

Prologue

This work is sufficient brief to prevent anyone from thinking of it as a re-write of *Method*, much less as the “far larger” work than *Insight* mentioned at the beginning of the Epilogue of that large book. Yet I would claim that there is a sense in which this little book should help to sniff out the larger missing work better than either of those works of Lonergan. This should not be surprising. Lonergan, in his last tired years, turned his attention away from functional specialization in favour of a final effort to get his economics accepted. Besides, *Method* was already a tired book and, as we shall see, a problematic book from its inception, and *Insight* was written prior to his fundamental methodological discovery. I, on the other hand, was relatively young when Lonergan spelled out for me, in the Summer of 1966, his fundamental insight of February 1965, and I have spent most of the past forty years trying to figure out the content and the operable dynamics of that structuring insight. Moreover, I was relatively well prepared that summer. I had been nine years on the trail of a solution to the problem of method, beginning with the *Verbum* articles in 1956, when I had completed Master’s Degree studies in general relativity and quantum theory. Despite that background I was quite flabbergast by *Insight*’s fifth chapter the next year. Fifty years working on these writings leave me still flabbergast, most recently - as we shall see below - at the reach of Lonergan’s four pages on plants.¹ At all events, I was lucky in my preparation for the 1966 pointing, and lucky since in my search for the significance of his descriptive specification of cyclic functional collaboration.

But I do not wish to enter here into the details of that lucky searching. I wish only to make this short book accessible. It is even shorter than what I originally anticipated, which adds to accessibility: it is a few hour’s reading. It could be a disturbing reading, depending on your present reach. Perhaps you are in the psychic state of Stephen McKenna who, after encountering Plotinus’ *Enneads*, wrote in his diary on his 38th birthday, “This is worth a life”. **This**, in the present case, is some collaboration in the implementation of Lonergan’s suggested division of labour. Perhaps, indeed, you already think that this is worth a life, but you cannot see your way

¹*Insight*, 463-7[488-92].

towards the collaboration. Then join the club: I too am in the dark, but I continue to reach, and have reached for a lifetime, and now express myself all too briefly in this odd little last book in a “methodological style which aims at decreasing darkness and increasing light.”²

I do not wish this Prologue to run much more than three pages, and you should notice that this is true of all the chapters. I follow in this the strategy that emerged in writing the book *Introducing Critical Thinking*,³ but here there are added twists to the strategy. There the 52 short chapters symbolized a year’s musings; here the 20 chapters with an Epilogue may remind you of *Insight* and point, perhaps, towards a missing larger work, with 50 pages instead of 3 per chapter, that would integrate *Insight* and *Method*.⁴ Also you notice that the specialties 1-8 are dealt with conveniently in chapters 11-18, but you also notice that the previous 10 chapters replace the 5 “Background” chapters of *Method*. They are my present answer to the question Lonergan posed to me forty years ago: “What am I to do? I can’t put all of *Insight* into chapter 1 of *Method*”.

You have surely puzzled about the title. Obviously it is a book on method in theology. What then does the “and botany” mean? Lonergan, on the first page of chapter 1 of *Method*, reflects on various approaches to thought on method: method as an art learned by following examples, method as reflection on previous achievement. “There are, however, bolder spirits. They select the conspicuously successful science of their time.”⁵ I have selected botany, but there is ambiguity in this selection, for it is both a conspicuously successful and a conspicuously unsuccessful science. How this is so must be left to sections of the book, but how the lack of success is to be met, that can be stated immediately. It is to be met by a strategy that is isomorphic with the strategy Lonergan advocated for theology. The *and* in the title then points

²*Method in Theology*, 270.

3. John Benton, Alessandra Drage and Philip McShane, *Introducing Critical Thinking*, (Axial Publishing, Cape Breton, 2005), is a text written for the final years of high school and is being used there as well as in first year university courses.

⁴That has been, as you shall notice from this short book, my fundamental project since 1966. It is, however, a project for a global community. See also note 7 below. There shall be further pointers to work of the previous forty years, my own and others, as we go along.

⁵*Method in Theology*, 3.

to an abbreviation: Method in Theology and Method in Botany.

But there is more to it than this. So, one may think of theology in an way that envisages its axiomatization: in the style, for example, mused on in the *Summa Theologica's* first question. But theology is no more axiomatizable than the acorn. Like the acorn, theology is a system on the move. In a forthcoming book Fr. Robert Doran asks, *What is Systematic Theology?*⁶ I surmise that he is asking about the seventh specialty of Lonergan's eightfold way. At all events, there is the larger issue of the total theological process. Is there something to be learned from botany's various problems of reaching a systematic identity? So, one reads the title with an eye on botany's nudging of the problem of method. This nudging is, of course, already present in *Insight's* attention to development as a key feature of theology. But here the issue is pushed further.

But the push, like all else here, is descriptive, suggestive. It certainly points towards the need for a massive literature regarding a fresh complex pragmatics of method. But the pointing that is central here is not towards such a distant goal but towards a proximate effort. That concerns us especially from chapter 8 on, when I am envisaging just how we might get the show on the road. And, most important, by *we* I mean the present and next generation of Lonergan students. Indeed, perhaps I should have said *you*. At 74 I should be past new tricks. Still, I would like to think that I have a thing or two to contribute by way of collaboration. What I am quite certain of is that Lonerganism is destined to go the usual way of other -isms unless Lonergan's students take with full seriousness Lonergan's final leap beyond Plato, a leap that would replace a monarchy of philosophy with a democracy of minding.

So, this final appeal of mine is to the younger Lonergan community, and the brevity is a key element in that appeal: I would not wish the appeal to get lost in a massive scholarly effort. Still, I have made such a massive effort in the forty years since Lonergan introduced me to the strategy that could, in this millennium, lift us efficiently into the third stage of meaning. It is a strategy that, as I shall argue in the first chapter, has history for its mother but Lonergan for its foster-father. At all events, it seemed worth my while to supplement the brevity with helps and

⁶University of Toronto Press, 2005.

hints from my fifty years of struggling with Lonergan's meaning. So there are the abundant footnotes. Do not let them distract you from the message of a first reading.⁷

My first version of the Prologue ended here, and the book itself ended with the Epilogue, thus meeting my desire to keep the presentation short. A test run past interested people gave me the impression that the strategy was successful: Lonergan's division of labour came across freshly as a possibility, indeed an omnidisciplinary and global possibility, and the invitation to take a stand was clear. What was missing, for those who wished to be involved, was sufficient direction towards participating in the enterprise. What to do? The compact presentation gave an encouraging vision: meshing into it more practical considerations could take from that visioning. My collaborative musings led me to a simple solution, which indeed, threw further light on the character of foundational work. The solution emerged by brooding over the penultimate footnote of the text, note 185. That note, a comment on the phrase "a new heaven and a new earth," which begins chapter 21 of *Revelations*, concludes by remarking that the "fuller heuristics has to reach both to within the next three decades and to beyond the next three billion years." The three billion years refers to the predictions of present physics regarding the future habitability of the earth, a legitimate foundational concern. But the three decades: that would seem to be a topic for a foundational Appendix - now Part Two - which would, so to speak, cycle itself into replacement in a few decades. Part Two, "Foundational Fantasy: 2007-2037", seeks to meet the needs expressed by those wishing guidance on the here-and-now possibilities and probabilities, and it also gives a quite concrete illustration of the process of foundation fantasy, the central contribution of the fifth specialty.

⁷The text may well be read first without the notes. The notes which are just references are regularly important leads, but it seems as well to compactly indicate the key lead that is found in a prior text, written six months ago as preparation for a conference on functional specialization and Christology. It is now available on the Website as *ChrISt in History*. Though the six months of thinking have left me with a much larger view - on this, see the Epilogue - the treatment of each of the specialties is fuller in that text.

Chapter 1

History's nudge beyond Fragmentations and Inefficiencies

“What is needed to clear the air is first an exposition of the nature of and relations among *theory, analysis and criticism*, then secondly, an examination of the pertinence of all this to compositional procedure.”⁸

I began thus my first serious article on the need for a general functional academic division of labour more than 35 years ago in Oxford, in the Bodleian Library of 1969, where the musicology section was at the time. My venture was into the problem as it manifested itself in musicology. But do not think that I am here leading you into this zone of learning. Rather I wish you to home in on some zone of learning that is familiar to you, and to find from your musings that, yes, there is a need to clear the air, as David Lewin wrote in 1969 about the study of music. Further, I would like you to notice that the suggested division would seem to help in your zone of interest. So, we have a modest goal. We are taking a very pragmatic stand on fragmentation and on helps to do even modestly better. We are not reaching, with Lewin, for a “Behind the Beyond”. Rather we are noticing history's accidental nudgings.

Noticing? My own experience of noticing is and was that it is not easy to notice. Would I have noticed the problem in musicology in 1969 had Lonergan not focused history's nudge for me in the summer of 1966? I'm really not sure, but I doubt it. Perhaps, if Lonergan had not made that leap to the division of labour in February of 1965, someone somewhere, during that century or this millennium, would have noticed history's nudge, in theology or in some other area, like ecology.⁹

Noticing? Taking note of? Giving notice to? Giving notice to one's own efforts to labour in the world of minding? There is a sense in which I have not got that far in four decades. I suppose, yes, that I have - as I have claimed now for at least two decades - been doing rambling

⁸David Lewin, “ ‘Behind the Beyond’: A Response to E.T.Cone”, *Perspectives of New Music*, (7), 1969, 61.

⁹See Arne Noess, “Deep Ecology and Ultimate Premises,” *The Ecologist*, (18), 1988, 131. This volume contains the special double issue on deep ecology devoted to “Rethinking Man and Nature: Towards an Ecological Worldview”.

dialectic in an effort to reach a fuller foundational perspective. But no, I have not given myself serious notice: the implementation of the new paradigm is still beyond me. This book is being written as I move through my 74th year both in the hope that you would come to notice the nudge and that I would get a better grip on concrete implementation and intimate that grip to the next generation of Lonergan students. Your level of noticing may be merely an assent: that there is something to be said for Lonergan's division, something minimal like: yes, it would seem to offer a more efficient way of doing progress-studies, or of doing whatever. Implementing the suggestion is quite another business, and it could be beyond your talent, your time, even your generation. So, from you, all I wish is a stand that may be inoperative yet is serious. In Ireland we talk about the hurler - the player of hurley, a wild game with curved sticks and a hard little ball - the hurler on the ditch who is non-performatively wise. I think the parallel in American football talk is the Monday morning quarterback, and no doubt Ma Jong has its sayings. So: have the leisure of a non-performative stand.

How might I get you to notice and thus take a stand?

The Prologue indicated that I am writing this book primarily to young people interested in Lonergan's work. Here and there I shall touch on how the division of labour may be relevant to your own work or your life, and this also helps in taking the stand. It does not commit you to a reform of your writing or teaching. Think of someone who wishes to teach chemistry: they get a B.Sc. that includes enough chemistry; they get a qualification in education; then they are on the job-hunt in the school system. "Work in the field of chemistry"? That may never have been on their agenda. Still, they met the Periodic Table along the way, and yes, it is a pretty good integrator of chemical studies. The equivalent of that acceptance of the periodic table is all I ask for here. But it is asking for the beginning of an ethos. The asking, of course, is the asking of history and the effective answering brings in all the problems of paradigm shifts that Kuhn points to, or the strain towards operative fantasy that I have been talking about for some decades.

Fantasy helps towards the expectation of a paradigm shift, and it is not at all easy. "Imagine," sang John Lennon. What that imagining reaches towards eventually is a global dynamic of collaboration, but that would be getting way ahead of ourselves here. Perhaps at this stage it is enough to notice that, in some familiar area of academic work, there is a muddle of

inefficient efforts. Think, with Lewin's words, of "the pertinence of all this to compositional procedure". In theology, this would be expressed most simply in terms of the pastoral problem. In philosophy, one might ask for the street value of the output of Journals in different zones and traditions. Do good theses on philosophy of education eventually hit the classrooms? And so on.

Perhaps you might find it useful to think of the problem in terms of particular individuals. What about starting with yourself, if you have views on some subject, if you have written a thesis, an article that was dear to your heart? What effect has it had? But it may be easier to think of the output of some of the "greats," of Aristotle or Aquinas especially if you take Lonergan seriously, as I presume you do. For my non-Lonergan readers I add here that the issue there is not the issue of taking Lonergan seriously but taking yourself seriously. I recall Lonergan being amused at my summary introduction of his work through entertaining the question, What is Lonergan getting at? "He is getting at you."¹⁰

So let us suppose that you take Lonergan seriously enough to accept that the pointing of Aristotle and Aquinas were missed. Has Lonergan improved the situation through his work? Does it look likely now that Aquinas and Aristotle, as Lonergan presents them, are going to make inroads in classrooms, on the streets, in economics and politics? Negative answers here nudge us to ask "Why not?" And notice now that there are two directions of answering this question, two aspects of "getting at". There is the "usual" view that would stress self-neglect, truncated subjectivity and all that: the established longer cycle of decline is the reason why-not. We are not going there. There is the other view that would be a "getting at" us, not regarding self-neglect, but regarding the pointing of history. Is the Lonergan contribution to progress just not "getting at" searchers for progress because the searchers are trapped in old inefficient styles of thinking and writing and publishing?

We are back with Lewin and parallels in all other areas of inquiry, and we have to do our own version of his inquiry. It need not be elaborate. It is the sort of thing that I found I could do in a first year university class. Get the class to brainstorm about the bits and pieces of some area

¹⁰B.Lonergan, *Introducing Bernard Lonergan*, Darton Longman and Todd, London, 1974, in the Introduction by P.McShane. The book is a short pamphlet containing three of Lonergan's articles.

of study: psychology, theology, economics, whatever. They come up with the various bits: history, theory, positive research, communications and inventions at various levels, etc etc. A mess of different attitudes, present in disorderly fashion even in journals that claim a focus such as the composition of teaching-structures, “compositional procedures”. It may help you to note that this exercise is quite similar to an exercise that I used regularly to get the students to discover for themselves the five causes. The exercise is a brainstorming about the different meanings of Why? As the class brainstorms the teacher fills the wall-length blackboard with the mess of answers. Then comes the ordering, and *voila*, five causes. So here, out of the mess of “what goes on in any discipline” teacher and class can find their way together to the usual list of specialities. The question for the class, as individuals, is “Would it not work better if the messy collection was linked explicitly the way they are linked hiddenly in practice?”

Notice that the answer at this stage is very nominal. Certainly, the word “function” can bubble up: the discipline would function better if thus ordered. But what that means is quite vague. One can help beyond the vagueness by using another of my teaching strategies: reflecting together on the dysfunctional holiday-making of a family. One comes to grip with a perspective on a functional way of tackling each year’s holiday project.¹¹

Depending on your background you may swiftly come to take a stand: yes, this ordering of tasks would improve collaboration. Then you have skipped to the end of this short book. Good. Some may need to work towards being clearer on the improvement. But it is important to grasp that this is the issue before you: taking a stand. What it is to take a stand, and to arrive at taking a stand?: that is itself a tricky question which has its answer in the digestion of the strategies of the second half of page 250 of *Method in Theology*, way past our introductory foray. That page was “in the back of Lonergan’s mind” the day he leaped to his division and scribbled his own excited stand at the end of his page. How far back? Even if it had been quite forgotten at the moment, there still was the excitement of, ‘Yes, this is finally it’, an excitement that came out in his scribble at the bottom of his discovery page: “vital, intelligent reasonable responsible mine and catholic”, with ‘mine’ and ‘catholic’ doubly underlined.

¹¹ See either chapter 5 of my *Economics for Everyone* or Chapter 3 of *A Brief History of Tongue*. Both books are from Axial Publishers.

Chapter 2.

Leads from botanical inquiry

I am being biographical and autobiographical here, a strategy that eventually shall be a formal component of the operations of *Method 250*'s program: one's positioning of oneself needs to be narrative. But we'll get to that later. Bear with my story-telling here simply as a strategy that helps us along to a first-ditch stand. So, I switch to botany, which happens to be my present concern. Indeed, I spent yesterday in the biology library of University of British Columbia working on genetic method in botany but also doing a fair bit of "Imagining". Join me gently as best you can. It is much better, of course, if you can venture into such a library, in this or any other area, and grapple with the ethos of the texts and journals in that area: how effective is all this print, and are the effects identifiable as progress?

In Easter of 1970 I had a conversation in Florida with Lonergan about my own work in botany. At one stage he commented on the second of the papers I wrote for that Florida Lonergan Conference. His remark was a great boost to my 38-year-old ego: "Well, it just opens up area after area". But now I wish you to brood over the perspective of "opening up" in relation to Lonergan's work, *Insight*. "Well" I would say, and perhaps you would agree in your own way, "it just opens up area after area". I would have your brooding lead you to the conclusion, about either my effort or Lonergan's *Insight*, "Well, it doesn't, it didn't".

Take the area of my present interest: those four pages in *Insight* on organic development. It has in fact been a serious interest for me since the early 1960s and indeed was a possible alternate thesis topic to what I tackled in 1966. It has become a serious topic for me now, forty years later, because of Robert Doran's question *What is Systematic Theology?* Not a topic for us here, unless it helps you along. Our topic is ineffectiveness and its remedy, and I would have you think now of that brilliant treatment of chapter 15 of *Insight*, in 1952, of genetic method in botany, unimplemented, indeed undigested, by Lonergan's disciples.

How brilliant is his four pages? The question calls for a lot of work, what you might identify as a poor version of the challenge of *Method 250*. There is involved, for example, assembly on a range of levels, from the history of embryology to the history of teaching grade 11 botany, or botany in undergraduate studies, or botany as a thesis or journal topic, or botany in its

various technologies. I don't ask you to attempt this work, but to brood over my few musings and pointers here.

The pages are a shocking achievement. Lonergan seems to have picked up on, and sublated radically, the best reachings of the twentieth century, for example, Hans Spemann's work on the "organiser" after World War I and Conrad Waddington's dynamics of development as he evolved it through the World War II period. In the period that followed, the dynamics of development went in directions dictated by the successes of microbiology, with an increasingly unwholesome meshing in of information-theory language or just the language of a general ethos of a naive mix of reductionism and micro-vitalism: "proper cell-fate specification and pattern formation rely on the cell's ability to search and interpret graded spatial information."¹² Present study of the organism is altogether remote from Lonergan's normative perspective.

Nor are we venturing into that topic here: my invitation is to brood over what might be done about the gap between Lonergan's perspective - which I consider correct, and you may at least consider attractive - and the present establishment. Switch to some other few pages of *Insight* that attract you, if you find it better, and ask the same question. One can go from his simple brilliant page on Newton's bucket¹³ to his compact few pages of canons of hermeneutics

¹² I quote here from a learned journal article, where one would - wrongly - expect better control of meaning: Jin Jiang, "Degrading C : who is Cul-pable?", *Genes and Development*, 16(2002), 2315. Note the journal title. Even without the mention of genes, journals on development hold to what I might call the micro-ethos. For instance there is a forty-year old journal published by a Japanese Society of developmental biologists, *Development, Growth and Differentiation*, which lives in that deficient world. Grade 11 and 12 school texts live there too, and texts on development written for undergraduate students present no serious perspective on development.

¹³ I note a single muddled author on the popular level, simply because it is easy to notice how that author's most recent work (Brian Greene, *The Fabric of the Cosmos. Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality*, Alfred A.Knopf, New York, 2004) messes round with Newton's bucket all the way through (see the index under *bucket of spinning water*). Contrast this with Lonergan's precision in section 3.3 of Chapter 5 of *Insight*. There is present in the literature a massive mythology of space-time structure. Professional physics does not escape these muddles. It is a complex mess, which makes the task of eschatological thinking, to which I draw attention in this short book, altogether more difficult. Illustrative of the mess is the technical volume in honour of John A.Wheeler, *Science and Ultimate Reality. Quantum Theory, Cosmology and Complexity*,

and find the same type of amazing gap. What might be done about this, about that?

We are back with the search for cosmopolis, but now with Lonergan's suggested answer. But first we, you, may need to think your way round some problems that haunt that answer, one relating to the answer as *Insight* envisaged it, the other as Lonergan envisaged it in *Method*. You may not, in fact, have either of these problems but still it is of interest in that the problems have effected discussion in the past fifty years.

The first problem was articulated especially by Charles Davis when *Insight* emerged. What is cosmopolis? One way of reading chapter 20 of *Insight* leaves the impression that it is the Catholic Church! But one can trim that back to being a broader heuristic regarding supernature as solution.¹⁴ Let us not go there. The one point I would have you consider is that the conclusion of chapter 7 of *Insight* leads to an expectation of a methodological solution within the dynamics of inquiry. That is the expectation that is of interest to me here. You already noticed that, perhaps, in the reflections of the first chapter. The needs noted in musicology were, so to speak, ordinary methodological needs felt by serious students.

Secondly, there is the suggested answer of *Method*, an answer stated not only in the context of theology but also - it would seem rather bluntly - in a context of a self-appropriation that is quite refined. I recall conversations with Lonergan in those years of the late 1960s as he climbed beyond his cancer operation towards meeting what he considered a demand for the completion of his life-work. He was focused on theology's mess, but he also felt the need to carry forward into the mess and its resolution the crazy demands of *Insight*. He summed that up in a question posed to me, mentioned in the Prologue, as he paced his little sixth-floor room in the

edited by J.D.Barrow, P.C.W.Davies and C.L.Harper, Cambridge University Press, 2004. The final section, on complexity, is handily illustrative of the absence of Lonergan's transposition of Aristotle's view into a contemporary aggreformism. On that topic, Cantower 29 is useful. Indeed, the set of Cantowers 27-31, which draw into parallel the first five chapters of *Insight* and the first five chapters of Feynman's famous three-volume introduction to physics, are a help in this area. Especially important is a reconception of the nature of energy: see Cantower 30.

¹⁴On this see Charles Hefling's suggestive article in *Lonergan's Hermeneutics. Its Development and Application*, edited by Sean E McEvenue and Ben F.Meyer, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.,1985.

Bayview Regis College: “What am I to do? I can’t put all of *Insight* into the first chapter of *Method*”. Later, when I came to index the book in November-December of 1971, I delighted in his cunning, expressed especially in those two pages, 286-7. Peruse those two pages with me. First he hits you with what is pretty well a table of contents of the first 18 chapters of *Insight*. Then he tells you, mid-287, that the first half of *Method* has to be lifted out of its elementary descriptiveness: and one might recall here the problem noted in *Insight*’s Epilogue, of being breathlessly late.¹⁵ But in this last decade I have temper my delight in various ways that, I hope, help towards strategies of the broader collaboration that Lonergan looked towards in the final pages of *Insight*.

The tempering of my delight was for me a matter of decades of struggle with the failure of both *Insight* and *Method*. We are back to the question, What is to be done? But I would hope that we are back to back, standing in imagination in a botany library. Such a library is a massive testimony to investigative energy but it also bears witness to a sort of sad, if blameless, blind tunneling. But to sense this testimony, to hear this blind witness out, one must pause, poise, in this and at this address for a day or a month. I have here only touched on one aspect of the testimony and of the poise, the aspect that relates to those powerful four pages of *Insight* about organic development. I would wish you to add, in reality or in imagination, the poise before the sunflower that I wrote of elsewhere, the beginnings of botany.¹⁶ “Study of the organism begins with the thing for us,”¹⁷ not - as the school text open before me directs us - with cells and codes.

We are relatively blameless victims of a firmly established ethos. What is to be done to challenge that ethos? It is a “tradition that nourishes” schoolchildren and scholars, who struggle authentically within that tradition. “There is the minor authenticity or unauthenticity of the subject with respect to the tradition that nourishes him. There is the major authenticity that justifies or condemns the tradition itself. In the first case there is passed a human judgment on

¹⁵*Insight*, 733[755].

¹⁶Chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk* reaches towards the mood of scientific inquiry that would emerge in the third stage of meaning, quite remote from present detached pseudo-science.

¹⁷*Insight*, 464[489].

subjects. In the second case history, and ultimately, divine providence pass judgment on traditions.”¹⁸ What might we do to walk with history and create divine providence? That is the question of this little book and of our larger lives. It is the question of a cosmic embryology that must reach into our molecules. But before we muster and mustard-seed those molecules of ours further perhaps it is worthwhile to listen to a life that struggled not to lose sight of the sunflower.

“The striking achievement of an egg is to produce things - roots, leaves, legs, eyes, backbone, and so on - which were not in it originally. It does more than merely reproduce itself; it produces something new. Even if you have a certain degree of biological knowledge when you start looking at it - knowing perhaps what everyone seems to know nowadays, that the fundamental characteristics of organisms are determined by the genes inherited from their parents, and that these genes are made of nucleic acid (DNA) - even so, merely to say that the lump of jelly you are looking at contains the right DNA to produce a rabbit leaves an enormous amount unaccounted for. Exactly how does the egg produce legs, head, eyes, intestine, and get up and start running about? Once you have seen the challenge that these phenomena offer to our understanding, the only hope of rescuing yourself from the seductions of embryology is to reflect that discretion may be the better part of valor, when you may conclude that development is really too difficult and you had better take up something simpler, such as biochemistry or genetics.”¹⁹

I would wish you to read this not only in its evident relation to the decline of botany but in a straining fantasy regarding the cosmic caul. We are dealing here with the seductions of a cosmic embryology, finality’s invitation to us to tune into the seed, the acorn, the tadpole of the second time of humanity. But let us hold that topic till chapter 4. First let us tackle the question “What is to be done?” in a way that tunes us minimally into present possibilities and probabilities.

¹⁸ *Method in Theology*, 80.

¹⁹ C.W.Waddington, *Principles of Development and Differentiation*, Macmillan, 1966, vi-vii.

Chapter 3.

Minimalist Functional Antifoundationalism

That is quite a title, and we won't exhaust it in this short chapter since it sums up the methodological attitude that I think would get Lonergan's project of functional specialization on a pragmatic track, *A Fresh Pragmatism*, to recall the subtitle of the little book in which I first proposed the minimalism.²⁰

First let us consider the minimalism in relation to the two problems mentioned in the previous chapter. There is the problem of identifying cosmopolis: here we identify only the beginnings of the road, "an egg to produce things", to use a phrase from the quotation just given from Waddington. The phrase, as we shall see, opens up a very rich analogue with the struggles of a semi-successful science. The minimalism holds to the usefulness of the 8-fold division of labour as merely a convenient way of linking up the various branches and interests of present botany. More about this, obviously, as we venture along, but for the present think of the classroom exercise that I mentioned earlier. Think of botany as looking to the past, distant and recent. Then the obvious future interests such as teaching or genetic engineering. And so on. A walk through the book stacks in a university botany library helps, but you can pause and walk sufficiently in imagination and come up with 8 divisions that hold together present scattered work in botany. Perhaps you might claim that 6 are sufficient, leaving out dialectic and foundational debate as really "only philosophy", but if you think your way minimally along here you find that there are procedural issues that are, so to speak, hard-nosed: what have we been doing in botany and what is the character of past achievement or future ambition? It becomes fairly evident that between history of botany and policy regarding its use - whether in education or engineering - there are zones of disagreement that need pragmatic identification.

The heart of that pragmatic identification is the functional connection. I would note that this needs to be thought out in a much more precise way than what is presented in *Method in Theology*. Lonergan was tired and pressured in his effort to move his original article to book form and the result is a patchwork of previous efforts that do not exude the ethos of functional

²⁰See Chapter 3 of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism*, Axial Publishing, 2000.

collaboration. I do not wish to digress here into this topic, but merely suggest that you would find the image of a relay team helpful, one I have enlarged on elsewhere and shall return to in chapter 8.²¹ Think of 8 runners doing the 800 meters - indeed think of then running against a single 800 meter champion. The functionality of the performance is magnificently focused in the runners' concentration during the baton exchange. A rewrite, in terms of function, of *Method's* 8 chapters (9, allowing for Lonergan's split of history, which in fact is the least successful section of the book in regard to function) that deal with the 8 specialized operations, that is a huge challenge to be faced in the next decades. But you might try thinking it through, starting with functional research. You may think either of the geohistorical sweep of botany or simply a day in the life of a physics particle accelerator. In either case, research can move routinely along until some oddity, some anomaly, turns up. A new particle? A new species? A little shuffle, or a paradigm shift? Call in the theoreticians! And so on, round the track, till the shift turns up in classroom or factory.

The exercise I suggest at the end of the previous paragraph is in fact just a very pale shadow of the massive empirical task of foundational definition of functionality, but all we seek at the moment is sufficient glimpse of the convenience and the possibilities of the "relay team" ethos. The more you brood over the functional relating the more you shall notice, for example, the corrective power of the cyclic collaboration. So, the historian or the dialectician - think of Gould's big book²² - has to be in the functional cycle, if the history or dialectic is not to emerge as something already dated. But what do I mean by *a pale shadow*? I mean, again, minimalism. It is best thought of in terms of the second problem noted regarding *Method*: the problem of Lonergan's list of general categories on pages 286-7. First, note that the list goes to number (9). What has minimalism to say to or about that list? It simply cancels or ignores it. What then is the

²¹ This key image only came to me at the turn of the century, yet it seems so obvious. It brings out the efficient collaborative focus of a group sharing a high level of talent, training, etc. It parallels the best in scientific collaboration which yet is to benefit enormously from this shift. It cuts out silly dialogue: physicists do not seriously discuss dialectically positions that are mythic or merely descriptive. On dialogue see further, note 38.

²² See note 134 below.

categorial attitude of minimalism? It is summed up in a single categorial stand: (10) “let there be an operative division of work in any area of human inquiry”.

In chapter 3 of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism* I present a double stand, or two categorial pointings, the other being “Let’s be sensible”. But there is a way in which, minimally, that does not need to be said, or perhaps one can say that it is included in (10). It seems to me better to leave (10) as it is and to regard the unspoken “Let’s be sensible” as replacing the previous nine categorial claims. Then (10) can be looked on in two ways. Yes, it is our single operative category. But, yes, also, it is a categorial claim, the categorial claim of the book *Method in Theology*, and it should be listed there on page 287 after (9). Such a listing changes the whole tone of the book, and does so increasingly as one refines one’s notion of (10).

You may note that the title of this chapter is an indication of an initial refinement. I wish now only to draw attention to the third word of my title in that regard, but in fact the word calls for a subtle postmodern attention that would locate us in the context of sophisticated cosmic embryology. I would have you come to read that quotation from Waddington at the end of the previous chapter in some fulsomeness of methodological fantasy. There is the organism that is history. For Christians that organism may be thought of in relation to the Mystical Body of Christ. Is there an axiomatics of that development, that evolution? Is this not the core question of Thomas’ first question of the *Summa Theologica*? Does it not jive with Lonergan’s question, “Is Scholastic thought to be cast in the form of an axiomatic system?”²³ Is it’s general form not at the heart of relativism and postmodernism? Perhaps I might go back to Lonergan’s discovery file, Batch V. 7, of February 1965, to make my point briefly and descriptively.

That file curiously includes an extract from the first question of the *Summa Theologica*. My reading of this inclusion was and is that Lonergan adverted to the deeper significance of his discovery and returned to the *Summa* - recall that, as he remarked on various occasions, such a book would not have been part of his working library - copying out relevant reflections of Aquinas for his musings over method. Yes, his discovery was and is a new *Prima Quaestio*, a fresh beginning, Five years later he would write in *Method*: “Foundations may be conceived in

²³ *Phenomenology and Logic*, 121.

two quite different manners. The simple manner is to conceive foundations as a set of premises on the contrary , if one desires foundations for an ongoing, developing process, one has to move out of the static, deductivist styleinto the methodological style, which aims at decreasing darkness and increasing light and keeps adding discovery to discovery. Then what is paramount is control of the process.”²⁴ And it is useful to add to our puzzling what he wrote twelve years earlier in the concluding pages of *Insight*. “It may be asked in what department of theology the historical aspect of development might be treated, and I would suggest that it may possess a peculiar relevance to a treatise on th mystical body. For in any theological treatise a distinction may be draw between a material and a formal element: the material element is supplied by scriptural and patristic texts and by dogmatic pronouncements; the formal element, that makes a treatise a treatise, consists in the pattern of terms and relations through which the materials may be embraced in a single view,” and so on through a full relevant page.²⁵

There is a mix in this puzzle of minimalist and maximal demands. The two demands are peculiarly related in a way that ties in with my suggestion above of a reading in analogical fantasy of Waddington’s reflections on embryology. Leads on that fantasy are the concern of chapter 5. But my interest now is in inviting you to move towards a minimalism that would cherishing pragmatically a “pattern of terms and relations through which the materials may be embraced in a single view.” What materials? Whatever materials fall within your present discipline of interest. What pattern? The pattern of the minimal functional division. So, in terms of the title of this chapter I am asking you to shift to “Minimalist Functional Foundationalism”. Concretely I am asking you, as a group, as a community who take Lonergan’s life-work with some seriousness, to take or make a towering stand.

²⁴*Method in Theology*, 269-70.

²⁵*Insight*, 742[763-4].

Chapter 4.

Making a Stand

Is this invitation a shift away from antifoundationalism? By no means. Nor is there any need here to twist and turn around theorems of incompleteness, or the legitimacy of perspectivism, or the remoteness of foundational reality that is humanity in the concrete. I would wish you to think of this shift in terms of normal scientific practice: settling for the best available perspective, suspecting that it is vulnerable. Think of present physics and its search for a TOE or a GUT, a Theory Of Everything or a Grand Unification Theory. That thinking is relevant to our present reaching. In the past decade I have drawn what I think is a very useful parallel between the universal viewpoint and such unification theories in physics. The universal viewpoint talked of in *Insight* has tended to become an elusive, indeed mythic, thing. It benefits from a comparison which talks of TUV and TUT. One thinks first of physics in its present struggle as muddling along within various suggested Tentative Unification Theories. So too, in, say, philosophy, there are tentative universal viewpoints, viewpoints on viewpoints. We shall find it useful in later chapters to talk of philosophic viewpoints, but what I would wish you to entertain, as we ramble round the possibility of a group stand, is the notion of a TET, your own tentative evolutionary theory. And what I am pushing for can be described as a TET Offensive.²⁶ I speak of making a group stand, not just taking a personal stand. Might we do it, tentatively but efficiently?

Who are meant by *we*? By *we* I mean the group already identified at the end of the previous chapter, those who take Lonergan with some seriousness. It is not an exclusive *we* of course, but I am being realistic, pragmatic: who else is reading this odd little book? I continue my reaching out for collaborators, but here I have a definite focus. As I noted in the Prologue, my assumed audience is those with some interest in Lonergan's work. Already I talked of taking a personal stand, and I would emphasize here that that stand need not involve any major shift of personal work. So, you have perhaps found Lonergan's attention to questioning useful in your teaching of a particular school grade or in dealing with a management situation, and this in a relatively commonsense fashion. Certainly the present reflections, and the leads given, may give

²⁶ Some may recall the military action in Vietnam so named.. *Tet* is a three day Asian festival celebrating the arrival of the new year.

the process a lift, but my primary interest is the ethos of the group, a group seriousness.

The seriousness that I wish for is an acknowledgment, on whatever level that suits you, of the central significance of Lonergan's invitation to divide the effort to move from past to future into 8 collaborative bents. This short book can only nudge you to suspect that this is key, under grace and within the dynamics of malice and stupidity, to shifting human possibilities into probabilities. It took me decades of messing to begin to comprehend this turn myself, but let me put the need and achievement in simple terms here.

Lonergan's creative reaching into human loneliness and possibilities is an astonishing reality. Indeed, he seems to have pushed forward every serious area of human inquiry. But we can settle, I think, for three very evident creative surges: his rediscovery of the self-attention of Aristotle and others; his lifting of economic thinking to a quite new level of theory and responsibility; his identification of functional specialization. None of these private surges of minding have become global surges. Yes, there is a Lonergan movement, but check out books on psychology or education, practices of economics, crises of non-collaboration. Check out surveys of 20th century theology or philosophy. Etc etc. Lonergan is no more successful than Plato in the advocating of philosophy as king or queen.²⁷

Might one change the odds of success? That precisely is the brilliance of Lonergan's - and history's - nudged towards functional specialization. He and history have lifted Plato's problem into a new context of probabilities of implementation. How is this to occur? That, of course, is the topic of this little book and indeed has been my central topic since I ventured to suggest the value of functional specialization in music. But perhaps I can pack the key shift into a single word: recycling. More sophisticatedly I can point you to chapter 4 of *Insight*, and a nudge regarding the relation of probabilities to recurrence-schemes. Twisting events of researching and writing and dialogue and policy and education into a functional recycling adds a lift of probabilities. "The probability of the component events in a scheme jumps from a product of a

²⁷ On problems of philosophy as queen see Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic*, 126-7,130.

set of fractions to the sum of those proper fractions.”²⁸ But it is much more complex than that. The component events are nudged, both systematically and discomfortingly,²⁹ towards an honesty and an excellence that, strangely, is mirrored in the image of 8 ladies or gents running an 800 meter relay against a single runner. There are many facets of this, and I have ranged round them in 41 Cantowers. Below, in chapter 8, I home in on one facet, relating to the inevitability of a type of convergence of all types of inquiry on the core issue of concrete grounds of progress.

Here I home in on that issue as personal and systematic and discomforting. That is, I would say, the genius of the great challenging page 250 of *Method in Theology*. About it I have written abundantly, but really is it not a matter of reading that page slowly and seriously? Lonergan asks the dialectic specialist to be explicit about his or her stand. I ask, in this little book, for a precise focus in that asking: where do I stand with regard to functional specialization, with regard to conversion to functional specialization? The question is self-posed differently by the ordinary person interested in Lonergan and by the scholarly person. But it is important for the non-scholar to take a stand, nudged by me one way or the other: for such a person it is not a matter of actively pursuing specialist work but of shifting into a commonsense ethos of this as the central crisis of Lonergan studies. The scholarly person adds to the challenge the difficulty of conceiving this challenge both in its full global possibilities and as personally workable. The latter challenge is the topic of chapters 8 - 18 below; the challenge of thinking globally dominates this little book. The next chapter is key to glimpsing better that global and omnidisciplinary shift.

But I am not talking here of either the global reach or the omnidisciplinary possibilities. I am talking about the in-group promotion of initial efforts towards specialist work. I amused Fr.Fred Crowe in the late 1970s by promoting the slogan “if a thing is worth doing, then it is worth doing badly”. He himself at that time was nudging others by asking “what specialty are you in?”

That first generation and the next - including myself - failed to pause and poise ourselves

²⁸*Insight*, 121[145].

²⁹ See *Method in Theology*, 299, 350-1.

towards an implementational effort. We were distracted by other possibilities, especially the possibilities that seemed to be presented by dialogue with other views: had not Lonergan given us examples of such an orientation? But he also gave consistent examples of taking a stand within those contexts of dialogue. It would seem now that what is strategically necessary is the taking of a focused stand within the inner group of Lonergan students. We need to “make conversion a topic,”³⁰ where the conversion is conversion to the functional division of labour.

How that conversion promotes other conversions in Lonergan students and promotes various types of global conversions, that is a large and complex question echoed in Whitson’s title regarding the coming convergence of religions, and intimated in history’s pressuring towards the world of theory, and theory’s pressuring towards interiority.

We have still to absorb the story of Lonergan’s forty-year climb from 1925 to his crowning achievement of 1965. To absorb it adequately is to make it “an aesthetic apprehension of the group’s origin”. Then “the aesthetic apprehension of the group’s origin and story becomes operative whenever the group debates, judges, evaluates, decides, or acts - and especially in a crisis.”³¹ *Insight* shall be fifty years old in 2007 and Lonergan’s economics sixty. If these two neglected cultural shifts are to become effective they need the recycling within the group that eventually can lift them to being light in the world. But the recycling can occur only if recycling becomes a commitment that dominates discipleship. That is the central crisis of Lonergan studies as we move forward in the new millennium.

³⁰*Method in Theology*, 253.

³¹*Topics in Education*, 230.

Chapter 5.

Further leads from Botanical Inquiry

We are back now at the issue of “trying to think through” the specialties in a particular zone of inquiry. I am distracted as I ponder on this task, and indeed on this section, by a fantasy that needs sharing. I recall, oddly, Thomas view of what no doubt were goings-on in Paris in his day “nudibus auctoritatibus citatis, vacuus abscedet”³²: a lot of authors are cited, and the student departs with an empty head. I look to a future of theology where the focus is on the real world in relation to God, rather than on a clutter of opinions. In such a theology there would be an assumed familiarity with inquiry in botany, a carry-forward from a serious grip on the zone from good schooling. Perhaps you have that advantage? I myself never studied biology, either in school or in university: it was part of my struggle in the decade of the 1960s, and now I struggle freshly with it. I earnestly and honestly recommend some such struggle to you: a month or even a week with an elementary text - late school or early university - can work wonders for your integral heuristic of reality. Especially if done in some advanced mode of generalized empirical method, and especially if you add a day in a biological library with that same stance.

I had hoped to give you helpful leads on the operation of that stance as you read particular elementary texts, but brevity cut back my efforts: let us leave that to collaborative possibilities. Here I am more interested in your journey, real or imagined, through the stacks in the library. First, a pause over our chapter title. What do you and I mean by botanical inquiry? I mean botanical inquiry as it has occurred, in Lucy’s Africa, in local schools, in WHO meetings, in future theology. That is simply my existential take on Lonergan’s describing metaphysics as really a luminosity of integral curiosity, a hard-won climb of theoretical consciousness. Notice that I did not say “metatheoretical” or “metaphysical” consciousness. So, I draw your attention to the shockingly normative claim of Lonergan regarding the reacher into theory: “Theoretical understanding seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view.”³³ I suspect that you have not previous read it that way? Well then, let us get back to the

³²I quote loosely from *Quodl.* IV, a.18.

³³*Insight*, 417[442].

biology library.

First let me say that I do not think you would find it difficult to identify the 8 muddled zones as you ramble through the shelves or focus on the various journals of botany. No point, then, in a summary run through here. Besides, we are going to attend, in chapters 11-18, to aspects of the initial rescue of inquiries, libraries, journals, and there we are going to mesh illuminatingly the two apparently different zones of botany and theology. But what I would wish you to home in on now, in fantasy if not in fact, is the large block of books whose topic is the use of botany, and here immediately you may think of genetic engineering.³⁴ It is not, of course, the only zone of discussion: modifications and clonings are exciting topics, especially when one moves the activities from plants to animals to humans, but I would have you advert to the fact that the usefulness of botanical insights is a dominant ethos of the venture of the entire library. So, for example, my present work is being done in the Woodward Library of University of British Columbia, where the predominant context is medicine.

Why are we inquiring, this past million years, this next million years, about plants? The sections of the library, backed by an ethos of Schumacher yearnings, green parties, *Gaia* movements, etc, nudge us towards a critical stance regarding those who “laboured under the delusion that their inquiry was *voraussetzungslos*.”³⁵ There is nothing presuppositionless about human organisms living in a culture, in a present culture indeed of a longer cycle of decline. Around me in the library sit young folk - mainly oriental girls, as it happens, today - insistently massaged by a culture of study and teaching and employment and life-styles that guarantees them some version of Proust’s stuntedness, middle years and an elderhood that is the fraud of being “not old folk but young people of eighteen, very much faded.”³⁶ They are the captives, the victims, of present conventions of teaching, of work and leisure, of the settled and settling culture of decline.

³⁴ The holding of the library used by me were abundant here, but this might be due to the library’s relation to various departments of praxis. But the mood of reflection is part of our times of transition, an increasing ethos.

³⁵ *Insight*, 578[600].

³⁶ M.Proust, *Remembrance of Times Past*, Random House, New York, Vol. 2, 1042.

But at present we are thinking about higher education and talking about a particular block of library books. The particular block cannot avoid raising the issue of the purpose of botany. Now there are two aspects of that block that I wish you to consider.

Clearly, I cannot enter here into the content of that mass of books, but we have here, or there, before us, an illustration of the turn of the page word of *Method* 249-50: *Assembly*. It is a partial assembly, and this not just because it regards only botany but because it is really only the second assembly mentioned in the fourth last line of page 250. The first assembly has been badly done, in a pre-scientific manner, and certainly one can say of the content of this block of books - *experto crede!* - “the results will not be uniform.”³⁷ The second assembly is of reflected opinions on the analysed block. Imagine if we could get the students around here, in the library, to reach for their own view on this block? Imagine if we could get the writers of all the other books in other sections of the botany library, and the writers of journal articles, to do the same, to thus step back from being led like sheep to the cloning? Might there, indeed, emerge a culture in which such reflectiveness would be taken for granted, granted by a new leisure in a new ethos? In the next chapter we shall envisage that culture and in the chapter to follow we shall begin detecting ways towards it, opening thus the way to the fresh pragmatics of chapter 8 and following.

This brings me to my second suggestion. I began this chapter by recalling Thomas’ condemnation of the sort of teaching that burdens busy students with opinions. Now that does not seem to apply to botany - although it does! So, various trivial opinions of the significance of the names of Crick and Watson and Mendel are in there, cutting off holistic and wholesome thinking and thinkers: we shall consider such cutting off in chapter 9. But my interest now is in your higher education, interested in Lonergan’s view as you are. Lonergan’s view is, of course, irrelevant: what is relevant is that you get to grips with your own presuppositions in so far as Lonergan’s writing nudges you brutally into looking your self in the I. I have been talking about leads from botanical inquiry, and I suspect that I have led you to see something of the beam in the botanical student’s eye. But notice that there is a genuine lead sitting there in the library of

³⁷*Method in Theology*, 250. The remark “*experto crede*” recalls Lonergan’s comment when he was trying unsuccessfully to push, in 1942, for a serious science of economics.

botany, in that block of books, a lead backed up by green movements and organic farming movements and save the sea movements etc. You are, I suspect, in philosophy or theology: where, there, are the equivalent movements?

Furthermore, has your education been a push towards your self-exposure or have you suffered the indignity described by Thomas? You may well be educated by disciples of Lonergan, and they may well be forced by departments of philosophy and theology to do the normal coverage act: but is there still the dominant existential pressure towards the revelation of teacher and students to each other, so that all somehow are invited to reach that second half of *Method's* page 250 in their own small way? Are you being invited to escape the 99% who fade into the business of philosophical and theological opinions and dialogue³⁸ between them?

Here it is not just a matter of answering the question “What do you want?”, but of reaching a luminousness about the dynamics of that question that would reveal the full nature of the theological quest that is lonely within you.

³⁸The topic of dialogue deserve a book, or rather functional specialist treatment. Chapter 5 of *ChrIst in History*, on “Communications in General” provides a background. I make only two points here. Dialogue with other views is mediated by the eighth specialty. It does not occur in the fourth speciality. It is regularly to be a mediation of apologetics as Lonergan considers that general function: an invitation to the other to be authentic within that other person’s own stand. See further note 21 above.

Chapter 6.

Converging Systems in History

“Study of the organism begins....”: regularly it is best to begin with the mature organism, and that is what I invite you to do here with regard to the organism of theology. As I mentioned in the Prologue, I am writing this little book in anticipation of Robert Doran’s work, *What is Systematic Theology?*, and he may well have anticipated me in my view here of convergence. But certainly I suspect that it is going to be a substantial work, bringing together and forward what was for Lonergan a central problem of the decade around 1960, the relation of system to history. Here I hold myself, ridiculously, to my usual few pages, so it certainly should be clear that I am only making a few descriptive doctrinal points.

I am writing now about a mature “theological tower” of later centuries, and perhaps the analogy that I developed elsewhere with “The Calculus of Variation” would help you.³⁹ The mathematical calculus has come a long way since the illustration in the *Aeneid* of maximizing the land surrounded by a given length, indeed it has come a long way since Husserl’s work on the subject in 1882. So here I look to a millennium hence when theological systematics will have reached a relatively mature stability. But what do I mean by theological systematics?

So I must pause illuminatingly over the ambiguity of Doran’s question. What is systematic theology? A first answer is that it is the operation of the cyclic antifoundational system that I wrote of in chapter 3. Yet, there is another answer, the answer that I suspect occupies Doran’s attention most. Systematic theology is the ongoing fruit of the seventh functional specialty. I have written sufficiently about this previously and do not wish to repeat myself. Suffice it to state doctrinally that it is a genetically constructed theology of theologies, holding the systems of history together much as the normative history of an organism holds together the life-stories of that organism.⁴⁰

³⁹Chapter 4 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, Axial Publishing, 2006, deals with the parallel between functional specialization as a calculus of variation and the usual mathematical physics of that calculus. Husserl’s work on this topic, under Weierstrass, 1882, is considered in this context.

0.⁴⁰ There are complex issues here of the use of names in both systematics and in history, for holding either dynamic together. Think of Darwin’s theory or Maxwell’s equations. You might

But now we seem to have two candidates for the title, **Systematic Theology**.

Furthermore, it would seem that the first candidate fits quite well the early methodological description given in *Method* for the venture called theology: "a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results."⁴¹ This is the normative dynamic of cyclic theological inquiry, and we are envisaging it now as having a relative stability of a thousand years of cycling. Within that venture there is the seventh functional specialty, which I talk of as a genetically structured theology of theologies. You notice the oddity of this view of the second candidate for the title of **Systematic Theology**? Does this second candidate not seem to include the first? Are we not here in something of the fix of Russell's paradox of the class of all classes that are or are not members of themselves?

Let us consider the cyclic dynamic in its concrete operation, as "bolder spirits. They select the conspicuously successful science of their time."⁴² There should be no problem in thinking of future physics as functional specialist, nor of agreeing that."the use of the general categories occurs in any functional specialty."⁴³ So, for example, it occurs in research physics: the use of such categories occurs in the watchers of data generated by accelerators. But is that sufficient? Obviously not: otherwise one might as well send in a botanist with the same categorial perspective. What the physics specialist needs is not only a categorial perspective but the most up-to-date fruit of the seventh specialty. That is what needs to be operative if significant anomalies are to be detected at this stage in the cycle. Recall now the reflections of the first paragraph of chapter four above. The researcher in any area needs to have, and is to have in the future, a TET, a tentative evolutionary theory of the zone of inquiry.

A point needs to be made here about the Tower Community. It is to be increasingly

find it worthwhile to muse over this in the context of the diagram of page 109 of *A Brief History of Tongue*. There is a relevant quotation there from unpublished notes of Lonergan: "Theology 1) note a Platonic Idea 2) but the many species (not individuals except as types as dominating personalities) 3) in a genetically and dialectically differentiated genus".

⁴¹*Method in Theology*, 4.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 3.

⁴³*Method in Theology*, 291.

separated from “plain meaning”, and its membership is to be an elite reaching for the remote meaning of humanity’s progress. The researcher in a later stage of meaning, the early stages of the second time of temporal subjectivity, is not just someone puttering through a graduate degree.⁴⁴ Nor is the serious meaning or significance of the research something that can be aired in *Time* or in *Scientific American*: will those odd publications still be around in a thousand years? But we are raising here sticky issues both of popularization and of the over-producing over-populated present world of academe. Let’s leave it at that for the moment.

The researcher, then, is someone who is capable of up-to-date observation, preservation, and cyclic promotion in the relevant zone. “This product of my work may well mis-fit in with our cyclic reach for progress.”⁴⁵ But brood over the mind-set of such a statement: it is quite fuller than a focused innocence cloning fish or fission chemicals. In a thousand years a *Praxisweltanschauung* will have nudged aside the mentality of isolated science, indeed of art for art’s sake, or of adds merely for the sake of selling.

But the statement intimates more. What is needed, a need obvious THEN, is a perspective on progress. What is generative of the meeting of that need is the emergent ethos of what I have called the Tomega Principle. “Theoretical understanding seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view.”⁴⁶ This is the Tower community’s calling, the cauling of history’s meaning.

And so on, beyond the researcher round and round past policy specialist and policy maker. What, THEN, is TET to be in the future of any discipline? It is to be a luminous operator, analogous to the organism’s integrator-operator, a communal Tower possession.

⁴⁴We are up against the problem of fantasy here. But nominally we can identify stages of meaning as Lonergan does in *Method in Theology*, chapter 3. Then the two times of human subjectivity that he introduced in his Systematic treatment of the Trinity (*Quaestio XXI*) can be identified roughly as the first and third stages of meaning. The ill-defined second stage is what I call the Axial Period, out present confused millennia-long times.

⁴⁵One can think of numerous historical instances: Kepler, Mendel: in the later stage of meaning this perspective of mis-fit is to be luminous and a dominant control of emergent meaning.

⁴⁶*Insight*, 417[442].

This is altogether too compact. I am putting forth foundational fantasy, generative of methodological doctrines altogether remote from, and brutally unacceptable by, present academic work. Will I even succeed in “making it a topic”?⁴⁷ History’s nudging will do so. But “the challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively to enlarge the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice,”⁴⁸ and perhaps even to so restrict by discovering and implementing “an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset interference with finality.”⁴⁹ Might you become a member of a small daft community pushing for that ever-ready state, tower? And how might that becoming occur? Well, let us leave that topic to later chapters, beginning with the ramblings of chapter 8.

But at all events is there not here a direction towards a solution of the problem of the two answers to the question, What is systematic theology? The aim of the cyclic structuring of theology is to generate a common TET, shared by the Tower community, the creative minority that is the authentic sublation of Plato’s academy. The philosopher is not king: TET is queen, perhaps, yet not as a constitutional monarch but as an irresistible ethos of the poise of withdrawal. Metaphysics as described by Lonergan, lifted into the context of cyclic implementation, becomes the character of characters minding the minding of progress.

What is thus solved is not just a problem of the meaning of systematic theology but “the problem of general history, which is the real catch.”⁵⁰ “The problem of general history is that it moves throughout on the presystematic level.”⁵¹ “What has one to know to be able to write general history?”⁵² One has the beginnings of an answer in fantasy in so far as one digests the above suggestions. One has a core operative answer in so far as TET enters the bones of

⁴⁷*Method in Theology*, 253.

⁴⁸*Insight*, 228[253].

⁴⁹*Insight*, 726[747].

⁵⁰Lonergan, *Topics in Education*, 236.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 251.

⁵²*Ibid.*

functional specialists. The doctrinal programming of that operative answer requires creative communal collaboration such that e.g. those seven pages of Lonergan on the problem of history become seven hundred, and regional cultures become existentially global. These cultures are always going to be “organically one and consciousness undifferentiated,”⁵³ or relatively undifferentiated. But one looks to the slow emergence of an organic global consciousness living in a myth-excluding acknowledgment that “historical intelligibility is not without mystery.”⁵⁴ That organic consciousness is to be the deliberate fruit of the ex-plane-ing of the tower’s high achievement to the heartlands of plain living.⁵⁵

⁵³*Ibid.*, 254.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 257.

⁵⁵See the conclusion to chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.

Chapter 7.

An Asymmetry of Slopes

Best start by talking about my chapter title. We are back now considering the actual state of affairs in various disciplines, and the manner in which we can foresee the emergence of the stable perspective envisaged in the previous chapter. By *slope* I mean the manner in which the movement of the specialties in any particular discipline can be expected to move from researching concrete particulars up to critical and foundational considerations of progress and then move back down to particular local applications. The obvious useful image here is of the usual house roof sloping up to the apex and then sloping down the other side. The initial meaning of asymmetry is caught in the image by assuming that the roof may not slope symmetrically. That gives us a start. The image, of course, becomes pretty battered as we move into detail, but let us exploit its simplicity by envisaging that the slope up is different in each type of inquiry: a 40° angle, say, in botany and a 45° angle in physics. What I am nudging us towards here is noticing that research in a particular type of inquiry starts and moves very differently from research in another area: two people are in the desert, one is investigating cactus-growth, the other is studying day-night temperature variation. If you are flexing your imagination you might add in others, like a person hunting for ancient scrolls. The botanist, the physicist, the hermeneutic researcher, all have their psychic orientation, their incarnate mindset. The viewpoints all differ, even from person to person in a particular discipline or desert: our neat image fragments. Still, it helps towards the general point, which is that as inquiry moves up from research to interpretation to history - ongoing facticity - there is an unavoidable convergence of disciplines.

What we are musing over here will all be quite obvious when the show is on the road, so to speak. But at present we are in fantasy land and at present also what is most obvious is isolation, especially if one is thinking in terms of philosophies and methodologies rather than scientists on the job. Think, then, concretely about a scroll discovery. The researcher has to extract it and preserve it and prepare for its interpretation, a matter of physics and chemistry.

From the previous chapter you have a better idea of the ideal level of personal competence of this scholar, but let us leave that aside for the moment. Think rather of what I

might call the concretization of procedures as the scroll makes its way up to historians trying to put it in perspective. Think of it, indeed, in the context of the layered historical studies: critical history of the first degree and of the second degree etc. This work is done in the context of the culture of what is to become in a millennium a precise heuristic general history, but which is even at present a sophisticated perspective on the significance of technologies in various fields of science: think of dating processes, or character-determinations from handwriting, or various statistical procedures. The historian, far from being in an isolated specialized mindset, is in the grasp of history and grasps written and lived histories with as much facticity as possible, possibly pushing or being pushed by the scroll beyond either cultural or perspectival presuppositions. This facticity is a facticity of a chrysalis in an anticipation of the butterfly of a fuller later history but it is nonetheless a best, within the stand of the historian. You may think here of histories of music or of mathematics as separable and separate, as different from this, but what after all are such histories - especially if badly written - but poor shadows of a genetic systematics. When the real history of a zone is tackled properly, it is a mesh and mess of general history.

But, in this impressionistic little chapter, we cannot shift into details of the problematic of remote and refined history, history to be quite beyond the reading of the general public. The only impression that I would like you to gather at this stage is the impression that the histories that take in and up the findings in the desert weave and slope towards an organic history, or a range of such histories depending on the colour of the historian's flag. A further nudge towards this is had by taking the fuller view of interpretation that includes implementation: think of asking such questions as what is the meaning of Jesus or Marx? The buried scroll is not a good example here, although it opens up the important topic of contrafactual history, important especially when interest is shifted to dialectic and foundational considerations. "When he develops positions and reverses counter-positions, he will be presenting an idealized version of the past, something better than was the reality."⁵⁶

On the two explicitly methodological specialties, dialectic and foundations, I shall be

⁵⁶*Method in Theology*, 251.

brief. Here the convergence is evident. “What is good, always is concrete.”⁵⁷ Progress is not just progress in music or minding, it is about humanity’s organic genesis. But I would recall the minimalism advocated in the third chapter. In inviting disciplines to adopt the convenience of the division one does just that. No question, then, of noting the grounds of the division in consciousness, or the basic form of alienation that haunts present studies,⁵⁸ or these slopes.

What, now, of slopes “down”? This is an equally complex topic, indeed, altogether more complex.⁵⁹ One rises up, say, from a scroll in the desert, or from Thomas’ medieval *Summas*, local achievements in space-time, but the descent is through fresh remote metapolicies that nudge genetic systematics forward towards richer possibilities of mediation in the total space-time of future humanity. The desert scroll can reach out to a Dublin school or a shopping mall in Dubai.

I have in mind here the problem of imaging, and in fact four decades of imagings, some of which I have made public under the name *metaphysical words*.⁶⁰ One of those “words” or as I now call them, *metagrams*, contains the reference to the key to my long struggle, and it seems relevant to quote it immediately, since we shall be leaning on it right from the beginning of the next chapter. As we climb chapter by chapter we shall be trying to “hold it all together”, where “it” is our comprehensive view of being and the reach for a luminous organic heuristic grasp of being. So here is Lonergan’s very sound pointer about that trying trying:

“This comprehension of everything in a unified whole can be either formal or virtual. It is virtual when one is habitually able to answer readily and without difficulty, or at least ‘without

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 27.

0. ⁵⁸“The basic form of alienation is man’s disregard of the transcendental precepts, Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible” (*Method in Theology*, 55). First, I would note the pragmatic need to break up intelligence and responsibility in such a way as to add the transcendental, Be adventurous. (on the grounds for this see Appendix A of *Phenomenology and Logic*). For one thing, Lonergan’s slogan has led his school to a disastrous neglect of the what-to-do question (see *Joisting* 3). For another, this added transcendental is the heart of the functional specialist bent, a *Praxisweltanschauung*. See note 88 below.

⁵⁹The essay “Systematic, Communications, Actual Contexts” is a help here. It is available in *Lonergan Workshop*, (7) 1985 edited by F. Lawrence or as chapter 7 of *ChrISt in History*.

⁶⁰ Cantower 24 gives a list of the beginnings of such a project.

tears,’ a whole series of questions right up to the last ‘why?’ Formal comprehension, however, cannot take place without a construct of some sort. In this life we are able to understand something only by turning to phantasm; but in larger and more complex questions it is impossible to have a suitable phantasm unless the imagination is aided by some sort of diagram. Thus, if we want to have a comprehensive grasp of everything in a unified whole, we shall have to construct a diagram in which are symbolically represented all the various elements of the question along with all the connections between them.”⁶¹

The metagram referred to, W3, is of course a help: in my work it is the equivalent of the periodic table in chemistry. But it needs a great deal of supplementing. My series of Wi may well be useful, but you may find it better to generate your own. An image-generating proverb which bubbled up a decade ago as a chapter title can help: “A rolling stone gathers *nomos*”, where you can add a further nudge by replacing the Greek *nomos* with a Latin reference “no *mos*”. *Nomos* is the elusive organic operator, e.g. of history’s butterfly that sheds the *mos* of the chrysalis.⁶²

In the present struggle with slopes I have used a sloping roof image. There are various ways of improving that. One can avail of the image of the standard global map, perhaps square for convenience. One can use coordinates to locate points of emergent significant research, interpretation, etc in space-time and similarly points of future application. One can think of a matrix of history as a sequence of such space maps in time.⁶³ But now we are envisaging interspersed sections of mediation equivalent to our rolling stone, our cycling collaboration. The 8 specialties intervene between the past and the future. At times I have diagrammed that intervention as simply eight upward steps,⁶⁴ which diagram has the advantage of shaking the

⁶¹*The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, University of Toronto Press, 2002, 151. The metagram referred to is on page 124 of *A Brief History of Tongue*, where it is to page 80 of the original Latin text.

⁶²See chapter 4 of *A Brief History of Tongue*.

⁶³The complexity of diagrammatic envisagement depends on one’s background. On matrix envisagement of history see P.McShane, *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence*, Gill Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1970, 237.

⁶⁴See *A Brief History of Tongue*, 109.

illusion that somehow 'communications' is a simple specialty when in fact it is the most complex and difficult. At times, instead of the two sloping roofs I imagine and sketch a pair of cones - or square-based pyramids if you are with me in the slice-mediation imaging with standard map - meeting at the point of dialectic-foundation work, but on each side having a complex of lines reaching global (x,y): towards the past, significant regions of changing perspective, towards the future, relevant regions of creative intervention.

Chapter 8.

A Strategic Ramble Round the Specialties

You should notice that this chapter is in reasonable continuity with the previous one, tracking initial efforts to do functional specialist work. Indeed, we are tracking the possibilities and probabilities of tracking, and perhaps we can end up with an image that gives “a comprehension of everything in a unified whole,” even though the comprehension is just descriptive, just what is to be shared in global dialogue in and beyond the studies of religion. The key image relevant here is the running track image, the relay race, the focus of each member in the process of exchange.

It is a simple image, but it captures both the division of labour aspect and, splendidly, the functional aspect. Anyone familiar with running knows the subtlety with which the overlap run is controlled, the handover achieved. Indeed, the overlap running with good teamwork illustrates a flexibility of the division of labour: the precise point of exchange is adjusted to the talents and paces of the pair. But already that brings too much subtlety into our brief reflections. What we need here is for you - and I, but only generically - to adjust to the pace of my particular effort here to pass the baton in relation to this precise topic of passing the baton.⁶⁵

You notice the twist here? My effort is not outside the context of functional specialization but within it, doing badly one of the tasks of communications, where the topic is number (10), the missing final member of the list given by Lonergan on pages 286-7 of *Method*. Further, I must tell you that I am much sharper about this than I was last week; and I must tell you this to encourage you to be patient in you own run. My run up with the baton, you might consider, has been a run - or rather a disordered ramble - of forty years, and I have been very very slow in getting to my present incomplete perspective. My ramble was strategic only in that I never lost my focus on the global problem: my ramble here is also strategic, as I would have you notice from this particular chapter.

I recall now part of my ramble, early 1989, in the Oxford science libraries, working through the nineteenth century journals of chemistry to get light on the shift in chemistry that I

⁶⁵On this, see the Epilogue below.

was then focused on as parallel, exactly a hundred years before, to Lonergan's effort. A distraction into that area gives a leisurely biohistorical tone to what we are at here. I quote now what I wrote then.

"In August 1869 Mendeleev presented a communication to the Second Congress of Russian Naturalists in Moscow on 'The Atomic Volumes of the Simple Bodies' which contained a periodic table in modern form. Lothar Meyer's first publication on the periodic law, dated December 1869, appeared in 1870.⁶⁶ It referred to a German abstract of Mendeleev's paper. In 1871, Mendeleev published a long paper - improved through Meyer's work - on the topic.⁶⁷ The publications of Meyer (1870) and Mendeleev (1871) attracted little interest. The first was too short and expressed doubt: Meyer remarked that it would be rash to change the accepted atomic weights on the basis of so uncertain a starting point. Mendeleev's paper was too long and made uncomfortable reading because of its ranging details. It was the discovery of 'missing' elements with properties predicted by Mendeleev that eventually moved the periodic table into centre-stage: Gallium was discovered by Lecoq de Boisbaudau (1875), Scandium by Nilson (1879), Germanium by Winkler (1886)."⁶⁸

I went on to ask what happened to theology after 1969, and to reflect on the culture of theological journals in those decades. Those journals, of course, were in another part of the library system, and revealed to me a terrible fixity of approach, as well as a terrible parochialism. Never mind the total neglect of the paradigm shift, not only was there none of the globality of chemistry, but e.g. the journals of religious studies that emerged, and still emerge, from the single city of Rome, showed me clearly that the chaps (and they were predominantly chaps) didn't read outside their own little journal or school.

But back to 1969, when Lonergan published his essay, "Functional Specialization in

⁶⁶*Annalen de Chemie und Pharmacie*, Heidelberg, 1870, Supp. vii, 354.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 1871, Supp. viii, 133.

⁶⁸I quote here from chapter 4 of *Process. Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*, written in Oxford 1988-9. The book is available on the Website.

Theology.”⁶⁹ Perhaps I might claim that Rahner, oddly, played Meyer to Lonergan’s Mendeleev or vice versa. In 1971, the *Gregorianum* published his short response to Lonergan which might seem to be negative, but in fact pointed very positively beyond theology: the method Lonergan was advocating was not special to theology but was of general application.⁷⁰ My own effort of 1969, written for the Lonergan Florida Conference of Easter 1970, with which I began chapter 1, was published only locally: I had decided, as editor of the proceedings, to put it in volume 3, which never appeared. At that conference functional specialization was simply not a topic.

Nor has it become a serious topic since, much less a serious occupation. At the Toronto centennial conference of August 2004 it was a conspicuously absent topic.⁷¹ Some participants spoke to me about working within the specialty of dialectic: I remained politely silent, since it was evident to me that their work was quite outside the context of Lonergan’s single-page program of dialectic. So here I am, pushing you and I hope them - uncomfortably - to “an objectification of subjectivity in the style of a crucial experiment”: “make conversion a topic.”⁷² It is the central metadoctrine of Lonergan’s achievement, and I think of it sadly in terms of Lonergan’s pithy remark “doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company.”⁷³

Is my effort here too short, like Meyers, or too long, like Mendeleev’s? My hope is that it is just long enough to pose that single practical question with seriousness, Are there members of the Lonergan community willing to push for the implementation of Lonergan’s program? There is a sense in which the book, *Method in Theology*, was too long. The **Background** provided too many rich distractions; the **Foreground** is a failed effort to detail further the essay of chapter 5.

⁶⁹*Gregorianum*, 50 (1969), 485-505.

⁷⁰Rahner remarked, “Die theologische Methodologie Lonergan’s schient mir so generisch zu sein dass sie eigentlich auf jede Wissenschaft passt” (Karl Rahner, “Kritische Bemerkunge zu B.J.F.Lonergan’s Aufsatz: ‘Functional Specialties in Theology’”, *Gregorianum* 51(1971), 537).

⁷¹See, further, the comment in the text at note 119 below.

⁷²*Method in Theology*, 253.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 299.

In my effort here, I too fail to detail strategies of the specialities, but there is the advantage of footnote invitations to more substantial efforts of illustrating and describing such strategies. My own latest effort of six months ago, *ChrISt in History*, is much more substantial than the present effort and I would say that it cried out, not for this work as sequel, but for “the larger one” mentioned on the first page of *Insight*’s Epilogue. But, as you may gather from chapter 10 below, it is perhaps too soon for this larger work. We need some output from struggles that illustrate badly how the process would shape up.

ChrISt in History, then, is a first fall-back for you if you wish further light on directions of struggle and output. And there are the *Cantowers*, especially *Cantowers* 34-41, where I tackled the key problem of the meaning of function; and other writings that I point to in my short chapters to follow.

I mentioned chapter 10, a difficult chapter as is chapter 9: no problem in skipping them on a first reading. Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the chapter that follows, chapter 11 on Research. Lonergan later regretted his brevity on research: two pages on a task which took up a large portion of his years. If I were to express a regret here it is that I have not produced an entire book on the specialty of research. Chapter 8 of *Christ in History* can give you a fuller impression of the reason for this regret, but I hope that, in chapter 11 below, I intimate some of the startlingly growing vision of this key zone of the cycle of collaboration. Indeed, there is a way of looking at this entire little book as a nudge towards a fuller research orientation, a research that would be global, geohistorical, primarily a self-researching of historical being’s loneliness.

Chapter 9.

Metaphysical Equivalence and Organic Development

Chapter 8 was in continuity with chapter 7 in their concern for beginnings, for slopes into functional collaboration. Here we need to link up with the remote ideal, with fantasy about the later control of meaning that a mature TET is to give us. There is a sense, too, in which this and the next chapter are my answer to Lonergan's puzzle, twice mentioned above, about getting all of *Insight* into a first chapter of *Method*. But my answer can only be an invitation to relevant exercises both at undergraduate and graduate levels: we shall see in chapter 11 how these exercises are to flow into the specialty Research.

Metaphysical equivalence is a topic that is quite remote from present Lonergan studies, even at graduate level. In a later stage of meaning it is to be a dominant ethos of academic or Tower reading and responding, a "tool which assigns to true propositions their grounds in the constituents of proportionate being and thereby reveal both what exactly the propositions mean and what the constituents are."⁷⁴ I am quoting the end of section 3 of chapter 16 of *Insight*, and there is no point in summary indication of that dense twelve pages. Instead I draw attention to exercises that can be associated with the seriously existential working of this tool.

The book *ChrIst in History* is a lengthy invitation to the reader to reach for the metaphysical equivalents of a true proposition and a valid question. The true proposition is contained in Mt 16:16 "Thou are the Christ, the Son of the Living God". The valid question is the first speaking of Jesus in John's Gospel: "What do you want?" The personal road to the metaphysical equivalents of the Matthew proposition is a long struggle for luminosity, symbolized by the Church's centuries-long dialectic climb. That climb did not result in luminosity, but in some obscure affirmation of minor real distinctions. What might the luminosity be? It is when one stands with Peter in a glorious self-possession quite beyond Peter, existential in the "transposition"⁷⁵ that poises one in a TET adequate to contributing to the

0.⁷⁴*Insight*, 509[533].

⁷⁵*Insight*, 504, last line [528, line 26]; 505, line 17 [529, lines 3-4]; 506, top lines [529, at (3)].

development of the theology of and reverence for Jesus.

One sees, then, Jesus's question of John 1: 38 in a new cosmic light. "What do you want?" The question relates both to ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, but the core of the challenge of metaphysical equivalence is to identify the question with contemporary adequacy. That challenge throws the Lonergan community back into the development that lead Thomas to reach for the question's self-appreciated subtlety in Ia IIae, qq.6-17, the ground of the massive second part of the *Summa Theologica*. Then there is the long road up through and beyond neuroscience that would take us out of the "unenviable position"⁷⁶ of ignorance of the want in Jesus and in us, a want that carried Mary's strange chromosomal fertility to dimensions adequate for crucifixion.

What, in metaphysical richness, is the development of the divine or human child? Should we not face the century-long challenge of reversing, sentence by sentence and proposition by proposition, the muddled metaphysics that dominates present thinking of such a development?

Let us pause over the first page of a 700 page text that sets the tone of its muddled science: the pause might well lengthen into a transforming exercise not only in equivalence analysis but also in counter-position reversal.

"A developmental system is analogous to a program, a sequence of prescribed events following a temporal order toward a goal. A set of coded instructions responsible for its execution resides in the totality of genetic information in developing cells. This information is stored as information tapes, nucleic acid macromolecules assembled in chromosomes and cytoplasmic organelles. Since these molecules code for all proteins in an organism, a developmental program may be defined as a timed sequence of synthesis and assembly of new protein populations in cell clones.

Developmental information, however, is not restricted to genetic macromolecules; it also resides in the spatial arrangement of cellular metabolic systems and their interaction network. The asymmetrical packing of enzyme arrays in membranes contributes to a directed flow of developmental information. Moreover, metabolic oscillations and mitotic rhythms are used as

⁷⁶*Insight*, 733[755].

clocks ticking off developmental events.

As cells proliferate into multicellular sheets, the information content of the system increases. Information processed by one group of cells is communicated to the adjacent and distant cells by diffusible molecules. The information in a multicellular system is now defined in terms of supracellular properties, the positional relationships of cells interacting within tissue fabrics.

Most questions about developmental information relate to its organization, storage, and use as macromolecular tapes. How is genetic information organized in chromosomes? What is the nature of information flow between different cellular compartments, and how are feedback circuits stabilized into patterns of cell behavior? Which developmental phenomena are preprogrammed and which are epigenetic?”⁷⁷

The exercise, I would say, is quite beyond the present generation of Lonergan students.

So: what do you want? To be a victim of, to let later generations be victimized by, such grossness in conceiving not only of growth but ultimately of the want that is the pinnacle of finitude’s reach and exigence for growth? Might your want to grasp want, and genuineness, blossom into a crucified lifting up by a searching for the metaphysical equivalent in you and in Jesus of a development “defined as a linked sequence of dynamic and increasingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of successively transformed underlying manifolds through successive applications of the principles of correspondence and emergence.”⁷⁸ So, one might be lifted up to the love of the invisible, beyond the lighter nudging of *Method*, “development seems to be from an initial state of undifferentiation through a process of differentiation and specialization.”⁷⁹. One might thus encourage in oneself and others that conversion, that turn about, that “come about” that is to characterize the later wanting of cyclic collaboration, a spiraling that merges in its satisfactoriness with the satisfaction of the Crucified. “So it comes about that the extroverted subject visualizing extension and experiencing duration

⁷⁷Philip Grant, *Biology of Developing Systems*.

⁷⁸*Insight*, 454[479].

⁷⁹*Method in Theology*, 138.

gives place to the subject orientated to the objective of the unrestricted desire to know and affirming beings differentiated by certain conjugate potencies, forms and acts grounding certain laws and frequencies”⁸⁰ and so the “basic enterprise of human intelligence can free itself from the morass of pseudo-problems that otherwise beset it.”⁸¹

The “commonsense contributions to our self-knowledge “ of “Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Newman”⁸² just doesn’t cut it any more. There is needed a broadened basis that one has luminously when one can read beings integrally and explanatorily with a spontaneity of word-bright metaphysics. “From such a broadened basis one can go on to a developed account of the human good, values, beliefs, to the carriers, elements, functions, realms, and stages of meaning, to the question of God, of religious experience, its expressions, its dialectic development.”⁸³

The organic development of the mystical body of Christ is an energy folded by finality into molecular loneliness. How could there not be a creative minority open to its intussusception?

⁸⁰*Insight*, 514[537].

⁸¹*Ibid.*

⁸²*Method in Theology*, 261.

⁸³*Ibid.*, 287.

Chapter 10.

Metaphysical Equivalence and Functional Specialization

Insight's invitation to that openness failed, but collaborative re-cycling of the invitation gives concrete hope. The creative minority is to become a Tower of Able.

The hope is fostered by a more elementary reach for metaphysical equivalence, a reach that meshes with the nudge of history spoken of in the first chapter. Again, it is a matter of tackling texts sentence by sentence, proposition by proposition. But the task does not make the impossible demands of *Insight*'s chapter 16: it requires only an initial descriptive grip on the distinction of the 8 specialties. If you like, you can contrast these two chapters 9 and 10 as pointers to results, 9 to an end result, the distant larger work, 10 to the identification of specialized work and its possibility.⁸⁴ So, we push on here from chapter 1.

The title may puzzle you. Metaphysical equivalence has to do with the relation of elements of knowing to elements in the object that we seek to know. How then is it extended to handle functional specialization?

Functional specialization is to yield a well-defined element in the total knowing - and believing of course, but let us not get into that here - of the human group.⁸⁵ Is it well defined yet? Here we have an enlightening difficulty. Well-definition, apart from the zone of advanced mathematics and logic, requires empirical occurrence.⁸⁶ Specialized work of the type anticipated by Lonergan just has not occurred yet, and this is one of the reasons for the failure of his project.

⁸⁴One may also fruitfully consider chapter 9 as referring to the first half of *Method*; chapter 10 as referring to the second half.

⁸⁵It is important, at the outset, to distance myself from Fr.Crowe's tendency to envisage elements of meaning that did not find their way into *Insight* (see note k of his editorial notes on chapter 5 [p. 790] and the references give there). We debated this issue during his fresh editing of *Insight*. He pushed for a reality of group forms, I against. I do not have the correspondence, but it is no doubt in his archival collection. Certainly there is a reality corresponding to group form, just as there are realities corresponding to statistical forms, to automobile forms, to a group standing in the form of a circle. But that reality is the reality of secondary determinations of primary relations, a pretty tough advanced topic: see *Insight* 16.2 and the Appendix on Relations in Lonergan's treatise on the Trinity.

⁸⁶On this, see *Insight* 304-9, 329-39; *Phenomenology and Logic*, 69-70.

Nor did Lonergan seriously anticipate the project in his own works, though, for example, one gets a sense of foundational work in *Insight* and in parts of his economics. Normal science is like re-telling a joke in different languages, in different contexts; creative shifting is like inventing a new joke: try it.

Have my own efforts yielded any serious illustration of functional specialization? I regularly claim that I have spent decades doing rambling dialectic and patchwork foundations, but in fact most of my writing might be classified as an off-shoot of the eighth specialty, but also classifiable as just old-style popularization. Fr. Crowe made a gallant attempt to move into the functional specialty history with his *Theology of the Christian Word. A Study in History*, but it is just doesn't qualify.⁸⁷ Fr. Doran has spent a decade struggling to reach a foundational perspective on systematics, and I suspect that the title of his forth-coming work, *What is Systematic Theology?*, is symbolic of his dissatisfaction, his continuing search. But his work brings into the open the poor presentation of *Method in Theology*. Doran's title-question preoccupied Lonergan himself at least for the decade 1955-65. *Method's* brief chapter on "Systematics" is little help: it is brutally minimalist. Both Doran and I are convinced that Lonergan had a decent answer to Doran's question, one lurking in his unpublished notes, shadowed in some published works.

We would seem, then, to be like physicists confronted with anomalies in data, suspecting new particles, or like biologists confronted with the remnants of strange species. So, we must either tackle the anomalies and remnants, or set up conditions for production and reproduction. This little chapter points to the value of musing over anomalies and remnants. And the exercise, as we shall see, is a good introduction to the functional specialty Research, our next topic.

I could digress here to consider further the issue of systematics, and the help from biology, but let us rather stay with the problem of the identification of functional history. As in the previous chapter, so here we are in the realm of exercises, of research exercises. First, we might check the data for factual history and find, perhaps to our surprise, that the von Ranke slogan points to an ideal rather than a fact. I had gathered quotations from various histories to illustrate this, but such quotations would eat up my allotted space. Add to that the bent towards

⁸⁷I reflect on this book, magnificent as a communication, but a failure as third specialty work, in Cantower 38.

the functional and you are in a quite foreign land, the world of a shared *Praxisweltanschauung*.⁸⁸ Later I shall have a few things to say about functional history, but it is worth noting that, as with systematics, so with history, *Method* is not a great help. The two chapters on history just don't get to the point.

But what is the point? The point is a quite fresh pragmatism about - (about)^{3 89} - our humble human place in cosmic emergence, feeble minding, emerging to emerge further,⁹⁰ yet an operative presence lifted into satisfactory efficiency by the Galilean intertwining of Infinite Minding.⁹¹ In *A History of Embryology* there is an article whose second part is entitled, "Spemann's embryological thinking in context." That part opens up broader cultural reflections. "That the historical sciences were pre-eminent in Germany, was not detrimental to embryology; it could claim a strategically important place in the historical chain of cause and effect, which ran from the simplest of organisms, to the highest organism of all - Germany."⁹² Here we are pushing for the contextual fruition of an embryological thinking regarding the organism that is

⁸⁸ There is a question here of fantasizing a quite new global mentality of caring for history, a fresh pragmatism. See note 58 above.

⁸⁹ Section 2 of Chapter 2 of *ChrIst in History* deals compactly with this topic. It is a complex issue relating to suggestions of Lonergan in his first sketch of a first chapter of *Method* in the Spring of 1965. The symbolic expression points to a third order of consciousness that is a control of historical meanings **about** being. Think of method being a control of spontaneous methods; then of method-ology as being the geohistorical study of methods.

0. ⁹⁰ The previous two notes provide an immediate context; add in the fuller reflections of note 115.

⁹¹ The satisfaction of Christ is discussed in *Joistings 8* as meshed into the collaborative dynamic of functional specialist work. The reflections here in note 115 enlarge the context of our reach for some glimpse of minding and Infinite Minding.

⁹² I quote here from 202-3 of the article by T.J.Horder and P.J.Weindling, "Hans Spemann and the organizer", written under the general section title *The emergence of experimental embryology in Germany*. The article gives a reference here that may be of use to some reader: it is not easily available to me: W.Mueller-Lauter, "Der Organismus als innerer Kampf. Der Einfluss von Wilhem Roux auf Friedrich Nietzsche", *Nietzsche Studien*, 7 (1978), 189-223. *A History of Embryology* was edited by T.J. Horder, J.A.Witkowski and C.C. Wylie, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

the cosmos. It is an embryological thinking that is mustard-seed functional, integral, within an emergent ethos of global commitment to the fine-tuned finality of 13.7 billion years, with strange eons to come.

But what is the immediately pragmatic point? It is that we must tune forward towards that element of the second time of the human subject as best we can, in proleptic reachings. Part of that reaching is a detection of methodological reorientations and distinctions. Libraries and conventions and parochialisms of interest and concern cut us off from envisaging much less attempting collaborative and efficient minding. Nazi Germany is an organism of the past, but American, Chinese and Catholic imperialisms are alive and narrowly well in prolonging the longer cycle of decline. Are we to rely on accidental reshufflings? Historians with a TET that is functionally effective in a cycling of humanity's nomological possibilities cannot emerge without a massive global grouping of committed researchers into the data of the truth about finitude, lifting interpretations of humanity's perfectibility⁹³ to new effective hope, and so on through a cycle of focused collaborations. Nor can that remote history shift the statistics of the effective hope without a massive lift away from biased commonsense's strangle-hold on policy, planning, executive reflection.

Metaphysical or methodological equivalence as focused on functional components of global reach needs to humbly detect glimmers of cosmopolis in the horrors of the longer cycle of decline. Lonergan's detecting was cut short without adequate visioning. The single page of *Method in Theology* 250 stands out as requiring minimal detecting, although it is the high point of Lonergan's creative fantasy. I have tried on occasion to bring out its proleptic power, the remoteness of its metaphysical precision, by suggesting a similar page written by a medieval about the scientific revolution that was to come in the next millennium: would anyone then take such a page seriously? Yet, somehow, page 250 is a neat clear program that could provide a start to Lonergan students in their genesis of richer data for the investigation hinted at in this chapter.

⁹³“The Perfectibility of Man! Ah heavens, what a dreary topic!” this is the frontispiece - a quotation from D.H. Lawrence - of the classic book, *The Perfectibility of Man*, by John Passmore (Duckworth, London, 1970). The topic is lifted out of dreariness by the hope of global functional specialization; the dialectic lifting is to occur *per se* through the mediation of *Method* 250.

Meanwhile all we can do is home in, with a transposed version of the first principle of the third canon of hermeneutics, on limp present operations, to see just how far short we fall of the emergent embryonic forms of globally-grouped collaboration that are to tower organically over the second time of human subjectivity.

Chapter 11.

Research

I recall vividly now a moment of what may be called research-illumination while musing in the Bodleian Library of Oxford in the 1990s. I was, in fact, in the history section, surrounded by walls of learned tomes. I suddenly saw these volumes freshly, in their objectification of their authors' hidden dynamic, the paged hiddenness a pointer to research in the third stage of meaning. It mirrored previous insights about the aesthetics of that future time - a statue becomes a larger reality then - and also anticipated my deepening appreciation of Lonergan's reflections on "The Psychological Analogy in Scripture."⁹⁴ Some of that appreciation comes across, I hope, in my chapter on "Research" in the book *ChrISt in History*. I must assume that you can and will avail of that chapter, much longer than the present one, though less advanced, since I am six months wiser, a stranger to myself of then.

These eight short chapters on functional specialties are, oddly, an introduction to you, for you, of standard researching in, say, physics or botany. Or perhaps I should say, non-standard research! Getting you to some existential sense of this is all that I desire in these first few pages. Or even in the twenty four pages on the specialties.

You may find this hope odd, misplaced: how might I achieve something here that the big book *Method* does not seem to have achieved? Obviously, it must be a matter of a new twist, and the new twist has to do with non-standard research. Some linguistic feedback is involved, but that, in its fullness, is something that belongs to a later generation.

What do I mean by non-standard research? Well, I think immediately here of the great twentieth century physicist, Richard Feynman, who liked to get into the most recent data-output of research. Why? Because his orientation was towards looking for something that they all had so far missed. Some tiny oddity, like the nudges that got physics to the suspicion that there was a neutrino. But think first of his "orientation towards", and perhaps usefully think of Lonergan's comment about the father and son looking at the giraffe. Both Feynman and the father are up-to-

⁹⁴Lonergan's doctrinal volume on the Trinity may not be available in English for a year or two. If you are not up to the Latin, e-mail me at pmcshane@sahw.ca for an English translation of this piece.

date on the theories. Feynman, if not the father, is looking now to features that upset the theory, upset his present perspective.

Standard research is not like that. When I think of radically standard research I recall a true story that Cantwell-Smith, the Muslim scholar, told me of meeting a doctorate student in north India. Their conversation led Cantwell-Smith to suggest that the student travel north to a monastery where he would find certain peculiar features of the tradition. The students reply: “Oh I couldn’t do that: it would upset my thesis!”.

Non-standard research aims to be upsetting.

Please don’t be upset by this if you are in the midst of a thesis: most thesis work is standard research. I recall Lonergan’s advice to me when I was bogged down in Oxford in the late 1960s: “give the guy what he wants: its only a union card”. There is a serious point here, however, that is worth brooding over, an upsetting point when one views the journals, the publish-or-perish tradition. It is a point about the cycle of functional collaboration that I am envisaging. It seems to me that we have to shake up, up-set, our view of scholarly work. O.K.: think of thesis-work, master or doctorate, as normally pretty standard - though neither Feynman’s nor Lonergan’s fit that pattern - then what I am talking about in the serious cyclic functional collaboration is the non-standard work of a creative minority. Our present task is to create the context that would make likely the emergent living of that creative minority.

Back to Feynman or Lonergan researching. They are relatively up-to-date in their approach to data. Feynman was tuned to the standard model of Chromodynamics but he also remained tuned to the inadequacies of elementary quantumelectrodynamics.⁹⁵ He had that marvelous attitude of ‘what are we missing?’ that got him into trouble in the Challenger

⁹⁵ Feynman’s popular book, *QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1985) is one of the few popularizations in physics that I can recommend, and in it he does nudge us towards an eccentric and enlightening view, backed up by his theoretic treatment of the problem: *Quantum Mechanics and Path Integrals*, McGraw-Hill, 1965. While I think of it - see further note 116 below - I would recommend his three volume work as helpful for tackling physics in *Insight: Richard Feynman, Fernando Moringo and Matthew Sands, The Feynman Lectures in Physics*, Addison Wesley, Redding, Mass, 1995.

investigation, where a little dabbling on his part upset some committee members.⁹⁶ I suspect too that Lonergan upset standard researchers who did a standard reading of his *Verbum* articles and just could not see what he was fussing about. What he was asking for was non-standard reading.

What, then, do I mean by research? I mean a reading that is fully up-to-date on the present theoretic perspective in the zone, and that is searching for nudges beyond it.

This claim can be quite upsetting for present Lonergan students, and it is to them that my short book is primarily addressed. We have to slowly note and acknowledge the upset and concretely work our way round it in the next decades, in the next generations. Lonergan, after all, represents a complex of upsetting paradigm shifts, not just a re-shuffle of standard practice in, say, theology, philosophy, economics, education.

Notice now how, from our beginning in chapter one above, the bent of my writing was to get you into a type of non-standard research? But - does this not make you happy? - not on that aspect of non-standard research that demands a personal control of contemporary theoretic meaning. More like Feynman round the table with the committee: nudging you to notice some obvious defects in the launching; in our case the launching of the future.

Out topic is, for me, bursting beyond the few pages I allow myself here. I think of my own upsetting pointers in botany, where my Cantower series in fact began.⁹⁷ The beginning was rooted - pun intended - in my morning walk-about with my wife, visiting our growing sunflowers as they tuned into the morning ground and sunlight. My question, my orientation, my how-do-you-do, towards the flowers was "How do you do it?": not exactly the usual lead-in bent for botany. Indeed, unacceptably upsetting for botany as it marches on in the pseudo-scientific

⁹⁶A fairly detailed account of the events of the Challenger Rogers Commission and Feynman's experimenting is available in John Gribbin and Mary Gribbin, *Richard Feynman. A Life in Science*, Plume of the Penguin Group, 1998, 228-39.

⁹⁷ I might claim that the *Cantowers* began with a promised essay, that eventually became *Cantower 2*, "Sunflowers, Speak to us of Growing" and the promised *Cantower 58*, "Tadpoles, Tell us Talling Tails", but the actual series emerged in a snowstorm in Cape Breton when I was preoccupied with Ezra Pound. The promise of the essay on sunflowers was in the context of chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, where I am pushing for a strange integral perspective within scientific work.

post-Cartesian conventions.

Research, then, seeks to notice the unsettling, the anomalous from the viewpoint of the present *nomos*.

Now here is where I must become pragmatic and minimalist. The viewpoint of the present *nomos*, in so far as you are interested in participating in, promoting, advocating, functional specialist work, is your probably quite inadequate viewpoint. Mine is inadequate on Lonergan's standard, and I have been at it fifty years! Let me now adopt the convention of writing TET-L as "the tentative evolutionary theory of Lonergan," his wonderful but incomplete achievement. TET-X is then anyone else's, X's. That is what you bring to the present research. You are perhaps, more like a first year student than a Feynman. But still, did you not notice something anomalous as you mused over chapter one above? Research, as a functional specialty, is asked to do this, and no more: no more, that is, except the positive functional move of handing on the problem to the theoreticians, who have to somehow place the new plant, particle, perspective. A tough job.

Chapter 12.

Interpretation

We move on in our sketchy brooding to interpretation. I have approached this topic in different ways and at much greater length elsewhere.⁹⁸ Also there is an entire volume, *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* (5) 2005, in which a group attempted, quite successfully as a start, to illustrate the functional specialty. My own essay in that volume gives me a point of entry into my few helpful comments here. The essay is on Lonergan's meaning of *complete* in the canon of complete explanation: a pretty hairy topic. Don't rush to read it! Which leads me to my first point here; don't rush to interpret Lonergan!

What do I mean by that? First, Lonergan's view, Lonergan's TET, even in 1953, is a complex mesh of paradigm shifts that are still quite beyond present culture. Don't rush to interpret Lonergan? Well, see what happened when a group gathered to interpret Lonergan on Interpretation: a shockingly deficient effort.⁹⁹

If you wish to experiment with the functional specialty interpretation, then - in the absence of something thrown at us by new research - pick some author on a particular topic, as did each of the group in *JMDA* (4). Now you have a first task of trying to be luminous about your own viewpoint as interpreter: this is key to the total challenge of the cycling process, and the discomfort of it turns up explicitly in dialectic: we'll get to it in chapter 14 below but you already have felt the pressure in my various requests for you to take a stand. So you are the X in the TET-X formula. Here it is worth your while to check the second last sentence in *Method*, ch. 7, section 5, "Understanding Oneself," about being critical regarding the tradition that has formed your own

⁹⁸There are too many relevant references here. Perhaps it is easiest simply to refer you to *Christ in History*, chapter 9, "Interpretation". In that there is a particularly enlightening relating of the canons of hermeneutics and *The Sketch*, two difficult parts of *Insight* chapter 17. Interpretation is a regular topic in both the *Cantowers* and in *Lack in the Beingstalk*. For an unsuccessful venture into the topic of Lonergan's Hermeneutics, see the following note.

⁹⁹ The volume emerged from a conference in Montreal: *Lonergan's Hermeneutics. Its Development and Application*, edited by Sean McEvenue and Ben F. Meyer, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1989. I don't think that any of us present would deny this. Certainly there were good things discussed, but we failed to get into Lonergan's serious work e.g. of *Insight* 17, nor into his canons of hermeneutics.

mind. It may puzzle you: do you postpone that till later?

Be clear that we are talking about, anticipating, trying to get going, the process of recycling. The critical perspective won by any generation's dialectic group will not be lost, will be a possible tradition among traditions. If we are going to get the show on the roll, then it is best to figure out how much of your inquiry-stance is *voraussetzunglos*, and see about shifting the fog. You should find the honesty of the *JMDA* (4) group helpful here. Don't, for heaven's sake, think of yourself as giving a Lonerganian interpretation: that is a terrible mythic view. You have your own TET, and that is what you use to get at TET-X, "Understanding the Author". But, you say, hold it: are we not dealing just with a particular topic? Alas, we are dealing with an author's view of a particular object and neither the view nor the object are isolated: this non-isolation is something later cultures of interpretation have to get used to. As they have to get used to the task described in Lonergan's totally obscure *Sketch of Insight* 580[602]. You need, alas, some decent control of "the context" mentioned on that page. With that control you have a chance of coming up with the "hypothetical expression", "what he/she would say."¹⁰⁰

Now I am writing here about a possible experiment for you, but also we are pushing along towards a descriptive view of the cycling process both as this gets under way and as it operates in some degree of maturity. The experiment for you might be a thesis: then, if you are lucky, you will find - perhaps with a director's help, but in the mature cycling, less a matter of luck because there is to be more collaboration with research - a him or her in the past who is suspected to have a boosting or a dysfunctional contribution. Is there a new angle on the story of

¹⁰⁰ See further note 98 above. I would note the need to think out the new control of meaning that emerges here. "The classics ground a tradition" (*Method in Theology*, 161) but in functional specialization as sketched in chapter 5 of *Method* we have a heuristic of a meta-tradition.

the unjust steward?¹⁰¹ Does Brendan Kennelly have something fresh to say about suffering?¹⁰² Did Maxwell have twists that we have neglected?¹⁰³ Is Friedman's view of profit a naive axiom of economic behavior?¹⁰⁴ Notice here a push towards a new mentality: we seek to collaborate luminously in the progress of humanity. Three or four years spent on some idiot doctorate topic just doesn't cut it - but concretely this may be, at present, hard to avoid!

When the show is on the serious roll, collaborative research will be relatively controlled by the best opinion of the day: TET- 3000 A.D, say. There will be a decent stability of "cumulative and progressive results." But I would note that, in my present envisioning of a collaborative effort on the part of Lonergan students, there could be a tentative stabilization of effort, a directed effort that I hope to specify cumulatively as we move through these chapters. But for starters on that, let us reflect again on my vigorous suggesting of avoiding interpreting Lonergan.

We each have our little TET, but nonetheless we share also a common belief that Lonergan has something serious to offer in his TET-L. The whole effort of cycling that we are initiating is in fact an effort to interpret Lonergan's *Praxisweltanschauung*. Take those last three words of the previous sentence: they give a great example of a starter-problem. Praxis-interpretation requires a prior luminosity about the question "what-to-do?", but our common

¹⁰¹ For leads on recent work on this parable see Richard Dormandy, "Unjust Steward or Converted Master?", *Revue Biblique* 109 (2002), 512 - 527. The parable interests me, of course, because of the message about the children of light.

¹⁰² Brendan Kennelly, *Journey into Joy*, edited by Ake Persson, Bloodaxe Press, Bewcastle-on-Tyne, 1994, deals magnificently with the law of the cross as incarnated in a sequence of Irish authors. The view is summed up in two lines from a Patrick Kavanagh poem: "Suffering soars on Summer air / The millstone has become a star".

¹⁰³ General pointers on Maxwell, especially in relation to Lonergan's reflections in *Insight*, are given in Joistings 2, section 2, "Minding Maxwell". I would note, too, pointers on Maxwell given, in a rich context, by Carver A. Mead, *Collective Electrodynamics. Quantum Foundations for Electromagnetism*, MIT Press, 2000, 14, 31, 49.

¹⁰⁴ On Friedman, see Darlene O'Leary's article in *Journal of Macrodynamical Analysis* (4) 2005.

belief about the place and patterning of this question is shaky. The deficiencies emerge, ideally, through researchers reacting to muddles that emerge from defects in application, to fresh twists on the question e.g. from contemporary neuroscience. Now, how might we build that problematic zone into exercises in interpretation? Back to sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 of *Method*, chapter 7, but now check out those who seem to have pushed towards an understanding of the question of planning: Aristotle, John, Nemesius, Damascene, Thomas, etc, right up to contemporary studies of the chemistry of adrenalin. What do I mean here by “check out”?

Again, we must contrast “for starters” with later mature re-cycling. Go back to section 2 of *Method* chapter 7: understanding the object. Here I would first like to make a point about mature recycling and the common TET of such a later stage of meaning. Then the object includes the object, planning, in its full actuality of human planning and in the actuality of understandings of that actuality: this is the meaning of that curious symbolism “(about)³”, “introduced earlier. This heuristics of the object, much less its fruition, is way beyond us at present. What do we do for starters? We have a shot at interpreting, say, Thomas, on the what-to-do question, “Understanding the Author” all the while trying to “Understand Oneself”.

But who are the **we**? The **we** is ourselves trying to get the show on the road. We are trying to do two things at the one time: shift from being Lonergan’s admirers, believers, followers, to understanding ourselves **and** shift into the “normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”

Obviously, I picked this particular topic because it reaches to the heart of our effort, the effort of Lonergan, the effort of this little book. The pattern is normative: in Lonergan’s perspective it points us towards a luminous collaborative discernment of discernments of discernments in a TET which is a normative third order of consciousness. Asking what discernment is would seem to be a good start.

But who are the **we** in the long run? One has to go back now to the parallel with successful sciences and to the notion of the creative minority. And there is sense in which we have to go forward, not back. Presently reasonably successful sciences are messy, muddled, random in progress. Later stages of culture will not eliminate the randomness of insights, but they will shift the statistics of messing round. Still, let’s hold to present theology as done

collaboratively by serious students of Lonergan, a team working to interpret themselves and others and to pass that achievement on to history and historians. Then slowly, in these next generations, the **we** is to be identified as those who are up to the “long ascent” to “Adequate Self-Knowledge,”¹⁰⁵ but the identification now is very much an identification of the *Lack in the Beingstalk*. “What is lacking is the cultural milieu most of all what is lacking is knowledge of all that is lacking.”¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵I quote from section 1.2 of *Insight* chapter 17.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*

Chapter 13.

History

Most of all what is lacking is a reasonably adequate mesh of system and history, a TET filled out over some generations, dominated by emergent imagings of the totality that are genetically open, indeed that include the remembering of the future that is hinted at in the conclusion of chapter 19. What is recycled over the generations is not the filled-out TET, but that filling out is lurking generously in the local efforts to refine our communal grasp of some zone of the geo-historical flow. The refinement occurs in the single scholar, or in a singular group, picking up suggestive batons from the family of interpreters. Meanings are thus freshly tracked in their inner development within later minds and in their outer implementations or neglect. No detail is dodged: it may be significant like a fleeting change of key in a symphony.

Obviously I am not attempting a replacement of Lonergan's two chapters on history, though that task must be faced if we are to arrive at a serious heuristics of functional history. I am cheeky enough to claim that they just do not cut it, despite the brilliance with which layers of critical history are identified. The final chapter of *ChrISt in History* is titled "reinventing History", but it needs a fuller re-invention of the heuristics of history, which means for you, I would hope, a re-invention of the characters who do functional history.

But that chapter gives us a point of entry for our few pages on history. It attends, curiously, to two periods of history, and in each case to the particular history that is the tunneling along of excavating past doctrines. A first evident value of this selection of entry-point is that we can immediately pull back into our few reflections the heuristics that is sketched in chapter 13 of *Method in Theology*.

The period of history mainly attended to in chapter 10 of *ChrISt in History* is the period between the councils of Nicea and Constantinople, so, the period 325-381. Recent authorities are Barnes and Williams.¹⁰⁷ Their competence as historians is unquestionable, though their

¹⁰⁷Their work is a topic in chapters 9 and 10 of *ChrISt in History*. Daniel H. Williams, *Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Arian-Nicene Conflicts*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995; Timothy D. Barnes, *Athanasius and Constantine. Theory and Practice in the Constantinian Empire*, Harvard University Press, 1993.

conclusions are the subject of expert debate. Is such debate a matter for historical exchange, as Lonergan would have it, or is it a reach into dialectic? The question points towards later refinements in the differentiation of these two specialties, as does the question of the place of contrafactual history. But our interest is in simpler heuristic points.

Let us suppose that I have the audacity - as obviously I do in venturing on! - to play dialectician, doing something of the operation that is eventually to sublate the first principle of the third canon of hermeneutics. Are these chaps working from an up-to-date TET? Not on my view. Think of the problem in the simple terms of “knowing the object”, which is a prerequisite of the historian no less than the interpreter. While proximately the object is talk about Jesus, the remote object is Jesus. How do Barnes and Williams stand with regard to Jesus’s question to Peter, the fundamental topic of the entire book, *ChrIst in History*? I am not here talking about a stand in faith, but a stand in theory. I am talking about a stand based on the strange come-about into strangeness that Lonergan describes in *Insight*: and why not repeat it once again, for it invites and could bear the strange re-reading that could lift one into a world invisible, or echo one’s presence there already.

“So it comes about that the extroverted subject visualizing extensions and experiencing duration gives place to the subject oriented to the objective of the unrestricted desire to know and affirming beings differentiated by certain conjugates potencies, form, and acts, grounding certain laws and frequencies.”¹⁰⁸

That come-about has further dimensions now, beyond chapter 16, beyond even *Method in Theology*’s patchy reflections on the ongoing genesis of minding. But the key point is that the character doing this history either is up to an existential stance of metaphysical equivalence or he/she is not. What is bubbling out of the muddles of the fourth century is the embryonic grip of the human mind on minor distinctions which are major in human and cosmic history.

But let us leave the experts aside for the moment and return uncomfortably to ourselves. What is our control of that meaning that is to move on through Nicea and Chalcedon and Constantinople III? Are we, are you and I, frankly, nominalists, for whom metaphysical

¹⁰⁸*Insight*, 514[537].

equivalence is not even vaguely a topic of interest? Then we become like the historian of physics who does not know calculus much less the geometries of particle-conjugations.

So we come to that other period of history, the parallel years of the twentieth century: 1925-1981. Know the object. The issue now is metadoctrines and here attention centres on the minding of Lonergan. Need I say more? You see better, perhaps, why I discourage ‘Lonergan’ as an object of interpretation? An object of interpretative learning, yes: but not, for some generations, an object for the functional specialties interpretation and history.

But let me be homely and pragmatic. Lonergan has to be an object of interpretation, and now I am thinking especially of the Latin works that are emerging in translation. If the *ethos* of which I write is to emerge, than those works must be met with a massive creative learning effort. They regularly do not read well, even in the original excellent Latin. They were written under terrible conditions which Lonergan could describe with laconic humour. But for him they were part of, and an occasioned expression of, a massive climb, and our personal parallel climb up through them is part of the journey to their come-about, turn-about, recycling.

This brings me to my final major pointing of this chapter, a pointing which helps to differentiate six of the specialties for the two specialties dialectic and foundations. Put simply, *per se*, those two specialties are the replacement for what is traditionally called philosophy. The other six are *per se* applied philosophy. But note first that I have said *per se*, and secondly recall the developed view, a perspective within a fresh perspectivism, of generalized empirical method. First, then, on the older *Insight* view of generalized empirical method, methodological innovation may occur *per accidens* during work in any specialty. But *Method in Theology* nudges us beyond it. “Just as the historian , first with respect to his sources and, then, with respect to the object of his inquiry, undergoes a development of understanding that at once is heuristic, ecstatic, selective, critical, constructive and, in the limit, judicial, so the critics of historical work undergo a similar development with respect to the work itself. They do so all the more easily and all the more competently, the more the historian has been at pains not to conceal his tracks but to lay his cards on the table.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹*Method in Theology*, 193.

But it is not just the historian that should be at pains to be self-critically luminous: it is the entire community of specialists, and in a later stage of meaning it is to become a cultural ethos. The shift and its probability schedules is what is pointed towards in my Childout Principle: “When teaching children geometry, one is teaching children children.”¹¹⁰ And, obviously, when one is teaching children history one is teaching children children. You might well pause here regarding the relation of this strategy and its fruits after generations to the problem of general history, but let me stay in this concluding space with the simpler general problem. In the new view, one is pushing for the second time of temporal subjectivity in the classroom, but that push includes oneself, the pusher.

Now all these facets of learning and teaching and innovating in methodology are lurking in the discomfiting later description of generalized empirical method. “Generalized empirical method operative on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness: it does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject’s operations without taking into account the corresponding objects.”¹¹¹

But I am over my self-imposed space limit, with a list before me of heavy pointers, best left now for collaborations, for *Joistings*. Still, not a bad quote to halt on: but I should add that the historian not only lays positional cards on the table but also lays the baton, self-luminously, in a hand of the dialectic community.

¹¹⁰ Cantower 41 introduces this principle in the context of other doctrines.

¹¹¹ *A Third Collection*, 141, lines 1-4.

Chapter 14.

Dialectic

I spent most of 2004 thinking and writing about this specialty, or rather its core procedure described in section 5 of *Method* chapter 10. The result is several hundred pages of guidance, mainly in reading and “doing” page 250.¹¹² If nothing else, this points to the need for the far larger work mentioned in the Epilogue of *Insight* and in my Prologue. My footnote may nudge you to find your way into those many previous pages. Here I wish to carry forward our attempt at beginnings.

I might well say that, when you finish reading this book, it is to page 250 you should return. This does not surprise you. Not only is it the only page or section in the book that is precise, concise, and clear on procedure, but it is at the heart of the beginning of the cycle of functional specialization. Why, then, was it not up-front in this book as such? Because minimalism does not require definite procedures of dialectic analysis, nor does it require that one be luminous about one’s own procedure. As the process gets under way in various zones of inquiry, the need and value of this structure can emerge. And will emerge: but will do so with a greater probability schedule if the value of the structure is evident from its successful use.

What I am talking about here, therefore, is the beginning that I would associate with those who consider Lonergan’s suggestions worthwhile. Is this the way to do dialectic analysis? My lengthy struggle with this short section, and indeed with *Method* since before its appearance, leaves me with the conviction that this is the most brilliant page in the book. Is it the way to do dialectic analysis? The is-question obviously pushes one back to the what-question, and perhaps I might nudge this push by the simple appeal, Please read this page 250 carefully, and take your stand on it.

Notice how I thus twist the page back on itself, so to speak. The page describes very precisely what the functional specialists in dialectic have to do. But we are not talking about that now: we are talking about a minimal stand on functional specialization that simply adds a stand

¹¹²The reflections began with the 8 articles entitled SOFDAWARE, then the topic was further treated in many of the 21 essays titled *Quodlibet*. These are all available on the usual Website.

on this strategy. A few pages later Lonergan talks of making conversion a topic: I am simply hoping to make the strategy of this page a topic. Let us be clear, then, on my appeal. Your what-question is not a reach for a comprehensive grasp but for a sufficient impression, especially about the first half of the page. It sets up a solid demand for assembly of data, etc from the past, and a way of sorting it out into YOUR expert categorial perspective. Further, it cunningly asks you to expose your stand on progress. Note next the cunning of the second half of the page. The experts - think of six or ten - write their books. Now, Lonergan says, let them each assemble those books etc. What they have to come out and up with finally are their best shots at improving their own foundational perspective, “at pains not to conceal his tracks”.

Here I would suggest that that improved foundational perspective is each specialist’s version of the categories: the equivalent of Lonergan’s pages 286ff. If you like, you can add in Lonergan as one of the experts - does he not deserve inclusion as a dialectic expert? - then his stuff cannot but come up through the work of page 250. A discomfiting business, obviously associated with the brilliantly strategic re-cycling of *Insight* and *Method* through the use of the procedure.

But here I am into the remote, not the immediate, beginning situation. Back then to our elementary reading, and the elementary stand simply on the value of this page. I asked already for a stand on the minimal, the value of trying the collaborative division of labour. This adds the question of a stand on the use of this page by the Lonergan community.

It is important to separate the question of taking a stand from taking a stand on this entire page. Over recent years people have asked about the massive requirements for stand-taking that the top half of page 250 sketch. This is not beginner’s work. Even if we should manage to interest experts in having a shot at implementing the page the first efforts would probably not be very dazzling. But before we think more of that, what about your efforts now as student, as beginner perhaps?

You may find, as beginner, or even as keen student, that spelling out for yourself, on the basis of the assembly of your own life, your own interests, your stand on thinking, its nature and its value, is worth doing in some shabby private fashion. It could turn out to be a surprising experiment. Putting Lonergan and philosophy etc aside, what do you really think is the real

business of life and of thinking etc etc? What is your spontaneous reaction to that position stuff that Lonergan springs on the reader early in chapter 14 of *Insight*? Where do you honestly place yourself in that odd line-up that he gives in the Introduction?¹¹³ Are you really out there with Aquinas, or are you not comfortably floating somewhere between empiricism and idealism? Here, I think, it is necessary to venture out of your solitude and talk to others. My very first conversation with Lonergan, Easter 1961 in Dublin, was about his shift to “startling strangeness”¹¹⁴ and he made this point immediately.

Back to the business of thinking, your stand on the value of thinking and understanding. Again, honest spontaneity is the lead-in. What is your view, for example, of the efforts of the lower sciences? Muse on it in this context, but it is convenient for me to leave reflection on that key question of “theoretic conversion” to chapter 16 below.

Lonergan’s description of conversions in this chapter on dialectic is minimal, convenient for his introductory purposes. He has a larger view, and his view needs massive enlargement. But that enlargement is to be the fruit of the recycling process. There are to emerge, through dialectic expressions of fuller foundations and through foundational fantasy, genera and species of conversions - I prefer the secular and more general word *displacements* - and their genetic cultivation.

So much for an introduction to taking a stand that is not related either to a stand on this page or on functional specialization, but now I return to the problem I left dangling above: taking a stand on this page in the context of a stand of functional specialization. Perhaps I might best narrow the point strategically by raising the question of “conversion to taking a stand”, the conversion to being at pains to be luminous to oneself and others.

This is a tough conversion: I need not write more about it here, since the point is made very solidly by the final paragraph of section 6 of *Method* ‘s chapter on Dialectic. But I would like to use the little space I have left on this large topic to comment on the last word of that section: *destiny*. What is your position on destiny? I suspect that you find it a strange question,

¹¹³*Insight*, xviii[25]: placing Platonism in the middle of positionings regarding realism.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*

and it is, in the full seriousness of its whatness, a stranger to present religious thinking. Yet it stands there, a discomfiting absence in Lonergan's thinking about emergent probability and in his reflections on spirit.¹¹⁵ That absence merges easily with the absence of the full seriousness of whatness in Lonergan's foundation reflections on religious experience, a topic of the next specialty. And it helps us towards some glimpse of the need for foundational fantasy, a fantasy that reaches pragmatically towards and beyond not only "the coming convergence of religions" but also the emergence of the theoretic in global religious thinking and the convergence of physics and theology.

I have passed over the other sections of this chapter in *Method*. What of them? Briefly, one may think of the sections prior to section 5 as extensions of Lonergan's background chapters, descriptive foundational suggestions. What of the sections that follow? Section 6 is a popular ramble about points in section 5, akin to my own ramble here. My ramble here, however, draws attention to the fact that what should have followed, or been included in, page 250, is some noting of the need of a categorial stand such as is expressed by Lonergan in sections 6 and 7 of the next chapter.

¹¹⁵ See the text below, in the paragraph containing note 152. I previously raised the problem of the use and meaning of the words *spirit*, *spiritual*, in *Insight* and elsewhere. (See *Lack in the Beingstalk*, note 94 of chapter 3, note 105 of chapter 4.) A context here is that of the problematic raised above in notes 89, 90. Combine this with the problem of reaching for an eschatological heuristic.

On this Thomas was both inadequate and, obviously, incomplete. There is needed a fuller venture into the character of the minding of separated souls, but the road there requires a fresher reading of both *Verbum* and *Insight*, focused on the *conditiones materiae* or a present understanding of the empirical residue. In the context of the best of modern astrophysics, the community must push towards a new astropsychology. Again, a rich eschatology must mesh with a fuller theology of Eucharistic presence and a more integral perspective on the twining of emergence, finality, and exigence.

Chapter 15.

Foundations

So we arrive, quite smoothly, at the chapter on foundations, here and in *Method* and in later practice. It gives, perhaps, the clearest instance in the book of the process of baton exchange. And it also brings out clearly the benefit of the division of labour. Foundational thinkers, of course, do not live in amnesia, as they pick up the baton, eyes forwards, and sprint on in categorial fantasy. By now you should have sufficient sense of the direction of development of the circuit or tower community as sharing the best available thinking context of the day, the best TET. The “cumulative and progressive results” are a communal thing, an admission ticket to serious conferences, the colour of conference dialogue, making it, by the way, incomprehensible to an overhearing common sense, even if it be the common sense of undergraduates.

Here seems to be a good place to pause over the distinction between the creativity of learning and the creativity that pushes for progress. For convenience why not use the obvious abbreviations CL and CP? The baton exchanging with the prior specialty is a matter of CL; the push towards the future, towards the next specialty, is CP. CL is not at all as stressful as CP: though it requires the sort of effort that is best illustrated for me by the teaching of mathematical physics: one needs strategic illustrations and exercises, and of course “one has to find out who and where there is a master.”¹¹⁶

Some serious further brooding on this is helpful in relation to the drive of this little book, and this brooding I would wish you to initiate from my few pointers here. There are broader pointers to the meaning of foundations to be had elsewhere that are relevant e.g. in chapter 4 of *ChrISt in History*, “Foundations: Special Categories”, but my twist here is towards you getting a better sense of my foundational effort in this book, a foundational effort that I would wish you to share.

Back now to the conclusion of the previous paragraph. In the community around Lonergan and his work there is an implicit recognition that we have found a master. But now we need the exercises and labour of CL. The problem here, however, is that the master shifted the

¹¹⁶*Method in Theology*, 149.

standard of work considerably. Einstein made a massive shift in tackling the general geometries of space time. Sir Arthur Eddington picked up on his work right off, and his writings were respected by Einstein.¹¹⁷ There is the story of the person who approached Eddington with an Einstein remark that only three people understood the General Theory. “Oh”, remarked Eddington, “who is the third?” Lonergan’s achievement was a much more massive multi-paradigm business; there was no second. So, the problem of CL is massive, multi-generational.

The previous paragraph is part of my foundational fantasy.

The task of foundational thinking is the twofold task of (1) fantasy and (2) freshening the re-cycling. In a later maturity of the functional collaboration there is to be a community that shares, with reasonable adequacy, the perspective so briefly expressed by Lonergan in his general and special categories. At present, however, the situation is one in which CL has not been seriously attempted. My fantasy, meshed into my view of emergent probability, its mediatedness by us and its control of meaning, is that we are at the moment at least up to the CL that can pick up, from Lonergan and history, the need for an eightfold division of labour. That foundational fantasy was, for me, a tough climb of CP. But you are in a position now of CL, and there is a decent statistic of emergent that could make “you” a small committed community. “You” might tackle the shifting towards the cultural reality of the Tower of Able in “your” different ways. Some of “you” may just settle for promotion, as it were, from outside the Tower. And some of you - and this is the tricky problem raised most clearly by my Epilogue below - may face the craziness of CL in its fullest foundational sense, “a vast undertaking.”¹¹⁸ Here, again, my fantasy is that the crazy “some” will be very few in the present and next generation. The cycling over generations will, I would hope, make the craziness more conventional.

This is more than a simple hope on my part of course, since I am thinking as best I can in

¹¹⁷To anyone tackling seriously the foundational perspective of *Insight* chapter 5 I would recommend the writings of Eddington, both popular and technical. Cantower 31 deals with that chapter of *Insight*. Lindsay and Margenau, *Foundations of Physics*, is still solid, but it might be supplemented by Ian Lawrie, *A Unified Grand Tour of Physics*, Institute of Physics Publishing, Bristol and Philadelphia, pb 1998.

¹¹⁸*Insight*, 186[210].

terms of probability-schedules statistically expressed, and of slopings, collaborations, e-mails in the next few years for me, gatherings for “you” in these next decades and centuries. I was thinking in terms of energy’s reach and finality’s richness and of the battered acorn of human meaning that we are. I was thinking of Thomas’ focus on foundations and its non-implementation and indeed of the same in Lonergan’s case. I was thinking in these terms when I was led, by Australia and providence, to abandon my Cantower project. At the Lonergan centennial conference of 2004, Fr. Ivo Coelho made a powerful case for a beginning to an effort to implement functional specialization¹¹⁹: one respected expert remarked to him after his presentation that he was too busy to get involved. Are you too busy? Is the busyness an implicit rejection of the Lonergan’s final stand?

Does this help you to see the strategy of this little book? It is a small shadow of the full process of recycling, when *Insight* and *Method* turn up in fresh fashion in the discomforting activities programmed on page 250 of *Method*. I hope for a random cycling of my stand in some sub-section of the Lonergan community. It would be sad to see the Lonergan community doing to Lonergan what the Dominican, academic and Church communities did to Thomas.¹²⁰ Still, there is the possibility that some other area of inquiry might follow history’s nudging, divide up their inquiry functionally, push forward culture, while all the while the supposed followers of Lonergan regard Lonergan’s view as, at best, utopian, at worst, an aberration, at middle insignificant. “Is my proposal utopian? It asks merely for an interdisciplinary theory that at first will be denounced as absurd, then will be admitted to be true but obvious and insignificant, and perhaps finally be regarded as so important that its adversaries will claim that they themselves discovered it.”¹²¹

I hope, then, that enough of my readers will take such a sufficient minimal stand

¹¹⁹Ivo Coelho, “Implementations of Lonergan’s Method: Critique”, *Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education* 15(2004) 379-404.

¹²⁰ See Leonard E. Boyle O.P., *The Setting of the Summa theologiae of Saint Thomas*, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1982.

¹²¹ Quoted from the conclusion of “Healing and Creating in History” available in Volume 15 of Lonergan’s *Complete Works, An Essay in Circulation Analysis*.

regarding my minimal demand that the move forward might come from within the Lonergan community. It will come very slowly and very weakly. But there may well be bolder, crazier, spirits who mesh their foundational efforts with other areas, such zones as botany or neuropsychology. When I began this odd project I had anticipated that I could build in much more about the symbiosis of botany and theology, but I am available to those who wish for more and are willing to tackle in detail the work involved, in botany, in physics, in economics, whatever. I would be thrilled, of course, if what I say about the special categories in the companion essay, “Foundations: Special Categories” gets some people moving on the push for explanatory considerations of such realities as religious experience. I would be thrilled if some would move towards the new metaphysics of religion skimpily developed in chapters 15 and 16 of *Insight*. I would be very gratified if the need for what I call metaphysical words - metagrams, a heavier symbolization of human aspirations and loneliness - would be operationally acknowledged. But I may have to be content with a minimum: some of you making some noise in the community about the neglected brilliance of the 1965 insight of Bernard Lonergan.

Finally, I would note that, just as I suggested adding to the list of (9) general categorial pointers the tenth, (10), that would put my present push up-front, so I would suggest that there be a clear addition to the special categories. Lonergan writes descriptively of five sets of categories. I would have “you” beginning to fantasize and to think, with serious explanatory and distant intent, about a sixth set, (6), that would focus on our post-mortem state, our destiny as minders emergent further - think of “natural resultance”¹²² - through darkness and light to “the glory of God, the manifestation of God..”¹²³

¹²²Lonergan, *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 147; add the references there at note 235.

¹²³Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, 374. The phrase occurs in a magnificent spontaneous answer to a question regarding suffering and being.

Chapter 16.

Doctrines

The foundations community obviously pass the baton of freshened categories on to the sixth specialty but there are other flows into that specialty. Here is where you find the racetrack image fracturing. But you have that other image of the 8 by 8 matrix that represents the complex of inner-tower communications.¹²⁴ So, we have various contributions to doctrinal work. It is quite a valuable exercise to try to figure out what contributions might be from other areas to doctrines, but I draw your attention here just to one. You recall *Classification* from page 250? “Sources of affinity or opposition which have other grounds”? On the road to a foundational perspective they are laid aside, but they are not lost; so, in a more complex treatment of inner-specialty dialogue there would be a need to take account of flows such as cultural affinities that help forward doctrinal, systematic and communications specializations. Here I stick very much to the race-track image: if you like, to the series of exchanges represented by $C_{i, i+1}$: here we focus on $C_{5,6}$. Foundational work within an ethos of fantasy and hope, nudges doctrinal work towards new categorial refinements.

Curiously, this chapter of *Method* hits it off, at least in a non-functional sense. Certainly, there is fantasy and hope in Lonergan’s invitation to tackle freshly the analysis of doctrines. But part of the curiosity is that really the task he is dealing with is a task of history, a future history that would bring to bear his richer categories of meaning on the old issues of the development of doctrines. I think that if you think of and think out sections 8, 9 and 10 of the chapter on doctrines in this fashion, you’ll find that you have a richer view of the task of history, and a fuller view of the difficulty of understanding Lonergan’s Latin works in the area.

A key part of this difficulty helps me forward in my particular aim regarding doctrines. In each of these eight chapters I have sought to focus on certain points that would help the genesis of work on the entire enterprise. Here the point worth attending to is the nature of a theoretical context. I can pose the relevant puzzle quite simply for us, for you, by asking, What is the

¹²⁴ The matrix is diagramed on page 108 of *A Brief History of Tongue*. Chapter 5 of *ChrISt in History*, “Communications in General,” deals with the topic in a broad context.

difference between a doctrine as we talk about it in sermons, and as we talk about it in this speciality? Don't hold yourself to Church doctrines here: indeed, the fullest perspective would have you think about global pragma rather than Christian dogma.

This is a very tricky question. It is obviously a great help in tackling it if you have had genuine experience of the theoretic world. Now this is a major problem for us at present, for Lonergan students. I recall once taking as illustration of theoretical thinking what for me seemed hackneyed; the derivation of Kepler's laws starting with second order Newtonian differential equations: Kepler's laws can bubble out with just a page of work! The group was enthusiastic, but we gave up after a few lines. I mentioned, in my few words on dialectic, the importance of theoretic conversion and your attitude towards it. Here its importance stares you in the face: the sixth specialty seeks remote non-commonsense meaning, a meaning described by the refined Greek meaning of *theoria*.

It seems worthwhile to pause over this, almost as a central piece of the little book, especially as I have dealt at a reasonable length with pragma, doctrines for the future to be evolved in this specialty in the light of richer categories or their anticipation.¹²⁵ Work within the functional specialties is uniformly remote from common sense. Have you perhaps been led by your imagination, and by the usual presentation of the specialties as "up four, down four", into the illusion that somehow we descend to the homely as we move towards Communications? I have avoided putting diagrams in this text, so as to cope better with its e-mailing, but I would ask you to envisage a tower of meaning climbing uniformly upwards in its cycling, upwards to a world and worldview quite foreign to common sense: but not alien to it, indeed vital to it. As Lonergan emphasized, without thermodynamics heating cannot but be primitive. And what is true of heat is true of daisies or dogs - or God.

Surely I do not have to do battle about this? Alas, Fontanelle took hold of our souls in the so-called Enlightenment, and modern popular writing makes available to all, swiftly, the most recent findings of everything from physics to parapsychology. Lonergan's lecturing career was haunted and hounded by that ethos and presentations of his work too often fall captive to it. But

¹²⁵The reference is to Cantower 41.

the question is, Do you have to do battle with this denial - regularly an unarticulated operative denial - of the remoteness of serious understanding? The development of the sixth specialty seems especially vulnerable to it: after all, are we not seeking some acceptable meaning, a policy? Your battle requires you to keep the policy statement in the meaning-context of the specialty. It is to be grasped “not an isolated atom detached from all context, but precisely as part of a context,”¹²⁶ here a rich categorial context best thought of in symbolic terms.

The proper meaning of a policy or pragma within this specialty is to be quite beyond public discourse. This statement is itself, you may notice, a policy statement. It occurs here, clearly, in the context of a popular presentation of the sixth functional specialty, and that occurrence serves to heighten the tension towards genuineness of our reach for the implementation of Lonergan’s program.

What, then, about work in this specialty? Mature work, that is a distant hope of remote meaning shared by a community in the manner in which present physics specialists might discuss Feynman Diagrams. But might we do something at present?

We began our reflections with an eye on a globally-shared minimalist hypothesis, but as we rambled round the specialties in these chapters I pointed to the concrete possibility of adding to that perspective a fairly common perspective, a modest sharing of the understanding of, and belief in, a metaphysics that “is uniquely probable.”¹²⁷ The modest sharing of understanding brings in the seed of its own development in struggling to develop such a doctrine as “when teaching children geometry one is teaching children children”. The development of that doctrine is eventually to blossom forth in a new breed of texts, teachers, textbook writers, and amazingly transformed conventions of education. And the same can be said for other educational challenge, like that which relates to mesoeconomic restructuring.

However, as I said earlier in this chapter, there is the larger complementary essay on doctrines in Cantower 41, all the more significant in that it is the cut-off essay of my Cantower

¹²⁶Lonergan, *Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 238.

¹²⁷I am quoting *Insight* 441[466], which locates metaphysics in a context that takes it out of the normal tradition of normal debate regarding its validity.

series, including in it a range of significant doctrines. So it seems best, in concluding this chapter, to draw your attention again to the single metadoctrine that dominates this book and to which I called particular attention in the previous chapter. It is the doctrine of functional collaboration. Certainly, that doctrine has its remote meaning when placed in the context of a mature foundational view or the maturing cycle of a century hence that I intimated in various ways already. But there is the doctrine as you may be taking it in now in your present reading, a doctrine that makes common yet uncommon sense. You can thus accept it in what we might call a street meaning. Your problem and my hope is the taking of it sufficiently seriously that you take a stand on it, promote it at your own level of opportunity, make it a topic of conversation or cultural displacement, make it the talk of the town, the ethos of respectable thinking.

Chapter 17.

Systematics

This specialty is the one which held me up most in my struggle in the 1970s to envisage the future of Lonergan's enterprise. I have treated it, and my progress towards its envisagement, in a variety of places and ways, and in my reviewing of those ways prior to writing these few pages it seemed to me useful simply to draw on one particular brief expression. That brief expression is from a present final series of writings, a series that is committed to fostering the shift to an explanatory use of functional specialization. The series title is *Joistings*, which has a variety of meanings and resonances. On the Website for December 2005 are posted the first twelve essays, beginning with *Joistings* 0: "Ongoing Collaboration" and ending with *Joistings* 11: "Small Steps towards Functional Collaboration". I shall comment further on functional systematics in the final page of this chapter. First I quote Section 1 of *Joistings* 5: "Genetic Systematics".

"Sensing the New Systematics"

My first sensing of what I call the new systematics came in some very memorable moments twenty five years ago. I had been struggling with the problem since the late 1960s, so I had fretted and fermented about it already for over a decade. My molecules, I suppose, were due a break. My hunt for meaning in those moments was in the Toronto Lonergan Centre, grappling with the twists of the passage from *De Intellectu et Methodo* that talks of the historian of mathematics, a passage given here in section 4. Then all the bits began to bubble together: genetic method,¹²⁸ pure formulations,¹²⁹ reaching out contrafactually towards twisting

¹²⁸This is a central topic of *Insight* chapter 15.

¹²⁹A baffling phrase from the dense page of *Insight*, 580[602].

counterpositions,¹³⁰ getting “something better than was the reality.”¹³¹ Now, of course, the dynamic global group-operations of the seventh specialty are quite evident to me, and quite startlingly removed from the terrible lightweight treatment that Lonergan had to give them in that penultimate chapter of *Method in Theology*.

But, if the pattern of those operations are not evident to you, how do I get it across to you?

This is, for me, a serious and frustrating question.¹³² The pattern seems to elude very serious Lonergan students. Is it perhaps because ‘system’ is tied to some image of the old axiomatic structure of Euclid? Don’t knock that: Thomas found it very useful in the *Summa*. But certainly this is part of the block.

These little essays, up to and including *Joistings 8*, are primarily not pedagogical. Still, perhaps a delay here over a couple of simple images may help, or help you to help others. So, we start with Thomas’ reasonable success. Here just consider his *Summa* as a single system: then think of it as a system in a sequence of systems. Useful here is to think of getting a summary of the *Summa* into a page, then placing it in a line-up of other like pages. Bonaventure would be in the neighborhood, and Albert the Great. Back much further would be the system of the Fourth Gospel; forwards would be Suarez and Schliermacher. What you have is a line-up that challenges us to think of a system of these systems. And the helpful image of the tadpole heading for full frogginess. Then Thomas is, so to speak, a slice of the journey. There is a lot more to it than this, of course. The tadpole - or the kitten, if you wish a cuddlier example - can have a sad life:

¹³⁰The text cited in the final section here goes on to talk of this challenge. It is important to face the challenge here of finding out how contra-factual history meshes into the various specialties.

¹³¹*Method in Theology*, 251.

¹³²My frustration with this, however, is exceeded by the frustration that relates to the “psychological block” that I wrote of in *Joistings 3*. But are not the two blocks related? The what-to-do? question in its full operative dynamic is seeking for newness: the present axioms of my life, or my topic, need discomfiting replacement. *Joistings 8* bring that discomfort into the context of the discomfort of Jesus. But you may have more homely reflections by considering a failed night-out, a failed relationship

starved, abused. In your systematizing you are looking for norms: how to take care of a tadpole, a kitten. So you have to think out the details of your environment, both ‘use’ and ‘reversed abuse’ of the growing beastie (I am thinking of Robert Burns’ wee mouse).

Well, at least this gives you leads to a beginnings. The beginnings of course need to push towards that terrible page 464[489] of *Insight* that I have written about endlessly, and to carry forward to those next pages on genetic method. Very tough work this, getting the natural analogue for genetic system into one’s mind and psyche. And then pushing forward to see how a global group of systematic theologians might collaborate, and how the entire group might build the best present systematics into a lift in the recycling that is theology. But now I am wandering way ahead. We will return to this problem a little in *Joistings* 8, but the leads are to be dug out elsewhere, and many of those leads are personal to you, to your zone of studies. And perhaps you might benefit from brooding over the series of systems that you were, that you are going to be?¹³³“

That short extract is, I hope, helpful in furthering your climb towards a view of the cyclic dynamic. It is important to bring to your attention once more that the inclusion in the cycle of the best present systematics is key to its success: improvements are built into the TET. The analogy with botany helps here: you might find it useful to peruse my reflections on Gould’s monumental work on the topic.¹³⁴ Such a perusal would help towards getting a fuller sense of the complexity of a serious theoretic context. But it still seems to me that the analogy with the successful science of physics, which I have used for some years, is best in pushing our thinking in this. So you may well avail of that parallel, expressed in the parallel between a “tentative universal viewpoint” and

¹³³Note that this is a reading of the book of oneself. Certainly it can benefit from other books, like those of H.S.Sullivan, Proffoff, Aresteh, etc etc: but this calls for a solitary leisured self-digestion. I recall a letter of W.B. Yeats as I write: “Why do we honour those who die in battle? A man [or a woman!] can show as reckless a courage entering into the abyss of the self”.

¹³⁴Stephen Jay Gould, *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002. Cantower 15 is a reflection on it which is selective in its interests, but it certainly points to the need for a functional consideration of TETs, placing Gould’s work in the assembly of Method 250. A further useful context here is Cantower 7, “Systematics and General Systems Theory”.

“tentative unification theory” in physics. You notice that I have not used that parallel so far in this book: the mention of universal viewpoint seems to bring with it an air of unreality, and I reach here for an air of pragmatic procedure. But perhaps you could pause over the various parallels between TUTs - the road to GUTs - and TETs in theology. I would wish you especially to note both the significance of symbolism and its haunting of the dialogue of experts.

I am continuing here the point I was pushing in the previous chapter: the remoteness of serious understanding, and the problem, raised in the chapter on dialectic, of taking an honest stand about your stand regarding it. The honesty relates to the struggle towards genuineness, and it is sadly amusing to bring together two statements of Lonergan, one about the historian “at pains not to conceal his tracks,” the other talking about the self who “keeps matters some entirely to oneself, and refuses even to face others.”¹³⁵ The “outer rind of the *persona*”¹³⁶ may well be eager to take a stand on the importance of understanding’s “bloody entrance,”¹³⁷ but some hidden layer rejects this and, oddly, that hidden rejection can be quite manifest in that self’s attitude towards the effort to seriously understand, even going to the extreme of a certain stand about the inevitability of C.P.Snow’s two culture, a stand that fits nicely with “the substitution of pseudo-metaphysical myth-making for scientific inquiry.”¹³⁸ So, one talks of feelings with disdain for chemistry.

Such an exclusion of serious understanding is presently supported by the dominant traditions of contemplation, which are anaphatic. The new systematics, on the other hand, is to be increasingly kataphatic. Systematic searchings, in a later maturity, will, as a “Language of the Heart”, “as central feature of the world of sense, intimate its finality, its yearning for God.”¹³⁹

“But we are not there yet. And for society to progress towards that or any other goal it

¹³⁵*Insight*, 470[495].

¹³⁶*Ibid.*

¹³⁷*Insight*, 186[210].

¹³⁸*Insight*, 505[528].

¹³⁹*Insight*, 724[757]. “Systematics: A Language of the Heart” is the title of a chapter in my book, *The Redress of Poise*, available on the Website.

must fulfil one condition. It cannot be a titanothore, a beast with a three-ton body and a ten-ounce brain. It must direct its attention to the overhead product of cultural implements. It must glory in its deepening, in the pure deepening that adds to aggregate leisure, to liberate many entirely and all increasingly to the field of cultural activities It must lift its eyes more and more to the more general and more difficult fields of speculation, for it is from them that it has to derive the delicate compound of unity and freedom in which alone progress can be born, struggle, and win through.”¹⁴⁰

¹⁴⁰*For a New Political Economy*, 20.

Chapter 18.

Communications

And so we lift our eyes to the more general and more difficult fields of communication, of Communications.

That statement seems very strange to you, unless you have been reading some of my previous efforts on the topic. There is a conventional view, aided by general imaginings of an “up and down to the concrete” process from first to last specialty, that this specialty is mainly dialogue. This is not helped either by the initial identification of its tasks in *Method*, or by Lonergan’s skimpy treatment of the subject in *Method*. A serious reading of that section (8) on page 132 in *Method*, especially in the context of our present struggle, can help shift the illusion. The tasks are massive, and the heart of the matter is the sophisticated mediation of those tasks internal to the specialty. Regarding the skimpy treatment in *Method*, perhaps it could help both to lift your reading of it and to move us forward if I recall a previous comment on the title of section 1 of *Method*, chapter 14. “ ‘Meaning and Ontology’? Could it be read profitably under an alternate title such as ‘passionate subjectivity in the lucid closed options of the finality of implementation’?”¹⁴¹

The passionate subject is the “character” of that short section, with all the reach and richness of meaning that we have pointed to here beyond the suspicion of the first paragraph of the *Magna Moralia*: “the treatment of character is a branch and starting point of statecraft.”

“The lucid closed options”? There is a primary reference here to the apparently simple point made in the previous chapter of *Method*, but also to the relatively closed options of TET in its contemporary recycling through systematics. “In” those options? The options are “in” the character, so that selections are in character: Aristotle’s view of virtuous performance. “Finality”? That is a topic I had best leave to chapter 20 below. “Implementation”? The sadly neglected heart of the book *Insight*: it has as yet not merited attention in the index.¹⁴²

0.¹⁴¹“Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts”, 146-7. See note 59 above.

¹⁴²You may find useful my start on such an index entry: direct references to implementation. *Insight*, 229[254], 234[259], 236[261], 391[416], 493[517], 507[530], 521[544], 524[547], 685[708], 726[748].

Implementation is, of course, my central concern in writing this little book. Again, my brief pointers can only help if you have the energy to follow them, at least in imagination and fantasy. *Method* chapter 14 was not a great communication about implementation, but then neither was *Insight* chapter 14, with its unexciting talk of major and minor premises reaching to a transformation of the concrete process of history. I tried for a fresh twist on the problem in *Cantower 14*, titled “Communications and Ever-ready Founders”. The “**ever-ready**” inclusion in the title is obvious to those familiar with some of my oft-repeated favorite texts: it refers to that final yearning thirty-first point hope in *Insight*’s longing for collaborative implementation. “The antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to know to an adapted and specialized auxiliary **ever ready** to offset every interference with intellects unrestricted finality.”¹⁴³ In the first section of that Cantower, titled “Foundations of Communications,” I pushed for an integral transposition of the two sets of canons in *Insight*. In the second section I pointed to the large enterprise of its title, infant cousin to the present little book, “Method in Metaphysics and Theology”. But it is in the third section that I come close to the imaginative crutch needed to lift the eighth specialty into implementable fantasy. Through Ann and Frank Braio’s generosity I was able to spend a week, in the summer of 2002, traveling New York City, grappling with its story and its present state within the character of this specialty. The result hides in the cold print of the section “Founders of New York”. In one of those days for five hours I reached out - or “in” - for the meaning of subway faces, but also went from the extreme of paddling in the ocean at Coney Island with the poor to nosing round the neon world of Time Square: as Chesterton said of New York’s lights, “a wonderland for anyone who can’t read”.

How are the Tower People to mediate the finality of molecular intellect to the lonely subways and supraways, to the classrooms and the class-distinctions? So we shift from the title of *Method*, chapter 14, section 1, to that of section 2 by adding the word common: “Common Meaning and Ontology”. How is the hope to be realized of carrying forward creatively a local emergent probability that reaches way back beyond Jonas Bronck’ farm and way forward beyond

¹⁴³*Insight*, 726[747].

the Bronx's Fordham? Only by a massive global collaboration, a new ethics that reaches into the psyches of children and the hearts of mayors and ministers and minstrels. "If there is to be a massive shift in public minding and kindness and discourse in the next century, there must be a proportionate shift in the mind and heart of the academy and the arts at the end of this century, with consequent changes in operating schemes of recurrence from government to kindergarten."¹⁴⁴

What is that massive shift, that new ethics?

I find it cheering that, almost by accident, I swing back to the first chapter here at the end of my brief foray into the specialties, but now in an intimation of a much larger geohistorical context. In the early 1980s Ken Melchin was working in Concordia University on his thesis and his eventual book, *History, Ethics and Emergent Probability*.¹⁴⁵ I was there at the time, as the First Fellow of the New Lonergan College, and we brooded over the project regularly. In an otherwise powerful book it is evident that the conclusion lacked something, something now quite obvious to me: the new ethics is to involve functional specialization.

Again, I appeal to the *Cantower* presentation of this problem and its solution. There the paralleling of the Cantower's with *Insight*'s chapters continued through to the Epilogue, and so Cantower 18 has the title "The Possibility of Cultural Ethics", with three sections that parallel the sections of *Insight*'s three sections. The third section, "The Problem of Liberation," ends in *Insight* with a question that merges with the issue of a hoped-for auxiliary. "There is needed, then, a further manifestation of finality, of the upwards but indeterminately directed dynamism of emergent probability."¹⁴⁶ The corresponding section in Cantower 18 drives towards that manifestation of finality, mothered by emergent history. The possible cultural ethics, yes, involves the graceful shift of the upper ground of loneliness considered heuristically in chapter 20 of *Insight* and of this present book, but surging up from the 13.7 billion-year-old lower ground

¹⁴⁴I quote here from the first paragraph of the first chapter of McShane, *Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy*. The copy of this book that is available on the Website has side jottings by Lonergan.

¹⁴⁵University Press of America, 1986.

¹⁴⁶*Insight*, 633[655-6].

of loneliness is the layered infoldings of energy that cauls the global recurrence-scheme that has been our topic throughout the book.

The tasks of communications are a layered array of multidisciplinary multicultural multimedia mediations, but the single task that I have focused on here is the task of drawing operative attention to the need for - but, oddly not the serious possibilities of, which are frightening - the functional division of labour in each area. There are, for instance, various disciplines that surround and support business studies. But what is business ethics? It can remain what it is now in many universities: a lightweight commonsense pursuit, commonly introduced - as it was in my own university - to prop up enrollment in a fading department of philosophy or religious studies. But might not business ethics become, oh so slowly, a massive cyclic adventure regarding, guarding, the pragmatics of global economic collaboration, transforming business psychology, seeding meso-economics in texts and in towns. "It will give new hope and vigor to local life, and it will undermine the opportunities for speculation corrupting central government and party politics, it will retire the brain trust but it will make the practical economist as familiar a professional figure as the doctor, the lawyer, or the engineer. It will find a new basis both for finance and for foreign trade. The task will be vast, so vast that only the creative imagination of all individuals in all democracies will be able to construct at once the full conception and the full realization of the new order."¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷Lonergan, *For A New Political Economy*, 36-7.

Chapter 19

THEN General Knowledge

While the reference to the 19th chapter of *Insight* is evident, we are not going in that direction: it was already the adventure of Cantower 19. Still, we are on the same track in that the full conception of the new order is being fantasized about in line with that strange central question of Chapter 19: “What, then, is being?”¹⁴⁸ We are back, if you like, in the context of chapter 6 above, with its pointings towards a meaning of **general** to be shared by the later Tower people, to be an ethos and a vibrancy of plain meaning: thus solving one facet of the problem of general history. But the pointing has a larger context, best intimated by the drive of the early Cantowers towards Cantower 5, “Metaphysics THEN”, with its echoes of the yearnings of Pound and Proust, Becket and Hesse, Voegelin and Teilhard de Chardin. All male yearning? In the previous Cantower the heart of the matter was the feminist integral heartiness of Candace Pert, Nadia Boulanger and Elizabeth Barrett Browning who writes of others like “George Sand, whose soul, amid the lions / Of the tumultuous senses, moans defiance / And answers roar for roar.”¹⁴⁹ And, with Pound, we must travel to China. We must meet Mo Ti, Lady Marasaki, and join in with the *isisusa* dance of the Zulu.¹⁵⁰ But do we need also to walk with Pound in the gloom of his final lines?

M’amour, m’amour
 what do I love and
 Where are you?
 That I lost my center
 Fighting the world.
 The dreams clash
 and are shattered -

¹⁴⁸*Insight*, 642[665].

¹⁴⁹Elizabeth Barrett Browning, *To George Sand*, a sonnet: lines 3-4.

¹⁵⁰I am recalling reflections of Magede M. Fuze, in the first major work ever written in Zulu, *Abantu Abamnyama. Lapa Bayela Ngaskona*. around 1900. The book is translated by H.C.Lugg, *The Black People and Whence They Came*, University of Natal Press, 1979.

and that I tried to make a paradiso
terrestre”

Are we trying to make a paradiso terrestre, and who are we that do so? The question “What, THEN, is being?” nudges us in directions not followed in *Insight*, nor indeed in *Method*.

But first it is best to recall the limited objective of Lonergan in *Insight*, expressed as part of an answer to a silly questioner at the Florida Conference who asked Lonergan whether he discovered feelings from Scheler. “There is in *Insight* a footnote to the effect that we’re not attempting to solve anything about such a thing as personal relations. I was dealing in *Insight* fundamentally with the intellectual side - a study of human understanding - in which I did my study of human understanding and got human intelligence in there, not just a sausage machine turning out abstract concepts. That was my fundamental thrust.”¹⁵¹

I shall return in the Epilogue to the “much more” of *Insight*, but here I wish to invite you to view the THEN with a fulsomeness of curiosity that seems to me to be direly needed. First I would have you pause over an issue that I have previously written about as all too briefly handled in *Insight*, the issue of what we might talk of as the fuller finality and exigence of material minding.

You notice that I use *minding*, *mind*, where Lonergan might use the word *spiritual*. As note 115 indicates, I find it easier to think out emergent probability’s hot and ambiguous dynamic towards the global outburst of minding without using the word *spiritual*. The issue of our “destiny” turns up twice in *Method*.¹⁵² But, like *Insight*’s turning up of the topic of the spiritual’s detach-ability, it is turned away from, not unwisely. But, as written history and metaphysics converge non-asymptotically on fact and negative mythologies of death are thus sifted factually, emergent probability is pushed, in minding and meant, by the big bang’s finality, towards a positive emergentist view of human minding. So global tower-minding can weave towards a freshening of Thomas efforts to think out separated mindings. The need emerges, literally, for minding’s grip on mindings privileges. Nor am I thinking here of some separation of general and

¹⁵¹*A Second Collection*, 221-2.

¹⁵²*Method in Theology*, 252, 293.

special categories, however distinct they are in mind and in meant. So, that need nudges us into and beyond Paul's resurrection reflections towards a fresh heuristics of finality, perhaps in the mood of the jingle of the Dublin of my youth, "Oh death where is thy stingalingaling?"

Finite being is integral, not a Noah's ark.¹⁵³ Finite minding within that being is also integral, so that each choice, amazingly, is a choice out of layered infinities of possible finitudes. Is, then, finite minding's looser post-mortem ties to molecules a step-away from the amazement in minding's being, a state of eternal rest? Is there not more to be thought and said about finality's upwardly directed dynamism? And would not that fuller view ground a larger aesthetic of both humour's invitations and of sublime aesthetic apprehensions? The need is in each of us, a primal radiation's infolding presence. It is my dark-glassed need. "What is needed is a qualitative change in me, a shift in the centre of my existing from the concerns manifested in the *bavardage quotidien* towards the participated yet never in this life completely established eternity that is tasted in aesthetic apprehension."¹⁵⁴

The need is global, a matter of "collaboration of intellects" being lifted by "psychic force", energy's highest molecular infolding, a "force that sweeps living human bodies"¹⁵⁵ - and even the living dead in their looser molecular dancing - towards the active shared aesthetics of being a becoming integral cosmic dance, a transposition of Origen's vision.

Such is the issue of facing mindfully our destiny, a facing which is a Towering task, paradoxically enlarging the realm of mystery and surprise, heart-searching the here and the here, after. Here, after? Surely energy's yearning is not to be shed: the chrysalis is to mesh with the wings.

The answers to these questions "lie beyond man's familiar range,"¹⁵⁶ but the questions are fact, energy's token, present in shaman's heatedness and in scholar's coolness. How are we to

¹⁵³A key point in Lonergan's perspective, compactly presented in *Phenomenology and Logic*, 348-55.

¹⁵⁴Lonergan, in a book review *Gregorianum* 1955.

¹⁵⁵*Insight*, 723[745].

¹⁵⁶*Insight*, 725[746].

reach those most fruitful answers that are beyond heat and cool, in mind's mining of minding's light? Yes, by the kataphatic minding that is a slow come-about from sensibility ordered to sublimate sensibility. But how is that minding to become an evident center rather than an eccentric fringe?

We are, of course, back at the same conclusion as the last chapter offered, but forwards in fantasy towards what seem to be impossible dreams. How easily we slip into imagining that we are the end of times, that we are some fullness of human meaning, when in fact the cosmic dance may be just beginning? There are those, of course, who expect a flame-out soon. Well, and even if so, I would repeat my claim of twenty years ago:

“Part of the glory of history is the human envisagement of its schedules of probabilities and possibilities. If the sapling of history is cut down from within, still it can have, within, a vision of the temporal noosphere that, paradoxically, redeems God. The envisagement is the core of future academic growth: its opposite is an elderhood that is the fraud of being in reality ‘not old folk but young people of eighteen, very much faded’. Our molecules, ‘our arms and legs filled with sleeping memories,’ passionately demand that we fly after the butterfly.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷I am quoting from the conclusion of my Preface to *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, University Press of America, 1984. The inner quotations are from the final volume of Proust, *Remembrance of Times Past*.

Chapter 20

Special Knowledge

The butterfly is a functional global collaboration at the heart of the second time of temporal subjectivity; the chrysalis is laced into the prior time, a long cycle of evolutionary emergence at present little understood, or capable of being understood, by theologies meshed in that prior time's truncated - indeed sometimes hubric, sometimes malicious - self-neglect. The climb beyond that gracecutting numbness is to be eventually identified as a lift of satisfaction of the organism that is God. But how are we to think of this second of a triple minding that is a fullness of minding, divinity's being?

How? I do not need to repeat the message of this entire little book. The last section of the twentieth chapter of *Insight*, a single page, speaks of identifying the solution that exists, speaks of a divinely sponsored collaboration, a mysterious psychic force, a triplicity within human minding that, as I speak, grounds a spoke and, in both you and me, a clasp.¹⁵⁸ The previous section of *Insight* weaves round the need for collaboration, mentioned there 29 times, the character of which eluded him for the next eleven years. But the Central Character, the second of a triple eternal minding, was heard by him in those years, a holding badly expressed, as I have claimed already, in his Latin textbooks.

What, we may ask, is it to identify? "To appropriate a truth is to make it one's own", and that appropriation includes tackling "the problem of identification". That section 2.5 of chapter 17 of *Insight* treats of the problem of identification that fits the *Insight* context, and I have dealt elsewhere with its nine paragraphs in a manner that lifts the identification into the context of our

¹⁵⁸There is a sense in which this is the high-point of my pointing in this little book. There is the living forward in the come-about (*Insight* 514[537]), that I have referred to more than once. That living forward invites the reaching for a fuller explanatory identification of the solution that would mesh with an isomorphic personal aesthetic. So, for instance, the reality named God or Infinite Minding may be, by a Christian thinker, more precisely conceived and conveniently named *Speak, Spoke, Clasp*. One does not abandon Bethlehem, but one hears better the call of Betelgeuse: closer thus to Arabic naming, to Hindu, Hebrew and Hottentot yearnings, to the *Completion (Method, 250)* that is the existential identification in which "finality is to be conceived more accurately" (*Insight*, 665[688]) and meshed with "the world of sense" in its "yearning for God" (*Insight*, 724[757]).

present concern, the context of functional specialization. That “elsewhere” is the conclusion of *Cantower 2*, where, as I mentioned, in a sense this all began, and as I perused that *Cantower* this morning it seemed appropriate that I should end here by quoting the end of that *Cantower*, which ends providentially with the poem that brought that whole incomplete project into symbolic unity. The whole incomplete project, tentatively titled *Roun Doll, Home James* was, as you might suspect, my effort to open up a community towards the larger work mentioned in the Epilogue of *Insight*, now best envisaged as the work of a global community.

But the ongoing work needs to be appropriated, identified, completed, intussuscepted by each character of the collaboration in so far as she or he is able. That has been my drive this fifty years, and it continues: my mind has not become dull, nor my brain exhausted, to recall the final page of *Insight*’s Epilogue. That million- word project of 117 *Cantowers* (Pound wrote 117 *Cantos*) was cut short abruptly at 400, 000 words and 41 *Cantowers*, due to the possibility and need for collaboration, which began with six months of collaborative writing, about the single page 250 of *Method*, with a group in Australia. The central issue is that mentioned in that final page of chapter 20, “collaboration in the transmission and the application of the truths of the solution,” no matter how one distinguishes special and general categories of heuristics. That is the central issue of this essay as it was of the *Cantowers*. It meshes with the key orientation of this last little book of mine, which is to make myself available [pmcshane@shaw.ca] to those who have questions and hopes. So I steal from the last words of Lonergan’s lectures on logic of fifty years ago: “In other words, this is our last slap at this problem, and people may have questions of one kind or another that they want to raise.”¹⁵⁹ I move on, then, to my concluding quotation from the end of *Cantower 2*, which, despite its obscurity or even because of it, may lead some of you to venture on the way of collaborative adult growth.

“So we find our reflections twisting round again to the central issue of these *Cantowers*. Might it not be possible that theology would become successful, so that a third year student can tower, does tower, over the second year student? And so on, now, to a vision of a culture of Elderhood Then?

¹⁵⁹*Phenomenology and Logic*, 138.

The possibility calls subtly in the molecular agony of classes in our times. Its call can be towered, towered round and up, by a new vortex humanity. THEN Thomas' fifty nine steps becomes a lived adult presence, foundational characters of a new kataphatic community, a "Meaning [that is] an[d] Ontology"¹⁶⁰ grounding a vortex explaine-ing sweep of living human bodies that lift "Common Meaning and Ontology."¹⁶¹ Then Plunkett's word - or Hopkins' - would bloodstream more bellies and bones Are Plunkett and Hopkins dealing in facts? Is Jesus busy today in the "luminous darkness of circumstances,"¹⁶² or are the poets just rhyming round pastoral metaphors?¹⁶³ Or do the daily doings of Jesus vibrate within multibillion capacities-for-performance, in an intimacy of mutual self-mediation, an intimacy that can become in each year of theology, in each decade of kataphatic Hello-ing, a luminous intimacy?¹⁶⁴ What is this herenow effect that is more real than the light on the flower, from the Son rising therethen, hanging out and up, therethen? Thomas asks us to pause in vibrant wonder on the 48th step,¹⁶⁵ on the 56th step.¹⁶⁶ The lag in the effect is at the disposition of the minding Word: so your

¹⁶⁰"Meaning and Ontology" is the title of the first section of chapter fourteen of *Method in Theology*.

¹⁶¹The title of section 2 of chapter 14 of *Method in Theology*.

¹⁶²I am recalling here most evidently the essay, "Asia Una Oscuridad Luminosa de las Circumstantia, *Insight Despues Cuarenta Annos*" *Universidad Philosophia*, (32) 1999, available on various Websites in English, including here, as **Archives 2**: "towards a Luminous Darkness of Circumstances after Forty Years". Less evident is the reference to Lonergan's discussions of divine control of events, Thomas' view of luck, Ortega y Gasset's reverence for circumstances, a reverence that ignited the essay mentioned.

¹⁶³Hopkin's poetry is familiar. Joseph Mary Plunkett, executed in 1916 for his part in the Irish Rebellion, wrote imagings of Jesus e.g. "I see his blood upon the rose / And in the stars the glory of His eyes / His body gleams amid eternal snows / His tears fall from the skies".

¹⁶⁴Think, for instance, of the "round and up a spiral" that might be the annual transposition of the Exercises of St. Ignatius. Might not the Foundations be a fresh beginning, and the endpoint *Contemplation for Obtaining Love* a new "embracing of the whole field"?

¹⁶⁵ IIIa, q. 48, a.6, "Utrum passio Christi fuierit operata nostram salutem per modum efficientiae"; as 2m.

¹⁶⁶ IIIa, q.56, a.1: "Utrum resurrectionis Christi sit causa resurrectionis corporum"; ad 1m.

world and mine are handheld-charged with the grandeur of the organic God.

But does it have to be the rare rare bird like John the Evangelist or Augustine or Thomas who make a serious business out of the foundational Hello? Is it not time that we move on from an adolescent anaphatic talent-burying to an unjust stewarding and a just stewaredessing wiser than John's Dark World?¹⁶⁷

Rare birds there will certainly be in these coming millennia: but the cosmopolis of the hodic vortex can shift gently¹⁶⁸ the statistics of those who seize and are seized by anastomotic¹⁶⁹ Word and words: the rill¹⁷⁰ of the Gospel can become the trill of a lifetime's melody of minding. Then expression in prose or poetry may have a new dense adequacy. How might you and I come to read section four?

4. Molecular Organisms of Ecstasy

We move round an imaging that somehow entwines a sensang of the Vortex that is the Eternal Idea Now establishing a nowthen bigbanging spiralwise towards a Great Bearcraunch¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷The recommended reading here is the powerful Scholion on the psychological analogy for the Trinity in relation to Scripture: B.Lonergan, *De Deo Trino I. Pars Dogmatica*, Gregorian University Press, 1964, to appear shortly in English.

¹⁶⁸The gentle process is a topic in *Cantower IX*: "Slopes".

¹⁶⁹*Ana-*, again, *stomein*, to provide with a mouth. "Using the device of *anastomosis*, Joyce attempts, in the last chapter of his last work, to bridge all the great ontological chasms," Margot Norris, "The Last Chapter of *Finnegans Wake*: Stephen Finds His Mother", *James Joyce Quarterly* (25) 1987-8, 11. See the following note.

¹⁷⁰*Rill* has two principle meanings: a small stream, or a furrow. The small stream may call to mind Joyce's green rill in his mother-hello in *Ulysses* (penguin, 1986, 474) that called for the trill of ocean-going at the end of *Finnegans Wake*. The rill that becomes a trill, a thrill, may also bring to mind Hopkin's sillion, the ridge between two furrows, and the task of plodding contemplatively that I point to [particularly in *Cantower XXI*, "Epilodge"]: "Sheer plod makes plough down sillion shine" (*The Windover*).

¹⁷¹*Craunch* is an earlier form of *crunch* meaning **echoic**. Would note that I am not, in the above, taking a position on end-cosmology speculation. Rather, I am hinting at the need for an imaging that would reach beyond the usual hierarchic structure. One of the big difficulties of any imaging here is the bent towards **embedding** which even the best of physicists do no escape: the

of echoing spirates. Densification of matter in fresh patterned geometries could mesh multibillion yearnings in anastomotic meshednerved circumincession. Somehow, in evertheneing surprise.¹⁷² The mystery of molecular finitude is that the Eternal Silent Voicing that we name God Gives itself a living wonder-us everlasting Throat.

Sun, flowers, Son flowered,
 Speak to us of growth,
 Seed cauled, cribbed,
 Kabod yet confined,
 Crossed with dark earth,
 Light-refined,
 Rill open-ends a trill
 Annotaste of Throat.

tendency to place finitude inside a 'larger' container. "End-times" will be a topic of later Cantowers, particularly *Cantower CXI*.

¹⁷²To give meaning to this is the task mentioned in the previous note. One needs to come to grips, on the level of the upper ground of loneliness, with the incomprehensible suprizingness of Eternal JoyLight for any finite mind, even the mind of Jesus, and on the lower ground of loneliness there is the continuum problem meshed everlastingly into our molecularity. Add the context of a needed precision regarding obediencial potency. See note 31 in this Cantower.

21.

Epilogue

My final topic is adult contemplative growth: the adjective *contemplative* should be superfluous, since it is the core of energy's and evolution's invitation, divine triplicity's call, caul. But let me focus my talk and our attention. Let us read together - what a strange business that is! - some of the final paragraph 9 of the section in *Insight* on "The Appropriation of Truth."

"Human intelligence and reasonableness functions in the higher integration of the sensitive flow of percepts and images, emotions and feelings, attitudes and sentiments, words and deeds. It follows that as the cognitional and volitional appropriations of truth are solidary with each other so also they condition and are conditioned by adaptations of human sensibility. Here the basic problem is to discover the dynamic images that both correspond to intellectual contents, orientations, and determinations, yet also possess in the sensitive field the power to issue forth not only into words but also into deeds. On this problem we have touched in asserting the necessity of either mysteries or myths; and to it we shall return in attempting to analyze the structure of history."

What age are you? On my view of normative adult growth, the vibrations of your reading are identifiable through that question as you reach it into your bones, as you pose and poise it (about)³ yourself. I have been reading that paragraph, and its contextualizing book, since 1957. Yet I read it now, this morning, with contentual vibrations that I could not "ex-plane" to myself of last week. This may seem strange to you, and it is only in the past decade that the obviousness of the claim became obvious to me, a contentual vibration. But I can say it in words to you: isn't it obvious that if you spend a week seriously and successfully thinking about something, you have left yourself seriously and successfully behind? My analogue comes from my teaching of mathematical physics. If a student missed a week of lectures and exercises, that student was pretty lost on returning the following week. Above I mentioned third year students towering over second year students; and this is true of good physics studies and classes. But what of a student who is in his fiftieth year of study - I am talking about myself - as compared to his forty ninth year?

The dominant destructive image here is the image of small increments to a settled view. Somehow, one is imagined to get a pretty good essential view of some zone, some topic, from a B.A. (which for me means Barely Adequate), heavens, certainly from a Ph.D. The rest of life is mainly small increments, footnotes.

Now, back to the third year physics student. The pace of growing understanding in that year is “up” from the pace of the previous year. One is, has, a larger context of understanding. The imagining that I find helpful here is to think of a balloon expanding uniformly (like a centimeter per second). In one second at a later time it takes in more air than in a previous second. Are you O.K. with that image?

Now what I say about the 3rd year, applies plausibly to the 4th year, 5th, etc years. Think of physics: I recall Feynman’s view of post-graduate work.¹⁷³ But would it be true of a 20th year of physics? Here we meet complexities in the problem of reality and imagination due to the narrow - indeed sinful - patterns of theoretic or enlightened life that dominate our culture. What Proust takes a literary stand against, and people like Karajan, Askenasy and Boulanger - not to mention Beethoven and Chopin - oppose in music, I oppose in terms of the Tomega principle. Karajan in his seventies talks about conducting a Beethoven symphony as “a new symphony”: I make the same claim about that single “familiar” paragraph. I am, at 74, like a sunflower seed in the being of minding, and I realize vividly, molecularly, as I type, that here I am tiptoeing through the tulip seeds that are my audience.

But this is not a problem to be overcome even by the third stage of meaning, though then there is to be a global luminosity of darkness that rescues and transposes primitive integrality. It is not, then, in Lonergan’s sense a problem at all: it belongs to the state, the level, of being human minders.

Perhaps a pause, three pauses, over the word *integral* helps. First, brood over the view, already quoted, of Lonergan, that the shift of a small new understanding is a shift in an integral consciousness, it shifts - sometimes shockingly slowly - the whole seen, literally: the whole

¹⁷³See page 116 of the book *QED*, detailed in note 95 above.

organism, intussuscepted as “our word of His word,”¹⁷⁴ triplemeshed, sealed in history’s structure, trumpeted by stars and angels,¹⁷⁵ leaving any fresh concept and its attendant molecules “loaded with the relations that belong to it in virtue of a source which is equally the source of other concepts”. Not leaving, but lifting, not just the concept but the very load, fresh start-ling, star-ling, windhover.

Secondly, pause over the transformed hylemorphism that I named, some decades ago, aggregreformism, and think of it in relation to descriptive knowing. Do you not feel the attractiveness of descriptive talk, thinking, living? So we screen, scream off, from ourselves, the fact that form is molecular form, and that the structure of history has brought us to a beginning of some serious thin glimpse of our organic yearning: “Study of the organism beings....” - whether the organism be ourselves, or Jesus, or the organic being that is history. We presently advance slowly to a glimpse of the remote geometries of physics and the more remote gyrings of our neuromolecules, a glimpse that should sweep us, like the Nativity of God, “to the love of the invisible” and a reverence for the mystery in the mirror.

Thirdly, return to the description - for that is all it is - of metaphysics as an integral structure. The metaphysical character - “Here Comes Everybody”, “Anna Livia Pulcrabella” - is the character- eyes and -ears and -ayes of all, the structure of history that includes the self and reaches secretly for circumincessional minding.

And I must emphasize, for all three broodings, and for the broodings of this book, that this is not a mystical business. It is a business of natural thinking, communicable kataphatics, but communicable only in that strange way of tipping climbing toes.¹⁷⁶

How might I end my present tip-toeing? Perhaps by re-calling previous tip-toeing in

¹⁷⁴The last paragraph of *Quaestio XXX* of Lonergan, *De Deo Trino II. Pars Systematica*, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964. To appear shortly in English.

¹⁷⁵I am thinking here of the issues raised in notes 117 and 185: the interpersonal relations within cosmic minding that need to be thought out within the context of a fuller view of emergence, finality, and *exigence* (see the index of *Phenomenology and Logic*).

¹⁷⁶Cantower 21, “Epilodge”, introduces this perspective in the context of the dynamics of the book *Insight*. Epilodge is a twist on Epilogue: the previous Cantowers 15-20 parallel the corresponding-numbered chapters in *Insight*.

which I was, in 1989 - more optimistic about this new century.

“The third stage of global meaning, with its mutual mediation of an academic presence, is a distant probability,¹⁷⁷ needing painfilled solitary reaching towards a hearing of hearing,¹⁷⁸ a touching of touching, ‘in the far ear,’¹⁷⁹ ‘sanscreeed,’¹⁸⁰ making luminously present - in focal darkdream - our bloodwashed bloodstream. It is a new audicity, an new hapticity, to which we must aspire, for which we must pray.”¹⁸¹

Such was my reaching at 57, the age at which Beethoven died. I have recently felt the ferment of a fresh openness to the strange tipstorying of his various quartets, climbing to that last tranquil, even cheerful, movement, cousin perhaps to the mood of the elder Shakespeare’s Pericles’ hearing of “the music of the spheres.”¹⁸² I certainly do not expect to rise to Lonergan’s level of listening to them, in his late seventies. I recall now for your final brooding two communications, tiptoeings of Lonergan’s middle and late period. The later one regards those Beethoven’s quartets, the late ones. I left with him during one of my journeys to Boston and his little room in St.Mary’s, a recording of these quartets. Later I phoned him from Halifax. “What did you think of the Quartets?” I asked. His immediate reply, with his usual rising tonality: “I

¹⁷⁷The title of the Preface to McShane, *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, UPA, 1985, [now on the Website] is “Distant Probabilities of Persons Presently Going Home Together in Transcendental Process”.

¹⁷⁸“Merced Mulde! Yessel that the limmat?” (*Finnegans Wake*, 212, line 26; 198, line 13). See John Bishop, *Joyce’s Book of the Dark: Finnegans Wake*, University of Wisconsin Press, 1986, 342. This heuristic transposition of Joyce, of course, demands precision of, and ‘boning up’ on, the notion of the notion of thing, pushing on from Aquinas, Ia, q. 76, a.8, on the soul’s bodipresence.

¹⁷⁹See Bishop, *op. cit.*, 343-46.

¹⁸⁰*Finnegans Wake*, 215, line 26.

¹⁸¹I am quoting from the end of chapter 6 of *Process. Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*.

¹⁸²*Pericles* V.ii.31. See Kavanagh’s long reflection on *Pericles* and the elder Shakespeare at the conclusion of chapter 2 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. The end of that chapter winds enlighteningly round our present topic.

don't think, I feel!" And how do you think he felt?

The other tiptoeing is from a letter he wrote to Fred Crowe at the edge of his fiftieth year. I quote the passage three times in *ChrISt in History*,¹⁸³ and it is close to the heart of that toeing of tips. It seems a good place to end. How might you pick up on the tip? There are many varieties of enlightenment, as there are many paths up Mount Fuji. You must find your own. But if you wish to build the tower, the bower of divine love,¹⁸⁴ then you had best take some darkly luminous honest stand regarding, guarding, the reach for an integral explanatory heartheld envisagement of the cosmos from first to last, "a new heaven and a new earth."¹⁸⁵ So, now, I end with another paragraph typed by Lonergan on his old machine. And how do you feel he thinged?

"The Method in Theology is coming into perspective. For the Trinity: Imago Dei in homine and proceed to the limit as in evaluating $[1 + 1/n]^n$ as n approaches infinity. For the rest: ordo universi. From the viewpoint of theology, it is the manifold of unities developing in relation to one another and in relation to God."¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³*ChrISt in History*, in the conclusions of chapters 2, 5 and 10.

¹⁸⁴*Cantower 4*, "Molecules of Description and Explanation" focuses on The Tower; *Cantower 5*, "Metaphysics THEN" draws attention to The Bower.

¹⁸⁵ *Revelations*, 21: 1. There is a vast range of questions lurking here, about guardians, about angels. Was Ricci right in his sympathy with the Chinese reverence for ancestors? Is Mo Ti minding China, or Moses minding the Hebrews? The patterns of post-mortem minding need more refined considerations in a fuller heuristics of history and eschatology. That fuller heuristics has to reach both to within the next three decades and to beyond the next three billion years.

¹⁸⁶I quote from a letter from Lonergan to Fr.Fred Crowe, written in May, 1954, which Crowe kindly made available to me.

PART TWO

FOUNDATIONAL FANTASY

2007-2037