Cantower XXV

Redoubt page 250 of Method in Theology

April 1st, 2004

25.1 Diagram, Liagram, Livagram

The last *Cantower* ended pretty abruptly. I was on a roll, about diagrams, and the roll was best halted. Thinking about it afterwards, I was reminded of a Lonergan story in *Insight*. "A friend of mine, who had been out of town, asked me how my work was going. I answered with a dreaded didactic monologue on the connection between insight and depth psychology. His laudatory comment ended with the remark, 'Certainly, while I have been away, you have not been wasting my time'" Since you, anyone, can break off reading anytime - unlike the entrapment that goes with direct address - I suppose I might have continued the roll. And indeed, I will do so a little here.

But how much? There is needed a lengthy treatise on diagrams, and even then the treatise would presuppose a culture to read it; our reflections are thus lifted forward into the layers of problems connected with adequate expression.² And all this only in relation to my view and yours on **diagrams**. But the topic heading in that final section was "My View and Hopes". What of my view? I suppose we might agree that my diagrams are summary expressions of some of my views, my positions. And that is O.K. And I can add to that view my view that I object less to summary by diagram than to "simple summary". Here again, we open up a huge topic of human communication into which I am not prepared to enter yet.

Well, at least you notice that so far here I am involved in "stating positions", which is what these three *Cantowers* are all about. And the topic of this particular *Cantower* is named above, with the word 'redoubt' not only meaning 'added

¹*Insight*, 194[217-8].

²You might begin on this topic in *Insight* ch.17 but it is a massive problem already raised by "The Words of Metaphysics" and I will pursue it in the *Cantowers* of 2008.

fortification' but also - please tolerate the pun - to "read out". Or in. And so, more puns or neologisms. What is it to "read in"? You may consider now that we are still on the same topic: diagrams. Page 250 of *Method* is a diagram. It is not a good diagram, in the sense that it is in English: perhaps an ideogrammic language would be better? Certainly, when teaching this page I have to shape its words and its sentences and paragraphs differently, and no doubt you as a learner have had the same experience. You may very well be an old-timer like me, with thirty years of recasting the page in your past. The recasting is a casting, a moulding, a molecularizing indeed, in a very real sense that I am trying now to intimate, to cast, to mould in you. You see the problems that keep "bubbling up"? But where do they bubble? And do the bubbles lead anywhere?³

In an earlier *Cantower* I expressed a type of disagreement with Aquinas about the meaning of ratio, about the nature of human reason. Again, I am taking a position here, a biographic position. There may be humans whose puzzledom breeds insight in some way like Aquinas seems to have. I, certainly, am not one of those. This morning I began trying to figure out how a ratchet and pawl pass on energy: I suspect that this could eat up my week.

Talking of eating up a week leads me to what perhaps is my most useful **diagram** that relates to our struggle: a week, just before my seventieth birthday, when I decided that I would memorize a poem that has been dear to me since the beginning of the 1950s. It is the poem by Hopkins titled, "the Windhover". What is this useful diagram? Well, you can start by drawing a line across the centre of a page and dividing it into seven: my week. But I leave you to struggle with Phil-ing it out. Ho Ho.


So, we may come to the meaning of my odd title: diagram, liagram, livagram. The starting diagram is the fourteen lines of Hopkins. Now I have no doubt that a younger person could memorize these lines in much less time: my neuromechanisms are probably slowing down, or perhaps clogged! But the two extra words - liagram,

³Lonergan spoke at one late period of his career of quasi-operators. There is a problem here of lifting such suggestions into a full metaphysical context.

livagram - are pointers to what was going on that week. There was a liaison and a living. Brain grams and earbones took flight, new-patterned in rhythms of sounds and references. Do you find echos in your own experience? So the diagram becomes a liagram and a livagram. So is evidenced the meshing of understanding and image. And the meshing can be evidence in a life of music or mathematics, singing or suffering. It is evidence for me at present by the life of Richard Feynman, which will haunt the *Cantowers* of this year. And there is the wondrous Nadia Boulanger, who "knew all of music and knew it cold". I am talking, of course, of character formation, but now with the intimation, indeed a diagraming, that it is a molecular thing.

One of the diagrams that I used constantly in class, especially when talking of aesthetic experience, was one that had Jack and Jill, six-layered, "facing" each other.⁴

⁴Simple as it is, it seems as well to repeat it here:



Each had "lived a gram or two". Think of Clara Schumann "faced" with Robert, or with Brahms. Think of Beethoven or Brubeck "facing" you. There is the internal diagram laced with feeling, objectified in lower-science realities void of feeling that yet can call to your curious molecules.

What is your view of all this? But that is the question for the next *Cantower*. Here I am noising abroad my view. But how is this done efficiently? It is certainly done more efficiently in so far as there is something of Rilke's view in our cultural space: "love consists in this, that two solitudes guard and bind and greet each other". There is the efficiency of an awareness, a luminosity, about the simple strange fact that biography speaks to biography in history, all of history back and forth between us, selecting this and that universe in each our signings. The question of interpretation will occupy us later: how do I interpret stuff to you, how do you interpret me; how do you interpret yourself? So, we find ourselves here in the middle of one of the funniest paragraphs of *Insight*, pirouetting on "a grasp of the audience's habitual grasp of its own intellectual development."

What is Proust's view, or Barrett-Browning's, or Shakespeare's, or Beethoven's? Have you a sense that, like the sunflower, there is mysterious growing, livagraming of the universe as diagram? And with that sense one can come liagramed home to a single line, a "little phrase".

⁵This is a massively difficult notion to grapple with, a refinement of the discussion of the divine creative knowledge of the unique universe out of layered infinities (think of the transfinite in Mathematical Logic) of possible universes. But in more homely fashion, and on a lower plain of being, you might think, not of you and me, but of ratchet and pawl turning only one way towards the future. "The ratchets and pawls that we make can turn one way. This one-wayness is interrelated with the fact that the ratchet is part of the universe. It is part of the universe not only in the sense that it obeys the physical laws of the universe, but its one-way behavior is tied to the one-way behavior of the entire universe. It cannot be completely understood until the mystery of the beginnings of the history of the universes are reduce still further from speculation to scientific understanding". Feynman, I, ch. 46, p.9.

⁶*Insight*, 563[586].

"When our two souls stand up erect and strong, Face to face, silent, drawing nigh and nigher, Until the lengthening wings break into fire At either curved point"

So, perhaps my view can be diagramed for your liagraming by simply contextualizing the single W3 in the morning of its wild creation in October 1986?8 I was due to come face to face with my silent colleagues, all of us regarding, some of us guarding, the lengthening wings of Lonergan's Hermeneutics. My text was a pre-given diagram, and you find that text now in the next section. There is a sense in which that text programs, diagrams, the remainder of my *Cantower* effort. But we will come to that in section 3. So, what was I to do? The pre-dawn ferment brought forth the strange diagram. And that is what I presented to my long-suffering colleagues. Did we draw nigh and nigher? The diagram, the view, has not been mentioned since. I was, I suppose, in another and strange world, far from the convention and the conventions of standard hermeneutics.

Where am I going with these odd musings about diagrams, programs, liagrams? I am going towards, pointing to, a read-out of the key point of p. 250. The key point is the invitation to take a luminous stand on your own liagrams and programs: the colour of your nerves. It is the key point for the present generation, and perhaps for the next. The rest of the page is magnificent in its suggestions of the structure of dialectic collaboration, and I shall write further about it when we come to deal with "Functional Dialectics" in *Cantower XXXIX*. Here I am being altogether more pragmatic in my concern for beginnings. It is the question of the fresh pragmatism that is the centrepiece of as recent work. So, for instance, I might sum up my minimal invitation or challenge to you in the question, "Do you think that we should be sensAble and divide up the

⁷Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Sonnets from the Portugese, XXII.

⁸Section 25.4 below gives a further contextualizing, from *Process*, written three years later. In the section quoted there, section 6.3 of the book, I made available W3 for the first time.

work of changing history? I could go on from there, or indeed you can go on yourself, to find in your own experience of writing, journal-reading, book-publishing, teaching and learning, researching and policy-making, organizing on all levels, etc etc, the seeds of improved efficiency, a pale shadow of the structure suggested by Lonergan. But the key is that you come up with some stand that diagrams yourself in that sense of meshing with your neurodynamics sufficiently to be operable. No question here, then, of some impossible dream.⁹

Am I making this point with some minimal but sufficient vigour and clarity? I am not asking you to speak out your stand to the world, like Luther did in the Council of Trent. Speak it out to yourself, and perhaps surprise yourself. "I 'really' am not interested in pursuing serious explanation, so" or "There is something in all this that calls to me, but...." And it may not be wise to speak your mind to anyone else: you don't have tenure yet, or perhaps there is a thesis to get written and passed....

BUT if you are not up to *some* degree of public statement that allows for, calls for response, then you really are not ready for this functional specialist ball-park. My view is that we have here a fundamental prerequisite: this is not a ball-park of *voraussetzunglosikeit.* Lonergan, on page 253 of *Method*, has the quiet remark that his

⁹There are layers of ambiguities and contexts here, to be uncovered by future refinements that lean on the emergence of more complex symbolizations and healthier psyches. This seriously effects the reading of the rest of this section, so a nudge could help.

There is a sense in which what is involved here is precisely the entertaining, mind-entry, of an impossible dream. That mind-entry is limited by the psychothymic culture of you, the axial minder. So, you can rise to a defective mental word of a hoped-for infested self, conceived of as to be constructed by a histolysis proleptic of health-filled fantasy. But you cannot conceive wholesomely of the health-filled incarnate self prior to the histolysis. You may not be familiar with the biological term *histolysis*: "the breaking down and dissolution of organic tissue". It serves here to bring out the organic nature of the personality-shift required to dream our way out of the axial period. Dream our way out of? One must add the context of *Insight* chapter twenty-concluding with the tensions of the 31st place - and the context of the challenge of *Existenz* that calls us to span axial molecules "by beginning from this particular time and place familiar to us through our senses and then proceeding by our imagination until we arrive at the Palestine, the Bethlehem, the Nazareth, and the Jerusalem of two thousand years ago"(Lonergan, *The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ*, 31: the conclusion to the section on *De Ex-sistentia*, 19-31).

strategy will "make conversion a topic". This is it! I am not talking about some list of differentiations, but of that conversion to self, that turn to the orientation that carries you through the days and years. What is your bent? What is its history? What are you really up to, in both senses of that phrase? Looking to the future, are to up to an effort to functional collaboration? Are you up to imaging and thinking trans-axially? Are you thus up to the personal intussusception of the distinction between theory and common sense that W3 diagrams as "The Line"?

But I am carrying us away or on or up towards refinements, edging towards the impossible dreams commented on in the previous footnote, dreams of a cosmopolis transposed. And, at all events, the self-questioning is premature. It is to blossom in the developing sections of the next *Cantower*. I am still having my say, here, in giving you the con-text that went with W3 on its first outing. But of course you can skip this next section's con-text, even skip on now to the task of taking a stand: give yourself a month's start on the job!

Here, then, is the text, quoted from *Lonergan's Hermeneutics*, pages 209-16¹⁰.

25.2 Psychic Differentiations and Systematic Heuristics

Professor Doran's work can be viewed as giving a new precision to the heuristics of mysteries, where the term is taken, as Doran does, in the sense given in *Insight*.¹¹ At the Florida Conference, Lonergan, conceding that his usage went against the normal use of the words 'myth' and 'mystery' and in later writings he used the word 'myth' more freely. In the reply to volume two of that conference he still held clearly to his view in *Insight*.¹² Doran's return to that strict usage is welcome in that the transposition of hermeneutics made possible by Lonergan's science of metaphysics sketched in

¹⁰Edited by Sean E.McEvenue and Ben F.Meyer, The Catholic University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1989.

¹¹*Insight*, 546ff[569ff].

¹²Language, Truth and Meaning, ed. P. McShane, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1972, 309.

Insight give a lucid meaning to truth and so requires a precision of language regarding the symbolic that does not recede with the advance mediated by metaphysics.

In my response to Professor Doran's foundational effort I wish to add to that achievement a set of contexts that should prove useful not only in our initial discussion but throughout our collaborative effort.

First of all there is the context of functional specialization which requires to be conceived in its full foundational remoteness, and within that conception there would emerge precisions regarding the distribution of tasks of hermeneutics compactly discussed in chapter 17 of *Insight*. I use the word 'compactly' deliberately to call attention to the fact that serious operations within functional specialization require a differentiation of consciousness that will lead to a new linguistic accuracy¹³ expressive of a focus of attention on a particular level of consciousness in one of the two modes of *anamnesis* and *prolepsis*. So far, all our efforts to work in single specialties have been relatively nominal. Perhaps one may claim that *Insight* itself, with the omission of the 'clarifications by contrast,' could be regarded A.A.S. seriously foundational, supplying general categories. But I would hesitate to identify a decompacted *Insight* with the science of general categories called for by *Method in Theology*, 286-8.

I would note, however, one elementary point relevant to a locating of Doran's work. The metaphysics of *Insight*, identified as conception, affirmation, and implementation, ¹⁴ twists into a foundational task of conceiving, affirming, and valuing concretely implementable categories within a perspective of emergent probability. Those categories mediate an increasingly enriched perspective on doctrines, systematics, and communication, ¹⁵ these being in themselves implementations internal

¹³Coupled with a genetic language shift towards subjectivity: cf. *Method in Theology*, 88, note 14.

¹⁴*Insight*, 391[416].

¹⁵The enriched perspective of the last functional specialties is discussed in P. McShane, "Systematics, Communications, Actual Contexts," *Lonergan Workshop*, vol. 6, ed. F.Lawrence (Atlanta, Georgia, Scholars Press, 1986), 143-174.

to the *Wendung Zur Idee* that is the theological enterprise, but the full implementation relates theology through communications to the concrete task of mediating change through history. Internal to the theological task is the envisagement of actual, probable, and possible schemes of recurrence.

Therefore, I find it useful to draw attention to the actual patterns of present studies in order to throw light on the difficulty of Doran's challenge in both its full conception and its external implementation.

A heuristic envisagement calls for specification of plausible ranges of links between actual and probable schemes or recurrent discourse in human studies and related fields. I would suggest, with long-term optimism, that such links are not present at the end of this disappointing century. Doran identifies a needed psychic sophistication, but the task of specifying it with implementable explanatory precision calls for moves beyond present descriptive and metaphorical psychoanalysis that are not seriously supported by present middle and lower sciences. Thus, the middle sciences, zoology and botany, take on airs of advanced subtlety mainly through reductionist strategies and in particular the provision of an elementary analogue for both ontogenetic and phylogenetic considerations of meaning, to which biological growth points, is substantially dodged by a cybernetic preoccupation with molecular biology, and a perspective dominates which excludes serious conception of categories of sensibility and irritability, categories precious to the efforts to move from description to explanation in that zone of human consciousness to which Doran draws attention.

Again, psychic differentiation and conversion may well occur as a single differentiation of common sense, and such a differentiation opens up enriched levels of response for a reader, listener, and so on, but it does not constitute such person as an adequate scientific interpreter. The sophistication that Doran requires is one of multiple differentiations, certainly including intellectual conversion. Without the latter conversion one only has the appearance of serious interpretation and collaboration: "Every shift in one' stance on metaphysics implies a change in the meaning of one's

every serious statement." ¹⁶ Hugo Meynell makes the point with regard to Frye, ¹⁷ and I incline to extend the view to the entire field of criticism, twisting Lonergan's comment on theologians: "In both Bathes and there is revealed the need for intellectual conversion." ¹⁸ Yet I do not envisage a rush of present critics to the five-finger exercises of the first eight chapters of *Insight* that would eliminate tiresome mythologies regarding "things" called authors and readers.

We may turn now to another context, that of the canons of interpretation, of which the transposition into functional specialization is a major task. What is at issue in the canons is a delineation of the upper blade of scientific hermeneutics. Insofar as contemporary workers in the field of hermeneutics reach some suspicion of the shift in perspective this involves, 'one may expect [them] to be somewhat bewildered and dismayed.' Here my comment parallels, I would say, the second hard saying of Hefling regarding explanatory history²⁰: contemporary hermeneutics is solidly literary, offering 'images and associations from which a reader can reach' insights in a relatively uncontrolled fashion.²¹ The key strategy of hermeneutic transposition in theses decades would seem to be, then, the first principle of criticism of the third canon.²² One is to approach contributions to the field stretching oneself towards a universal viewpoint that would shift valid elements into a context of ongoing scientific collaboration.

Doran's work specifies elements of that stretching that are not explicit in the canons. The canon of relevance requires the stance of the universal viewpoint, and the canon of

¹⁶Quentin Quesnell, "Mutual Misunderstanding: The Dialectic of Contemporary Hermeneutics", *Lonergan's Hermeneutics*, 20.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, "The Great Code and the Christian Faith"; see 67–68.

¹⁸Method in Theology, 318.

¹⁹*Insight*, 581[604].

²⁰"On Understanding Salvation History", *Lonergan's Hermeneutics*, 274.

²¹*Insight*, 586[608].

²²*Insight*, 588[611].

explanation cuts away description in a subtle but precise manner.

`But throughout the discussion of the canons there are indications of refinements of sensibility necessary to meet differentiations of meaning; these are related to the first and second conditions of extrapolation to human meanings at a different stage of development - "is he sufficiently aware of the diverse elements of human experience?' Doran's work precises the meaning of sufficient awareness. Moreover, I think he would agree that the psychic conversion adequate to interpolation is not a single or twofold differentiation but the fivefold harmonious subjectivity of full differentiation, contextualized by the differentiation of functional specialization. This certainly is a high demand, but it has its parallels in more elementary fields like physics and chemistry, and the concrete process of climbing towards adult adequacy is described in homely fashion in *Method in Theology*²⁴ and in the conclusion of the *Verbum* Articles.

However, one might note that Lonergan's illustrations are 'simple', 'uncluttered by the complexities involved in interpreting instances of intersubjective, artistic, symbolic, or incarnate meaning.'25 That is not to say that scientific interpretation in the history of ideas requires no enlargement of psychic undertow: what is evident is that the history, say, of aesthetic meaning is closed to the aesthetically obtuse. However, that history is also closed to the aesthetically refined without the higher-level differentiations that would make possible the casting of meaning into an explanatory heuristic. Such a casting, 'so fine a detachment, so rigorous a disinterestedness, is a sheer leap into the void for the existential subject,'26 however aesthetically or intellectually refined that subject be.

One aspect of that sheer leap comes into focus when one attends to problems of specifying accurately what one means by description, how one moves to explanation,

²³*Ibid.*, 589[611].

²⁴Pp. 155-73, 181-96, 249-53.

²⁵Method in Theology, 166.

²⁶Insight, 539[562].

what descriptive components survive in an explanatory account of the universe, including universes of discourse.²⁷ Here I can only indicate an unfocused problem. Perhaps in the present context in can be focused slightly by juxtaposing two passages from Lonergan's *De Deo Trino*, the first paragraph from his first volume dialectic analysis of the early centuries of Christianity, the second a thesis from his very relevant analysis of relations at the conclusion of the second volume.

[1] Modum cogitandi et loquendi gnosticum diximus esse speculationem pseudo-symbolicum, speculativum quidem quia de rebus ultimis tractat, symbolicum vero quia ita sensibilibus et senstivitatis categoriie utitur up doctrinam altiorem exponat, pseudo- symbolicum denique quia notiones abstractae personificantur et categoriss sensitivitatis quodammodo admiscentur"²⁸

[2] Quod relationes non dividuntur in praedicamentales et transcendentales nisi is stadio scientific intermedio, neque valde convenienter ita dividuntur in illo stadio".²⁹

How does one structure the analysis that contextualizes explanatorily the first paragraph in a way that cuts beyond predicamental blind alleys which the thesis of [2] finds inconvenient? We are back with Hefling's hard saying and with the problem of functional specialist transpositions of the canon of explanation.

Lonergan's discussion of description in *Insight* is relatively skimpy. While his indication of the triple correlation involved in description³⁰ can be sublated for descriptions on the level of spirit, and placed in a larger heuristic context by the use of principles of metaphysical equivalence³¹ meshed with the two sets of canons of inquiry,

²⁷*Ibid.*, 490-7[514-20].

²⁸De Deo Trino I, Gregorian Press, Rome, 1964, 36. While an English translation of this exists (*The Way to Nicea*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), Lonergan's Latin is preferable for accuracy; so, for instance, 'diximus esse' appears in the translation as 'we have described'.

²⁹De Deo Trino II, 308.

³⁰*Ibid.*, 555[578].

³¹*Ibid.*, 502-7[526-530].

nonetheless what Lonergan has provided at this infant stage of scientific hermeneutics, in the canons and precepts, are not much more than 'a few obvious rules'.³²

So we come to one final fundamental illuminating point made by Professor Doran: that the hermeneutic concern is with the being of meaning.³³ The point blossoms into a saving perspective on history when it is enlarged through analogies of sciences, natural analogies relevant to glimpses of Hidden Mysteries. The two domains linked by the analogies, however distinguishable in line with Philip the Chancellor of Paris, are not separable. Therefore, if a parallel is drawn between, say, meaning in species of literature and subsections of the zoological enterprise, the parallel still lives in the cloud of unknowing, focusable by inverse insights.

The key analogies of the third stage of meaning will be analogies of procedures, and so there is much to learn from the procedures of discovery in history. The search for adequate cosmologies has lived for millennia in a naive descriptive optimism that, as Voegelin would put it, slides easily into the egophantic. History in this past millennium - I recall Butterfield's point about the scientific revolution³⁴ - divinely reveals the remote intelligibility of such common and simple things as electrons, water molecules, and trees. Physics learned a deep humility a t the beginning of the twentieth century. Chemistry became serious in the period between Lavoisier and the discoveries of Meyer and Mendeleev. Biology at present is uncomfortable with the explanatory heuristic of an emergent probability that links genetic realities.

Meaning is a realm of being altogether more complex and its present study might be regarded as paralleling pre-Linnean biology. The parallel may seem farfetched. But only in this century has the complex problem of the self-energy of the electron brought

³²*Ibid.*, 503[527].

³³"Psychic Conversion and Lonergan's Hermeneutics," *Lonergan's Hermeneutics*: see 163-64.

³⁴"Since the rise of Christianity, there is no landmark in history that is worthy to be compared with" the seventeenth century revolution in science. *The Origins of Modern Science* (London: G.Bell and Sons, 1965, 190).

forth remote twists of mathematical searchings: what of the self-energy of *notio incarnata* that is the origin of species? Lonergan's life work represents a push towards a collaborative control of that originating in these initial millennia of its expression ,a control hinted at by the metaphysics sketched in *Insight* and the differentiations of consciousness named in *Method in Theology*. The later chapters of *Method* fail to spell out the subtlety of *anamnesis* and prolepsis of Lonergan's unpublished efforts of the early sixties.

So, for example, I have been led to envisage the present points regarding the remote complexity of a systematics of meaning by passages such as the following which deals, in pre-functional specialist fashion, with the problem of an adequate transfer of fulsome historical knowledge into systematic coherence:

"The history of any particular discipline is in fact the history of its development. But this development, which would be the theme of a history, is not something simple and straightforward but something which occurred in a long series of various steps, errors, detours, and corrections. Now, as one studies this movement he learns about this developmental process and so now possesses within himself an instance of that development which took place perhaps over several centuries. This can happen only if the persons understands both his subject and the way he learned about it. Only then will he understand which elements in the historical developmental process had to be understood before the others, which ones made for progress in understanding and which held it back, which elements really belong to the particular science and which do not, and which elements contain errors. Only then will he be able to tell at which point in the history of his subject there emerged new visions of the whole and when the first true system occurred, and when the transition took place from an earlier to a later systematic ordering; which systematization was simply an expansion of the former and which was radically new; what progressive transformation the whole subject underwent; how everything that was explained by the old systematization is now explained by the new one, along with many other things that the old one did not explain - the advances in physics, for example, by Einstein and Max Plank. Then and

then alone will he be able to understand what factors favored progress, what hindered it, and why, and so forth.

Clearly, therefore, the historian of any discipline has to have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the whole subject. And it is not enough that he understand it any way at all, but he must have a systematic understanding of it. For that precept, when applied to history, means that successive systems which have progressively developed over a period of time have to be understood. This systematic understanding of a development ought to make use of an analogy with the development that takes place in the mind of the investigator who learns about the subject, and this interior development which the mind of the investigator ought to parallel the historical process by which the science itself developed"³⁵

Here we find a struggle for the heuristic conception of an ongoing selfelucidating, objective, finite process self-mediative of the noosphere's control of history's meaning.

Fry can write with honesty:

'In Shakespearian criticism we have a fine monument of Augustan taste in Johnson, of Romantic taste in Coleridge, of Victorian taste in Bradley. The ideal critic of Shakespeare, we feel, would avoid the Augustan, Romantic, and Victorian limitations and prejudices respectively of Johnson, Coleridge, and Bradley. But we have no clear notion of progress in the criticism of Shakespeare, or of how a critic who read all his predecessors could, as a result, become anything better than a monument of contemporary taste, with all its limitations and prejudices'. ³⁶

With Lonergan we have pointers towards a working model leading slowly to the functional specialist dialectic operation of the needed clear notion of progress, the implementation of which belongs to future millennia.

³⁵I am quoting form Michael G.Shield's translation of 1990, *Understanding and Method*, 130-2, replacing the Latin text that was in the first publication. The original Latin text I have of *De Intellectu et Methodo* has the material on page 55.

³⁶Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton University Press, 1957), 8-9.

25.3 "Until the lengthening wings break into fire"³⁷

Looking back now to that presentation of October 1986, I recall no breaking into fire, nigh and nigher in viewpoint, but perhaps quiet tolerance of an eccentric viewpoint. It is for you to lace together the written presentation just given, and previously given to my audience then, with the diagram presented as its context. That written presentation was certainly not uppermost in my minding as a I struggled with the *Cantower* project in the past eighteen months, and with the outlined list in the past few months, so to me as well as to you it should come as a pleasant surprise that the list for these next few years echos the directions of my reaching then. The issue remains a beginning on functional specialization and the five-finger exercises of the early chapters of *Insight. Cantowers XXVII-XXXIII* home in on the latter; the *Cantowers* to follow turn to the prior challenge of conceiving and implementing **functionality**.

So it would seem that there is a comforting continuity of viewpoint and this is true: a tadpole heads towards a frog.³⁸ But I would be remiss now if I did not remind you - if you have been reading with me these months or even years - that it is deeply untrue. "Infesting" does not mean "at all the same thing" to me as when I placed the word in the title of *CantowerXXIV*. Not could I tell myself of last week what it means now, and this difficulty is altogether more vibrant to me now than when I wrote the

³⁷Line 3 of Elizabeth Barrett Browning, *Sonnets from the Portuguese*, Sonnet XXII. Perhaps it is as well to quote here the entire sonnet, a diagram of our present dialogue. "When our two souls stand up erect and strong, / Face to face, silent, drawing nigh and nigher, / Until the lengthening wings break into fire / At either curv-ed point, - what bitter wrong / Can the earth do to us, that we should not long / Be here contented? Think. In mounting higher, / The angels would press on us and aspire / To drop some golden orb of perfect song / Into our deep, deep, silence. Let us stay / Rather on earth. Belov-ed, - where the unfit / Contrarious moods of men recoil away / And isolate pure spirits, and permit / A place to stand and love in for a day, / With darkness and the death-hour rounding it."

³⁸The problem of development can only be tackled with precision in a later context of developed symbols. For a beginning see *Cantower LIX*: "Tadpoles, Tell us Talling Tales"

Bacchus Page about it at the end of *Lack in the Beingstalk*.³⁹ The issue I am raising for you here is a central problem of the ending of the axial period, and I do not wish to be derailed into further reflections on it now. I can only ask you to bear, bring it forth, in your molecular mind. It brings you back to the question asked earlier of you here: what are you up to? Are you up to growing beyond your present recognizing of you? This is my face-to-face question about your viewing of your views. Are there to be lengthening wings, windhover wings, reaching for mastery of the winds of change within and without?

There are, then, the lengthening wings of the future Elder that I wrote of in *Process* three years after the Concordia conference. The years between were years of a tight-roping of sanity, moving to the challenge I had given myself in 1974. Process met, but did not meet, that challenge: another story, another walk "Within a Budding Grove," bringing forth again, in a year of mad isolation from the academic world, lived in the heart of that world, "the same" challenge. As I struggled to bring that challenge to a satisfactory end-point, indeed hoping that it become a final work, I found strangely that I could "break into fire", or perhaps rather into kindlings, "at either curved point". There was a wing towards the sun, written in italics, inviting those who might so aspire to the foundational, the Sargawit, life. The other wing pointed to the earth, ground beginnings. So, in four sections of that chapter there was a cumulative divergence, a wing towards the stars, a wing towards the stairs of the first eight chapters of *Insight*.

But now stars and stairs weave together in the Sargawit's search. So that I can quote for you a tadpole viewgram - I was only 57 years old when I viewed thus - of the Sargawit's high-winged adventure as it surrounds - in italics - the plainer prose of the earth-turning wing. It is far from " a golden orb of perfect song into our deep deep silence", that golden orb is a destination, not a pilgrim word - but perhaps it will tilt a

³⁹The Bacchus page is reproduced in section 3 of *Cantower XXXIII*, which focuses the present challenge.

⁴⁰The title of the second volume of Proust's *Remembrance of Time's Lost*.

lygram in your pilgram minding? It expresses a massive contemplative challenge, but also for many of those who read this, just something to admire, cherish and cheer on from a sideline, or perhaps, "A place to stand and love in for a day". Or for a life, in your own way: for that is to be the Tomega excellence of the streets in the third stage of meaning.

The section I quote now, for your brooding, is section 6.3 of *Process*, where an interest in chapter 2 of Insight is the concern of the plain talk. In the next section, 6.4, we move higher in italic reach, but point within to the plain need of beginning, beginning again, the struggle of chapter one of *Insight*. But it seemed best here to quote the prior section, in which providence led me to put the same W3 diagram that is my discomforting invitation, not an ornament in a comfortable culture and academy, but a moral necessity when the academy has become a farce and "the culture has become a slum".⁴¹

25.4 Sargawit⁴²

The Sargawit is one who has grown and groaned to the middle kingdom⁴³ of a cosmogenetic tranquility in which layered conflictual imaginative syntheses, given

⁴¹Method in Theology, 99.

⁴²The title is the title of the original section 6.3, reproduced here except for the accompanying diagram, W3. The format is retained: italicized paragraphs at the beginning and end which relate to moving forward; the central section here is a move back to chapter 2 of *Insight* - in section 6.4 the forward "italicized" move is matched with a focus on chapter 1 of *Insight*. The notes are also from the original section 6.3, though I omit some of them.

A marginal note in the "Triv and Quod" section of *Finnegans Wake*, 294, indicates "Sarga, or the process of outgoing". *Sarga* is the Sanskrit for "process of world creation or emanation".

⁴³P. MCSHANE, "Middle Kingdom, Middle Man", *Searching for Cultural Foundations*, 1-43.

and Given, mediate, and are mediated by, a cosmos, "a room filled with music".44 The incomplete project, the nocturnebeginning of God, is heard ecstatically in the silence of minding minding. What is heard is stumblingly communicated through the sin-soaked-saved grouping of groups falteringly faithful to the call for redemptive withdrawal, wit drawing on Idea. Any person, within the groups or not, may shatteringly sense foundational possibilities of time, touch, taste, theory, but the Sargawit is committed to seek the foundation whole, and the seeking is one of mind and marrow, over decades. The communication of that whole calls for impish⁴⁵ persuasive mediation of self-persuasion.⁴⁶

How does one become a kanon of elementary science if not by thematizing an explanatory heuristic of one's own serious efforts at scientific explanation? And I would sadly note that such serious efforts can be by-passed in school sciences, in the survey courses of liberal arts colleges, even in science degrees. A chairman of a reputable chemistry department remarked to me once that students get a degree in chemistry

⁴⁴Method in Theology, 290.

⁴⁵See McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", *Creativity and Method*, ed. M.Lamb, Milwaukee, 1981, 550-2, on the bridge of IMPS.

⁴⁶One needs to reach out here to the growing literature on persuasion and therapeutic self-persuasion.

with good memories and some talent for cooking. So, we continue our gloomy trail backwards, and I give a concluding remark of *Insight*, chapter 2, a new meaning in relation to this 6th chapter:

"In the present chapter we have moved not forward and outward but rather backward and in ward to the subject's anticipations of insights that have not occurred and to the methodical exploitation of such anticipations. In that inward movement the reader can foresee the direction in which the whole work will advance. For our goal is not any scientific object, any universal and necessary truth, any primary propositions. Our goal is the concrete, individual, existing subject that intelligently generates and critically evaluates and progressively revises every scientific object, evert incautious statement, every rigorously logical resting place that offers prematurely a home for the restless dynamism of human understanding. Our ambition is to reach neither the known nor the knowable but the knower. Chapter 1 spoke of the insights he seeks. Chapter 2 has introduced the heuristic structures that inform his seeking." 47

In section 6.4 we will comment on *Insight*'s first chapter's focus on 'the insights he seeks', revealing the manner in which the language allows the reader to escape the foundational challenge. Here we continue to move backwards and inwards in honesty. Our goal, indeed, is the concrete, individual subject that might revise some scientific object - like revising Boyle's Law - if such an object were within that subject's (you!) control. But, alas, we are in all too many cases dealing with 'the subject's anticipations of insights that have not occurred,'48 and 'the anticipation, instead of being fruitful, may be the source of illusions.'49 The novel analysis of this chapter of *Insight* 'cannot be tasted except by confronting strictly scientific results.' Can confronting mean some solemn staring at colours, at a periodic table, at second order differential equations, at giraffes?

⁴⁷*Insight*, 69[91].

 $^{^{48}}Ibid.$

⁴⁹Insight, 542[565].

Perhaps a homely hint may help us along here. Consider the two following curves:



You can draw both if you have two straight pins (or thumb tacks) and a decent piece of string. I leave the reader to work out what I mean by decent. Drawing the oval is one of my favorite exercises for beginners, not only for the methodological exercise but also because the drawing disposes towards discovering the form, the why, of the oval.⁵⁰ The first curve can be drawn easily once I tell you that it is the curve of a hanging string. The problem in both cases is to discover the form, the equation. The hanging string will take you a little longer than the oval! The point of my exercise is to give you the experience of trying to get from description to serious understanding, explanatory correlations. My exercise takes further point when I note that the end-result is the hardwon understanding of merely the curve of a smile, the shape of an eye or a face. What must it be like to thematize explanatorily the meaning of the many smiles, the meaning of troubled eyes or nervous faces?

By such exercises you 'may acquire a rough idea of what mathematics is about,' or of the science of bridge-building or of therapy. But serious science is another world,

⁵⁰See McShane, *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations*, 22-23, on the oval. An obvious context is *Insight*, 7-13[31-37]. You are, I hope, lead on to envisage the Cartesian definition of the ellipse? I suspect that the hanging string will defeat you: it involves odd functions like Cosh x. A book such as Horace Lamb, *Statics*, Cambridge University Press, 1928, 194-94, can help.

as is serious theology. At a workshop in Boston on *Theology as Public Discourse* in the 1970s, Lonergan made the blunt statement that theology was not public discourse and, when questioned later about what theologians should know of physics he remarked, 'well, they should be able to read Lindsay and Margenau'. Now, being able to read Lindsay and Margenau, or Joos' *Theoretical Physics*, requires a prior comfortable competence, for example, in geometry and calculus. Theologians may object to this. They may share the view expressed to me by Gilbert Ryle when I spoke with him of my doctorate work on emergence and statistics: 'Science? Stones rattling in a bucket'. Such educated effeteness calls mainly for more adequate satire. But theologians may object that they are busy (like Martha? Missing the one thing necessary: physics!).

Frankly, I cannot see a serious option in the challenge of spending a year with Descartes' geometry and Leibnitz's calculus compared to the challenge of reading that same year's journals of religion. I recall remarking at the Lonergan Florida Conference that if one spent the first thirty years of one's career struggling with the content of ten three-year degrees one might have something serious to say in one's fifties. This may be a pointed exaggeration. But I would note at least that there is an intrinsic worth in physics, since 'every little insight is a glimpse of God'52 and, especially in present physics, there is a pull, an invitation, drawing us to the love of the invisible. And I would note the sad larger need, the price to be paid to escape the 'sin of backwardness, of the cultures, the authorities, the individuals that fail to live on the level of their times.'

⁵¹McShane, *The Shaping of the Foundations*, 41.

⁵²Insight, 684[706].

⁵³In *The Shaping of the Foundations*, 135, 207, I related this both to the "towards the love of the invisible" of the Preface of the Nativity and to Whitson's thesis regarding *The Coming Convergence of World Religions*, N.Y., 1971.

The foundational whole is a view of concrete inference and interference, an all-inclusive transposition of what was once called metaphysics. The Sargawit envisages, with a rich and referent abstractness that echos the divine Idea, feach member, each group, indeed our whole host and its great pilgrimage the eternal strivings of the human spirit towards the East, towards Home. The Sargawit is committed to detachment and the living of Foundations and to the pain of foundational adult growth. It is a calling to mind minding that constitutes her or him as permanently vulnerable to contractive meaning, so that, like Proust's

⁵⁴The intention of being is concrete. The mediated illuminated intention of being is no less concrete.

⁵⁵The sophistication of concrete reference is an implicit topic of *Insight*, chapters 16 and 20.

⁵⁶The context is *Insight*, chapter 19, sections 5, 6, 7, and 9, sublated into a *praxis* perspective on "the Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God"

⁵⁷Herman Hesse, *The Journey to the East*, London, 1970, 12.

⁵⁸I am thinking here of a transposition of Becker's view of "detachment and the writing of history".

⁵⁹Cf. "The Bridge of Bones", McShane, "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", *Creativity and Method*, ed. M.Lamb, Milwaukee, 1981, 549-50.

⁶⁰Relevant here are Lonergan's references and pointers regarding bias,, resentment, and commonsense eclecticism in *Insight* and *Method in Theology*.

man on giant stilts',⁶¹ crossing a room becomes a precarious adventure, words and gestures crushed in commonality.⁶²

25.5 An Available Patch

So there you have it, in various senses of 'patch'. ⁶³ You may take the archaic sense: then I strut forward as a court jester, a "motley fool". ⁶⁴ But there is 'patch' in the ordinary sense, a small piece of material or dressing or shield. It seemed an appropriate

⁶⁴I take great joy in coincidence. When I typed "motley fool" I was not thinking of the date of this *Cantower*, April 1st, All Fools' Day. And here I am, finishing the footnotes, as it happens, on April 1st, 2003.

The muddle of dates for these *Cantowers* should not be too much of a puzzle. I am a year ahead at present, but my main preoccupation is physics, struggling for fresh insights into thermodynamics and quantum physics, insights that may lift my meaning for later *Cantowers*. The "motley fool" bubbled up from memorizations of my distant early teen-years. It is from Act 2, scene 7 of *As You Like It*, with Jacques speaking. "A fool! A fool! I met a fool I' th' forest, / A motley fool. A miserable world! / As I do live by food, I met a fool, / who laid him down and bask'd him in the sun, / And railed on Lady Fortune in good terms".

Part of your position-taking is to be honest regarding what you may think of my apparently foolish claims, my ramblings or railings about Lady Fortune's axial stay. My views have never been popular: but I would prefer if they were publicly unpopular, spoken out like Jacques or Joey, the anonymous reviewer of *Phenomenology and Logic* (See section 4 of chapter 4 of *Lack in the Beingstalk. A Giants Causeway*).

⁶¹Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Times Past*, conclusion.

⁶²One needs to sublate Roger Poole's notion of ethical space (*Towards Deep Subjectivity*, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1972) and Lonergan's perspective on post-systematic etc meanings into a full post-modern metaesthetics.

⁶³I cannot resist giving one such sense here, beautifully contextualized by Hopkins in a relevant piece titled "That nature is a heraclitian fire and of the comfort of the Resurrection". It is worth quoting the led-up extensively: "But vastness blurs and time beats level. Enough! The Resurrection, / A heart's-clarion! Away grief's gasping, joyless days, dejection. / Across my foundering deck shone / A beacon, an eternal beam. Flesh fade, and mortal trash / fall to the residuary worm; world's wildfire, leave but ash: / In a flash, at a trumpet's crash, / I am all at once what Christ is, since he was what I am, and? This jack, joke, potsherd, patch,, mathwood, immortal diamond, / Is immortal diamond."

way to centre my invitation to you to patch together your honest view. Obviously I cannot press on you to do this, to pause and think a bit and write to yourself. But can you be contented without taking an operating position, or at least pausing over the need for a present patch on the axial garment? Lonergan's divided labour is an available patch. "Be here contented? Think. In mounting higher / the angels would press on us".

But it is not angels but an inner exigence that must press. It is an exigence, too, that needs self-soaked expression, way beyond a general consensus of a Creed, "an *a priori* whence he can understand other men, their social relations, their history, their ritual, their destiny". ⁶⁵ You and I can view each our view as a dignifying of our walk and talk, something that "permits / A place to stand and love in for a day". The Sonnet's end, the line that follows, shades destiny "With darkness and death-hour rounding it".

My patch of Lonergan's patch, my list of views beyond tadpole-sensing but at the heart of tadpole-swimming, points in its end to the need for reaching for the light that offers to round the day, each day, a promise of "infinite surprise". The shabby view of that later life, when spoken out, reveals and supplements the shabbiness of today's view of today. It needs speaking out in its full truncated neglectfulness. The cosmos invites you towards a molecularized inner word of self and all. Might you not thus read and cherish the first and last lines of another sonnet?

⁶⁵Method in Theology, 292.

⁶⁶The final words of "Being and Loneliness", the Epilogue of *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations. Self-Axis of the Great Ascent.*

⁶⁷This final statement of the *Cantower* has an anastomotic character, rounding my list like the poem that brackets *Cantower II*. On that anastomotic reach see the conclusion of chapter 2 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, where the sea seizes the inner ear of Shakespeare's *Pericles* and Joyce's *Wake*. The molecularization of word refers both to a Word Incarnate and to the inner word traced with mattering matter, the womb-content of the everlasting soul. But we are stretching here towards the final thirty six *Cantowers*.

"How do I love thee? Let me count the ways
I shall hut love thee hetter after death" 68

 $^{^{68}\}mbox{Elizabeth Barrett Browning, lines 1}$ and 14 of Sonnet XLIII, Sonnets from the Portuguese.