusion of giving the “essence” of *Insight* to students: such teaching can take on the characteristics of serial killing.



obvious need for a hands-on approach boosted by imaginative representation. I cannot repeat that here, or even produce the equations on this machine. But, yes, a little “Sleepwalking”<sup>35</sup> in the nineteenth century helps towards a sense of: a current in a straight wire giving a circular magnetic effect round the wire; a moving magnet putting a current into a local wire; an electric charge sort-of radiating outwards; an absence of ‘magnetic charges’ that might do that. Four statements, then, pointing to four equations. Just a beginning, but a very important beginning. Without this solid patient entertaining initial messing, a second year student in physics can get into rhythms of memorization, technique, exclusion of understanding: get a degree, of course, but become an abominable teacher.

The solid messing involves an amount of reading, depending on time and enthusiasm. A decent text in physics, backed by history.<sup>36</sup> But what of Maxwell in *Insight*? Obviously the messing allows one to read both more intelligently and more humbly, heuristically.<sup>37</sup> But what if one’s aim is an understanding of Lonergan’s meaning, or even of a contemporary reading that would enlarge Lonergan’s meaning? Getting at Lonergan’s meaning here is, of course, already tough going. He remarked once that a theologian should be able to read Lindsay and Margenau, a work he battled with the late 1940s. *Foundations of Physics* puts Maxwell in quite a complex context, one that Lonergan sublates magnificently. The sublation would require a decent-sized book. It is not just a matter of illustrating explanatory reachings. It is a matter of locating Maxwell within real geometry, and that is a massively muddled zone in both popular and

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<sup>35</sup>I am thinking here of Arthur Koestler’s book on Kepler and company, *The Sleepwalkers*. There may well be an equivalent book on Maxwell but the only history I have to hand is Sir Edmund Whittaker, *History of Theories of Aether and Electricity*, in two volumes, Harper, Pb.

<sup>36</sup>On history, see the previous note. On physics, there are standard texts, but - as readers of the Cantowers know - I have a fondness for Feynman’s Three volumes, *The Feynman Lectures in Physics*, regularly republished in paperback by Addison-Wesley. The required stuff is mainly in volume 2. I mention these volumes below as Feynman I, II or III.

<sup>37</sup>There is the broader “allowing” given by serious messing with what I have called the words of metaphysics, Wi, but that is a larger topic. Chapter 25 above gives a preliminary list of these words.

professional physics.<sup>38</sup> How, then, does one think of Maxwell in the context of “Generalized Geometry”?<sup>39</sup> One is pushed into having to think beyond **E** and **B**, Electric and Magnetic vectors. One now has a vector potential **A**<sup>40</sup> that allows one to think of the electric and magnetic fields as components of an antisymmetric field strength 4-tensor, [all of which, to most readers here, is just gibberish]. Recall reading of this in *Insight*, where Lonergan points you towards<sup>41</sup> an appreciation of the significance of tensor analysis and the strategies of determining tensor coefficients: “In the General Theory of Relativity, the coefficients are symmetric, so that  $g_{ij}$  equals  $g_{ji}$ ; and in the Generalized Theory of Gravitation, the coefficients are antisymmetrical.”<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>First, I note a single muddled author on the popular level, simply because it is easy to notice how that author’s most recent work (Brian Greene, *The Fabric of the Cosmos. Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality*, Alfred A.Knopf, New York, 2004) messes round with Newton’s bucket all the way through (see the index under *bucket of spinning water*). Contrast this with Lonergan’s precision in section 3.3 of Chapter 5 of *Insight*. There is present in the literature a massive mythology of space-time structure. Professional physics does not escape these muddles. The comment to follow and the footnotes give some pointers, but it is a complex mess. Illustrative of the mess is the technical volume in honour of John A.Wheeler, *Science and Ultimate Reality. Quantum Theory, Cosmology and Complexity*, edited by J.D.Barrow, P.C.W.Davies and C.L.Harper, Cambridge University Press, 2004. The final section, on complexity, is handily illustrative of the absence of Lonergan’s transposition of Aristotle’s view into a contemporary aggreformism. On that topic, Cantower 29 is useful. Indeed, the set of Cantowers 27-31, which draw into parallel the first five chapters of *Insight* and the first five chapters of Feynman’s famous volumes, are a help in this area. Especially important is a reconception of the nature of energy: see Cantower 30.

<sup>39</sup>The title of section 2.5 of *Insight* chapter 5. One needs to place this in the context of the shifts of geometry during the nineteenth century.

<sup>40</sup>Feynman goes a pedagogical route round this topic in the volumes mentioned in note 9 above. Carver A. Mead takes him to task on this in *Collective Electrodynamics. Quantum Foundations of Electromagnetism* (MIT Press, 2000), in his Preface, in an interesting manner. The text mentioned in note 20 below is more integral, but it is graduate stuff. Experts will recognize the problems of locality here, recalling Aharonov and Bohm.

<sup>41</sup>The pointing is not serious unless the “towards” is supplemented by such a work as E.Schroedinger, *Space Time Structure*, Cambridge University Press, 1955. I highly recommend this old book: it was a sort of bible to me in the mid-1950s.

<sup>42</sup>*Insight*, 147[171].

And with this one is only warming up. “The merely coincidental becomes space-time through the interrelations of gravitational and electromagnetic theory,”<sup>43</sup> but this is only a beginning of the reach for “an abstract relation field”<sup>44</sup> that would ground real geometry. One must push forwards towards a fuller view of “Forces, Connections and Gauge Fields”<sup>45</sup> to reach the non-Abelian analogue of the electromagnetic field strength tensor and so move into a control of the meaning of various gauge groups that would enable an advance on the full spectrum of the primary relations that specify the patterns of the physics of the universe.<sup>46</sup>

Nor can we settle for that specification, the so-called Theory of Everything or Grand Unification Theory - TOE or GUT - as an adequate theory of graviton, electron, quark, whatever. The concrete intelligibility of space-time pulls us on into at least a rough statistics of occurrences that can fatten up into a complex thermodynamics of emergences or focus down towards a glimpse of initial cosmic events. GUTs “leaves to observation and, in the general case, to probabilities, the determination of how many masses with what momenta are at what positions.”<sup>47</sup>

And Maxwell equations, or their complex verified equivalents, hover there in that first cosmic second, reaching now into the room in which you read. “Try to imagine what the electric and magnetic fields look like at present in the space of this lecture room .... fields produced by .... coat sleeves .... and warm foreheads .... light, x-rays, radio waves .... music .... waves which

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<sup>43</sup>*Insight*, 510[533].

<sup>44</sup>*Insight*, 494[517].

<sup>45</sup>This is the title of chapter 8 of Ian Lawrie, *A Unified Grand Tour of Theoretical Physics*, Institute of Physics Publishing, Bristol and Philadelphia, paperback, 1998. This is a book I have been recommending as a type of update of *Foundations of Physics*.

<sup>46</sup>I recommend two sets of books here, Up-to-date and graduate level there are two works by Lochlainn O’Raifeartaigh, *Group Structure of Gauge Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1986; *The Dawning of Gauge Theory*, Princeton University Press, 1997. Pedagogically good are two books by Arthur Eddington, *The Mathematical Theory of Relativity*, Cambridge University Press, 1918 and his later popular paperback titled, I think, *General Relativity*.

<sup>47</sup>*Insight*, 494[518].

originated billions of light years away.”<sup>48</sup>

And, of course, I could venture further into the light that weaves round your present reading and your retina,<sup>49</sup> thus reaching into zones of whose problematic nature Maxwell was well aware.<sup>50</sup> So one lifts Maxwell’s equations into the world of entropy and negentropy<sup>51</sup> of energy’s fragmentations and elusive localizations.<sup>52</sup> Indeed a full concrete heuristic would fill the room with a view of “the music of the spheres”<sup>53</sup> and the radiations of the Divine Pacemaker,<sup>54</sup> all infoldings of energy’s radiant pilgrimage.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>Feynman II, 20. 8 - 20.9.

<sup>49</sup>Helpful here are chapters 35 and 36 of Feynman, vol. I.

<sup>50</sup>Feynman I, chapter 40, pp.8-9, dispels the myth that all was well in physics up to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He makes the point from papers of Maxwell, 1859 and 1869.

<sup>51</sup>A good introduction to this topic is E.Schroedinger’s little book, *What is Life?* These are popular lectures given in Trinity College Dublin in the mid-1950s, available in various formats. The audience grew by the week. I take the opportunity here, however, to recall that old danger of the merely popular. If you is serious about a world view, then one has to get down and dirty. If you wish to grapple with the entropy of the universe, it is as well to start in one’s own kitchen with the entropy of the fridge. Here I find that it is better to join the engineers, rather than staying with pure physics. My own old book on the topic is *Thermodynamics. An Engineering Approach*, by Yumus Cengel and Michael Boles, McGraw-Hill, 1989. I recommend it or some such book in your struggle to understand Maxwell in *Insight*. One might puzzle about why Lonergan did not discuss entropy in *Insight*. I suspect that Lonergan gave up on the task of integrating that part of Lindsay and Margenau into his reflections. But you might also consider how entropy and statistical mechanics can be sublated into a full theory of emergent probability.

<sup>52</sup>The mess of standard Quantum Mechanics remains with its abundant mythology. Carver Mead ( see note 40 above) shakes it up a little, as does John Bell in his various works. Feynman vol. III gives a decent start, but there one can diagnose elementary mistakes. The troubles go deep into the heuristics of the geometry adequate to present particle families, and to the character of secondary determinations in real dispersedness and its layered infoldings.

<sup>53</sup>Shakespeare, *Pericles*, V.ii, line 231. On Shakespeare’s mature vision in this play, see section 5 of chapter 2 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.

<sup>54</sup>See *Joistings* 6, “Jesus My Pilgrim Pacemaker”.

<sup>55</sup>Section 4 of chapter 15 of *Insight* opens up this topic. Further clues are available in *Cantower* 30.

This ends the section of *Joistings 2* relevant to our work here. But we need to push further into a broader view of structures and testing of hypotheses to contextualize the difficulties that Doran presents.

## Chapter 33

### Testing Structures

My title is nicely ambiguous: there are structures to be tested; there are testing structures. There is an evident zone of present inquiry that deals with both in an inadequate fashion. That zone of inquiry, contemporary logic, is the object of Lonergan's popular presentation in the first half of his 1957 lectures.<sup>56</sup> Does it not seem silly to attempt a condensed presentation in a few pages? Yes: yet is also seems important to intimate further where we are going, cyclically, in the search for common foundations. And it is key to our reflections on Doran's work to note in some substantial if obscure way that this is the zone of explanation of such ventures as mapping, axiomatizing, adequacy, testing, etc etc.<sup>57</sup> But it struck me a short while ago, walking home in the pleasant Christmas damp of Vancouver's Commercial Drive - where, according to my wife Sally, old hippies come to die! - that I should have mercy on my patient readers at this stage and give a basic descriptive answer to Doran's puzzle.

At the end of the last chapter I mentioned the room filled with electromagnetic stuff: but that is the stuff of testing and that is the stuff, amazingly, for which the four equations of Maxwell prove adequate. The tricky thing is to become luminous on the descent to the concrete, whether the existential concrete or what may be called the *formal concrete*.<sup>58</sup> In regard the

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<sup>56</sup>The edited lectures from Volume 18 of his *Collected Works, Phenomenology and Logic*, (University of Toronto Press, 2001). The use of the word *popular* in regard to these lectures may puzzle some readers. It is a difficult topic, but you might use the present chapter as an example. Without the notes, the text may be read meaningfully, either as doctrine or as popular depending on the reader's intent. The notes point beyond doctrine to climbing. I have made those rather full in this third last chapter, pointing beyond my minimalism to the larger task ahead. Best, perhaps, to skip the notes at a first reading.

<sup>57</sup>You may find it odd, but stimulating, that "another key" is scarcely mentioned: see notes 68 and 84.

<sup>58</sup>It may seem odd that I add the word *concrete* here. It connects with the problem of the nature of mathematics that Lonergan deals with in chapter 10 of *Insight*. As precision is reached on the meaning of energy, virtuality, dispersedness, neurochemistry, the theoretics of incompleteness of all levels of inquiry, etc, then the meaning of the historic concrete will illuminate the temporary concreteness - and incompleteness - of molecular spirit. There are many aspect of this that I see as needing immediate follow-up efforts to Lonergan's work:

existential concrete, it is important to hold to the possibility of testing and of the initiation of revisions on the basis of description. I think, for instance, of the descriptive hypothesis of the neutrino. You might think in philosophy of the nudge towards a hypothesis of God that one gets from a described world, whether it is a room filled with furniture or “a room filled with music.”<sup>59</sup> The formal concrete is a trickier affair.<sup>60</sup>

What then might I say briefly about the four-point hypothesis? Section 9 of chapter 19 of *Insight* moves right along in an expansive<sup>61</sup> deduction towards the claim that God is personal. Think, then, as I suggested earlier,<sup>62</sup> of adding a 27<sup>th</sup> place that would parallel Thomas’ 27<sup>th</sup> question in the *Summa*. Indeed, you might even think of adding that<sup>63</sup> into the first place and twisting the entire sequence towards a more interpersonal view of the flow of points after the 18<sup>th</sup>

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suggestions about indeterminacy, about layers of coincidental aggregates, about the place of neurodynamic processes in pondering, planning and prudential behaviour, etc. I think now of that classic of logic, the Decision Problem, touched on in one of my last conversations with Lonergan. He was asking about Goedel’s incompleteness theorem: I had very little light to offer on the matter. Or should I say on the concrete?

<sup>59</sup>*Method in Theology*, 290.

<sup>60</sup>Chapter One of *Phenomenology and Logic* begins with some elementary reflections on the testing of formal systems. A broader context for this whole business of control of meaning is P.McShane “Obstacles to Metaphysical Control,” *Method. Journal of Lonergan Studies* 24 (2006).

<sup>61</sup>This is a key and problematic word in dealing with genuine or apparently genetic structures. It becomes more problematic when one looks for precision regarding inner and outer words. The case mentioned above is a good illustration. In what sense is the flow from 1 to 26 expansive? Do the words express an expansion? Who is doing the expanding? It is interesting to consider the entire book *Insight* in this fashion. How much is expressed in chapter one? Where is the moving viewpoint?

<sup>62</sup>See note 7 above.

<sup>63</sup>“Think of adding that” is a phrase that illustrates a layered presentation that floats around layered readings. The beginner reader is certainly not in the world of Augustine, focused on the inner word, much less in the world of Lonergan’s third order of consciousness. The latter world is a known unknown, to be cultivated communally in the second time of temporal subjectivity. **That** becomes an addition to a shared metatheoretic tower-secure in the later stage of meaning.

place, where attention shifts to creation. The hypothesis as it stood, “in the first place,” was adequate to grounding an account of history; would not the supplemented hypothesis ground an account of the supernatural in history? So, one might argue that, yes, the four-point hypothesis could wind in here as a sufficient grounding for the full set of special categories.

But some would not be satisfied with such descriptive plausibility: then they must face the more strenuous adventure of asking such questions as we skim over below. So, let us brood over this task in luminous doctrinal fashion.

The task is internal to foundations, fleshed out by systematics. It is eventually to lift logic into a quite fresh field, where that word *field* is to have all the vibrancy that Lonergan intends. As well as Whitehead,<sup>64</sup> there is Woodger,<sup>65</sup> and there are the world s of the six logics that Lonergan mentions,<sup>66</sup> all coming under that simple statement in the supposedly simplest chapter of *Insight*, the ninth. “Logic is the effort of knowledge to attain the coherence and organisation proper to any

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<sup>64</sup>I am thinking of the Whitehead (with Russell) of the *Principia Mathematica*, not the Whitehead of process theology. One might do some enlightening contrafactual work here on where Whitehead might have gone had he moved, like Woodger(see the following note), into the world of axiomatic biology. Woodger’s work lacked a heuristics of randomness and I would note, in that regard, that present axiomatics is struggling to handle randomness, but still lacks the leap of aggreformism. At all events, I am drawing attention here to the open character of heuristic ventures in logic at all levels, as Lonergan does in writing about mathematics: “ From this feature [the grounding acts of direct and reflective understanding] there follows its dynamic character, for it contains an invitation to mathematicians to explore the possibility of setting up a series of deductive expansions that would do as much for other empirical sciences as has been done for physics.” (*Insight*, 314[339]) Add the perspective on incompleteness theorems touched on in note 82.

<sup>65</sup> See J. H. Woodger on biological symbolizations e.g. *The Axiomatic Method in Biology*, Cambridge University Press, 1937. See also N.R. Hansen, “E.S. Russell and J.H. Woodger: The failure of two twentieth century opponents of mechanist biology”, *Journal of the History of Biology*, 17(1984), 399-428.

<sup>66</sup>See *Phenomenology and Logic*, 94. The reference there is to Hellmut Stoffer, “Die modernen Ansätze zu einer Logik der Denkformen,” *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 10(1956), 442-66, 601-21.



stage of its development.”<sup>67</sup> Might we **map** - to use a problem<sup>68</sup> word from Doran and Monsour - both the early efforts in logic of Lonergan and his late efforts, even lifting the efforts into a genetic integrity, on that statement, map creatively on it what Kneale and Kneale<sup>69</sup> did not do, even indeed reach out to a logic of history? It depends on what the meaner means by the statement. Could the meaner have meant better through complexification of expression? “The one point we wish to make is that specialized modes of expression have to be evolved .... illustrated by the genetic theories of biology, psychology, and cognitional analysis .... working out types ... by determining the operators that relate classifications relevant to one level of development to the classifications relevant to the next.”<sup>70</sup> Such a reach will not be a Platonic or Hegelian business: it is to be luminous in its self-appreciation of the minding that is going on, and going on organizing, the minding crawling forward through the whatnesses of material things.<sup>71</sup> So it will stumble forward through the elementary zones of the lowest level of whatnesses in its geometrical possibilities and its physical actualities, and look up from that dispersedness - the heart of virtuality<sup>72</sup> - only with the seeing-crutch, the white-stick tapplings and

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<sup>67</sup>*Insight*, 276[301].

<sup>68</sup>Various aspects of the problem are touched on here in the sense that I point towards relevant enlargements of the discussion. Curiously, though, but strategically, I make no attempt in this chapter to give summary expression of the core difficulty: what is meant by relation, by divine relation, by primary and secondary components in relations, etc. See the conclusion to footnote 84 below. How, one might ask, is finite being mapped differently in each of the Divine Persons?

<sup>69</sup>I refer to their classic work, *The Development of Logic*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964 [recent corrected edition, 1978]. Missing of course is a scientific heuristics, but I have in mind here the challenge of its title: to push on into a logic of development.

<sup>70</sup>*Insight*, 572[595].

<sup>71</sup>We are all too familiar with the slogan that identifies the object of human minding: there are deep reasons for an effort to freshen it, but the freshening is to be a slow cyclic omnidisciplinary business.

<sup>72</sup>Virtuality is an enormously complex topic, even in the restricted zone of the potential of axioms. Add the context of Susanne Langer’s reflections on virtuality in *Feeling and Form*. There is also the context of obediential potency (See *Verbum* 149, 219), and one could push on to

mappings that lean on simpler invulnerabilities of insight.<sup>73</sup>

These are the complex questions raised by Doran's testing and mapping issues. They are way beyond the present generations of logicians. Is the four-point hypothesis adequate to reach all of history? Certainly it is so within the Logic of God, even though the "manifold cannot be systematized."<sup>74</sup> But is there not a deep clue here regarding a genetic axiomatics that holds heuristically and heartily to the relations talked about as thus infinitely comprehensive of this history and all possible histories?<sup>75</sup>

But who are to do this heuristic and hearty holding? We must envisage a Tower Community in which adult growth in minding, and in the minding of minding, is luminously normative, and leisured elderhood<sup>76</sup> of meaning is the creative seeding of new genetic reachings quite mysteriously beyond those very seedings.<sup>77</sup>

And this, in truth, is the direction that I finally took in this chapter, so as to point to a

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ask in what sense the Eschaton was virtually present in the Big Bang.

<sup>73</sup>See, in general, *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 185-6, but the particularly relevant consideration is in the reflection on the relevance of techniques of reduction in the fourth last paragraph of "A Notes on Geometric Possibilities", *Collection*, 105-6.

<sup>74</sup>*Insight*, 651[674]. See also note 82.

<sup>75</sup>The comprehensiveness varies from Person to Person in the Trinity and the variation is intimated by the titles of the Persons: think, for instance, of the Word in relation to the cosmic word and in relation to our inner words of the Word and of these variations.

<sup>76</sup>On retirement as a zone of escape into normative leisured accelerated growth, see P.McShane, "The Importance of Rescuing *Insight*," *The Importance of Insight. Essays in Honour of Michael Vertin*, edited by John J.Liptay and David S.Liptay, University of Toronto Press, 2006. The acceleration I have in mind relates to the equation  $d/dx [e^x] = e^x$ . You should note that  $e^x$  is the function that is central to Lonergan's view of the communal growth of theology (see his statement at note 15 of chapter 29).

<sup>77</sup>General bias, in control in our axial times, invites us heartily to think we have a fairly decent idea of such reaching. It is to be sobered and shrunken by the lift of elementary efforts, such as reading and locating Husserl's thesis on the variation-genetics within a general genetics of meaning and expression. Its communal sobering is the challenge issued by the mix of *Insight* 17.1 with *Method* 14.1.

quite distant universe of discourse regarding adequacy, testing, axioms, whatever. Certainly, the elementary road was there, but even it immediately gets beyond the elementary if it seeks to deal seriously with “Elements.”<sup>78</sup> Is the definition of the circle adequate to ground the genesis of Euclidean geometry; might one map Euclidean geometry on it? Well, it depends on who is defining, and how it is defined. “A geometer understands the whole of Euclid.”<sup>79</sup> To him or her “it is evident that all radii in the same circle must be equal”<sup>80</sup>, but that e-videns for the adequate geometer is inclusive of Euclid’s axioms, indeed of axioms in worlds of discourse quite beyond Euclid. We are talking about comprehensiveness of viewpoint, but in our context it is comprehensiveness on a quite new level. “Comprehensive grasp of the whole subject is not some phenomenon that you can pin right down and describe the structure. When you’re seeking insight into insight, not only have you a different term of attention, but your methods of procedure have to differ if you’re going to get anywhere.”<sup>81</sup> And what if you are seeking insight into insight into insight in the impossible total science of history?<sup>82</sup> And what if each small leap shifts the science genetically in the style of the rate of change of  $e^x$ ? “Conceptualization of understanding is, when fully developed, a system .... the concept emerges from understanding not an isolated atom detached from all contexts, but precisely as part of a context,”<sup>83</sup> In chapter 29 I made the point

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<sup>78</sup>The title of the first chapter of *Insight*. I take the opportunity to note the problem of an existential gap as one faces the reading of the first page of that chapter. The first paragraph points to the need to take simple problems seriously. The challenge at the end of that page is the “simple problem” of Archimedes: one has to be honest about it. Is it to be skipped? *Cantower 27* goes into some detail using Archimedes’ original work *On Floating Bodies*.

<sup>79</sup>*Phenomenology and Logic*, 357.

<sup>80</sup>“A Note on Geometrical Possibility”, *Collection*, 100.

<sup>81</sup>*Phenomenology and Logic*, 357.

<sup>82</sup>The methodological impossibility is expressed summarily in *Insight*, chapter 19, section 7: It is a central topic in chapter 16 of that book. Again, there is need here for axiomatic development that would bring out precisely the gap between “an abstract relation field” (*Insight*, 494[517] and precise or probabilistic determinations. That axiomatic development would extend the incompleteness theorems of logic to other zones.

<sup>83</sup>*Verbum. Word and Idea In Aquinas*, 238.

that, had Aquinas achieved the leap to the concept of the four-point hypothesis, it would have shifted the system. For the future student of progress, living in the (about)<sup>3</sup>-turn<sup>84</sup> tower of cyclic explanatory explanation, the leap is a leap of the entire tower project.

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<sup>84</sup>I end this heavily-footnoted chapter with this reference to central pointers, a text of Lonergan, and my own discussion of the terminological (about)<sup>3</sup>. The text in Lonergan is one I have quoted regularly, from Insight 514[537], regarding the turn-about that moves the extroverted subject into being a luminously isolated explanatory subject. The move is a slow business. Some description of the climb is given in *Cantower 9* “Position, Poisition, Protopossession”. I would repeat a point mad at various stages here, that, since writing Cantower 9, I have found increasingly relevant to the continued climb a cultivation of a dynamic chemical imagery that helps to envisage human living as a matter of lonely patterned chemicals that reach forward under the dynamic of energy’s finality. Further, such imagery helps towards both an explanatory grasp and a living within aesthetic and therapeutic chemistry. The second pointing of “(about)<sup>3</sup>” is discussed in various places: not recently in section 2 of chapter 2 of *ChrISt in History*. It relates to Lonergan’s naming of three orders of consciousness, in a 1965 draft of a chapter one of Method, which leads to a precise definition of methodology as a study of methods. That precision underpins a fresh accuracy about genetic systematics. One final point brings out the deliberate incompleteness of this present sketch: it is a drawing attention to the central relevance of Lonergan’s precision regarding relations (especially see *Insight 16.2* and the second Appendix to his systematic treatment of the Trinity).

## Chapter 34.

### The Unified Field Structure

The name of this penultimate little chapter is Doran's name for what we seek, and it seems appropriate to hold to it in an effort to move towards the fuller integral perspective that is required. Of course, my own view of what is required has already been presented in Part One, and enlarged on in Part Two. The problem posed in this Part Three was to make a beginning on - or rather to invite you to move towards - an integration of the rich suggestions of Doran and Mansour with the findings of the previous parts. But indeed, if you have been with me even descriptively since we ventured to consider history's dynamics in chapter one, you will suspect that the sharing of integral perspective is a further task of history. Here, and in the final chapter, I can only continue earlier points regarding the humble cycling towards a Tower community constituted by such a perspective. And the pointings will be continued, I hope, by some embryonic community of searchers willing to enter the minimalism that I have been advocating from the beginning. But my share in the searching is to add to my willingness to collaborate in various ways, but most explicitly through the continuation of the series, *Joistings*, that was begun with that very intention. So, as I promised previously, *Joistings 15* and following will pick up, in community, on the complex set of problems to which Doran's work draws attention. We have attended here only to a short central section of his book. The rest of Doran's book, and his previous output, calls for something like the larger work named in the Epilogue of *Insight*, but now as a communal searching of generations. But the following chapter here, with the title of Doran's following chapter, "Anticipations," is an expression of optimism. I read his chapter again yesterday with enthusiasm. It seemed to me that I could just quote it, repeat Doran's reach there. Am I reading too much into its dynamics and its hope? Might you read it with the same hope?

Your reading depends on whether you have broken through, or can break through with the help of the added pointers of this chapter, to answer the question raised at the end of the first chapter: are Doran and I in different worlds of discourse?

As I mused over carrying forward this conversation I jumped to the bright idea of adding a further metagram to those already given, and I place it at the end of this chapter. The interesting

thing about this metagram is that it belongs in the sporadic dialogue between Doran and me that spans the thirty years of which he writes.<sup>85</sup> Indeed, I can claim that the key metagram, W3, is due to his reaching and nudging in “Psychic Conversion and Lonergan’s Hermeneutics”, the paper he submitted prior to the conference in Concordia University, Montreal.<sup>86</sup> My reply to his paper, “Psychic Differentiation and Systematic Heuristics”<sup>87</sup> was also submitted prior to the conference, indeed this prior distribution of papers was one of the positive aspect of the gathering. But when it came to my presentation of my paper it seemed to me that something more than my paper needed to be aired. The pre-dawn light of the morning of my presentation brought forth the scribbles that I now name W3. The oddity now is that W6, added immediately in the form in which I wrote it, is another creation related to Doran’s work, but a post-lecture thing. It was written the morning after his evening presentation, at the August 2004 Conference, on the nature of systematic theology, and shared with him and others at that time. You can see in it the solution to the problem of worlds: well, with perhaps a fresh read of this little book!<sup>88</sup> My single contribution to the August celebration of the Lonergan centennial was a brief comment on Doran’s paper, when I talked of tadpoles and frogs. The present book might well have included zoology rather than botany in the title, but organic development is enormously easier to handle than the psychic development of the frog, so I stuck with plants. But the analogue from either zone is an analogue of hope. We should recall Waddington as I quoted him in chapter 2: “The striking achievement of an egg is to produce things - roots, leaves, legs, eyes, backbone, and so on - which were not in it originally. It does more than merely reproduce itself; it produces something new. Even if you have a certain degree of biological knowledge when you start

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<sup>85</sup>Doran, ix, x.

<sup>86</sup>*Lonergan’s Hermeneutics. Its Development and Application*, edited by Ben Meyer and Sean McEventue, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1989, 161-208.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, 209-16. Doran added a short reply to my paper, 217-20.

<sup>88</sup>I refrain from adding elaborate comments here on the metagram: a few further pointers emerge in the final chapter. The elaborate comments, indeed, are the present book. But different individuals will come up with their own difficulties and suggestions, and I am open to particular conversations.

looking at it - knowing perhaps what everyone seems to know nowadays, that the fundamental characteristics of organisms are determined by the genes inherited from their parents, and that these genes are made of nucleic acid (DNA) - even so, merely to say that the lump of jelly you are looking at contains the right DNA to produce a rabbit leaves an enormous amount unaccounted for. Exactly how does the egg produce legs, head, eyes, intestine, and get up and start running about? Once you have seen the challenge that these phenomena offer to our understanding, the only hope of rescuing yourself from the seductions of embryology is to reflect that discretion may be the better part of valor, when you may conclude that development is really too difficult and you had better take up something simpler, such as biochemistry or genetics.”<sup>89</sup>

You can better see now, perhaps, the manner in which the failure in contemporary botany or zoology is mirrored in contemporary theology. The failure in both botany and zoology is to be faced in Faith by a community circumincessionally imitating, in luminous self-possession of the four-point hypothesis, the objective ground of the source of that hypothesis in the stand taken by The Suffering Servant.<sup>90</sup> The striking achievement of future theology, seeded in the New Covenant, is quite beyond present fantasy

It seems good, in concluding here, to comment on the title of this chapter in a way that brings in perhaps Lonergan’s most profound expression of his bent, an expression of his remote minding dynamics of the summer of his 54<sup>th</sup> year.<sup>91</sup> Add that expression to the expression of the “falling into place” that Lonergan wrote about to Crowe.<sup>92</sup> In neither, obviously, has he come to what I diagram in W3. How might you pick up on these two expressions, volume 18 of his

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<sup>89</sup> C.W.Waddington, *Principles of Development and Differentiation*, Macmillan, 1966, vi-vii. You might find it helpful to read, in this context of parallel theology and botany, the third chapter of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, which has such strange subtitles as “The Little Flower”, “The Field and the Garden”, “The Field as Foreign and Friendly”. On the key topic, field, see the conclusion below to this chapter.

<sup>90</sup>I have treated, in *Joistings* 8, the manner in which shifting to the cycling collaboration is an imitation of the Suffering Servant.

<sup>91</sup>Of course, the more detailed ‘bringing in’ was a motive for the writing of the previous chapter here.

<sup>92</sup>See the quotation at note 15 of chapter 29 above.

*Collected Works* and his short comment to Crowe, to give yourself your own W7, something that might give you a controlling grip on the whole of historical being and its flowerings? That controlling grip is a surrender to the seductions of cosmic embryology, an embrace by and of material being, Claspéd, Spoke, Bespoke.

So I invite you to pause over the word “field” in the title and Lonergan’s hints around it in his lectures on existentialism.<sup>93</sup> The topic deserves a creative book. I concluded the Introduction to my index of *Phenomenology and Logic* with the remark, “foundational indexing is dominated by a normative pointing towards the actual and the potential progressive structures of the elusive field (see the index under Field).” Foundational indexing is rooted in the indicator’s self-digested **what**.

A useful start to your pause is a pause with your unarticulated question, “What is being?” or now, “what is the field?” and to put into that pause my curious answer: “yes, **what** is the field”. In my researching for the book *Phenomenology and Logic* I found sources in existentialism for Lonergan’s picking up of the word *field*. Undoubtedly too there was his struggle with fields of physics in Lindsay and Margenau. But, as I mention later, it seems to me that he was growing in a concrete psychic appreciation of his and our mind-distance from being. And I would add that he was growing in his appreciation of our distance from an answer to the question *Was ist Metaphysik?*<sup>94</sup> Oddly, our distance from metaphysics is greater than our distance

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<sup>93</sup>See the comment on these lectures at note 56 above. There is a shifting in Lonergan’s meaning that I would associate with the elder Shakespeare’s climb in *Pericles*: see the conclusion to chapter 2 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. Brooding on the meaning of field, especially within a context of description-defying chemical imagery, can keep one’s climb adult-growing.

<sup>94</sup>Martin Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt, 1965, a talk Heidegger gave in the University of Freiburg in 1929 on which I comment at the beginning of chapter 2 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, worth delving into in our present context. But I end this chapter recalling Brendan Kennelly’s identification of the dark *Journey into Joy* (Bloodaxe Press) that note 65 of Part two brings to mind. Kennelly writes of visions after surgery (*The Man Made of Rain*, 7), “they probably lasted a few seconds, in daylanguage terms”. I write of the surgery of serious thinking that pauses and plods over this flower and that for decades, turning Heidegger’s question towards the field. Poetry and plodding are both needed in the blood stream. “My mind took off down the hill of blood / running full pelt through the morning. / It looked back once, saw a real sick nut / seeing a bright, informed, frightened thing” (*Ibid.*, 87)



from being, for the former involves our luminousness regarding the latter.

But I leave it to you to follow up these pointers, aided by the index to *Phenomenology and Logic*. It reaches to the heart of our struggle, the heart in our struggle. That struggle, a drive forwards of humanity that is global and concrete and rising to a third order of consciousness, is intimated by the metagram, W6, with which I conclude this chapter: but only to a molecularly-alert whatter.


Perhaps you need to meet a woman made of rain.

W6

Periodic Table in  
ongoing genesis of  
chemical system

Periodic Functional Cycling  
in ongoing genesis  
of genetic systematics

(track... and  
baton exchanging)  
Quadrant 2



(250) Dialectic Achievements:


versions of 286-7+

→ "BATON" →

N.B.  
Foundational  
Acceptance  
of Tradition

Foundational Reaching:

Fantasy and its Circulation



## Chapter 35.

### Anticipations

“With few exceptions, the foundational reality to which Lonergan appeals has enjoyed only more or less coincidental appropriation on the part of theologians. Making it explicit is what enables us to anticipate an ongoing genetic sequence of systematic theologies, a collaboration over time that, in principle, would never cease. For it provides an ever-developing account of the sources of such a sequence.”<sup>95</sup>

My quotation is from Doran’s chapter 8, of the same title, towards the end of his first one-page section on “An Open but Continuous Future”. That paragraph section is three packed and magnificent sentences and indeed I might say the same about the three paragraphs of the section. Further, as I read and re-read his chapter, it seemed to me that I could well leave it at that for the moment. Doran goes on to pose key problems, problems that are to carry theology forward in these next generations, in these next millennia, indeed Is there a sense in which he is right on when he writes of “a collaboration over time that, in principle, would never cease”? I must ask him what he had in mind,<sup>96</sup> for that is the benefit of an Ovalteam dialogue: might you be able to pick it out in the Communications Matrix? Recall the discussion of that matrix, which

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<sup>95</sup>Doran, 79.

<sup>96</sup>My suspicion is that we are, in fact, in different zones of interest at present, a difference that would effect our present meanings of this phrase. In the past decades I have been struggling increasingly with the character of the eternal collaboration, suspecting that there is to emerge a magnificent theology of hope and an eschatology, something that does with modern physics and cosmology what Thomas never got round to doing again in his *Summa* - what is normally included there is a patchwork of previous young efforts. What of the cyclic dynamic in the state of “Infinite Surprise”? ( The concluding words of the Epilogue of *Wealth of Self*). A curious parallel occurs to me as I write, about a conversation I had with Lonergan, in Easter 1961, walking the streets of Dublin: we were on a mundane journey to buy him a pair of shoes! He spoke of Thomas having an integral cosmology. Of him, in that speaking, I can ask, and have asked, what did he have in mind? I suspect that he was not thinking of eschatological cosmology explicitly, but I would say that he had not blanked out that zone of proportionate being in the 28 years of climbing towards *Insight* and its cut-off pointing regarding spirit’s escape from energy-fields (*Insight*, 516-19[541-3]). Had he been given the extra year to complete the book, would he have pushed on to questions about post-mortem minding?

gives the general form of Oval-dialogue as  $C_j, j+1$ , where  $j$  runs from 1 to 8, and  $9 = 0$ .<sup>97</sup> That is the *per se* dynamic of collaboration; the *per accidens* dynamic includes all elements of the matrix, any specialist talking to another. Are you still with me? I shall return to this imaging shortly, for a larger perspective on the matrix is key to handling methodologically most of the problems which Doran raises in section 3, “Anticipations of Content”.

But back to section 1 of his chapter. The first sentence of it anticipates, indeed states more fully, the key pointing of the quotation with which I started. “The ground is now available to enable a contemporary systematic theology to anticipate on ongoing genetic sequence of interrelated systematic positions.”<sup>98</sup> This, as with the initial quotation above, is a powerfully suggestive statement, but I suspect that Doran and I wrote and read it differently. What is your suspicion, and how would you tackle resolving it, sublating it?

Taking that last question seriously, you will notice, helps you to find your own position, your own systematic position. Should I leave the task like that, dangling before you, perhaps too vaguely?

How will the Ovalteam of 2037 resolve and sublimate the difference between Doran’s view and mine? Have you guessed right? Of course: they will be working through the challenge of page 250 of *Method*. But who are **they**? **They** are to be the dialectic community, struggling in a tincture<sup>99</sup> of the differentiation of that specialty in so far as it has been developed in these next thirty years.

Now perhaps this directive, and my reminding you of the matrix of specialized conversations, helps to pose better the problem of differences in orientation. I am quite explicit about the need for symbolisms and metagrams, but that is a generic element of properly

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<sup>97</sup>See chapter 26 above.

<sup>98</sup>**Doran**, 78.

<sup>99</sup>Lonergan uses the word “tincture” in *Method in Theology* (329; see 299, 304, 307-9) in referring to emergent system in the Church’s early councils.

advancing science.<sup>100</sup> The directive, however, is quite precise, even though in my view it is again generic to serious inquiry within the human genus, and perhaps will “never cease”.

This, of course, gives me the opportunity to bow out at the end of this chapter, for my treatment of the directive to page 250 of *Method*, is a substantial book about that page.<sup>101</sup> Still, the metagrams help to locate the task of sorting out positional differences, and in particular the metagram that I have now labeled W6, with which the preceding section concluded. I suggest re-reading that metagram in tandem with a re-reading of chapter 6 of Part One. Your focus should be on a reading of that single sentence that begins Doran’s first section of chapter 8 of his book, already quoted, but let us repeat it now.

“The ground is now available to enable a contemporary systematic theology to anticipate an ongoing genetic sequence of interrelated systematic positions”.

For me, it is a startlingly coherent pointing to the meaning that I have sought and reached in this odd little book on theology and botany. Again, I appeal to Waddington, already quoted twice. Where he writes of “the seductions of embryology” I think of our embryonic finitude, a Clasping Spoke, cauling us, Attractor-Wise, to birth, berth.<sup>102</sup> The interrelated positions? Think of the global out-reach within the analogy of the organism’s integrator-operator positions. Think, indeed, of the very young organism as an image of our finitude in this period of our history, with perhaps three billion years to go even as we think of three decades.<sup>103</sup>

Are you anyway with me in my foundational fantasy? “The ground is now available”, but only like the scattered fragments of organic chemicals wrongly called a code: unless we take *code* to mean something like an enigma, something quite unlike a patent.

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<sup>100</sup>I recall again Lonergan’s comment on the need, in controlling meaning, for symbolization: *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 151.

<sup>101</sup>I refer, in particular, to the two series in the Website: SOFDAWARE and *Quodlibets*. SOFD recalls the title of Lonergan’s brief section “Structure **OF** Dialectic”.

<sup>102</sup>Naming the Divine Three is a tricky matter of time, culture, orientation, as Thomsad illustrates. The names above recall my effort at the bottom of W3.

<sup>103</sup>“The Earth could remain habitable for two or three billion years hence”(Paul Davies, *The Last Three Minutes. Conjectures about the Ultimate Fate of the Universe*, Phoenix,138).

What is a contemporary systematic theology? It is, I would claim, what I diagram in W3 and W6. It seems to me that Doran's focus is on the functional specialty systematics, but with a further sub-focus that does not immediately help to hold to the central fact that the functional specialty is intrinsically genetic. The four-point hypothesis is like an integral perspective on a stage in the life of a sapling oak-tree. At any period in botany, especially if we are thinking of a future in which botanists are lovingly integral in embracing the whole flower and the whole forest, there can be a leap regarding a life-slice's structure that illuminates one's grip on the whole, from acorn to gnarly oak. One sees, and is seized by, the acorn differently. How about the seizing of chapters 14-17 of John's Gospel in the luminously-molecular intussusception of the four-point hypothesis?

My focus is on the ground that pragmatically enables, on an intussuscepted operative cyclic dynamic that is a global "normative pattern of recurrent and related operations reaching cumulative and progressive results."<sup>104</sup> That pattern gives efficient unity to the science of progress, "and it is quite legitimate to seek in the efficient cause of the science, that is in the scientist, the reason why the science forms a unified whole."<sup>105</sup> The normative pattern is, as Part One, suggests, to be in the scientist, luminously. Further, that normative pattern is, in the long run, to be global: a run anticipated in the heuristic conception of efficient sloping, which sloping also guarantees a lift of theology from its bad breadth.<sup>106</sup>

Such an effective operative perspective, "a specialized auxiliary,"<sup>107</sup> would both meet Doran's three concerns of the beginning of section three of his chapter, and fit in with Lonergan's and Doran's views of the twentieth century in theology as paralleled with the twelfth. One might go on to envisage the failure of the centuries that followed the twelfth as something that

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<sup>104</sup>*Method in Theology*, 4.

<sup>105</sup>*Topics in Education*, 160: line 16.

<sup>106</sup>The reference is to Lonergan's remark (*Insight*, 733[755]) about "arriving on the scene a little breathless and a little late", but it also recalls a private remark of his in Dublin, Easter 1961 describing institutionalized theology after Trent as a matter of "big frogs in little ponds".

<sup>107</sup>"An adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference with intellect's unrestricted finality" (*Insight*, 726[747]).

Lonergan wished us to avoid paralleling in this new millennium.

Doran goes into more detail in this section, on “Anticipations of Content” - the section occupies 2/3rds of the chapter - and considering it further here would open up a whole new area of detailed reflections. However, his topic is primarily dialogue with others such as the Barthians or those who would follow Balthasar, and this is a topic that was raised in the discussion of patterns of collaboration and communications.<sup>108</sup> The upshot of that discussion is the position that such dialogue belongs within the provenance of the eighth specialty: to attempt the inclusion of such dialogue elsewhere is dysfunctional. But that compact earlier discussion requires not summary but lengthy book treatment.

So, it seems best to halt my reflections here, holding to general pointings.<sup>109</sup> Let us return, then, to Lonergan’s claim of 1954, that he is closing in on the drive of theology. Functional specialization was still a decade away. Place that claim, symbolically expressed by him, in W6, at the spot where I hint diagrammatically at the sequence of systems: the point is close to Doran’s pointing, but now you may see the leap to the contextualizing of that “closing in”. Might you diagram it, as I suggested, with your own effort at a W7? Or might you not find, as I suspect, that W6 winds round into W3, giving the closed set, W0 - W6, of an open symbolic heuristic for this stage of our embryonic struggle? I would like to think that I have fulfilled the role of the metaphysician of giving “a symbolic indication of the total range of possible experience,”<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup>See chapter 26.

<sup>109</sup>I return here, in this final non-referential note, to the problem of popularization that was raised before at various times, that is raised by this book. The problem is caught in the problem of various meanings for the word *general*. On this I have touched before, in reflection on the final section, “The Problem of General History,” of the final chapter of *Topics in Education*. I would be profitable to hold this little book within this context and the paradox of the book is that it holds, heartholds, that that holding is a thing of the distant future. “Regional culture is the simplest realization of a way of life. What is a way of life?” The Region that I envisage, whose way and **what** I have tried to intimate, is a global non-local region, The Tower of Able, with the characteristics of “Cosmopolis” (*Insight*, 8.6): “not a police force”, “bearing witness to the possibility of ideas”, “not a busy body”, seeking “to protect the future” through luminous self-criticism; finally, “not easy”.

<sup>110</sup>*Insight*, 396[421].

centered on the experience that is to be a luminous global control of emergent probability.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>See *Insight* 8.3, on “Alternatives of the Longer Cycle”. See? The difficulty has been just that, these fifty years since the visibility, the present-ation of those sketched alternatives, that stretched minding. “Mindbleeding never ends. / What’s half a century between friends?” (Kennelly, op.cit. Frontispiece, 64). The problem is, to make friends, Aristotelian equals, with the man made of rain.”He was actually raining, all his parts were raining slantwise and firmly in a decisive contained way”(ibid., 7), not then “the extroverted subject...” (*Insight* 514[537]), “drowned in the familiar sea of Dayenglish” (Kennelly, 8) but present in beingdark present-ation. The rainman or rainwoman is your mightbe, breeding the *nomos* like the girl directed in her playing by Plato at his death. Did you walk your town-streets on that dialectic walk of chapter 28? “The man of rain walks the streets of Dublin / like a giant flower / the unacknowledged generations / have slaved to create. / This flower is a human poem / the trodden streets can read.” (Kennelly, 67).