<u>Cantower XXXVIII</u> Functional History

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38.1 The Making of History

I could do no better here, perhaps, than to direct you to re-read the first section of *Cantower XXXV*, which was, is, an effort to point us towards a fresh and strange poise, a tadpole poise in history. What is being? Being is to become a frog, with a new double-legged swim-stroke. Being is becoming. I write 're-read' but a re-reading, instead of being a functioning of fantasy, may be just another tickling of a sick stale culture, and what is needed is the seeding of a new heart-culture. You are, perhaps, the seed, and the ground is stony. Might I nudge things along slightly by modifying minimally the first paragraph of chapter 8 of *Method in Theology*?

"The word, history, is employed in two senses. There is history (1) that is written about, and there is history (2) that is written. History (2) aims at expressing the making of history (1)."

"Making', then, replaces 'knowledge' in this brief description. If you consider that I am deadly, or lively, serious about this, you must surely ask How can this be and become? And you may even notice that there are two key objections to my move, a move you may consider as a move away from Lonergan's view. First, there the problem of "ulterior motives and purposes".¹

This issue is dealt with in the section from which I take the phrase: "Seventhly, is the historian devoted to social and cultural goals?" My answer is Yes: that is the poise of functional specialization, the tadpole poise, and it freshens the meaning of the phrase, "What was/is going forward". What of false pragmatism, bias, etc? The hodic re-cycling is the embarrassing² counter-poise to such shrinkage. Secondly, you notice that I seem to be re-instating the function of pre-critical history, especially in its *prophetic* role: "to hindsight about the past there is joined foresight on the future and there are added the recommendations of a man of wide reading and modest wisdom". But you can come to appreciate that the "joining" has the sophistication of the division of labour, and the foresight is anticipation both of what the next groups of contributing specialists need and of what in the presentation of history might help meet that need. Specialists in engine-construction need to be highly focused, but they are quite aware

¹Method in Theology, 231.

²My usual reference here is to *Method in Theology*, 299: "Doctrines that are embarrassing are not to be mentioned in polite company".

³*Ibid.*, 185.

that the engine is just a part, and further, their presentation, the storage and placement, of the engines is tailored to the next stages of the total process. So, critical history in all is complexity is toned up, lifted to a new complexity and precision of unburdening the dialectic elders in their massive task. As the specialist in engines can note stress-zones and connective-points for the assemblers, so the "assembly" that is part of dialectic is aided by "the historian's own self-revelation" who has been "at pains not to conceal his tracks but to lay all his cards on the table." You will recognize here a reference to the "scientific moment" that we have reflected on both as the per se key point of page 250 of Method and as the key to genuine participation in dynamic operation of the hodic process. At a later stage of the development of the re-cycling, linguistic-feedback will make such positioning and self-revelation quite internal to any specialized functional expression. But that is a later topic. For now it is sufficient to recognize zones in Method's treatment of history that can be lifted with some ease into the new poise.

When I use the word *recognition* here I mean, also for you, re-cognition. So, you may have to recognize a problem that emerged already, as recently as the previous *Cantower*: you are not at home in the stuff on history in those 60 pages, or in the further relevant stuff that we come to in the fourth section here, the stuff in the 39 pages on Doctrines. That may mean that you have the double task: prior to lifting the 100 pages into the new context, you need to find out what you are lifting. Find out?: I mean rather **become**, become constituted, a character in history and in whom history's heuristics has molecular occupancy.

I can beset convey this task to you by returning us to the strategy of "bolder spirits. They select the conspicuously successful science of their time". The layering pointed to, in these 100 pages of Lonergan, of strategies, contexts, differentiations, merges with and enriches the reality of Universal Viewpoint that is to become the orientation of any functional specialist in the next generation. The layering and merging is certainly difficult: Einstein's layering and merging of geometry and gravitational theory is still no walk in the park. But no self-respecting graduate in physics is without the constitutive meaning that the 20th century forced into the zone of

⁴*Ibid.*, 250.

⁵*Ibid.*, 220.

⁶*Ibid.*, 193.

 $^{^{7}}$ See *Cantower IX* , pp.25-6.

⁸This was the focus of *Cantowers XXIV-XXVI*.

⁹Method in Theology, 3.

physics.

You might answer this by pointing out that after all, this stuff is only Lonergan's opinion. My claim is that it is no more Lonergan's opinion than gravitational theory is Einstein's opinion. There is a massive complex heuristic of history spread through the writings of Lonergan: it is extremely hard work to intussuscept it. It involves the same scientific dedication as the work of the undergraduate in physics battling into the world of theory. But, as I noted, in the previous *Cantower*, regarding UV, we have to struggle with beginnings. In the work suggested here we have another angle on that beginning: reaching for that control of the meaning of history that one may possess, that may possess one, in so far as one broods for years over the stages of meaning and their substages of differentiations, local and global contexts that are ongoing, overlapping, merging, etc etc. That brooding must be empirical. I am distracted here by one of my own experiences of brooding. I was in Oxford at the time, reading my way through Greek drama. I had begun to glimpse Euripides position as a shift, a fragmentation. In my excitement I phoned Lonergan in Boston - midday for me, suppertime for him, and articulated my shift regarding Euripides' shift. Lonergan's immediate reaction. "Oh, yes". I had only found a corner of his home turf. Being "at home in transcendental method" is not some glibness in speaking of levels of consciousness: it is a refinement, literally, of the circulation of the blood. One of the scandals of Christian theology is the low level of minding activity. The result is an absence of any serious actual context¹⁰ that would respectably parallel either GUTS - or the Standard Model - in physics or even the Periodic Table in chemistry.

Only you can figure where that leaves you with regard to having or getting some idea of functional history. Perhaps you need time off to push into Lonergan's heuristics of history and doctrines with fresh vigour and patience? But I would note that the push can include in that freshness the seed of the mood of functional history, so that as you work your way through the text - and there is the need to do a great deal of other reading and thinking to do that work - you can identify what might be called "locations of lift". For instance there is the word "Verstehen" associated with the work of Droysen. Can you come to grips with the lift of its meaning by a being luminous about its two modes, answering not only what-is but also what-is-to-be? And has this lift anything to say to Gadamer's view of effective history? "A proper hermeneutics would have to demonstrate an effectivity of history within understanding itself. I shall refer to this as 'effective-history'. Understanding is, essentially, an effective-historical

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 163-64, 183-84.

¹¹See especially *Method in Theology*, 208 - 214.

¹²On the two modes, see Appendix A of *Phenomenology and Logic* and the two diagrams there.

relation". 13 We will return to the problem of functional lift in the concluding section.

38.2 Remembering the Future

You are familiar by now with my strategy of dealing with chapters of *Insight* or *Method*: the stand against summary is brought out mainly by a focus on a single paragraph and a few topics. My broad aim is to encourage the beginnings of a tradition of serious generalized empirical reading, a tradition that would slowly lift itself - cyclically, self-critically - towards quite new and "fantastic" patterns of intussusceptive minding. Here we share the more difficult task of perusing the two chapters on history in *Method in Theology* with the hope of resonating with the new twist on the historical task, of thus noticing both possibilities and gaps.

Now I really don't mean "perusing": I mean, rather, a contemplative poising over what should be a familiar block of Method in Theology. But now, alas, for you - or is it not great to sense this disappearance of meaning into your future?! - I have moved to a new subtlety regarding the meaning of contemplation, quite beyond the meaning I emphasized in December 2003 when I wrote of the "Epilodge" in CantowerXXI. It takes on now, if you like, a much more "lean forward" meaning, continuous with what we are struggling with now. And the struggle you are invited to now is a "lean forward" over these two chapters of Method. It requires exercise, detailed illustrated exercises. This should remind you of our struggle with Feynman's first five chapters in their relation to the first five chapters of *Insight*. Feynman was brilliant at what I call for the moment directed semi-popularization, but the directing fails in so far as students take the popular indications as a warm arrival rather than a coloured road-map. Have you battled with those two chapters of Method, summarized them, diagramed them, sifted out the parts that are genuinely foundational, identified the parts that are clearly dialectical, sorted out functionally the full 60 pages, paragraph by paragraph? Indeed, sentence by sentence, or indeed from one punctuation mark to the next, for this text of the second stage of meaning is pre-functional, shifting around pragmatically and subtly to make a few unwelcome major points.

¹³Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Seabury Press, New York, 1975, 267. See also p. 305ff. I am not wishing upon you a struggle with the elusive meaning of Gadamer, but certainly rubbing shoulders with him tends to free one from tendencies towards glib clarity. It can renew in one the biographic challenge sketched in *Cantower IX*. But the mention of Gadamer's book gives me a nudge to quote Gadamer's frontispiece from Rilke, a poetry of our reflections: "Catch only what you've thrown yourself, all is mere skill and little gain; / but when you're suddenly the catcher of a ball / thrown by an eternal partner / with accuracy and measured swing / towards you, to your centre, in an arch / from the great bridgebuilding of God: / why catching then becomes a power - / not your's, a world's."

My question and my suggestions startle you. Yet I am simply carrying forward our discoveries in the struggle with Feynman's text. Do you see the startling parallel? Had you thought before of these two chapters in any way parallel to two chapters of Feynman's introduction to the problem of doing physics? Are we not dealing here with a quite different order of difficulty of understanding Space and Time and Motion? I recall now my own foolishness when I began reading *Insight* in 1958. Despite my background in physics, I found the first five chapters terrible and so came with some relief to chapter 6: it promised to be about common sense. My illusion is still being beaten down after 45 years: over the following four decades the black humour of the final laconic noting of the last sentence of chapter seven of the book has festered, effervesced, in my molecules, and I invite your molecules to get "slowing" in the fact: "May we note before concluding that, while common sense relates things to us, our account of common sense relates it to its neural basis and relates aggregates and successions of instances of common sense to one another". 14 Are you with me, in shock? Can you, for instance, seriously think of Dunkirk as, concretely and truly, aggregates of aggregates of neurodynamic reachings in the darkness of the being of war?

Perhaps it would help you here to venture aside, into the final chapter of *Topics* in Education, where Lonergan reflects on the problem of "General History". The venture is doubly worthwhile. First, it brings you into a text that resonates with our problem of poise. This stuff was written prior to the discovery of functional specialization and there is need to eventually distinguish nine classes of specialized meaning for the word "history". But let us for the moment think, beyond the Lonergan of 1959, of the "big problem, general history" in terms of two problem zones diagramed in W3. There is general history that belongs below the line: there is general history that is a task of the third specialty. But I wish you to catch the mood of these closing words of Lonergan's lecture. There is a mood of concern for the future which is carried over from the conclusion of the previous lecture on art. He speaks of the slum, and of "the attempt that has been going on in recent centuries to remake man," 15 an evident throw-forward from his agonizing voicing of his discontent on the previous day: "What I want to communicate in this talk on art is the notion that art is relevant to concrete living, that it is an exploration of the potentialities of concrete living. That exploration is extremely important in our age, when philosophers, for at least two centuries, through doctrines on politics, economics, education, and through ever further doctrines, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to make life unlivable". 16

¹⁴Insight, 244 [269].

¹⁵Topics in Education, 253.

¹⁶Ibid., 232.

The mood of concern, and the pointers towards its incarnate presence in the historian that haunt these last pages, need slow intussusception, so as to eventually become "the style," a "characteristic of the regional group" that is the group of functional historians. I would note here something that Lonergan would, I think, have come to modify later, had he had the time, energy, opportunity. While he writes of the artistry of history, he also writes of history that as "a conceptualization is not going to be able to conceptualize it." He is talking about the organic unity of the art of living. By the mid-1960s he would be reaching for a fuller view of understanding as symbolically toned, something that has been running through these *Cantowers* as a poisition. I am talking here, of course, of a remote and difficult sophistication that should blossom when we come to eschatological matters; what I say, then, is not a bow towards that trivial view of the later Lonergan as somehow discovering feelings. I would say that Lonergan re-discovered and uncovered feelings when he first did the *Exercises* of St.Ignatius.

My pointing here is towards a reading of these seven pages that would help you to get a sense of the poise of functional concern, and a sense of the need for a sublation of "our earlier analysis of the good as a developing object [that] provides us with a set of categories of what really there is to go forward". 21 That earlier analysis adds the context of the surd within history and the "Christian hope that is a supreme force in history", 22 but these are topics for later reflection. Which brings me to the second benefit of the double advantage of pausing over this text. We have already been touching on it. It is the issue of the remoteness of functional history from the general history of particular cultures. W3 has it in a neat little corner: "On-going matrices of cultures etc: MIT 48", and there is an arrow there coming from the word "mediation" on the margin. The key point here is the remoteness of the meaning with which this specialty struggles, and I see little point of summarily going round the point again. The issue is raised by chapters 3 and 4 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, and it is an issue that is central to this last talk of *Topics in Education*. It is the challenge of The Tower, the reaching up of a salvific community for a meaning that is increasingly remote from common sense, but without which common sense will persist in living the unlife foisted on it by

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 252.

¹⁸*Ibid*.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, 255.

²⁰See, for example, *Cantower IX*.

²¹Topics in Education, 255.

²²Ibid., 257.

"papmongers or propagandists of whatever stripe power's windowdressers everywhere." But now you have the need, surely, to pause, and re-assess your perspective on the character of this general history (2) of the Tower, that is a calling to mediate, by both living and ex-plane-ing, the everyday, general history (1).

And now, perhaps you might more profitably return to those 60 pages on history in *Method in Theology*? Nor is it any harm to bear in mind - though there is no way we can enter into this complex problem - anything you recall about the emergence of these chapters and the manner in which the tired genius patched together the book. As I remarked already, it is quite an set of exercises to sort of functionally what Lonergan did in these 60 pages, but laced into the work is a magnificent re-vamping of the historical enterprise that could go under the name of critical history. I look at my own notes on the sorting out and the re-vamping and am quite clear that it would be more helpful if I could get you to tackle the exercise rather than having me shuffling round the various sections and paragraphs.

So, on to some suggestions about functional history.

38.3 Reaching for Functional History

The practical bent of our reflections here is conveniently brought out by considering the manner in which apprenticeship is served. I have not as yet reflected on the ages of various specialists, indeed whether there might be a significant difference in the statistical age-distributions over the specialties. One might expect such differences. In the work Process I drew a parallel between the forward specialties and economic rhythms: the Communications person was paralleled with the Kitchin or Crum cycle of three years; the Systematic thinker was a paralleled with the Juglar cycle of 8 years; the Doctrinal or Policy thinker was paralleled with the long cycle known as the Kondratieff. That left the Sargawit as paralleled with a larger unspecified rhythm. Implicit in the paralleling is a view of age and maturity, especially if you bring to the paralleling a notion of metaphysics as concrete, molecularly intussuscepted: then the larger control demands a fuller maturity if the person is not to be functioning like the old-style metaphysician who entertained a simplistic notion of grasping the essence of things. The situation is similar with the first four specialties, although there are significant differences, beyond our present sketching, which give the issue creative twists. But at all events, one may note that historians are in general not expected to be young. This does not mean, of course, that history is shelved until one has served apprenticeship in

²³Seamus Heaney, *The Government of the Tongue*, Faber and Faber, London, 1988, 61.

²⁴The hyphenation recalls the peculiar meaning introduced at the conclusion of chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.

research or interpretation. Indeed, I recall the Oxford tradition of plunging the unfortunate student into some heavy essay from the get-go. But it does mean the genesis of a humanity and a humility through an empiricality - which of course must slowly be brought up to the Childout level - that both controls and fosters ecstacy. And in this the historical effort is, as we have noted already, analogous to the effort that we considered at some length in the *Cantowers* - especially *XXVII-XXXI* - devoted to physics.

An obvious apprenticeship to the historical effort is efforts to function in the previous two specialties, and illustrations of such apprenticeship are to be had from the very reading of the 60 pages to which we are attending at present. The issue is philosophy or method of historical studies. You are plunged, by Lonergan, into the task of finding the relevant authors, texts, passages, etc, 25 and you are reminded of the various points made in the previous *Cantowers* on Interpretation. Obviously, key common problems of the specialties are the problems associated with the genesis of your own embryonic UV and there is no need of covering the same ground here. But you may notice that the undergraduate apprenticeship has to be lifted gradually, over decades of generalized empirical history, history (2) in both Lonergan's sense and mine. Realistically you may think of an educational context that parallels the context that the period table gives chemistry: instead of that table we have the words of metaphysics, in particular the word W3 to which I have already referred here. Am I being unrealistic? I do not think so. The task is a massive cultural shift. Those convinced that Lonergan's perspective on both history and on functional divisions makes sense should surely be willing to subscribe to some such heuristic diagraming? The slow gathering of momentum of the hodic cycling will make such diagraming a general challenge, one that is met or, in rejection, relegates the rejecters to some form of pop-cultural activity that will be increasingly suspect. History departments that I am familiar with - and I had the doubtful privilege of running one for a couple of years - have special courses on methodology in the graduate years. It will be quite different when methodology becomes intrinsic to historical studies, and this even at the school level: "When teaching children history one is teaching children children". Then the ball-game will be quite different at the graduate level.

So, in the previous discussion of interpretation I emphasized aiming at excellence. One raises the issue of UV for one's colleagues and for the historians envisaged in one's "handing on" of interpretation. Indeed, that raising is amazingly unavoidable, for regularly one is interpreting someone of consequence, someone reacting to previous viewpoints on being and becoming. The thinker with which one is dealing will have his or her own version of Lonergan's view: "Theology 1) not a Platonic Idea 2) but the many species (not individuals except as types, as dominating

²⁵You might be helped, too, by following up my own puttering in the area, nudged on by Haydon-White: see *The Redress of Poise*, chapter two.

personalities) 3) in a genetically and dialectically differentiated genus". ²⁶ The cyclically-improved UV moves towards an ever more precise and luminous differentiated genus, and this holds not only for theology but for any field of inquiry. Its stable fruits become the inheritance of the genuinely empirical, and an embarrassment to truncated studies, and it is intussuscepted by the self-tasting undergraduate. "You come into it by being born into it and living with the people." ²⁷ Moreover, that intussusception occurs in the context of ever more refined categories and ever richer systematics: a systematics which has lifted the historical achievement to a quite new level of genetic structuring, "the past somewhat better than was the reality." ²⁸ But I am off now, talking of a distant excellence, when in fact the notion of a genetic systematics that could become and "constitute part of the reality of the one that means" ²⁹ in hodic work is not much spoken of, much less practiced, in Lonergan circles.

Obviously, the move towards and cultivation of this excellence is a challenge for those working in history, the fruit of which can flow into undergraduate work. Moreover, by history I mean history in any area, and this brings to mind the concrete reality of the hodic collaboration as involving a convergence of disciplines as one mounts from research to dialectic: a previous topic. So there is a mutual self-mediation operative here, of excellence at one end, of embarrassment at the other. "What has one to know to write general history?" of mathematics. One has to have reached, and be reaching within one's systematic perspective, for a coherent perspective on the core views of dominating personalities in the tadpole struggle for progress. And that reaching and reach, echoed and echoing in undergraduate classes, can become "a constitutive component of the group as human. It is an aesthetic apprehension of the group's origin. The aesthetic apprehension of the group's origin and story becomes operative whenever the group debates, judges, evaluates, decides". Thus is to emerge

²⁶I quote from unpublished notes of the early sixties, available in the Toronto Lonergan Centre, Batch B,8,6,V.

²⁷Topics in Education, 253.

²⁸Method in Theology, 251.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 356. I am referring to that brief section, 14.1, on the ontology of the hodic character.

³⁰Topics in Education, 251.

³¹Quoted in *Cantower VII*, pp. 12-13.

³²Topics in Education, 230.

a future version of the existential reality of Academus' garden.

38.4 The History of the Christian Word

We shall return to a fantasy about Academus' garden in the next section. Here we pause in a characterization of the first step. "If, as Lonergan maintains, and I am increasingly convinced, we need a 'complete restructuring of Catholic theology,'33 then our first step is to realize the magnitude of the task before us, and our second is to begin, with what resources we have, to do what is possible here and now. When you have a mountain to move, and only a spade and a wheelbarrow to work with, you can either sit on your hands or you can put spade to earth and move the first sod". The book I quote represents a gallant first step by Fred Crowe towards the functional specialty history. A second step could be to assess his success, and this I shall attempt to do here, but in a random, shabby, way. I recall amusing Fred, a few years after that book was written, by suggesting, as a principle of shooting for functional specialization, "if a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly". In my own career I have failed to attempt any specialty, nor are these *Cantowers* an attempt: they continue my strategy of random dialectic and foundational work and perhaps had best be thought of as outside the specialties, popularizations.

This section is no exception to the notion of badly-done popularization. And it is of some advantage for you to notice what I am popularizing here, for I am inviting you to do the same, with your own or others efforts. It is a way of getting a concrete sense of the mountain to be moved. Nor, in so far as you take the challenge serious, is it an easy way, as I have found in the present instance. I have had this little book of Crowe in my possession for over twenty years, read and re-read. I battled again with it this past week in my new present context. My aim is foundational: fantasizing forward. The fantasy pivots on what I am popularizing.³⁵ So: I am operating within the canon (the third of five) of successive approximation, and within the first principle (of five) of criticism, which I might as well quote for you here:

"A first principle of criticism is supplied by the demand for the universal

³³A Second Collection, "The Future of Christianity", 161.

³⁴Frederick E. Crowe S.J., *Theology of the Christian Word. A Study in History*, Paulist Press, New York, 1978, 148-9. I refer to this work below simply as: Crowe History.

³⁵You must assume that I am into pop-talk all the way here. "Pivots on"?: the pivoting is really a shabby version of the way dialectic pivots (think of the operations described on page 250 of *Method*) towards foundations. The word *fantasy* means whatever it means to you, but its has for me a precise complex technical meaning relating to efficient global molecular expansiveness. And so on.

viewpoint. Moreover, this demand possesses the requisite dynamic character. For though a contributor fails to present his results in terms of the protean notion of being, a critic can proceed from that notion to a determination of the contributor's particular viewpoint, he can indicate how the particularism probably would not invalidate the contributor's work and, on the other hand, he can suggest to others working in the contributor's special field the points on which his work may need revision."³⁶

In the present case and context, my effort cannot but be sketchy, shabby. If Crowe can conclude his book by claiming that "this book is meant to be a spadeful of earth in the moving of a mountain" then a few comments here are less than a sprinkle from a tea-spoon. My battered copy of the book has been marked over the years, and is now freshly marked with my searching about What he is at: the searchings have the makings of a book about a book. Let's see what I might usefully intimate in a few pages.

The book is a shot at what I call *hodic history*, a history of the Christian message *as communication*.³⁸ There are historical stages "that it is the purpose of the book to delineate"³⁹: (1) as message; (2) as word; (3) as truth; (4) as having sources; (5) as word across space and time; (6) as cosmic word; (7) as inner word of Spirit. Does Crowe succeed? Yes, but badly! "My study is confined to 'what was going forward' …. it does not assemble its own data, or determine their meaning; much less does it go to the roots of conflicting ideas, or proceed to the author's own position on the word of God, with expansion into foundations, doctrines, systematics, and communications."⁴⁰ But does it proceed *from* the author's own position? Crowe does not make this clear in the book. Is it because, like *Insight*, his book is a moving viewpoint? If this is the case, can it be considered as hodic history, which mercilessly should be contextualized by the author's own categories?⁴¹ But isn't it thus contextualized: for, are not the seven divisions noted something in the way of ongoing overlapping contexts, the fruit of a dialectic and foundational effort? In his "Conclusion and Projections" he remarks that "the force at

³⁶Insight, 588[611].

³⁷Crowe History, 149.

³⁸I lean on Crowe's description and on his self-criticism, which can be distinguished from critical comments from myself.

³⁹Crowe History, 1.

⁴⁰Crowe History, 5.

⁴¹See notes 52,53, 54 below. I am drawing attention to the distant goal of the use of the categories in all specialities (*Method in Theology*, 291).

work in every step [he means in history(1)] is the religiously questioning and reflective power of the human spirit The answer to one prepares the way for another: they are linked together in a structured sequence. Of course, the 'structure' is also a 'construction' of the historian, his 'organization' of history." But one may ask, where did the historian Crowe get this organization and how did he get it? The organization could be, could have been, a starting point: then the historian would work towards creatively filling out details 'under that organization' by the methods of critical history. But the book proceeds more by a way of discovery, indeed more like a teaching book, mote like my own efforts that fall outside the functional specialties as popular communication.

In dealing with the question of sources, (4) in the list, the question of *Loci*, Crowe writes: "there are surely important anticipatory steps in the long history between 325 and 1563, but it seems to me, after pondering the evidence, that this thematization occurs in exact form only at that later date. Let me set forth that evidence now for the reader to examine." ⁴³ I do not sense that here "the reader" means the dialectician to whom the historian hands over the functional baton. I suspect rather that it is Crowe doing random dialectics within a commonsense bent ⁴⁴ for a more general audience. Indeed, he modestly indicates that he himself is a member of that laity in relation to his topic: "to find one's way through the literature on Luther nowadays is so arduous a task that a layman in the matter may be forgiven if he boldly states his case without deferring overmuch to the experts". Crowe would probably extend that modesty to other areas of his book: ⁴⁵ might he not, indeed, claim that he is operating more as a generalist? There is grist here for the mill of the final section, but suffice for me to suggest here that Crowe is predominantly working as a dialectician in search of intrinsic foundations. What do I mean here by *intrinsic*? Since I just made up the term

⁴²Crowe History, 145.

⁴³Crowe History, 59.

⁴⁴Earlier he notes his avoidance of "highly theoretical questions on the nature of truth, objectivity, and the like. From my viewpoint these question should be left, as far as possible, to a later functional specialty" (Crowe History, 161, note 5). Much earlier he takes a similar stand, "...I leave the determination of the question [he is dealing with problems in St.Paul] to the experts. Restricting ourselves to what is clear to the nonspecialist, we can say" (*Ibid.*, 27). This just doesn't cut it within hodic history, the control of which is the position, the poisition, of the historian. More on this in section 38.5. Crowe History, 158, note 5 adds a context for critical reflection.

 $^{^{45}}$ The entire book is written in a modest suggestive tentative fashion, right to his final comment on it.

now, I had best spell out for both of us what I mean.

There are, then, foundational positions that emerge, so to speak, at the bottom of page 250 of Method in Theology. Their focus is more fact than fantasy: grounds of progress that have emerged from the past. But there are the fuller foundations that are generated *per se* by the specialty foundations. The next section will focus on these. Crowe's achievement, I would say, is the former. How is this plausible sequencing of overlapping and ongoing contexts reached: controlling contexts of actual and possible discussions of revelation as communication? By a descriptive compacting of the first four specialties, interlaced with dialectic and foundational reflections. So, Crowe ends the chapter (4) that we have focused on here with reflections on "the 'proliferation' of sources in Cano"46 "Is there an analogy with the sensus fidelium that will replace all the categories of *loci?*"⁴⁷ His answer is richly suggestive and critical, swinging towards types of reversals of counterpositions caught nicely in the titles of his next two chapters: "The Sources as Word Across Space and Time"; "The Primary Word: Jesus Christ Yesterday and Today". So, for instance, "My own concern now is to exploit the Thomist idea for a modern theology of the word of God, and that involves consideration of three points: generalizing Saint Thomas's idea, reversing his priorities in regard to the literal and spiritual sense of scripture, and taking account of the reasons for his reluctance to give the spiritual sense any prominence in his own thought or exegesis". 48 Crowe sweeps forward here soundly through spiritual writers like de Caussade, on through Pannenberg and Gadamer, beyond Newman, beyond Barth. He rises, in his conclusion, to point to the meaning of the Son meshed with creation "understood as a word that is meant". 49 So, he gives fresh meaning to the sciences, to personalist philosophies, and "Third, there are the new theologies, the theology of work, the theology of the world, the theology of prayer.... all of these together, and others too, can be made tributory to a theology of history in which the meaning of Jesus for the whole space-time universe can be investigated". ⁵⁰ This is not the talk of hodic history, but of foundational reaching.

I have noted dialectic writing in the few chapters referred to here. But the entire book is flawed, as history, but enriched, as popular dialectics, by such reflections. So, Crowe reflects creatively on the works of Bauer, Dodd, Von Campenhausen, De

⁴⁶Crowe History, 78.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Crowe History, 111.

⁴⁹Crowe History, 122.

⁵⁰Crowe History, 122-3.

Vooght, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Gadamer, Pannenberg in a manner that does not belong within the precisions of critical history in the complexities of its first degree or its second compounded degree. His bent is methodological and his purpose is an amalgam that spreads round the precise function of hodic history. What is that precise function and purpose of the third specialty? That is a question best raised in a separate section - I did not say faced, since it is to be faced in a century, not a section - within the supporting structure of foundational fantasy.

38.5 History (2) in 3000 A.D.

You probably do not recall a previous effort of mine, in the essay "Systematics: A Language of the Heart" in which I reached forward to a fictional oriental dictionary of theology of the year 2500 A.D. The effort was related to my regularly unsuccessful efforts to intimate the character of a genetic systematics. That effort, and its lack of success, is related to the problem of conceiving hodic history. It relates to the problem that preoccupied Lonergan in the decade after the writing of *Insight*, nicely caught in the title-paring "History and System." It relates to the problem with which I concluded the first section, quoting Gadamer and my final sentence there makes mention of the problem of a functional lift.

It is the problem of the *Cantowers*: it is the problem of the cultural fragmentations that leaves scholarly work in all areas disorganized, ugly and inefficient. What might I add here to my various previous pointers, in the context of Crowe's dialectic reflections? Perhaps there is a useful road for some in Pannenberg's reflections on Gadamer and on the need for "a comprehensive horizon." that somehow involves a total understanding of reality. Pannenberg accepts Gadamer's thrust towards a universal concept of history that would somehow dodge Hegel. Perhaps it is no harm to brood here over Pannenberg's words on this issue with the help of some elementary pointers.

"If interpretation has to do with the relationship between then and now, so that the difference between them is preserved when the hermeneutic 'bridge' is built, and if, further, one must go behind the text by asking about its unspoken horizon of meaning, about its historical situation, so that the first task of the interpreter is to frame the historical horizon from which the text comes, then the only way that the historical situation of the text can be adequately linked to the present time of the interpreter is through an investigation of the historical context of the present in its connection with

⁵¹Robert Doran has been attending to this problem for a decade now, with various essays in *Theological Studies* and *Method*.

⁵²Wolfgang Pannenberg, "Hermeneutics and Universal History," *Journal for Theology and the Church*, Vol. 4, 1967, 138. Quoted in Crowe History, 118.

the situation as it prevailed when the text was written".53

My helpful pointers are two: one from a problem of autobiography, one from a story of successful science.⁵⁴ I would like to think that the suggested brooding over Pannenberg with the help of the pointers would lead to a new reading of W3. Might it nudged you thus, so that you have a new edge, as subject⁵⁵ on the hearing of the whole story, the hole story? Perhaps two corners of Crowe's reflections could help here. Both relate to hearing the word from the Hebrew minders: (1) "It is difficult for those trained in the analytic scientific manner of thinking to enter into the Hebrew mind and grasp the special character of the word we are dealing with now." ⁵⁶ (2) "We may think of theology as a whole view, corresponding to history as the whole reality of creation, but such a total view is hardly a **word** for me in the way Nathan's was for David: 'You are the man'." ⁵⁷ The functional lift that I write of in the hopefilled anticipation of the next millennium, ⁵⁸ would cut down the difficulty in (1), would make heart-fielded the **word** in (2) in a contemplative embrace in and of the universe. ⁵⁹ But only if you are taking the

⁵³*Ibid.*, 146; quoted in Crowe History, 119. You might take as an exercise discovering the manner in which this paragraph points to the need for Lonergan's canons of hermeneutics of *Insight* chapter 17.

⁵⁴Both pointers stem from Lonergan: learning from successful science is a strategy of the beginning of the first chapter of *Method*; reflection on autobiography as an aid to understanding the processes of historical studies begins on page 182.

⁵⁵Recall our reflections on as in the 'late 20s' *Cantowers*: a matter of refining the focus on subjectivity and field in the concluding lectures of *Phenomenology and Logic*.

⁵⁶Crowe History, 39.

⁵⁷Crowe History, 123.

⁵⁸The context is the thirty -first place reflection of *Insight* chapter 20 (726[747] on the advance of the antecedent willingness of hope to specialized ever-readiness.

⁵⁹CantowerXXI , "Epilodge", discuss the contemplative stance. The take-of text is what I call the Tomega Principle from *Insight* 417[442]: "Theoretic understanding, THEN, seeks to solve problems, to erect syntheses, to embrace the universe in a single view". In the following three *Cantowers* I hope to enlarge on this principle in relation to what may be called Tower work. What will emerge is a quite new view of the lifestyle of the serious academic, swept - I speak normatively of course - into a spiraling community personally, core-wise, reaching for that single heart-view, spinning off and on revisions of the ongoing genesis of humanity. This is in profound contrast to present academic life, where revisions and pseudo-revisions occupy the centre of the life, the

task of scheming in history to heart in a quite new theology of prayer.

Why the line-brake here?

At the beginning of *Cantower XXXIV* I noted the sequence in which these five Cantowers - XXXIV - XXXVIII - were written. In the present one I had paused here, more than six months ago, leaving sketchings for completion, sketchings that of course represented my reach both for my own larger view and for a communication, an intimation, of that view. The sketchings are now irrelevant, over-ambitious regarding communication, under-ambitious in respect to my own climb. I find myself now much further on in that climb, and perhaps you get a sense of that by pausing seriously over the essays written in between, especially perhaps the key essay of the *Insight* series, where I tackled a presentation of the manner in which a serious heuristic of energy lifts the world-view of the fourth chapter of that book. Lifts? For whom? It took me forty five years to get the lift, and I am not more than averagely stupid. To that under-ambition there is added the sad sense of over-ambition. A morning dream this morning vividly intimated the axial origin of the so-called "analytic scientific manner of thinking" that Crowe mentions in the quotation above. But it is probably part of your training, if you were ever lifted out of the dominant commonsense eclecticism that controls most of philosophy and theology. What then of this functional lift that I was venturing towards, that would cut through and beyond the difficulties (1) and (2) that I picked from Crowe?

Yes, I had fresh things to say about autobiography. Yes, I intended to add new twists to the parallel with successful science that could help meta-thinking. But was I not falling into the trap and the desperate hopeless hopefulness of compacting that must be the dominant mood of great art, of Turner's seascapes or of Beethoven's last quartets? I was about to plunge compactingly into Lonergan's already compact stuff on writing one's autobiography. Should I not have learned my lesson by now, from Dogen, or simply from those long undergraduate classes where I with studied slowness lifted the students towards a commonsense glimpse of creative memory's wonders when let loose over old photos of their living and partly living? We are back, evidently, at the message of the end of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, repeated in these recent *Cantowers*.

In those recent *Cantowers* I availed of the strategy of repetition: for example, there was what I had to say twenty years ago about Lonergan's historical reach, to

soul, and the soul starves in sophisticated tunneling.

⁶⁰I recall Charles Hefling's account of Lonergan's efforts to write elementary economics in his final years. "In his early works he does write more expansively, drawing out his argument at length and establishing his points in detail. By contrast, towards the end of his life he wrote in a spare and lapidary style that makes every word count" (*Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, xix)

which I added footnotes that at least raised the question of a gap in meaning, the gap of my climb, the gap to be surmounted by your future climb, or passed by legitimately, or through ill-luck, or ill-will. I am not going to repeat that strategy here, but my musings these days regarding presentation of the challenge of doing history in 3000 A.D. sent me back to a younger me, writing thirty years ago about the broader undifferentiated problem. The issue then was not functional history as I cherish its possibility now, but "Authentic Subjectivity and International Growth: Foundations". But it is generic to the present specific functionally-specialist issue: or, if you like, categorial. and so the categorial to which I pointed there are to find there use in functional history. Will there use be found there before 3000 A.D?

The challenge as presented there, thirty years ago, so densely, laughs at the notion of any still more compact summary. I swing into my topic by bracketing it within the upper and lower grounds of loneliness and then tackle each word of the title - including 'and' - with uncompromising doctrinal vigour (I would not have called it that in those days). What did I begin to mean by 'subjectivity'? "By human subjectivity I mean the intelligible unity-identity-whole genetically and dialectically integrative of the six-leveled events of the life of a man or a woman". Further, there were four dense notes to that short text, chasing the unfortunate serious reader - if there were such - through sections of *Insight*, *Method in Theology*, "The Natural Desire to See God", the treatise on The Incarnate Word (out for you by nowthen, I expect, in volume x's English). And it - or I of my early forties - carries on with twenty merciless pages of challenge to end?: "to end with the openness of the question in a mind, are not these questions personal?"

These question were not personal then in the community of Lonergan enthusiasts, nor are they now, but my long-term optimism remains. Boosted especially by the embarrassing⁶² dynamics of hodic method, my optimism of "Distant Probabilities of Persons Presently Going Home Together in Transcendental Process"⁶³ reaches towards the "second million years".⁶⁴ Or this millennium? Might the

⁶¹The Shaping of the Foundations, 120; note on that text on 194-5.

⁶²I recall that key element in recycling that sublates human weakness according to Lonergan's doctrine of *Method in Theology* p. 299: "A doctrine that is embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company".

⁶³The Preface-title of P. McShane (ed), *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, University Press of America, 1984,

⁶⁴A notion I borrow from Toynbee, "the second million years is on our side". It is laced into the title of chapter 6 of *Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy:* "An Improbable Christian Vision and the Economic Rhythms of the Second Million

embarrassment of the Lonergan community be, as I begin to suggest in the third chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics*. *A Fresh Pragmatism*, that the eightfold way blossoms in areas ranging from music to mountaineering before philosophers and theologians come out of their self-satisfied tunneling?

So, instead of a further, richer, dense reflection on autobiography here, I refer you to my younger and more brutal expressions of the challenge. And instead of weaving it all together in parallels with successful science, I throw out one parallel from my present struggle with history's fermenting of 14 billion years ago. Before he plunges the reader into a summary glimpse of "The First One-hundred Second" in his chapter VII, Steven Weinberg, has a chapter title "Historical Diversion". I quote from the first paragraph. "The detection of the cosmic microwave radiation background in 1965 was one of the most important scientific discoveries of the twentieth century. Why did it have to be made by accident? Or to put it another way, why was there no systematic search for this radiation, years before 1965?" 65

I do not wish to elaborate on curious parallels between Lonergan's lonely focused searching of 1965 and the odd searchings of those few curious astronomers of that year, but the topic does serve to flex the imagination. The background radiation of the problem of an implementable method of historical progress was bubbling there in Jeremiah and Jesus, in all the civilizations that Jasper's associated with the axial period, in all the muddles of Voegelin's *Ecumenic Age*, and very clearly in the Athenian Strangers of the latter's third volume of *Order and History*. Lonergan discovered in theology a sickness of history and a cure. The cure is a luminous turn to hodic spiraling that spins theology into the whirl of cultural cravings. Or may spin, in this millennium.

May? That depends on you, either taking a whirl at the spiraling turn to the idea, or at least not discouraging it in the next generation. We are back at my nudging of you towards listening to "the whole story, the hole story", back to Crowe's two corners, the "may" in "We **may** think of theology as a whole view, corresponding to history as the whole reality of creation, but such a total view is hardly a word for me in the way Nathan's was for David: 'you are the man'". Are you the man, or woman? We are back in the mood of the function of these *Cantowers*. But who are the *we*? People have asked me about the struggle of reading along, a struggle that is, frankly, quite beyond them since it is certainly beyond me! I am now one-third of the way through my Proustian reflection, but it can be shared properly only by some few lunatics who wish to get to the heart of history's seeding. I wish, in these next three *Cantowers*, to make the challenge of that seeding, and its avoidance by Lonerganism, somewhat more evident descriptively and methodologically. But that writing effort is postponed till Mayday

Years".

⁶⁵Steven Weinberg, The Last Three Minutes. A Modern View of the Origins of the Universe, Basic Books, N.Y., 1985, 122.

2005 when, as it happens, this *Cantower* on functional history was due to appear on the Website. Meantime I must turn to the contemplation of astronomic and the nanotopic universe in a drive towards a freshening of eschatology. But before I do so it seems part of the Fresh Pragmatism, as I end these very inadequate essays on function, functional interpretation, and functional history, to say a prophetic word to you about some simple dipping.

38.6 Small Steps in the Making of History

Above we had the story of Nathan and David and the statement, "You are the man". Here I recall Elisha and Na'aman, the leper commander of the Syrian army. You know the story? When Na'aman arrived with the trappings of his culture, Elisha suggested simple 7-times dipping in the local Jordan river: not a very exotic cure, not to Na'aman's liking. "Are not Abana and Pharpar, the rivers of Damascus, better than all the waters of Israel?" ⁶⁶

There is an axial leprosy which I have named schizothymia. It festers inwardly beneath and in all the trappings of a culture that "deteriorates cumulatively" sparklingly and busily. "You are the man, the woman", even as you strain to "be against all sorts of mortmain", even as you "speak against unconscious oppression". ⁶⁸ So, I can echo Pound's dedication: "go, my songs to the lonely and the unsatisfied", but the sickness cloaks the real loneliness, the dire dissatisfaction. There are many facets of the cloaking device, the cover stories that pass for lives, but my attention here is directed at a single problem: dare I push the parallel with Elisha's advice and call it a problem with the reception of the suggestion of a simple 7-times dipping? ⁶⁹

The single facet to which I wish you to attend here is what I risk calling the

 $^{^{66}2}Kings~5:12.$

⁶⁷Insight, 229[254].

⁶⁸Commission, Pound's poem quoted earlier (see *Cantower XXXIII*; it is the first Interlude of *Music That Is Soundless*).

⁶⁹Fourth-level functional specialization (see *Shaping of the Foundations*, chapter 4) is the locus of what was called metaphysics, split now into what we might call 'findings and fantasy'. The other six zones mediate them and are mediated by them in the recycling process. Increasingly, as the Tower-cycles mount, the metaphysical presuppositions of all participants become luminous, pushing towards the goal of a luminosity that is fully methodological: about about as the **as** in each whatas-whereas-whenas stealing the title of *stars* from Hollywood Bollywood in a redemptive galactic spiraling.

doctrinal facet, a prevalent insidious doctrine about doctrines. Pat Brown wrote of me recently as the Jeremiah of the Lonergan movement, a quite reasonable assessment with many facets. But I do not wish to lose my focus and ramble about that as I end this third of the *Cantowers*: my real purpose here is to give you simple dipping-advice, simple doctrines, simple policies, regarding your academic culture, re guarding the climb of history's molecules. And the twist of the last sentence may nudge you - once again - towards the **impression** that the guardianship is not that simple a dip, a trip, a ship.

In the first *Cantower* here, *XXXIV*, dealing with functional interpretation I wrote of Siddhartha instead of giving simple advice. The problem is, was, that the advice, given within the Tower, is not simple, is a problem of a life-storing. The doctrines I propose are remote in meaning, just as the functional history that I propose is remote in meaning. But what, really, is the problem? It is the problem of cultural trappings and of the communal leprosy that I have named psychothymia.

I have written about dipping. There is the dipping into the water-puzzle of that first page of the first chapter of *Insight*: I am quite sure that very few of the Lonergan experts took that dip, or will take my advice, Lonergan's first paragraph advice. There is too much sparkling and business, busyness, around Abana and Pharpar. There is the dipping that I suggested in *Cantower XXXV*, gently nudging the experts writing in *Theological Studies*. Will there be a rush to change the pace and the face of theology?⁷² Get real, honey!

But herenow therethen perhaps I am by this time writing only to a few outsiderishly "nerve-racked ... enslaved-by-convention" who sense that my words "bear to them my contempt for their oppressors". To you, interested in functional work, I wish now to give simple dipping advice. But I could not do it without these few

⁷⁰Patrick Brown, "Implementation in Lonergan's Early Historical Manuscripts, *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis*, 3(2003), 235. http://www.mun.ca/jmda/vol3/brown.pdf

⁷¹The bold print, used first for this word in *Cantower XXXIII*, invites you to think in terms of the first word of metaphysics: the impressing on you is a layered reality, intussuscepted by you according to your capacity-for-performance, your *potentia activa*. Determining the meaning of this bold print goes deep: indeed its meaning is laced into an ontogenetic and phylogenetic meaning of *exigence* (see the index of *Phenomenology and Logic*), into the dynamics of energy and loneliness, into an eschatological astronomy.

⁷²The *Cantower* is at present on offer to *Theological Studies*.

⁷³Commission.

prophetic prefatorial remarks. History generates doctrines; axial history generates doctrines of continued decline. Understanding this history, those doctrines, that decline, is a massive Tower task of the future. The counter-doctrines that I propose here seem so simple yet are within that Tower, remote. But you are invited now to read them as simple, with my hope that there is a growing committed **impression** in you of a strange climb. "I will remain by this river, though Siddhartha. A friendly ferryman took me across. I will go to him. My path led from his hut to a new life.... May my present path, my new life start from here!"⁷⁴

Start from here?

We are into the practical problem of first steps in getting the revolutionary show on the roll. The topic of **function** has been aired, especially in relation to interpretation and history. But, you may have noticed, we skipped the first specialty, functional research. Why so? Our little venture began with the group writing in *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 4 (2004). We began with a strategic selection that met both our talents and present needs. Like the few crazies that occupied spots in Dublin in 1916. What would really transform Ireland? That certain is still a question, as the country admires the rivers of Abana and Pharpar. But at least we can stir the local waters. So, in our parallel revolution, we were not initially concerned with the full problem of functional research. But that full problem is worth a pause. Indeed, it is worth a book. Why not a compact paragraph, daftly doctrinal?

Functional research will mature slowly in this millennium to be an efficient categorial conversation with all the other specialties.⁷⁵ It will develop subtlety of selection so that elements of human achievement thrown forward by fantasy and fact will be less tardily caught and connected with the seeds that were there unnoticed in previous millennia. Outsiders with strange bents will pace the stage in place of queens and kings.⁷⁶ And the pace, identified in words of the neglected wise, will likely be oh so

⁷⁴Herman Hesse, *Siddhartha*, 106: already quoted in the relevant context of section 2 of *Cantower XXXIV*.

⁷⁵This certainly, is a large chapter of the story: think of the shift of theology and philosophy out of the conventional research into muddled and commonsense putterings into the demands made by the products of artistry and science.

⁷⁶Below I pick up on the outsider Francis of Assisi and talk of recycling his attitude towards flowers. It is a shift of research to replace e.g. some learned philosopher of his period with Francis' sayings - or to put Chesterton's biography on a theology classes reading list! Think, fantasize, about the recycling that would bring freshness into the present brutal study of botany.

slow, oh so sane.⁷⁷ The words of wise and unwise will be re-cognized **as as as** in an about about turn of self-tasting.⁷⁸ The luck of retrieval will spiral round and up in a Towering new statistics of Remembering the Future.

Someone surely will tackle a book on functional research in the next decades. And there is the book on functional history, going way beyond the few stray hints of this *Cantower*, giving a quite different focus to the two chapters on history in *Method in Theology*. The key point in any of these books is a luminous pointing to the increasing beauty and efficiency and unity of the spiraling: answering on a quite new level the question of tradition, *Process: A Paideiad*.⁷⁹ But I must halt and in conclusion return briefly to the effort to do functional interpretation. Perhaps, by the time I return to the writing of the next three *Cantowers* - in seventeen months - others will have pushed forwards in illustrating and specifying these areas?

So: doctrines of interpretation? Obviously, if you are with me sufficiently through the previous readings you appreciate that doctrinal or policy statements can be

⁷⁷I have been writing about the sick haste and chatter of the twentieth century for decades now, in its simplest form in *Music That Is Soundless*. Perhaps one connection to economics would be a useful nudge. There is the bustle of business boiling out innovations. "The first difficulty is psychological. The static phase is a somber world for men brought up on the strong drink of expansion. They have to be cured of their appetite for making more and more money that they may have more money to invest and so make more money and have more money to invest. They have to be fitted out with a mentality that will aim at and be content with a going concern and a standard of living. It is not an easy task to effect this change, for, as the Wise Man saith, the number of fools is infinite." (Lonergan, *For A New Political Economy*, 98) Functional specialization in the psychology of business (and its cousin, law) should cycle in a massive dose of research on the concomitant madness and unhappiness.

⁷⁸There is a re-cognition that grounds a massive re-reading, whether the reading be of statues, furniture, or simply books. I recall the shock in the late 1980s of "looking at" the shelves of journals in the Bodleian Library and envisaging a massive new recycling of what is already gathered. But the sifting process requires a Towering subtlety.

⁷⁹This is the title of the work promised on p. 117 of *Wealth of Self*. It shrunk to the more elementary work, *Process. Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*. But some such work needs to be tackled, lifting *Method in Theology* out of simple description within a single zone to a refined explanatory global heuristic dominated by developments of the words of metaphysics. Its success would be measured by an incomprehensibility that places its meaning embarrassingly beyond commonsense eclecticism.

just mountaineer talk at the base camp, or even reading at the resort hotel. But to the wise a wink is as good as a nod. We are, then, in the mountain mess of *The Sketch*, 80 which we tie in with chapter 7 of *Method in Theology*. Realistically, we assume that our UV is weak, and that we actually don't know the object. But let me talk in term of 'I'.

I am tackling a piece of interpretation because it seems to me that Fran (Francis or Frances: perhaps you might think of what Francis of Assisi says about contemplating - studying!⁸¹ - birds and flowers!) has a view within which there is a neglected good view on the object. Why 'neglected'? Because the recycling process aims at efficiency. Of course, as an undergraduate exercise, any interpretative exercise can be efficient!

Fran has a view: that's important for me to **bear** in mind: Fran is viewing, someway, what is **to go forward in history**. In more usual terms Fran has a notion of being that includes becoming. Has? Well, develops over a life-time. And it is important here to note that this development in the lifetime, within history, is all part of the context. What I am looking for is Fran's best view of X, X being the object. For example, I mentioned Francis of Assisi's attitude towards flowers. So, let me shock you and myself by saying that the object in this case is **the study of flowers**. Is it a shock? The shock relates back to the 'present state of the categories' that we and the culture have, someway. It relates back to that terrible **about about about** that I introduced in the *Cantowers* on the early *Insight*. There is a shadow of GEMb in what Francis is saying about flowers, and you and I have to **watch out for** that: *that* is shift from content to method Lonergan writes about. Sa

You sense, perhaps, that I am opening up Eiger-climbs, but I am merely pointing

 $^{^{80}}$ *Insight,* chapter 17, section 3.6. And of course there are the canons sketched later in the chapter: section 3.8.

⁸¹See *Lack in the Beingstalk*, the beginning of chapter 3, where I relate study to it Indo-European roots. The mood of chapter three carries forward especially into *CantowerXXI*, which deals with contemplation.

⁸²We are musing about the *Fourthly* of *The Sketch* here. The paragraph needs a great deal of spelling out. I am just making a main point which I shall make again in relation to Lonergan's doctorate work on Aquinas: split context from content. The context includes the ontogenetic and phylogenetic genesis of the relevant idea. What you want to hand on "essentially" to the historian is the "best idea" in the author.

⁸³I invite you to track down Lonergan's nudges about this in *Method in Theology* and in some of his later lectures.

back to my riverrun, riverroon.⁸⁴ I suspect that some of you have to fight the leprosy in you mind and molecules that infests you: from the culture, from Lonerganism. So, there is need for the simple dipping in the water-exercise of *CantowerXXVII*: indeed, there is the 7 dips that I would see as transformative of Lonergan Studies: the 7 *Cantowers XXVII* - *XXXIII*.⁸⁵

But the focus is on that other 6: the six specialties that are not directly methodological but **use**, circulate, the methodological fruitjoists that are the *per se* concern of what I call fourth-level specialization, the seventh. So, returning to the task of interpretation, I would suggest that, because of the immature state of the hodic ventures, the interpretative effort should include your own fourth-level effort. You should have a shot at saying what you are doing as, I would suggest, close to half of your interpretative essay. ⁸⁶ This, of course, is embarrassing: you are trying to show how little you understand of *The Sketch*. If you are really frisky, you push into the canons, keeping an eye on the amalgamation of them with the canons of chapter 3 of *Insight*.

I must cut this short. Two suggestions. Think out the problem of sorting out Lonergan's work on Thomas' view of grace. Can you envisage pulling out a hypothetical expression of Thomas' best view on grace? Then shuffling round the rest so that you get a context and you also have a large remainder that belongs in other specialties? Do you recognize here the possibility of a transposition of the first principle of criticism of the third canon of hermeneutics?! Do you see how it might be packaged

⁸⁴*Run*, pronounced roon in Irish, means **secret** and is also used fro beloved, as in the song titled "Eileen a Run". At the end of *Cantower XXXI* I have a lengthy note - note 75 - on my then-discovered title for the entire *Cantower* project, *Roun Doll, Home James*.

Na'aman, but I find altogether too much learned talk - of subjectivity, of self-attention, of conversions - that is trapped in a cultural and comparative eloquence. My suspicion is that serious, detailed, transformative self-attention was just way out of reach for most of the first couple of generations of Lonergan students. And the serial killing so easily flows on in our new millennium. Recent readings and communications nudge me to see the axial period as stretching on through this millennium. Is it still too soon to expect humanity to take Socrates seriously? But **you** may turn to corner about about about.

⁸⁶Possibly, a really forward-pushing essay would have three equal sections: a section on content, a section on context, and a concluding section on the personal presuppositions of one's procedure. A short introductory piece would locate these directions within a bow to the task of research. And the big challenge, of course, is to hold yourself within the run, the roon, of the second specialty, sentence by sentence!

so that it becomes a pain in the **as** for historians?

Secondly, back to Francis on flowers. See the need for avery slow patient and expectant flexing of the imagination, the way Chesterton leads in his *Francis of Assisi*. Come out of the cave with Francis, standing on your head so that you now see flowers and friends in suspense, and flowers as Friends' Fancy. I am, alas, sweeping you back to earlier doctrines of these *Cantowers*, climbing policy for decades, an invitation of those who would be Sargawits to climb slowly towards **the field**. Some later latter day you may come to read chapter three of *Lack in the Beingstalk* not as doctrine but as a delight of home, of Epilodge, ⁸⁷ of Empirical Residence. ⁸⁸ THEN⁸⁹ you could pause with the little prince. Might we recall now the end of the section "From Big Bang to Coloured Flowers" in *Lack in the Beingstalk*?

"'The little prince could not restrain his admiration: 'Oh! How beautiful you are!' 'Am I not?' the flower responded, sweetly. And I was born at the same moment as the sun....'91

How should the story be told, of the flower, born before yet with the sun, armed slowly with radiations wings and wiles and chlorophiles, painstakingly coping and copying with pigmentations plethora of possibilities? Could I perhaps talk you into an Anna Livia Florabella, a flow of worldflowers, Purefoyled, energy's hungering for whole-colour? Should I start again, like 'Oxen of the Sun', with a primitive invocation to the sun of fertility? 'Deshil Hollis Eamus. Deshil Hollis Eamus. Deshil Hollis Eamus. Send us bright one, light one'. 92 How can one make popular a billion years of yearning?" 93

Making popular is a matter of cycling and recycling over millennia. As I wind now towards the end of the first third of the *CANTOWER* enterprise it seems fitting to repeat the compact invitation at the end of the second chapter of *Lack in the Beingstalk* that meshed the searchings of the elder Shakespeare with those of Joyce and Kavanagh.

⁸⁷Cantower XXI.

⁸⁸Cantower XXXII.

⁸⁹ Cantower V.

⁹⁰Chapter 3, section two.

⁹¹Antoine de Saint Exupery, *The Little Prince*, Harbrace Paperback, 1973, 32-3.

⁹²See the note to this beginning of chapter 14 of in the section referred to in *Lack in the Beingstalk*. The invocation seeded the general title of the CANTOWER project discussed earlier (at the conclusion of *CANTOWER XXXI*): .

⁹³Lack in the Beingstalk, 89.

"Skin-within are molecules of cos mi c all, cauled, calling. The rill of her mouth can become the thrill, the trill, of a life-time, the word made fresh. Might we inspire and expire with the lungs of history? But the hole story is you and I, with and within global humanity, upsettling *Love's Sweet Mystery* into a new mouthing, an anastomotic spiral way of birthing better the buds of Mother". 94

⁹⁴Lack in the Beingstalk, 76.