

*Eldorede 7.***Loneragan's Educational Philosophy: A Basis.**

Certainly my audience is interested in finding out who Bernard Lonergan was and what the context of his interest in education is. But it seems to me that it would be best, in this first lecture, to get to the heart of the issue of educational reform, and to leave the task of locating Lonergan and our challenge in a broader context to the second session.¹ So I begin at what I call "a strategic point of entry" that will help us glimpse the minimal shift in classroom strategy that his work involves.

1. A Strategic Point of Entry

In my short presentation on education this morning I take my lead from a note of Lonergan in his chapter on "Systematics" in *Method in Theology*. Lonergan remarks there: "the key issue is whether concepts result from understanding or understanding results from concepts."²

I take my lead not only from the text I have quoted but from Lonergan's attitude in the writing of this entire chapter. His writing in that chapter is what might be called *minimalist*. He had a great deal to say about systematics. This is evidenced by the massive collection of notes from courses he gave in Rome on the topic between 1953 and 1965.³

¹Now *Eldorede 8*.

²*Method in Theology*, 336.

³These notes were donated by Lonergan to the Toronto Lonergan Centre in the early 1970s and catalogued then by ConnO'Donovan and Philip McShane. Until recently there were only two copies, one at the centre, the other in the possession of McShane. Both McShane and Doran have written extensively on the fuller view of systematics to which the notes point, most recently in the works, *What is Systematics?* (Doran, University of Toronto Press, 2006) and my own *Method in Theology and Botany* and *Loneragan's Standard Model of Effective Global Inquiry*.

But in this single chapter he chose to avoid summary or survey and rather focused on elementary key points. So here I follow his example. The key issue in education happens to be the one he mentions in that note in *Method*. As his book, *Topics in Education* illustrates, there is a wide range of other issues, problems in theory and in morality and in history, problems of culture and aesthetics, problems of changes in scientific perspective, problems of what is called *haute vulgarization*.⁴

Furthermore, all these problems point to the need for an application of functional specialization, a topic to be taken up in the third lecture and developed in our fourth session.⁵ Here it seems best to begin with, and focus on, the single issue that Lonergan noted.

Holding to that issue has another advantage. It means that, in the presentation here, this very key issue is made a concrete teaching issue, thus, we may say, a sort of self-illustration. So, consider the following question: "What is good teaching?". How is it to be answered? It can be answered by what we call a *definition*. For example, holding to Lonergan's emphasis on the key issue, "good teaching requires that one operates on the assumption that concepts come from understanding". Those words point to a **definition**, or - and this is important to attend to right through this talk and the discussion to follow - a **concept**, of good teaching. But, if I am to convey that concept, Lonergan's concept and mine, to an audience, it must be conveyed, not by the series of words that I have written or spoken as a *definition*, but by bringing the audience to the beginnings of an understanding. And that bringing is both the topic and the strategy of my presentation.

⁴The book *Topics in Education* is a problematic book, nor dealing directly with education. As Lonergan remarked to me in the mid-seventies, "I was just trying to work out a few things". There is a second aspect of that problematic character, in that - as with a great deal of Lonergan's lecturing of this type - he is ironically placed in the position in these lectures of one called to popularize, to meet the demand of *haute vulgarization*, which he criticizes vigorously in Volume 6 of his *Collected Works*, pp. 121, 155.

⁵The third and fourth sessions are here *Eldorede* 9 and 10.

This must seem quite a twisted beginning to what should be a good presentation of the nature of teaching, so let us turn to an illustration of good elementary teaching in order to untwist the presentation. What better could we do here than take the illustration that introduces the topic in Lonergan's *Insight*? So, I turn to his reflections, in chapter one of that book, on the strategy of teaching the definition of a circle. That will be the focus in section 2. Section 3 will turn to the significance of that reflection for other areas of education. Section 4 turns to broader and personal aspects of the problem of teaching and of reforming teaching practice. The final fifth section is a bridge to the third and fourth lectures of the morning: it recalls the full problem of cultural transformation as Lonergan presented it in *Insight* and *Topic in Education*, and gives an indication of the task Lonergan faced in the decade after *Insight*: reaching for a full practical solution to the problem of education on a global level.

2. An Elementary Classroom Discovery in Geometry

This second section invites us to bring the second section of the first chapter of *Insight* into the realism of the classroom. That treatment by Lonergan is six pages long, which in itself helps us to see that all we can get to here is an introductory glimpse. We do this by holding the focus of our attention on the first two sentences of Lonergan's treatment. "As every schoolboy knows, a circle is a locus of co-planar points equidistant from a centre. What every schoolboy does not know is the difference between repeating the definition, as a parrot might, and uttering it intelligently."

Perhaps we all have memories of the type of learning that leads to our parrot-like repetition as boys and girls, or even as undergraduates. How did it happen? We needed to know a formula, for the circle, for getting square roots, for solving a problem in statistics, for identifying a historical period or a psychological illness. What does a formula give us? A technique for talking or for doing something. What has happened to us in doing this? And note realistically that we do this sometimes because we are in a

hurry, sometimes because it is the style of the teachers. We have a problem: we do not solve it but find a name for the solution. So we now have an answer: say this, do this, don't worry about the "why?".

We could deviate here on the various types of Why-question,⁶ but let us keep to our elementary focus and take the question WHY now as the one identified with the WHAT question. "What is a circle?" means, as Lonergan notes in his fifth sentence of the section, "Why is it is round?" How do we answer that question properly in a classroom or for ourselves at home, or even here? It is a situation no different from any other problem, big or small: we have to take time, or be given time, to muse over the situation, to mess around with the source of the problem. And part of the trouble in any classroom, with any problem, is that we - and the culture - are not willing or allowed to take the time to mess around wonderingly with the problem. Why does this wheel, this plate, this drawing, have this familiar shape? How many of us have the good memory, as students, of pausing in a classroom to wonder about what in fact we do not understand, and a memory of the teacher leading us on the adventure that starts with the spokes, the lines drawn out from some point that the teacher helps us to think of as the middle? If we have such memories, and memories of a delightful jump to understanding, then our puzzling over it now puts us in that small group that can identify the difference between parroting and being able to really tell someone else the WHY of roundness. The difference we can call the difference between a **formulation** and a **formula**.

We are back at our starting point, but now with a better idea of its educational significance: "the key issue is whether concepts result from understanding or

⁶This certainly has to be followed up later. Perhaps my neatest treatment of the issue is in *Process. Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minded*, section 4 of chapter 1. The book is on the website. *Cantower 19* connects the five why-questions with the five ways towards God of Thomas Aquinas.

understanding results from concepts.”⁷ We are here confronted with the main destructive result in education of the second opinion. If understanding results from concepts, then education can be a matter of somehow giving concepts which the students, the children, the undergraduates, can get familiar with, memorize, analyze. It is a short step from there to mistaking the formula for the concept, for the formulation, for the definition.

So, we pause here to ask ourselves, what do we mean by the word *definition*? Do we not easily slip into the cultural assumption that a definition is, well, a formula? Consider Lonergan’s second sentence in the section: he talks of “repeating the definition”. He really means repeating the words, the formula, but he is yielding to present convention. In a strict sense, the schoolboy or schoolgirl is not repeating a definition, but words that name the problem in a new and sometimes helpful way.⁸ It is this helpfulness that deceives us, in almost every area of teaching, into mistaking patient analysis of a formula for serious teaching. Teaching becomes a dull business, a cousin to the dull business that preoccupied British philosophy in much of the twentieth century, when it was identified as Conceptual Analysis.

⁷*Method in Theology*, 336.

⁸This is an extremely complex problem whose consideration is quite beyond introductory treatment. The point is true not only of good explanatory definition-expression, but of good descriptive writing. We come across one excellent instance of the latter later in what I name *The Childout Principle*, which is a non-explanatory formula of a deep pedagogical formulation. Normal instances of this patterning of words towards incarnate enlightenment occur in poetry. Related to this fact regarding word-patterning is the value of memorization, which holds both for poetry and for science, and it is this that grounds the plausibility of memorization as a technique of education. So, to take two examples from Lonergan, there are the questions, What is Emergent Probability?; What is Development? The student is well-advised to memorize the four- or five-line ‘definitions’ that Lonergan gives as answers to these questions. That memorizing gives him or her a unifying control over the problem of understanding either reality. But it would be a foolish scholar who would mistake that control for the slow messy process of formulating.

3. *Discovery in Other Areas.*

That last sentence points to a large context of the mistake, a context which goes back eight centuries in the English tradition, a context carrying a mistake about thinking and teaching that spread through the British Empire and beyond, and is at the root of many of our present problems, a root evil whose remedy is to be the topic later today. But here I wish us to notice that the problem in any classroom is identical, in this matter of definition, with the problem in geometry. We could certainly pause now and each of us could find illustrations of being presented with what are called definitions: the definition of a sonnet, of a sickness, of a part of speech, of a peninsula, of penicillin. We can even embarrass ourselves by admitting that on occasion we have asked, foolishly, for a definition when we actually only mean, and are only given, a series of words. Some of us may even have come here today to hear Lonergan's definition of good teaching.

How are we to find out what good Korean education is? Curiously, by making it occur, finding out what works, promoting changes that help it to work.⁹ But, in this present small effort, we are simply noting one central feature of that goodness.

Perhaps you find it a shock here to have me recalling Paul the apostle's

⁹This strategy is treated in some detail in the first of my series of four articles applying Lonergan's theory of education. It is as well to list them here for reference:

[1] "The Reform of Classroom Performance", *Divyadaan. Journal of Philosophy and Education*, (13) 2002, 279-309.

[2] "The Wonder of Water: The Legacy of Lonergan", *Divyadaan. Journal of Philosophy and Education*, (15) 2004, 457-75.

[3] "How might I become a better teacher?", *Divyadaan. Journal of Philosophy and Education*, (16) 2005, 359-82.

[4] "What Do You Want?", *Divyadaan. Journal of Philosophy and Education*, (17) 2006, 248-71.

I should add that the strategy suggested is being concretely implemented in Ontario Canada through the school-use of the text, *Introducing Critical Thinking*, (John Benton, Alessandra Drage and Philip McShane, Axial Publishing, Canada, 2005). That book is a source book for the extension of the view presented above to various other topics in education.

comments on love? “Love is always patient and kind.”¹⁰ And at the beginning of that famous chapter Paul talks of a command of language that nonetheless is more like a gong booming. A teacher can boom out a nominal definition, a formula, and go step by step over the words in that formula with a great command and control of language, with great clarity. That step by step presentation normally leads to note-taking, but it rarely leads to a wondering messing around with the original situation.

And we do not identify the exchange as one of friendship and patience?

We are talking here, and focusing here, on education in the formal sense, classroom education. But discovery in other areas includes everyday life and it can be a great help to think out how discovery is either encouraged or excluded in our daily talk. Let us think either of a difference of opinion or of someone asking for an opinion. What is the standard procedure? Is it not to appeal to reason, to being reasonable? And being reasonable, does that not mean making explicit premises that lead to conclusions?¹¹

The shocking discovery lurking in those questions is that, especially in this long axial period of human history, we do not address each other as humans, as capable of

¹⁰I Cor 13: 4.

¹¹See note 8 above: we are touching here on a further feature of the complexity of presentation, and on a related plausibility in educational strategies. Poetic expression, be it the brief structure known as the *haiku* or an epic of orient, occident, Africa or Ancient Australia, is a structure that lifts those who share it towards incarnate insight. Reasoned presentation, especially one with poetic lift, can do the same, as advertisers know. But the instance that would be important to consider in the present context would be the presentational strategy of Euclid’s *Elements*. Consider the famous theorem of Pythagoras. It is presented “reasonably, deductively” by that book. The steps in the pattern can be given plausibility by a teacher; the pupil can take in that plausibility superficially and arrive at the concluding Q.E.D. with an equally superficial nod. But the student has not really got it, and the “proof” fades from memory. What is missing is the unifying understanding of the whole that one gets if the teacher follows the strategy advocated by Lonergan’s first option. But dealing with that strategy in detail is again a complex issue beyond us here. For an elementary introduction to the deeper issue see Lonergan’s early article “The Form of Inference” in the fourth volume of his *Collected Works*.

growing, oh so slowly, in appreciation.¹² Indeed, there is the deeper shock of the discovery that we ourselves were not invited to grow, did not grow, are only faded children.¹³ Human living, whether in the classroom, in the office, in the temple, in the street, is an invitation to discover. That is the message of our small children, who in their third year blossom into incarnate what- and why- questions. And what is our reply to them? To the child's "What is that?" is it not so much easier, so normal, to answer with a name, a formula?

What these few pointers seek to bring out is the massive problem that exists within our accepted cultures, our accepted ways of life. What is brought out is a challenge that seems hopeless, and we have not even touched on some of its more brutal consequences for our work and play. Such consequences, to be dealt with in the fourth and fifth sessions¹⁴ today, call for the patient long-term solution to the problem of

¹²On the axial period see McShane, *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, chapter 1. The Axial Period was thought of by Karl Jaspers as a key transition of human history occurring between the years 800 B.C. and 200 B.C. in the civilizations of Persia, India, China, Israel and Greece. In various works (for example, chapter 1 of *Searching for Cultural Foundations*) I have enlarged the period to a period that spans our own times, perhaps 2500 B.C. to 2500 A.D. The period would correspond phylogenetically to the gap between what Lonergan calls the first and the second times of human subjectivity (see Question 21 of *The Triune God: Systematics*, volume 12 of Lonergan's *Complete Works*, to appear perhaps in 2008), the gap represented by the problematic second stage of meaning (see chapter 3 of *Method in Theology*). We return to the problem of the axial period in *Eldorede 11*.

¹³This is the terrible message that we are getting increasingly at this stage of the Axial Period from people as different as Marcel Proust and Abraham Maslow. One can get an aesthetic sense of it from George Eliot - Mary Ann Evans - in her indelicate claim: "If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's hear beat, and we should die of that roar which is the other side of silence. As it is, the quickest of us walk about well-wadded with stupidity" (*Middlemarch*, Norton, N.Y. 1977, p. 135). On the manner in which we are led as children into this mental straight-jacket see the beginning of chapter 3 of McShane, *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations*. (The book is available in website www.philipmcschane.ca and is a relevant context for our present efforts.)

¹⁴The fourth session is Eldorede10 here. The fifth session referred to was an open discussion session that ended the day. Let us hope that various groups will carry on that open

education that was the final great achievement of Lonergan's life. But for the moment it is best to retain our focus on the classroom, and on the immediate personal challenge there for us as teachers.

4. The Personal Challenge for Teachers

It seems to me that the easiest way to come at the concrete challenge that the previous considerations pose to teachers, to you as an audience hearing, perhaps, about this approach for the first time, is to centre the reflections of this section on a basic principle of the new approach.¹⁵ The Principle is curiously expressed, and that in itself will help us along.¹⁶ Nor should we miss the relation of this problem of expression to the basic point of this entire presentation. We move around this curious expression as we moved around the diagram of a wheel: we are searching for a definition - an inner word, joyously cherished - of good teaching: this odd Principle offers clues.

The Principle is: **When teaching children geometry one is teaching children children.**

You would agree that the principle does not manifestly offer the **form** of good teaching, no more than a wheel offers directly the **form** of roundness. It is amusing, but also enlightening, to push the parallel in a pun: the wheel has spokes, the teacher also has spokes, or rather speakings. And we move forward by messily trying to find what

discussion.

¹⁵It is presented in various places, but in a full context relevant for educational policy in *Cantower XCI*, "Functional Doctrines", available in the website referred to in note 13.

¹⁶See notes 8 and 11 above. The deeper issue has to do, among many other things, with the third mode of generalized empirical method (see McShane, Joistings 21 on the website referred to in note 13).

the speakings of the good teacher have in common, what makes them good.¹⁷ Why the messiness? Because, if this is genuinely a fresh view of teaching, then it may be unlikely that it fits any of the standard present formulae or definitions of good teaching; and this is true. Let us, then, proceed with our messing.

First, note that the word *geometry* can be replaced by the name of any other subject, indeed by the word *anything*. But, when seeking an insight, it is best - our first sections illustrate this - to home in on a particular instance. So, what we were doing in section 2 becomes now directly relevant to our searching, our messing. Or more precisely what I was doing, I the teacher, you the children. No offense here: but now we can notice that the word *children*, occurring twice at the end of the Principle, can be replaced by the word *anyone*.

We need to pause over this: it is not at all a trivial move. It points to the fact that the Principle is in fact a quite general indicator of a massive and total cultural shift. In Lonergan's terms, already mentioned, the Principle characterizes the shift from the first time of human subjectivity to the second time.¹⁸ Further, in other terms of Lonergan's reflections, it is the shift from the first stage of meaning to the third stage of meaning.¹⁹ That shift leaps over the second stage of meaning, the period of fragmentations and problems sketched by Lonergan in various works, to be part of our personal identification as finding ourselves in the Axial Period. But we are not immediately interested in that larger view; we are interested in how the leap poses a problem for teachers now, the present period in educational history. We are on our way to identifying the challenge that is mentioned in the title of this section.

¹⁷In today's presentation we are avoiding any explanatory thematic of the good or the normative. We are leaning on, leaning into, the spontaneously orientation that we all share, that leans us towards improvement.

¹⁸See note 12 above.

¹⁹See the conclusion to note 12 above.

Let me digress here in order to put our problem in a larger and comforting context. Jean Piaget as a young man decided to dedicate himself to the study of children. His life-work produced a massive series of personal and collaborative volumes. But his background was one that, in the main, is represented by the “other” view of concept-formation, the one Lonergan takes a stand against. Piaget never broke free of that. Was he dishonest, insincere, obtuse? By no means: he simply could not break out, break forward, to glimpsing children as they are. Or to glimpse himself as he really was. The real Piaget, like all of us here, reached concepts through the messing process, through puzzling about ranges of experiences. But old habits die hard, especially if they are the habits of a very long period of educational history.

So: let me suppose that you are somewhat attracted by the view presented here. I would say that, if that attraction is not just to fizzle, one has to diagnose as best one can at this initial stage, just where that attraction points.

The attraction in facts points to you as potentially a good teacher. But note that, like Piaget, the culture may be against you: indeed is against you. Did your teacher-training invite you to discover, in any existential fashion, how you discover? If this were true of all of us, then we would have already arrived, and Lonergan would be merely stating the obvious. But such slow laborious self-discovery is not an existential interest. And, as we did with Piaget, so let us take consolation with a pause over the existentialists of Europe in the last century. Lonergan’s volume, *Phenomenology and Logic*, leaves us in no doubt about the fact that this entire tradition missed out on the dynamics of the searching existential self. The two diagrams, which are part of this morning’s handout, are from Appendix A of that volume: they represent Lonergan’s view, a view quite alien to the people he is discussing. I would further make the seemingly extravagant claim that a view that is self-neglecting is implicitly held right across the philosophic board. That extravagant view of mine is worth musing over when you are nudged to find parallels between Lonergan and those who talk of wonder or insight etc. It could help you to be clear, or suspicious, about others who would

promise to guide you into good teaching, and certainly of others who would claim to guide you into fathoming what good teaching is and what the attraction - or good! - of good teaching is.

Now you might say that, still, it is the children, or the people being taught, that are the focus of attention. You are attracted to the notion that you are inviting the children to discover their own wonder and the pattern of their wonder as it moves forward, grows, complexifies over the years. But it does not take a massive pause to glimpse that, if you have not followed up such an invitation in and for yourself, your invitation to children will be hollow, worthless, blind.

Let us now be optimistic and assume that we have paused enough, or will do so in coming days, to accept the challenge of self-discovery.

Note that this challenge is already within the Principle. For, if you are teaching yourself geometry - or any of the other topics, as we noted in section 3 - then normatively you are teaching yourself yourself. And does it not, at least now, seem shockingly obvious, that if you do not know what it is to learn, how can you invite others enlightenedly to discover what it is to learn? But follow our optimism: we are convinced, we are ready to give this perspective on teaching a serious try.

Alas, not just philosophy and philosophy of education, but the entire culture is against you. To spell this out with any adequacy would lead us into a prolonged reflection, such as Lonergan offers, on decline,²⁰ on culture slumming,²¹ on evil,²² on the history of conceptualism.²³ So I would suggest that we, that you later, simply consider the culture of school texts. We did this a little when we considered in note 11 above the

²⁰The key text here is section 8 of chapter 7 of *Insight*.

²¹See *Method in Theology*, 99-101.

²²See, for a beginning, pages 49-69 of *Topics in Education*.

²³*Verbum. Word and Idea in Aquinas* is the best introductory part of Lonergan's works on this topic. It is obviously the central topic of this presentation.

classic text, Euclid's *Elements*. What is involved is a well-established perspective that is under the illusion that the central feature of education is clarifying concepts. We will follow up on this in relation to texts in our discussions, but it is an exercise that must be done by anyone attracted to this new style of teaching, it is part of the problem of identification that we face in section 5.

5. Elements of Initial Identification

Right through our day together we have a problem of identification, of identifying ourselves and our potential in our present culture. Part of that identification is to advert to the meaning and reality of the word *initial* in the title of this section. One convenient way of adverting to that meaning is to note that "the problem of identification"²⁴ is treated by Lonegan only after 550 pages of his book *Insight*. "The well formulated system is mine in so far as I understand it, in so far as I can identify its empirical elements in my experience."²⁵ Part of self-identification is knowing where one stands in relation to that system: but we return to that problem of identification in the conclusion.

Let us start where Lonegan starts in dealing with identification. "Until one gets the insight, one has no clue (apart from the direction given by a teacher) for picking out accurately the elements that are unified or related. But once the insight is reached, one is able to find in one's own experience just what it is that falls under the insight's grasp and what lies outside it. However, ability is one thing, and performance is another. Identification is performance. Its effect is to make one possess the insight as one's own,

²⁴*Insight*, 558[562]. The relevant section is section 2.5 of chapter 17, entitled "The Appropriation of Truth". I would note that this meaning of *identification* has still to be acknowledged by an index entry. The section deserves serious study, as well as an extension to the problem of functional specialization to be considered in the next section.

²⁵*Insight*, 560[583].

to be assured in one's use of it, to be familiar with the range of its relevance."²⁶

We took some elementary steps towards that self-identification in the previous sections, especially in section 2. The broader elements of identification and their significance are quite beyond an introductory glimpse: it would lift us into problems of aesthetics and history etc etc. and a reach towards the implementation in education of a full view of the dynamics of why-questions. Our focus in this section has been very limited, and we will hold to those limits in the discussion to follow. But let us assume that we can talk concretely and generally about the culture of textbooks in our institutes of learning, whatever the topic, as long as our focus is on the question raised at the beginning, sharing concepts. Discussion of the culture of examinations would extend that venture very fruitfully: not just then what we give to the students but what the students give back to us as expressing genuine achievements. But let us not aim too high.

We have made a beginning here: our steps are initial; our steps today are invitations to find in ourselves, in those we teach, and in those who organize the context of that teaching, the blocks that we must try to overcome if we are to rescue education from present distortions. And we must try this in the classroom: but the classroom is in a building structured by the present economics of education, over-viewed by a board of education caught in present conventions, undermined by perhaps 90% of the books in its library, disoriented by the cultural context of ourselves and our students. Coming to grips in some initial way with this surrounding context is part of our problem of identification. Only in an initial way: Lonigan invites us a larger effort when he concludes his book on education with two chapters, one on art and one on history. In the centre of that two-chapter discussion Lonigan expressed his own identification in a resonant performance. I quote, yet it would be quite another

²⁶*Ibid.*, 559[582].

experience of learning to be in the presence of that performance.²⁷ “What I want to communicate in this talk about art is the notion that art is relevant to concrete living. That exploration is extremely important in our age, when philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on politics, economics, education, and through ever further doctrines, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make life unlivable.”²⁸

Our initial problem is to identify as best we can that unlivability as it pervades the classroom and to take a pragmatic stand against it, not by a revolutionary rejection of the present situation, but by making what may seem slight inroads into a distorted culture of teaching and a distorted culture of normal present texts. So many of those text, right from the start in chapter one, abuse us, dose and daze us and the students with what are named *basic concepts*. Illustrating that would take at least an extra hour of our time. Perhaps all that we have done in this session is to create a suspicion about

²⁷“Identification is performance”. The tapes of this lecture and this statement give a powerful intimation of the incarnate reality of Lonergan’s concern. We touch here in another deep aspect of the problem of education which must be passed over in an elementary discussion but is so evident to all of us in our spontaneous normativity (see above, note 13): it is that the incarnate meaning of the teacher is what counts. On incarnate meaning see section 6 of chapter three of *Method in Theology*. We could, in a larger reflection, return here to the **Childout Principle** and move ourselves slowly to appreciate that teaching children children calls the teachers to be, normatively and incarnately, in the forefront of the culture that one hopes for. So one may ask as a teacher, uncomfortably, what is my world view, really? The added word, *really*, asks about the incarnate conviction that constitutes me as an adequate character in the drama of education. What is meant here by character? Perhaps we might follow the lead of Aristotle here, opening up the topic of political control, topic ultimately of the global functional specialization to be aired in the fourth lecture today. “Since our purpose is to speak about matters to do with character, we must first inquire of what character is a branch. To speak concisely, then, it would seem to be a branch of nothing else than statecraft. For it is not possible to act at all in affairs of state unless one is of a certain kind, to wit, good. Now to be good is to possess the excellences. If therefore one is to act successfully in affairs of the state, one must be of good character. The treatment of character then is, as it seems, a branch and starting point of statecraft. And as a whole it seems to me that the subject ought rightly to be called, not Ethics, but Politics” (Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*, the first paragraph).

²⁸*Topics in Education*, 232.

these various fundamental misdirection, especially that they pivot on going in the wrong direction of the two options identified by Lonegan in the quotation with which we began: “the key issue is whether concepts result from understanding or understanding results from concepts.”²⁹

I would hope that this key issue and the effect of its two options for teaching would help us forward now in our discussion.

²⁹*Method in Theology*, 336.