Cantower XXXVII

Functional Interpretation

April 1st 2005

"It is interesting that something like this can be around for thirty years but, because of certain prejudices of what is and is not significant, continues to be ignored".¹

37.1 Difficulties of Beginning

The quotation with which I begin this beginning of a pedagogy of functional specialization - and it is yet another new beginning - suits the topic extremely well, with chapter 7 of *Method in Theology* sitting round begging for implementation these thirty odd years. Yet it is from quite another zone of interpretation, and indeed it can be taken as referring mainly to the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Still, as Lonergan intimates on the first page of the first chapter of *Method*, from successful science one can pick up clues and hope. Carver Mead writes of the messy success of twentieth century physics: "It is my firm belief that the last seven decades of the twentieth century will be characterized in history as the dark ages of theoretical physics." A little later he notes, "To most non-specialists, quantum mechanics is a baffling mixture of waves, statistics, and arbitrary rules, ossified in a matrix of

¹Feynman II, 15-12. Note 1 of *CantowerXXXIV* gives a relevant chronology of these 'mid-thirties' essays. Note 6 below refers to the *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis for 2004*. The efforts of the group involved stimulated me to tackle the 34th essay early, before I had reached those essays dealing with physics (*Cantowers XXVII- XXXII*). This essay also belongs to that period of early 2003. *Cantowers XXXIII, XXXV, XXXVI*, are more recent works. The concluding section of *Cantower XXXVIII* gives a brief doctrinal summation of a direction in which the functional effort of the first three specialties might go. So, it would give you a context in which to digest the heavier stuff contained in this *Cantower*.

²Carver A. Mead, *Collective Electrodynamics. Quantum Foundations of Electromagnetism*, MIT Press, 2000, 1.

impenetrable formalism. By using a superconductor, we can avoid the statistics, the rules, and the formalism, and work directly with the waves".³ And indeed Mead does just that, lifting the reader forward from elementary reflections on loops of superconducting wire.

Mead obviously raises here the problem of interpretation in physics and it will be a later concern.⁴ Here our focus is on the task of implementing Lonergan's suggestions regarding philosophical and theological interpretation, but the mess in physics should surely give us courage and patience. Theological interpretation is altogether more difficult than interpretations in physics, and, moreover, its mess has extended not through seven decades but through seven centuries. And now someone has the audacity to offer us a Superconducting Loop!

So, here we are, precisely three years out in the *Cantower* adventure, poised in our different ways to have a shot at functional interpretation. Why did we not start right in, poised on the word 'function' that was the beginning of the title of that first April first *Cantower*? If you have been with me, at your own level, through these three years, you will have your own version of plausible answers. Yet the very struggle may have made those answers implausible. I am reminded of the story Lonergan told once of Columbus and the Grandees who belittled his discovery: how Columbus asked if any of them could stand an egg on its end. They could not. He showed them finally, by dinging the end to form a small circular platform.

So now we are in the process of forming a small circular platform - the beginning of the Tower - but even if we succeed in this beginning, the Grandees of present culture are unlikely to applaud, unlikely to loop in. I, and others, have made the case against

³*Ibid.*, 11.

⁴One might scan the list of future *Cantowers* given in *Cantower XXIV* to see how the issue dominates the project right to the end.

the ugliness and inefficiency of present fragmentations⁵ and for the unity, beauty and pragmatic truth of the cyclic collaboration that is to be the superconducting loop of humankind towards fuller living.

Yet this line of reflection only brings us back to some of the many difficulties that occupied us in previous *Cantowers*. There are a host of external difficulties and discouragements meshed together in the institutions, roles and tasks of our times. The one difficulty that I wish us to focus on here is the difficulty of an initial break-in, a dinging of the status quo, a revolutionary jolt, a forming of a small circular pattern. And it seems to me that this difficulty is very much tied to a difficulty of envisagement which yet is not a huge difficulty if only a pedagogy of foundational fantasy could free our imagination.

In this matter Lonergan does not offer much help. And here I am not interested in returning to the various facets of the unhelpfulness. I am interested in the flexing of your fancy. But the flexing has a focus: the reading of parts of Lonergan's two very different **guides** to interpretation: that of *Insight* and that of *Method*. There is *The Sketch* in *Insight*, which - like myself for some decades - you probably have found pretty incomprehensible. There is the fairly readable account of interpretation that occurs in chapter 7 of *Method*, but that account does not seem to mesh with the discussions in *Insight*. And then there are those incomprehensible canons late in chapter 17 of *Insight*. These, of course, will all make sense when the Tower rises up from the small circular platform. But what do we do in the meantime? If we are to attempt something vaguely resembling, assembling, what Lonergan is writing about we need a prior successful attempt at glimpsing concretely what he recommends. Might I clue you into that glimpsing? You recall now Lonergan's comments on adequacy of expression.

Take the first piece of our puzzle: The Sketch. From my own struggles with this

⁵The fragmentation of effort is evident in all areas. It is compactly discussed in *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism,* chapter 3.

piece, since I read it first in the late 1950s, I would say that adequate expression, in our present culture, would be at least ten times longer than the original. What to do? If I were in a teaching situation, then obviously we would read together, pause, puzzle, muse, meander through suggestions and illustrations. And doesn't that final word hit the lack-pot? For, the problem is the lack of illustrations.

Fortunately. However, some attempts at functional interpretation have recently appeared to give us leads.⁶ But it would seem good preparation - and also a good exercise in a certain type of interpretation - to pause over a few paragraphs of Lonergan's guidelines. There is, then, for starters, the fourth paragraph in Lonergan's *Sketch*, which talks of *pure formulations*. Perhaps it is just as well to quote the paragraph fully here.

"Thirdly, there are pure formulations. They proceed from the immanent sources of meaning to determine differentiations of the protean notion of being. Such differentiations may be either the content of single judgments or the contexts constituted by more or less coherent aggregates of judgments. In either case they are pure formulations if they proceed from an interpreter that grasps the universal viewpoint and they are addressed to an audience that similarly grasps the universal viewpoint".

We will come back later to the "first and secondly" that goes with the "thirdly". Let us circle this opaque paragraph slowly, picking out what we might call soft spots. Even if you have not been with me these three years, "universal viewpoint" should ring a bell. We are working on a paragraph in section 3.6 of chapter 17, and talk of "universal viewpoint" has been centre-stage since section 3.1. Our problem has been to take the notion 'out of the clouds'. If you have been in on the struggle with me, you will recall reflections on the work of Ivo Coelho and on the parallel I regularly drew

⁶Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis, 2004. See note 1 above.

between UV and GUTS, grand unified theories in physics.⁷ But I wont presume here that you return to those sections, or peruse them with any intensity. We need a more elementary approach to get to grips with "someone writing from the universal viewpoint, from UV, to someone who has UV".

First, think of the someone as a scientist, graduate years behind her or him, doing research. Assume the field is biology: so the scientist is investigating the tadpole or the sunflower shoot. The investigation, of course, is not vague or general: it is quite focused, on a particular molecular dynamic of the young thing. The pains-taking researching and interpreting yields new insights on some particular transition-pattern in that growing: details of the swim-pattern or of the early sun-orientation. What is the parallel to UV here? Simply that the scientist is up-to-date in the field, and that he or she expects colleagues to whom the paper is written to be up-to-date in the field. Later we can reflect on other audiences, as chapter seven of Method invites us to do. But here we stick to developing a parallel to the key part of the specialist's task in H2. We are considering, then, a scientific community sharing the best opinion of the day on - stick with zoology - both the tadpole and the field of zoology. Here, of course, we are in trouble, a trouble paralleled in the zones of our methodological interest. The best available opinion may not be operative in the zoological community. But even if it is not, it can be assumed that those to whom the paper is written know the description of the various stages of a frog and are sufficiently versed in frog chemistry and neurology etc. That gives us a first nudge towards a parallel with UV. The frog is a genetically and indeed dialectically related structure8: you are certainly not in the ball park if you do not 'have' that on some serious level. And you can add to that seriousness e.g. a common

⁷See *Cantowers XIII* and *XVII*.

⁸This is a complex topic in both botany and zoology: the degrees of adjustment of the organism to unfavorable conditions. Is there a dialectic of grass-growth in relation to animal grazing?

appreciation of the evolutionary perspective on the frog's ancestry. And this is assumed - by writers, by referees, by readers - in the communication that is the scientific paper. You begin to see how to read the last sentence of our troublesome paragraph? A parallel to the 'pure formulation' is simply the character of the up-to-date talk of the community. Certain new relations and integration of the chemo-neuro-dynamic of the tadpole have been discovered. The paper is written in a style that homes in on the newness, in a manner, moreover, that leaves the amateur or incompetent reader quite in the dark.

There are all sorts of complications lurking here that we shall tackle later. But let us presume that the scientist making the particular discovery belongs to an up-to-date sub-group in zoology. Then he or she writes in merciless disregard of those considered out-of-date. Depending on your background you may think here of major and minor paradigm shifts, the whole Kuhn thing. The discovery may involve a shift in context, a fuller genetic coding, a quantum account of synapses. Then the writing has to change and push the context. The protean notion of the frog has been enriched, and that broader enrichment has to be conveyed in the paper. In either case, there are differentiations of the tadpole to be conveyed. A minor discovery can be communicated with single judgments about this nerve or that chemical aggregate and the contexts are underplayed; a disruptive discovery calls for a more or less coherent aggregate of judgments that invite the reader to a shift of contexts. And who is the reader? The

⁹Cantower LIIX will deal talk of tadpoles; Cantower LIX will move to the larger topic of "Developments and Evolutions". There it will be clear that the heuristics of development is at present not alive, well, operative, in present zoological research, interpretation, history. What is primarily operative, within the science and its popularization, is a destructive reductionist shambles.

¹⁰Recall, perhaps, the treatment of Kuhn in *Cantower XVI*.

¹¹Isn't it marvelous what the little letter 'a' can do? We shift from the protean notion of being to the protean notion of **a** being, and we might just get a new glimpse of what the whole business is about.

answer may startle you (it certainly startled me!): it is the scientist primarily as historian but also, perhaps with a dialectic twitch.

Think of the concrete situation in zoology. The reader is working in some area related to the writer's work. The reader wants to know **what is going on**, and the more reliable and reputable the writer the less the dialectic twitch. This is true of readers in general, but now let us recall our particular interest here, functional interpretation, an interest that can be nicely focused in that simple word of our paragraph, **to**: "addressed to an audience". Functional interpretation is primarily¹² addressed **to** an audience that is formally interested in history. That is the address **to** which it is going, globally: "C/O H3". And - I emphasize again - it is to H3 at its best, even at a new anticipated best.¹³

We will get back to that in the next section. Here I would have you focus on the word **to** to the limit of your concrete fantasy. And to aid that fantasy I shall return to my analogy of interpretation in physics, Mead's work. Sorting it out is a later task, but some general reflections help us towards appreciating both the word **to** and the difficulties that surround this new strategy of functional interpretation. But it is relevant to note here how undifferentiated Mead's brilliant little book is. So, Mead is interpreting current in loops and in coaxial transmission lines, but he is also interpreting freshly Maxwell and Einstein, doing a "A Brief History" which bubbles with dialectic issues,

 $^{^{12}}$ One must bear in mind the significance of the *per accidens* and of luck in the genesis of progress. Also one must bear in mind the functional significance of the full matrix, C_{ij} , (see *A Brief History of Tongue. From Big Bang to Coloured Wholes*, p. 108) of hodic communications.

¹³You may well ask how this relates to the principle of minimal categories suggested in the third chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics. A Fresh Pragmatism.* That principle notes that all may be invited to the division of labour by holding to the minimal view: (a) the division is suggested in all areas by present trends; (b) we all implicitly assume a categorial imperative, "be sensAble". The principles still holds and in its operation it will twine with the above agenda, as we shall see.

¹⁴The title of section 2.1, pp. 31-35.

laying out a "Foundations of Physics", 15 pointing towards a more adequate pedagogy. 16

But Mead is pushing here for the best, irrespective of hurt feelings or ruffled feathers. He begins and ends his monograph acknowledging his debt to Richard Feynman, colleague and friend: "as I walked away from Feynman's wake, I felt intensely alone". But this does not prevent him taking Feynman to task about his treatment of the topic (the vector potential **A**) in Volume II of those famous lectures. Although a colleague, he attended these introductory lectures, but Feynman did not push towards a new presentation in this area, although he mentioned it. In chapter 25, he develops the equations of electrodynamics in four-vector form - the approach that I have adopted in this monograph. I can remember feeling very angry with Feynman when I sat in on this particular lecture. Why hadn't he started this way in the first place, and saved us all the mess of a **B** field which, as he told us himself, was not real anyway?" You may recall now my reflections in *Lack in the Beingstalk* on "giving offense", or the discussion of the failures of my Lonergan colleagues: as Fr. Crowe once wrote, "there is need for a measure of bluntness," a bluntness which needs thematization in narrative positioning. But the bluntness has its pre-thematic reality in

¹⁵The title of his Introduction, pp. 1-8.

¹⁶A central topic in *Cantower LIV*: "Quantum electrodynamics, Pedagogy, Popularization".

¹⁷Mead, xv. The acknowledgments occur throughout the Preface and on p. 124.

¹⁸Feynman II: the volumes used throughout *Cantowers XXVII-XXXI*.

¹⁹R.P.Feynman, *QED. The Strange Story of Light and Quanta*, Princeton University Press, 1988, 123.

²⁰Mead, xiii-xiv.

²¹Spirit as Inquiry, Introduction.

²²The problem was discussed in *Cantowers XXIII* and *XXV*.

feelings such as Mead's at Feynman's lecture. There is an evident lesson relating to the challenge of functional interpretation. One must advert to and deal with, both informally and thematically, fixities of perspective and foibles of temperament. Bohr browbeat Einstein, "gathered... a clan at Copenhagen", "a muder the pressure of Bohr's constant verbal abuse, Schrödinger finally gave up his quest for a theory that would be continuous in both space and time". More insidious than verbal abuse and browbeating, of course, are the strategies of condescension, neglect, avoidance: the comfortable closed-minded school.

So I return to the meaning of the word **to** and the challenge of writing to "the best". Yes, I am back in the first paragraph of *Cantower I* of Easter Monday, April 1st, All Fools Day, of 2002. Or back with the analogue of Easter Monday in Dublin of 1916. Strategic buildings are to be occupied, against an empire, with whatever excellence can be mustered. What does this mean here? You may not have any serious glimpse of a UV, a graduate perspective that might emerge if there were any undergraduate seriousness. But you have, perhaps, sniffed the legitimacy of the analogy with semi-successful sciences? And to that sniff there are added - the parallel with chemistry's periodic table has been made regularly - the heuristic words of metaphysics: W1, W2, W3, W4 (presently introduced) and WO. We have been reading here a piece of W3: indeed, the recurrences of the letters **UV** throughout, but especially as they occur in the boxes that diagram H2 and H3. Have you a little more light on the meaning of someone talking from UV to those with UV making a neat fresh contribution to "what goes on"?

But, you say, I haven't got the UV. No: but you can name it, like the first year chemistry student can name the periodic table. Further, I would suggest that such naming, in the present culture, should be up-front. Mead's little book has a first section

²³Mead 2-3.

²⁴Mead, 2.

²⁵Mead, 104.

"Foundations of Physics" that attempts to locate his "jump". You too need, for yourself as well as for your reader, an introductory statement of your stand, even if be slimly heuristic. And that stand brings you back to the "secondly" of *The Sketch*, "the immanent sources of meaning", to what I now suggest calling W4, the diagrams of knowing and doing that are presented in Appendix A of *Phenomenology and Logic*. At all events, have we made some progress in reading the paragraph beginning "thirdly"? And perhaps we are ready to deal more broadly with that little word **to** in its last sentence?

37.2 To

There are some really funny phrases, sentences, paragraphs in *Insight*, like "we are now familiar with the notion of the empirical residue" or "we discovered in the rationally self-conscious subject..." ²⁷ You might claim that we are already dealing with a funny paragraph - funny peculiar - and yes you are right. But the paragraph that pirouettes on the meaning of the word **to** is my present choice of funny paragraph. It is the paragraph on "reflective interpretation" that occurs early in section 3.1 of this chapter 17.²⁸ Lonergan is off in his own little or large world, typing away in the summer of 1953 about an audience's habitual grasp of its own development.²⁹ Isn't that

²⁶I am here recalling the attitude of positioning discussed in *Cantower XXV*. Recall also that there I adopted my own usage of "position" as looser than Lonergan's, for whom "position" meant correct position. This is just a matter of convenience. Lonergan's usage is quite strategic but not too manageable. When I wish to speak of Lonergan's "position" I use the word "poisition", since I do not think that one can have, or be had by, "the position" without the flavor of poisition. (See *Cantower IX*).

²⁷*Insight*, 618[641].

²⁸*Insight*, 563[586].

²⁹You may recall dealing with this earlier, in *Cantower VII*, where the inclusive topic was development, and I quoted at length from "On Intellect and Method" on the precise topic of self-luminosity.

something, quite far out?! From that paragraph he works his way to inviting you to glimpse the necessity of UV.

Now UV certainly includes, normatively, your own viewpoint as well as your audience's viewpoint, and the audience's UV includes yours. But these UVs are on the move, growing, and the aim of the moving - including the present moving as I finger your brain - is to mediate a self- luminous growing. All this, and much more, lurks in the little word **to** of the phrase "addressed to an audience". **To** is a matter of the mutual self-mediation embedded in the later definition of generalized empirical method that I sloganized as "when teaching children geometry one is teaching children children". For our present circumstances and considerations we might express it as "when talking interpretation to historians one is talking historians and history to historians". We are in deep water here, but it is necessary to at least dip in our toes.

Talking in any culture is matter of biography reaching to biography in history. But here we are in the Dark Tower, the spiral seeking, sloping, to mediate "plain talk".³⁰ Our mutual reaching in that Tower, at its best, a luminous incarnate presence of self-tasting general kategories: "the use of the general categories occurs in any specialty."³¹ The **to** of the talk, the writing and the reading, strains - but it is not vertical finality that strains and groans in us?³² - for the reduction of dialogue darkness.³³ But that strain is deeply normative, hidden, frustrated, history's cry for authenticity. We can only do our best, but that poor best should be luminously poor and heuristically rich. We are

³⁰See the final section of chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.

³¹Method in Theology, 291.

³²I am thinking here of the context of chapter 8 of *Romans*; a further fruitful context is Lonergan's Reflections on vertical finality in "Mission and Spirit", *A Third Collection*.

³³A context here is the discussion on Scripture at the end of Lonergan, *De Deo Trinto. Pars Systematica*, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964.

speaking, in cyclic collaboration, to the next million years.³⁴ The luminous poverty and the heuristic richness are both sustained, braced, by your embracing of the words of metaphysics, already recalled in the first section. These words are an expression of a key part of the new control of meaning, but they must become a character-presence of the Tower people, sustained and planed by new patterns of linguistic feedback, new symbolizations.

But all this, perhaps, is straining your fantasy overmuch at this stage. Still, I would insist that I am merely developing the analogy with e.g the successful elementary science of physics. That analogy is massively resented and excluded by present philosophy, theology, human studies. The word to in the new context has a meaning massively different from the commonsense usage that prevails in those areas. That massive difference can emerge slowly, but with better statistics of emergence and survival, through the slopings of the Hodic Tower. The slopings are angled up by the excellence of the functioning in each global sub-zone of the enterprise's scar-trek. So, the funny paragraph on reflective interpretation has its point, its pointing. I recall a remark of the sociologist Peter Berger: "we become what we are addressed as by others". I have always used this in discussions of cultural stagnation and decay. But there is cultural uplift. The operative meaning of to can become, oh so slowly, a self-tasting authenticity that can make the future better than it was.

37.3 To H3 With Love

Are we beginning to make sense of the paragraph on pure formulations? And we are only warming up! But whatever else the reflections so far have done they have

³⁴In this context it is worth brooding over the section in *Method* (pp.79-80) that deals with community, existence, history, tradition's authenticity.

³⁵You may connect our reflections here with the earlier reflections (*Cantower IV*) on the **To**-mega principle and its commonsense realization.

surely given you a sense of the distinction between doctrinal writing and pedagogical writing, a later difficult topic.³⁶ And that distinction is important here, as we struggle with the heuristics of functional interpretation, for the *per se* 'writing to' of functional work, especially as the tradition moves from its infancy, is to be predominantly doctrinal.

But first a refreshing pause over the doctrinal character of *Insight* which we have experience first-hand in our work on **to**. My analogue here is mountaineering. My stepson Jamie climbs mountains in a frighteningly professional manner. In the language of that discipline, Lonergan in *Insight* was not a lead climber: a lead climber is literally roped into the group, lacing it up the rock-face or ice-face grip by grip. Lonergan, in that same language, was a speed-climber. He reminds me of a famous British conductor who rehearsed only the first movement of a symphony before the concert. A piccolo player piped up, "but I haven't ever played this symphony". To which the conductor replied, "Oh, You'll enjoy it tremendously". Doctrinal writing demands a culture that recognizes it as such, that does not confuse a horizontal book on Everest with the vertical journey. Sadly, the book *Insight* had no such culture waiting for it in 1953, when Tensing and friend first climbed Everest.

So, what about this doctrinal aspect of functional interpretation? Here we move our reflections abruptly into the context of chapter 7 of *Method*, indeed into the particular section on "stating the meaning of the text": "Our concern is with the statement to be made by the exegete qua exegete. As in the other functional specialties so too in interpretation the exegete experiences, understands, judges and decides. But he does so for a specific purpose. His principle concern is to understand".

Now you will notice here that I am giving the topic a twist: his or her principle concern is not understanding, but a concern with and for history which includes,

 $^{^{36} \}mathrm{The}$ particular focus of $\pmb{Cantower}\, \pmb{LV}$: "Electrodynamics, Pedagogy, Popularization".

indeed luminously, that effort of understanding. The principle concern, then, is the loving address of the future through the next functional orientation. There is no point in going back here over the difficulties of Lonergan's writing of *Method*. What is important is that you struggle to keep our reading of pieces of this section of *Method* in the context of our reflections on the paragraph on pure formulations. You might now ask, Is my twist of the topic a twist away from Lonergan's meaning? The answer is to be had at the end of the next paragraph of the text: "all the listening to the past and transposing it into the present have no purpose unless one is ready to tell the people of today just what it implies for them". But, yes, there is in the twist a fuller emphasis on the dynamic and creative aspect of the collaboration, the aspect of fantasy that belongs *per se* to foundations, the aspect of readiness caught in the title of the related *Cantower XIV*: "Communications and Ever-Ready Founders".³⁷ And I would suggest that you could import that twist into the paragraph just mentioned by replacing the word "settle" in it by "unsettle". The aim of the interpreter is to unsettle, indeed to unsettle both the historian and history.

I appeal here to your power of concrete fantasy of papers and presentations within this specialty. "The exegete qua exegete expresses his interpretations to his colleagues technically in notes, articles, monographs, commentaries". 38 I insist, as I did previously, that the interpreter's task is one of controlled creativity: functional efficiency and beauty require that the exegete not inflict on colleagues or historians a searching ramble. Merge here the fourth principle of criticism, "derived from the goal" with section 6 of *Method* chapter 7, "judging the correctness of one's interpretation". And of

³⁷You may remember that in that *Cantower* I pointed to the problem of integrating the two sets of Canons and I went on the illustrate the hodic dynamic in relation to the possibilities of lifting the life of the south Manhattan of the Gangs.

³⁸Method in Theology, 170.

³⁹Insight, 589[612].

course, in the new culture, there is the problem of living, in that effort to judge, with a histo-global eye on the problem of re-bottling old wine. The hodic cycling is a matter of un-settling, not re-settling. But there is need for care in dealing with old wine: Aquinas remains to be read; Maxwell has better things to say than contemporary electrodynamics;⁴⁰ and Mead concludes his monograph with a sentence about Einstein that can certainly be applied to Lonergan. "I close by recognizing the enormous wealth of insight we have inherited from Einstein, only a minuscule fraction of which has, as yet, entered the consciousness of physics as a whole".⁴¹

But back to the problem of the exegete stating the judged content and context. This is not something for which a prescription can be given: the new culture of UV and luminous linguistic feedback is distant. One must reach, as best one can, for that distant standard, sentence by sentence. There are to be no deviations into research or dialect, no distractions about the history of interpretations, no ramblings into comparative reflections, but a focus on locating the newly-discovered meaning in the fullest genetic context. Think of our tadpole illustration, but now we are interpreting not a tadpole but some thinker who had some embryonic UV controlling the expression of context and content. Thematizing that egg of a UV is an extremely novel undertaking. One of the novel aspects, that surely will discomfort various naive orientations is, however, easily imaged in terms of the tadpole. Let us think of our old friend Damascene on the topic of W4. You might think of him as a tadpole version of Aquinas' frog. And, discomfortingly, your thinking and writing of him is thus controlled.

The high purpose of the exegete, then, is to hand the baton over at full tilt to the

⁴⁰See Mead, 31-33.

⁴¹Mead, 124.

⁴²This is a topic which merits a lengthy foundational essay. An interpretation reaches towards a thematization of the semi-explicit or operative orientation of a thinker within the relevant cultures. The following note adds a context.

historian who is leaning dynamically into the future. To smell out that purpose more adequately we need to come to grips with the stance of the functional historian, a stance patchily expressed in the relevant two chapters of *Method*. That is our next *Cantower's* task. To prepare the way we had best conclude this orientational section, and move to the core of our troubles, the canons of hermeneutics as they apply to H2. But perhaps there is no harm in concluding the present section by noting that in my plea for an aiming at excellence, a speaking to a scarcely-existent UV audience, I am pushing for a pragmatism to deal with the good, the bad and the ugly. The good - those who take Lonergan seriously in the dark vertical finality of his suggestions - should welcome the lift, the stretching. The bad - those who have no contact with Lonergan's hodic suggestions and so cannot but muddle along badly in contemporary fragmentations - should gradually recognize and imitate the excellence, especially as it trespasses to give a new edge to collaboration in their own zones. The ugly - Lonergan disciples comfortable only in the estranged world of *haute vulgarization* - should find other work.

37.4 Visiting the Canons of Hermeneutics

By now you are clear on the "visiting" aspect of this *Cantower*. In the previous two sections we have paused, very briefly, over single paragraphs in the text of our interest. We follow the same strategy here: the strategy is a matter of illustrating the task of reading seriously so that it can be carried into the full text. The carrying in our present culture, as you are increasingly aware, is inevitably defective. In these last two sections I would like both to increase that awareness and to move the strategy to realistic initial remedies of defects. And my efforts, and yours, pivot on reading a single paragraph of Lonergan's discussion, in section 3.8 of chapter 17 of *Insight*, of "canons for a methodical hermeneutics". So let's have the paragraph up-front. It belongs in the third canon, the canon of successive approximation; here we are entertaining a broader notion of approximation that Lonergan, approximating and cultivating distantly the proper operation of the canons.

"A first principle of criticism is supplied by the demand for a universal viewpoint. Moreover, this demand possesses the requisite dynamic character. For though a contributor fails to present his results in terms of the protean notion of being, a critic can proceed from that notion to a determination of the contributor's particular viewpoint, he can indicate how the particularism probably would not invalidate the contributor's work and, on the other hand, he can suggest to others working in the contributor's special field the points on which his work may need revision".

Now a first reading of this paragraph calls for an identification of both critic and contributor - if only potential - with yourself. This, I think you will find, gives a very different, even strange, reading to the first short sentence. The reality is you in the contemporary world, a principle of criticism, a directed first principle of directed criticism. The double "directed" emphasizes the reality of you as a notion of the future. Are you supplied by your nerves, within the contemporary world, with a demand for such a viewpoint? Only distantly, perhaps only reluctantly, perhaps with massive screening by personal and cultural biases. The contemporary world is a Pauline groaning demand for the seedling and sapling of the universal viewpoint in characters such as you. You would not be reading this if you were not a dynamic character. But it is unlikely that you are the requisite dynamic character for possession of, by, the demand. Does your loneliness, that is you as first principle, as a peculiar nature within an evolving nature, reach effectively towards the contemporary supplying of the demand, a supplying that works "to bring the virtualities of that nature into the light of day?" 44

I am attempting to turn the first two sentences of the paragraph into an impossible dream, so as to enlarge our glimpse of the words in the next sentence, "a

⁴³One might well consider a re-thinking and re-writing of *Insight* chapter 12 in this context to arrive at a fuller notion of being.

⁴⁴Insight, 535[558]

contributor fails". We are not facing some local failure of our times to meet recognized norms: we are facing an axial neglect that fermented forward brutally after the thirteenth century. The settled product of that fermenting, decaying, neglect is a viewpoint that would fill out Lonergan's discussion of universal viewpoint with the lightweight dialectic of philosophies that is standard pablum in departments of philosophy and theology. Then one reads comfortably that the universal viewpoint "would equip him with a capacity to transport his thinking to the level and texture of another culture in another epoch" envisaging safely the texts of Tertullian or of Scotus. But what if the cultural epoch is twentieth century physics with its demands for the universal viewpoint?

Contemporary philosophers and theologians - and the vast majority of Lonergan enthusiasts - will cry "unfair: I am interested in this notion as it applies to the history of philosophy or of religion and theology". Lonergan replies that such an interest just doesn't cut it, nor can it breed the universal viewpoint, which "has its base in an adequate self-knowledge". At That adequate self-knowledge is made possible and probable by the development of modern science, a development not just in one's neighbour but in one's own minding. And how now do you react to my present supplying of the demand? Far out; "A Bridge Too Far." But if you are reacting favorably, then you are one the eccentrics that we reflected on earlier, reaching for the Dark Tower. You are alone. "What is lacking is the cultural mileau" that would take

⁴⁵*Insight*, 565[588].

⁴⁶Insight,565[588].

⁴⁷A theme of my article "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", *Creativity and Method*, ed. M.Lamb, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1980.

⁴⁸The concluding topic of *Cantower IV*.

⁴⁹Insight, 535[588].

as obvious that "theoretical understanding seeks... to embrace the universe in a single view," 50 to hug being and becoming to its heart.

So we reach in this third sentence a hearty darkness. Neither contributor nor critic, you both ways, can operate from this developed notion of being and becoming. You, as principle, have been supplied by fraudulent demands that deny you "the security and leisure" for "a long ascent." How, then, are you to appreciate and indicate how the particularism of your present viewpoint probably would not invalidate your past efforts at interpretation, your present efforts to reorient your poise in the face of a task of interpretation? How might you suggest to yourself points on which your "work may need revision"?

Certainly you may now wish to read the paragraph again with an eye on some other contributor, but it seems best here to keep the focus on the 'existential gap." ⁵³ In the next section we shall muse over possible practical strategies for moving along towards beginnings. ⁵⁴ Here I would have first you enjoy a pause of satire and humour over your own viewpoint. "That serene act of cool objectification" of present views might indeed "hurry them to their destiny of bringing about their own reversal". ⁵⁵ We will, in any case, carry the reflection forward to envisage aspects both of the standard vision and of the initial push needed to replace it. That push towards replacement will occupy us right through the *Cantowers* on functional specializations, listed elsewhere

⁵⁰Insight, 417[442].

⁵¹*Insight*, 535[588].

⁵²*Insight*, 535[588].

⁵³See on *Phenomenology and Logic* this topic.

⁵⁴Check also the doctrinal summary in section 6 of *Cantower XXXVIII*.

⁵⁵Insight, 626[649].

for your perusal.⁵⁶ You may think of the push so gradually depicted as a slow rereading of the basic diagram, W3, where UV occurs right through the cycling. But I am getting ahead of myself.

First, then, at best, your attempt to articulate your personal shot at UV may not in fact be very personal. Indeed, it may only be a memory of philosophy or history of philosophy classes, where viewpoints were lined up like Biblical ancestry: Descartes begat Kant; Kant begat Hegel; Hegel begat Marx, etc. Or more sketchily there are families in China, or Greece, or in the modern West: German idealism, British empiricism, American pragmatism. Brood over this for a bit. What sort of a paper - or if you are an established academic, book - would you produce (without going to resources beyond your own 'principles') about these sequences of viewpoints? I am asking you, of course, to struggle towards a poor imitation of a pure formulation of your own context.

And, further, you can ask yourself how the effort measures up to the grim project sketched in *Cantower IX*. Literally, at this stage, whatever turns you on. You may enjoy the purgative pleasure of finding that you are caught in an imaginative synthesis,⁵⁷ back and forth across the English channel or the Pacific in colours, and this can be true even if you use images and lists from Lonergan.

So you come back, more personally, to the difficulties of the shift to excellence that I wrote about in the earlier sections. The *Cantowers* up to now have been a lengthy invitation to sniff out and shift out of a domineering cultural mileau. In *Cantower VIII* I wrote of the slopes involved in the mature cycling and re-cycling, but now perhaps you have a better sense of those slopes. So, there is the large reversal involved in thinking and talking decreasingly about philosophical discourse and increasingly about the "philosophy of" internal to particular dedicated human searchings. In an earlier work I

 $^{^{56}}$ In the full list given in *CantowerXXIV*. See also note 75 below.

⁵⁷See section 6.4 of chapter 3 of *Insight*.

made this point in relation to the *Opera Omnia* of Descartes and Pascal, contrasting the problem of the methodology of their geometry with their confused commonsense ventures in methodology and philosophy.⁵⁸ Nor is this an erudite matter, like discussing how Kant was categorially trapped in the common sense of Newton's "Space and Time". It is a matter of a plain commonsense view being carried all the way into methodology: the person who is to be attended to in talk about any being is the person who has taken that being seriously. As you notice already, above, the notion of being a frog seems to be much more trouble than the notion of being. Viewpoints on frogs can be neatly dodged by the genetic and dialectic sequencing of blinkered philosophers' views on Being.

Still, you have to start where you are, within this cautioned mood. Lists and diagrams from Lonergan can help. So, one picks up, even as a first year student, on the lists and line-ups that can be conjured from *Insight*. Have you ever envisaged turning the "line" or "line-up" of the Introduction so as to see it as a lead to history's mess of philosophic stances? Then, amazingly, the stances are seen to oscillate up and down between the bottom point of pure empiricism and the halfway point of Pure Platonism. Thomas is "far out", up there in the strange zone that I call "extreme realism". And, to wind round again to humour and humility, just because Lonergan reached luminosity on this does not magically warrant a large school equally successful and luminous.

And so on. *Method* can be searched for on-going and overlapping contexts to reveal - if only descriptively or diagrammatically - broad shifts of viewpoint, including the great span of a historical views that identifies our present axial views. And that spanning grounds my present effort to sense the distant goal, the distance to be

⁵⁸ !Somewhere in *The Redress of Poise*. The exact reference is unimportant: what is important is struggling to the mood of suspicion that commonsense contributions can be mightily sophisticated, opening up new explanatory territory: but the axial tendency is to over-rate the sophistications.

⁵⁹Insight, xxviii[25].

traveled to bring us out of contemporary philosophic arrogance. Nor is the way out of that arrogance being intimated by present truncated philosophies of the arts and sciences: but that certainly is a larger and distracting issue, and dealing with it "demands" subtle strategic moves in the demand for the universal viewpoint. I am inviting you to think both big and small. We are reaching for a massive shift in the control of meaning. But each of us must live as luminously as possible in the microshifting of our own view of views.

And that duplication leads me to the final point of this section. Share with me again 60 the question, Have I a view of my own view? Does this question strike you as a strange twisted question? Indeed, it is a strange deep question, relating both to the strangeness of a deeper sense of intelligibility that was the whole point of the *Verbum* articles and to the methodological twist given by identifying a second order of consciousness and indeed a third: but we'll get back, or forward, to that. 61 But, more elementarily, UV surely requires me and you to have a view of our view? Our UV should contain our views on this and that. Contain? Contain luminously, in a manner that makes our views on this and that more luminous. We are on the edge here of another zone, indeed another specialty, that of Systematics, and you would benefit from trying the adventure of *Cantower VII* on the matter. At least read the text quoted there 62 (in English!) from Lonergan's *De Intellectu et Methodo*, where Lonergan is discussing how a mathematician would write about the development of mathematics. Are we not back to the tadpole-frog analogy? And we are in the context of autobiography, giving you a chance to exercise the UV reflection in regard to the

⁶⁰But did we really share it the first time, above, in the paragraph talked about at note 29?

⁶¹See the quotation at note 63 below. We have been around this topic previously with the refrain 'about about'. See note 20 of *Cantower XXVII*.

⁶²Cantower VII, pp. 12-13.

massive task of "Remembrance of Things Past", but lifting Proust's effort into a quite new context.

Here a digression is, if not in order, at least helpful. Often I find commentators on Lonergan relating his work to other thinkers who speak of questions, insights, whatever, and the commentators seem to imply that these thinkers are right into generalized empirical method without knowing it. That is just not true: it is no more true of John Dewey or Norman Hanson than it was of Proust. Growing self-knowledge is growing self-knowledge. The growth, or cultural transition from truncation, that is generalized empirical method, is a refined luminous startling self-knowledge: can it be had without self-knowledge, without any expression of its startling presence? Perhaps there is light to be shared here by inviting you to reflect on Lonergan's description of three orders of consciousness: "Distinct and concomitant, consciousness and intentionality are linked by the two bridges of continuity and introspection. There is the bridge of continuity between the conscious human subject and the body in which he is incarnate; consciously he may move his fingers, hands, arms. There is also the bridge of introspection: it is the shift of attention by which we advert to the data of consciousness. Such adverting is both conscious and intentional, but it is of a second order, for it supervenes upon a prior consciousness and intentionality. Second-order consciousness is the presence of the subject to himself as introspecting; second-order consciousness has a second-order object that in a first order is not an object but a datum of consciousness. Similarly, when as at present one introspects introspection, then there is a third-order consciousness, for consciously we advert to our adverting to our own operations. There is a third-order intentionality whose third-order object was, in the second order, not an object but the datum of consciousness that is the introspection being introspected".63 Second order consciousness is a massive shift towards having a

⁶³I am quoting here from the Lonergan file of February 1965 which is the centrepiece of Darlene O'Leary's book, *Lonergan's Practical View of History*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2004. It is taken from a sketch of a first chapter of *Method*, one which promised

view on views. Third-order consciousness is the leap to a full evolutionary science of views and their heuristics, to a method -o- logos that, as I regularly say, is to method what zoology is to animals. It is the present UV of the community reaching out with new hodic luminousness into *the field*, as the GUTS of the physics community reaches out beyond present GUTS and present field theories into that same *field*.⁶⁴ But here we are reaching quite beyond beginnings.⁶⁵

37.5 How Might I Begin?

You recognize, of course, the "beginning" nature of the present *Cantower*, perhaps most evidently from the restriction to three paragraphs of the immediately relevant writings of Lonergan. The central difficulty of beginning adequately is the difficulty of foundational fantasy, of lifting yourself in imaging out of the version of axial culture which possesses your bones and nerves and tongue. There are hints to that effort in the previous pages. Here I wish to give those hints a more practical focus. Who, then, is the "I" envisaged in the title? There is the "I" that holds a position as teacher and scholar; there is the "I" that is a student, interested in surviving the system,

to be a more massive achievement than what eventually emerged in the book.

⁶⁴See the index under *field* in Phenomenology and Logic, and the reflections at the conclusion of the Introduction to the index.

⁶⁵A context for the move beyond beginnings will be generated in *Cantowers LXVI -LXXXI*, Where refinements of the words of metaphysics will be generated against the background of Lonergan's reflections, in *Phenomenology and Logic*, on the layers of controls and metalanguages of Logic. He hints at this need in his sketch of 1965 of a first chapter of *Method*. See Darlene O'Leary's work cited in note 63, in chapter 2.

⁶⁶Such is that possession that you may well suit up for your academic daze without any sense of the massive unlivablity of that daze. So, you have to find Lonergan guilty of a mood of foolish exaggeration when he writes: "...philosophers for at least two centuries, through doctrines on politics, economics, education, and through ever further doctrines, have been trying to remake man, and have done not a little to makes life unlivable" *Topics in Education*, 232.

even in getting a job in the system in order to improve the system and the symphony of history. I am assuming that both types, both of U, are familiar with Lonergan's writings and I hope that my commentary above - and in previous *Cantowers* - has given a fresh lift to your reading.

Let us think in terms of UVA and UVB, where I am mainly a UVA: UV Academic (it is to be hoped, in Academus' sense) and you are either UVA or UVB: a Beginner UV. Notice the identification of you and your viewpoint: think of it in terms of the two short sections in *Method*, the section on Incarnate Meaning in chapter 3, the first section of chapter 14 on the Character of the Tower dweller. We are, each of us, some level of UV, just as everyone can be considered some level of tennis player. That parallel may be useful to U, especially if physics frightens you. It helps towards realistic humility: we are not all the stuff of the tennis circuit. This, you should remember, is also true of physics: there are some very routine doctorate theses, followed by lives of creative learning and teaching that are also relatively routine. This is acknowledged in physics; it is altogether more manifest, on-court, in tennis. Why can't we have the same realism of talent in philosophy and theology?

So this brings me to the realism of U and I and our UVs. Whether U are a UVB or a UVA, think in terms of the climb through undergraduate years that should eventually emerge, bringing forth graduates that can actually hope to attempt serious functional interpretation. I have been over this ground before many times. If the third year course in theology and philosophy is quite intelligible to a beginner - and is this not regularly true? - then there is something wrong with the program. Curing that cultural sickness is a very long-term project, but it helps to think in those terms in order to locate one's defective culture and context imaginatively, descriptively, satirically. And within that location one can better puzzle over the challenge of beginning.

Let us pause first over the problem of the UVA. For the UVA the challenge of functional interpretation is more immediate and direct. The personal reading of that paragraph from the third canon is a central nudge. You may have been a contributor,

even done a doctorate "interpreting": check back on it now, secretly! I would be very surprised if you had written it functionally (excepting the meaning of *function* relating to the function of getting through!). Have you a better sense now of the power of this luminous functionality that defines the collaborative mentality of the hodic way? Do you glimpse the possibility in this millennium, finally, of the emergence of a metaphysics, a hodics, that has a unity and beauty and efficiency that lifts it to a higher level of likeness to the collaboration of the divine community?⁶⁷ But let us keep an eye on the immediately practical. What of a present contribution, a publishable exercise in interpretation? I already mentioned illustrations of such exercises, and reading them is a start. Now you may say that you are not a Wimbledon tennis player: but there is more to global tennis that Wimbledon. Hodic collaboration consists of multitudes of small efforts of interpretation. I have pointed to such small efforts in relation to a text of Damascene, and one could extend the illustrating to texts of Dogen, or Daniellou or Dewart or any other group in the alphabet soup of history's thinkers.

Here I would recall the problem of knowing the object that the person is writing about. You may not know the object: but then you should try to be up-front about the state of your knowledge. Lonergan writes about the growth involved in reading classics. Functional interpretation reaches out to them, and Lonergan details the pattern of that reaching, the limited judgments, the statements. I emphasize here mainly the need for luminousness, the presence - especially in these initial decades - of explicitations of the "scientific moments" that *per se* belong in the operations of dialectic described on p.250 of *Method*. In so far as you know the object better than the author - I think of the great twosome of the early decades of the 20^{th} century, Einstein and Schumpeter in the intussuscepted context of Lonergan's work on the nature both of real

⁶⁷On imaging the divine community, see Lonergan, *De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica*, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964, p. 208 ff.

geometry and of scientific economics - than that too should be up-front.⁶⁸ This point is, of course, strange to many traditional views of interpretation: U are in a much better position as interpreter if U know what the author is reaching for and where later authors went.

In *Cantower XIII* I pleaded with those involved in "interpreting Lonergan" to try to avoid inflicting on us their stumbling learning experience. Here what I said about other classics is much more important: articulate your position either at the beginning or at the end. But aim, in the body of your work, at straight functional interpretation. This whole business of interpreting Lonergan calls for heavy reflection that would range through the specialties: I leave it for another day.⁶⁹ But I would note that from the point of view of the hodic cycling Lonergan is just another author.⁷⁰ Don't pretend to "use" Lonergan's categories to interpret Lonergan or anyone else. All you have is your own categorial perspective.

Now having said - or read - that, let us brood over a loophole. Stay here perhaps with the analogy of chemistry.⁷¹ The advancement of a science involves a belief-structure. That point is brought out nicely, as I recall regularly, by the presence inside the cover of introductory texts in chemistry of a chart of the periodic table. This chart is in some way the equivalent of the non-existent chart of GUTS in physics. The best equivalent in the present venture is the chart which I have named W3, but it has to be

⁶⁸I am thinking here of the efforts of Quinn (on Einstein) and McCallion (on turnover periods) in *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 4 (2004)

⁶⁹See below, notes 73 and 75.

⁷⁰One of the powers of the hodic process is that a work such as Lonergan's *Insight* will gradually be sifted through as grounding foundational fantasy.

⁷¹You may well have your own better analogues from music, painting, whatever.

complemented by W0, W1, W2 and W4⁷², and the meaning filled out from the general categorial list given by Lonergan. I do not wish to digress here on the significance of symbolism and the need for its further development. But, commonsensically, you can appreciate the advantage of a decent map, especially if the map can be trusted. Now that trusted map or set of maps belongs to your categorial perspective, so it does not contradict the conclusion of the past paragraph. But it belongs only **as such**. That is a tricky problem in practice: being continually luminous and critical about turning the maps into mere techniques. The slips here are of a like nature as such slips in physics: One can witness graduates in physics' seminars handling stuff with technical competence but very little else.

A range of pointers occur to me here regarding the UVA surviving present academic life and yet contributing to the cultural shift. But perhaps each UVA will detect the particular strategies required to publish, teach and not perish. In any event we can only touch on some of these strategies that are common to all UV hunters, whether UVAs or UVBs. And it is important to note the if you are a UVB the previous paragraph is even more relevant to you; furthermore that it is a basis of fruitful luminous linkage between the UVA as teacher and the UVB as student. The five words of metaphysics give a very solid - palpable, indeed discomforting - control of meaning. This next generation will have to live with the humility that it imposes, a humility that

⁷²I introduced the name W4 formally in *Cantower XXIV*. It simply names the two diagram of knowing and doing that are available in *Phenomenology and Logic*, Appendix A.

⁷³I halted myself here in a way that is important to ponder. Perhaps the point can be made best by a parallel. Lonergan pushed forward in the final chapter of *Topics in Education* to speak of general history. A careful reading will show how he is trapped into a sketching that permits *haute vulgarization*. What is needed, there and here, is the emergence of a new culture with its guides, manuals, exercises, standards. It would be foolish of me to attempt sketching. So: my *Cantower* turns now towards a convenient ending.

battles the culture of serial killers that I wrote of previously. Are theses five words of metaphysics or hodics dangerous? Only if mere technique is allowed to pass as character. We are just not up to the standards set by Lonergan's *Insight*. The revelation of that is a matter of mutual self-mediation - we are back to our reflections on TO - in that teacher and student can ask each other, What could possibly be meant by, say, b_k or z_1 , in W1 and W3. Increasing the probabilities of a fuller competence in the next generation of methodology-teachers is another and more complex issue 75 , but at least you can suspect that luminous use of the 5 words would give some lift to undergraduate struggling.

However, our immediate topic is getting into functional interpretation, where getting into is something proximate for the UVA (who wishes to work in that specialty) and something to be aspired to by the UVB. Here you have to think more concretely, in this context of a massively deficient culture, of Lonergan's sentence: "The exegete also speaks to his pupils, and he must speak to them in a different manner." First, note how you can lift the meaning of the sentence by reading "in a different manner" in the context of our reflections on **to**. Then modify what Lonergan says here and in *Insight* to suit the cultural crisis. We are all relatively innocent of the full meaning of *functional*. And we are equally unused to thinking in terms of the global efficiency of our efforts as

⁷⁴Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway, 146.

⁷⁵It is an issue that haunts the second four specialties, and it will have to be tackled in some preliminary way in the *Cantowers* (*XXXVIII*, *XXXIX*, *XL*, *XLI*, *LII*, *LII*) dealing with the six specialities that follow Interpretation, and more fully in the later *Cantowers* (*LXVI-LXXXI*) that reach for more sophisticated expressions of levels of progress and control.

⁷⁶Method in Theology, 171.

⁷⁷The issue was raised first in *Cantower I*, where I surmise about limitations in Lonergan's own orientation. It was made a precise topic in *Cantowers XXXIV* and *XXXV*.

intrinsic **to** the unity and beauty of metaphysics and life. Lifting the level of our concrete intention to functional performance in the full dynamic of being and becoming: that is not a serious present topic much less a mood of *praxis*.

But think now, not of the seminar that Lonergan writes of, but of the class presentation. The teacher can invite interpretation of Lonergan from a student: the interpretation of short passages, such as I illustrated above, such as is illustrated by the work of McCallion in *Journal of Macrodynamic Analysis* 4(2004).⁷⁸ The paragraph that we reflected on from the third canon of hermeneutics can provide a context, and as I mentioned above it is meant to merge into a generally unsettling context. We are trying to unsettle old habits of teaching, of promoting commonsense and common nonsense, of turning towards *haute vulgarization* or distracting comparative comments. We are normally doing so in the old context, and so we must be as cunning as serpents: we may be required to "cover" (what a wonderfully appropriate word) Kant or Derrida or Paul or Tillich, but we can add in spots of uncovering, seeding efficiently, with slow-growing beauty, a lift that still may take a millennium.

⁷⁸See note 47 of *Cantower XXXIV*, and the text there.