<u>Cantower XVIII</u>

The Possibility of Cultural Ethics

September 1st, 2003

The place of this *Cantower* in the sequence should certainly not be obscure. I have been moving, particularly since *Cantower XIV*, in parallel with the chapters of *Insight*, and here the title most evidently echoes the title of chapter 18, "The Possibility of Ethics". I had originally thought of "The Possibility of Academic Ethics" as title, but the above title is truer, more accurate: this will become clearer in section 3, below, but you might think of the type of reflection that occurs in mountaineering or music as sub-cultures: I am addressing a problem in such areas. Furthermore, at this stage you hardly need section 3 to get the connection with the concluding sub-sections of chapter 7 of *Insight*: "Culture and Reversal", "Cosmopolis". The effort here, then, is continuous with the entire *Cantower* project, with the central message of the book *Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway*.

At this stage, too, you are not expecting some sort of survey of chapter 18 of *Insight*. What I am trying to do all along here is nudge you to a fresh re-reading of both *Insight* and the book of yourself in history. And the nudge, as with other chapters, is in two directions: first, to lift what I might call the pre-hodic reading to the original level of the book, beyond conventions of Lonerganism; secondly, to lift the book into the context of functional specialization, the context of a collaborative Cosmopolis that gives beauty and unity to the search for a truly implementable metaphysics that had its luminous beginning in Socrates and Plato.

My project here, conveniently, fits under the subtitle of chapter 18: call it fate, or kindly providence. Under the first title I tackle the "regular Lonerganist problem" that goes under the rubric, "Lonergan's new notion of value". Under the title "The Notion of Freedom" I draw attention to features of freedom that have been amazingly neglected - for reasons that will appear in that section - by students of Lonergan. Finally, section 3 gets to the core project of these *Cantowers*: "In the third place, there is culture. The dramatic subject, as practical, originates and develops capital and technology, the economy and the state. By his intelligence he progresses, and by his bias he declines. Still, this whole unfolding of practicality constitutes no more that the setting and the incidents of the drama. Delight and suffering, laughter and failure, joy and sorrow, aspiration and frustration, achievement and failure, wit and humour stand, not within practicality but above it. Man can pause and with a smile or a forced grin ask what the drama, what he himself is all about. His culture is his capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his intelligence and speaks to his heart".¹

The man Lonergan paused, for a decade after *Insight*, in his *capacity*² and *need* to reach a hearty answer to the unlife that he and his contemporaries were leading in Rome, in the world: "the setting is magnificent; the lighting superb; the costumes are gorgeous; but there is no play."³ He conceived of an *institution* with its *roles* and *tasks*, that could transform that pretentious evil misery, thus identifying a new ethics of cultural reflection on culture.⁴ The finality of that identity cries out in each our molecules.

18.1 The Notion of the Good

It seems best to start where Lonergan starts the parallel section, to start then

¹*Insight*, 236[261].

²The italics in this paragraph refer you to the matrix of meaning on page 48 of *Method in Theology*.

³*Insight*, 237[262].

⁴The excitement of that idea and conception is recorded in his scribbled notes of February 1965. See chapter 2 of Darlene O'Leary, *Lonergan's Practical View of History*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2002.

with his first paragraph. Indeed, this entire *Cantower* can be considered as an exercise in reading, embracing, cherishing, this single paragraph. Nor am I talking now about a moving viewpoint: I am talking, indeed, of the highest elevation of *Insight* of which we might be capable. In the article where I focused that challenge I advocated what I called a Dogenesque reading of chapter 12 of *Insight*. As Aquinas' search is compended in his *Summae*, so his contemporary Dogen (1200-53) compended his quest in the work *Shobogenzo*, (truth-eye-law-treasure), "The Fullness of the Vision of Truth". Dogen, within his compact Japanese quest for enlightenment, would find the paragraph strange, but there is an integrality of search there that is desperately needed in our times if we are to bridge the "Existential Gap" in the reading of ourselves and our aspirations.⁵

Let us pause now over that first paragraph of *Insight* 18.1.

"As being is intelligible and one, so also it is good. But while the intelligibility and unity of being follow spontaneously from the fact that being is whatever is to be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably, the goodness of being comes to light only by considering the extension of intellectual activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will."

This is, very definitely, foundational doctrine in a redoubtable form. "This is Everest. If you manage to get to 25,000 feet, you should have a clear run at the top". It is interesting to recall that Lonergan was climbing up these chapters of *Insight* in 1953, when Everest was first climbed. Lonergan had no Sherpa. Lonergan goes on, in his now obviously inadequate style, to give what can be view as a popular lead into the foothills. But it can also be viewed as a sort of summary of a common culture: we all know the meaning of 'good' and 'will'. It is a massively difficult task to persuade oneself that these word name unknown bents in us, that four thousand years of culture

⁵The mention of existential gap brings in the context of the existential reflections in *Phenomenology and Logic*: See the index there under *Existential gap, Anxiety, Dread*.

have in fact given them little meaning. And it does not seem any easier, if one has so persuaded oneself, to do the Socratic or Dogenesque thing for someone else. What are our chances here?

Our chances together will be better if we, at least nominally, identify the character of our present quest. Can you identify that character, your character? Let me suppose that you have read your way through *Insight* to this beginning of chapter 18, and that you have at least read the previous *Cantower*. What next in the reading? That obviously depends on the character that you have become. And my suspicion is that your reading of the previous few chapters of *Insight* have not prepared you for "the highest elevation of which we might be capable" that I mentioned a few paragraphs ago.

We are here at a very crucial, cross-road cross-filled, stage in our revisiting of Insight, in our **Cantower** struggle. Insight was written from a moving viewpoint. But there is a type of breakdown when we move to, through and beyond the chapters on metaphysics. That breakdown is implicitly highlighted in my introduction, in *Cantower XVII*, of the three words of metaphysics, W1, W2, W3. Or, more elementarily, it was highlighted by the introduction of the First Word of Metaphysics. That word names a perspective, and perhaps only in that sense is it an introduction. It could be more, of course, much more: that depends on your character of reading *Insight.* If the character of your reading had the character of a serious study of chemistry, then the First Word would be like finding - as you regularly do - the first word of chemistry, the Periodic Table, displayed inside the back cover of a first year university Introduction to Chemistry. It shows up, if not as an old friend, at least as an acquaintance. But there are ways of reading *Insight* that do not parallel a successful first-year struggle with the science of chemistry. An acquaintance with the perspective symbolized in W1 can be identified as a goal of the first sixteen or seventeen chapters of Insight. That is my claim, my position, my stand. It will not go undisputed, but that

disputing I prefer to leave to academic history as it is swept into the hodic cycle and the jousting page 250 of *Method in Theology*.⁶

But I ask you now just, joust, joysting, to muse over your own reaction to my introduction of W1. Was it not discomforting? Yet it simple puts in a symbolic block a key piece of the message of *Insight* thus far. It expresses neatly that "uniquely probable" heuristic paradigm that is quite beyond Stephen Gould and Thomas Kuhn. It points to a new open control of meaning, the emergence of the meaning of the past and the discovery meaning in the future. Just as the periodic table in chemistry points implicitly towards all the complexities of biochemical realities - the dance of the Benzine ring for example, or the Krebs cycle - so W1 (much more, of course, W3!) points towards all the complexities of trees and trains - and the dance, for example, of the growth of a sunflower.

Now I would note that Lonergan postponed the discussion of the dance of sunflower development till he and we had reached his stand on metaphysics. So, it would seem wise to postpone a serious consideration of ethical development till he had reached such a perspective: he would then be in a position to do like Thomas - but in a massive sublational sense⁷ - to tackle his "sweep of the *Prima secundae*",⁸ and

⁸*Insight*,434[459], in the footnote.

⁶Details and rules of the tournament will be discussed in *Cantower XXV*: "Redoubt *Method* 250".

⁷The massive sublation, of course, is the issue of these *Cantowers*, but one may think in elementary fashion of the challenge of that odd paragraph on page 287 of *Method in Theology*, which speaks of being capable of going on to re-write the early chapters of *Method*. Otherwise we remain "breathless and late" (*Insight*, 733,755). Aquinas' discussion of virtue needs the lift of W1, the first word of metaphysics. Facing this is a very central problem of a counter-positional stance on the sufficiency of description, especially in human studies: we will face it in more detail in *Cantower XXIII*: "Redoubt Description: *Method* 250".

indeed carry on to perhaps "the inception of a far larger work"⁹ that would sublate the *Secunda secundae* and the *Tertia Pars*.¹⁰

Lonergan was not in such a position: the pressure was on him to finish the book and pack for Rome. But even if he had the time, would he have swung into such a treatment of ethics? The question does not concern us here: what concerns us is that he did not follow up with a discussion of will that was contextualized by an adequate metaphysics. Rather, he wrote a chapter that was quite readable, that in my own teaching experience could be conveniently put with chapter 9 of *Insight* as a beginners' reading. Again, one may ask whether he thought of building into that hurried readable chapter the mood of, or even footnotes to, that single powerful footnote of chapter that I referred to in note 8 above. There are many reasons, besides hurry or readability, why he should not include such a mood or such references: for instance, his interest in a contribution to apologetics.¹¹ That contributing would likely not be helped by a turn to metaphysics at this stage in the book. But, at any rate, what I noted at the beginning of this paragraph holds: as with development, so with a consideration of the interplay of will and intellect: that consideration would benefit from the full metaphysical context.

What he wrote, of course, makes reference to that context, but it is not a troubling reference, nor one that would lead the reader back to that key footnote. For instance, did the following sentence lead *you* back to that note, or forward to ponder the metaphysics of **capacity-for-performance** that I have been drawing attention to in various ways since **Cantower II**? "Besides the capacity, will, and the habit, willingness,

¹¹Insight, 732[754].

⁹*Insight*, 731[754].

¹⁰The conclusion of that part would, of course, have saved you and I and the next century from having to sweat towards a serious contemporary eschatology, an understanding of our "destiny"(*Method in Theology*, 292)

there is the act, willing".¹² But my point stands, and it is perhaps a stand against the readability of the book at this late stage, and it brings to my mind that discomforting key paragraph in *Method*, where Lonergan invites his readers to go back and lift the first half of the book to an explanatory level: "one can go on to a developed account of the human good....".¹³

At this stage in this section I am desperate to avoid a morass of problems and to get on, as I mentioned in the previous *Cantower*, with some foundational pedagogy. There are questions about the sublation of *Grace and Freedom* into the fuller context of *Verbum* and *Insight*; there are questions about the consequent explicitation of what I would call *the molecularity* of the entire dynamic of complacency and concern; there are questions about the massive hodic communal enterprise that "the developed account of the human good" would be - an enterprise that would replace adequately¹⁴ the Secunda Pars of Thomas' Summa Theologica. And, alas, there are abundant questions for a mature dialectics: "the new notion of value" has given rise to quite a volume of discussion and speculation which, frankly, I do not find inspiring. Metaphysics in Lonergan's sense is avoided, but a subtle metaphysics of orientations is slipped in which simply is in direct conflict with the fundamentals of generalized empirical method: so, for example, the people who are struggling to understand feelings and their interplay with other human orientations are battling along - in the style of Aristotle - with the best contemporary work on biophysics, biochemistry, neurodynamics, etc. Into this we will not enter here, but perhaps you glimpse now

¹²*Insight*, 598[622]. (the editors add quotes in the new edition). The rest of that paragraph is worth pondering: it is very Thomist, and it points very clearly to the difficulty of knowing will.

¹³*Method in Theology*, 287.

¹⁴One does not need to know the full history of the *Summa* to know that it was not adequate in my sense of "efficient and beautiful" in that efficiency. The question here is the unity and beauty of scientific progress. See *Topics in Education*, p. 160.

better the significance of the control given by W1? Understanding feelings pushes you into those inquires that deal with the relevant conjugates represented by p ,c , b , z . Lonergan wrote in *Insight*; "if one wants to know just what forms are, the proper procedure is to give up metaphysics and turn to the sciences"¹⁵; "failure to observe this results in the substitution of pseudo-metaphysical myth-making for scientific inquiry."¹⁶

Leaving all this aside then, what pedagogical encouragement might I give? I would have you - you may have done it already, but if you are a beginner, I suspect that the suggestion is novel, even startling - I would have you pick up on a challenge previously made¹⁷: to approach the quest named in the title of chapter twelve of *Insight* in Dogenesque fashion, but with as much of the subtlety and patience of *Insight* and *Phenomenology and Logic* as you can gather and cultivate in that self-tasting. "The Notion of Being"? Chapter twelve would poise you contemplatively, with a will and a willingness out of focus. One can thus ferment forward the being of blossoms and bread, of artistry and practicality, into an admiring heuristic integrality.

But what of dread and desire and the incomplete logic of one's own being in being? Then the focus must need shift. To the admiration of practicality there is added but it was there already - the practicality of admiration, of bread and dread, of logic and laughter. Perhaps we might say that "The Notion of Being" takes on the colour of

¹⁵*Insight*, 498[521]. Lonergan's later view of generalized empirical method (*A Third Collection*, 141) would lead him to modify this. The bio-psychologist needs metaphysics; that need will be manifested and met gradually by hodic method, an ethical mediation which is the topic of the third section here.

¹⁶Insight, 505[528].

¹⁷In "Elevating *Insight*: Spacetime as paradigm Problem", *Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies* 19(2001), 222.

"The Notion of Survival"?¹⁸ At all events you will arrive at the middle of that first paragraph, poised quietly, and slowly "the goodness of being will come to light"¹⁹ in a way that will enlarge and complement the fundamental ontology of being, the true, the good. Then one finds, instead of this supposed large discontinuity between the Lonergan of *Insight* and the Lonergan of *Method*, a deep continuity between our first paragraph and an equivalent later paragraph.

"In *Insight* the good was the intelligent and reasonable. In *Method* the good is a distinct notion. It is intended in questions for deliberation: Is this worthwhile? Is it truly or only apparently good? It is aspired to in the intentional response of feeling to values. It is know in the judgments of value made by a virtuous or authentic person with a good conscience. It is brought about by deciding and living up to one's decisions".²⁰

Whatever this means, I cannot concede that it means that Lonergan at 38 had somehow missed this point in Thomas, that he had missed this point in the subtlety of his own Newmanesque, Ignatian and Augustinian discernments. But, whatever about Lonergan, one cannot do justice to issues of the mesh of feelings and willings without venturing, as I noted already, into the "study of the organism" that we are, and the molecular estimative sensibility that reaches to keep us safe in being. Moreover, the distinctness of that notion of value needs existential exploitation in both ontogenetic and phylogenetic logic, so that a refined ontology of the good breeds a precise praxology

But these pointers certainly carry us beyond the beginning moves of a contemplative return to chapter 12 of *Insight*. "Just what a person is, or what

¹⁸"The Notion of Survival" is the title of chapter 10 of *Wealth of Self and Wealth of Nations*. ¹⁹*Insight*, 596[619].

²⁰"Insight Revisited", A Second Collection, 1974, 277.

responsibility is, or why the person is responsible for his judgments, are further questions that cannot be considered yet," since we are only climbing up through chapter 9. But slip chapter 18 in as a next chapter and find a new sharpness to the notion of being.

18.2 The Notion of Freedom

"Further clarification of the notions of will and choice, introduced in the preceding section, demands a consideration of the nature of human freedom".²¹

As section 18.1 began with the first paragraph of the corresponding section in *Insight* and really got no further, so here we have the first short paragraph of the corresponding *Insight* section. At least the previous section has led you to expect that we are not going to get much further. At best the previous section has startled you by drawing your serious attention to the massive effort Aquinas made to handle the matter skimmed over by Lonergan in these few sections. Perhaps the best I can do here is to add some contexts that could motivate and guide you towards the clarification and consideration demanded.

The consideration will be strenuous and tenuous and the clarification minimal: the context I am referring to here is the context of mystery and W1 emphasized in section 17.1, the context of the elusive meaning of the spiritual²² and of the analogue for the procession of the Spirit. But even without focusing on these penumbral layers there is the elusiveness of that zone of ourselves to which Thomas invites us to turn by catching the acts, scrambling towards a glimpse of the form of such acts, reaching "over a lifetime" for the meaning of the strange finite reality called *will*.

So, a second helpful context is the analogy of science: the self-energy of willing

²¹*Insight*, 607[631].

²²This elusiveness was a topic in *Lack in the Beingstalk*. See there, note 105, p. 151.

is literally infinitely more complex than the self-energy of the electron, a graduate topic in physics. One needs a plethora of empirical work and a growing theoretic context. It is not a matter, then, of a few handy illustrations but of endless and subtle exercises meshed with much subtler meta-exercising. And here, fortunately, we can witness and join a master at work: we can settle for spirobic days with Aquinas as he weaves through questions 7-17 of the *Prima Secundae*. I have already drawn attention to this in section 2.6 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, where I recalled Gilby's translation of this part of the *Summa* and the useful appendix where he diagrams the twelve steps envisaged by Aquinas.²³ Did he get it right? These forty odd pages of the *Summa* are the way towards correcting Gilby, if he needs correction. Thomas operates within his metaphysical context, and it seems to me that - like *development* as a topic in chapter 15 of *Insight* - the most refined metaphysical context is required here as a crutch, a control. Only after such a serious effort at exercising with Aquinas will one come to see how hopelessly inadequate the few sub-sections of this section of *Insight* are.

Some will not like my referring to a metaphysical context as a required presence. But what I said above of Lonergan scholars dealing with feelings and willings holds generally. Whether one likes it or not, there is a metaphysical context operative in your searchings. The difficulty of forming, or reforming, an amateur tennis player or piano player is that there is a system already in place and in control. Instead of tennis players and piano players one might consider the logicians and the existentialists of *Phenomenology and Logic*. The two sets of players there are blocked, by contemporary sophistications of a truncated tradition, from handling "The Decision Problem" as it occurs in the two areas.

So, coming to the third context, I would claim that within present Lonergan studies, however strongly it asserts a devotion to intentionality analysis as opposed to metaphysics, there is an old-style metaphysics operative in such work which narrows

²³Lack in the Beingstalk: A Giants Causeway, 59.

its scope. But I puzzle over its devotion to intentionality analysis in this area. Simply put, it does not take vast self-attention to discover that when one raises the question Is **it** worthwhile? the **it** has a content borrowed²⁴ from the activity of a transcendental orientation that may be indicated as Be Adventurous. That orientation calls out all the twists and turns of the *Prima Secundae*, qq. 7-17. I will say no more here about this gap in Lonergan studies. It will certainly call for attention in future if the challenge of the *Prima Secundae* continues to be skipped.

The fourth context is the context of Appendix A to *Phenomenology and Logic*. In it there is a brief discussion of the modal distinction between **what** and **what-to-do** questions, and there is a diagram. The treatment there is minimal: I was lucky to retain any part of the original Appendix A following reader Joey's reaction.²⁵ The modal distinction reaches much deeper than indicated there: but one has to follow the trail indicated above to cherish a new meaning of chapter 12 of *Insight*, a fulsome appreciation of the relation of an Ontology of the good to a Praxology of the good.²⁶

The diagram of **adventure**, too, requires deepening in the subtlety of its symbolization. It is a diagram that I have used since the 1960s to introduce beginners to self-tasting within the pattern of concern. It needs supplementing to make less virtual both the elements of willing and the twists and turns involved in creatively reaching possibilities and deliberating over their end-bent viabilities.

History and contemporary innovations is rich in such reachings, and indeed rich

²⁴I am recalling here the tricky self-attention required to give meaning to the paragraph in chapter 9 of *Insight* on the borrow content of judgment: 275[300].

²⁵Fr.Robert Doran, as general editor, generously gave me the option of fighting the reader's criticism. I opted to drop the original Appendix without fuss: it is reproduced in chapter 5 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*. The critique of the anonymous - and gender-anonymous - Joey is given as section 4 of Chapter 4.

²⁶The fulsomeness requires a self-tasting reaching of the grounds of the meanings of *potency*., particularly the meaning of *potentia activa* reached for in *Verbum*.

in stumbling searching for the character of such reachings: which brings us to the final context. It is the context which explicitly brings to the fore here the drive of *Cantowers VII, VIII, IX*, the drive of chapter 4 of *Lack in the Beingstalk* with its ambiguous and suggestive title, "The Calculus of Variation". The context is hinted at in an evident way when I mention Aquinas' reflection on the potency and possibility of human freedom: and I am recall here the Prologue of the *Prima Secundae*, where Thomas begins by recalling Damascene. Damascene might recall Nemesius, as Nemesius did Aristotle. But the context is much larger, a global business of recalling Solomon and Krishna and Mo Ti. What is to be the *nomos* of humanity's reaching for *nomos* and how is it to be discerned? So we reach question regarding the humble discernments of discernments that is now a probability within the evolution of cultural ethics.

18.3 The Problem of Liberation

There are, of course, a variety of existential and global contexts of liberation, problems that have emerged in the fifty years since the eighteenth chapter of *Insight* was written. The only one that concerns me here is the ongoing fragmentation of academic and cultural responses to such problems: on the academic side one may think of liberation and feminist theologies; on the cultural side one may think of shifts in movements, be they dance movements or the various NGO efforts. In so far as you are familiar with, embroiled in, any such movement, well and good. But that *good* is now placed, at least tentatively, descriptively, in the new context of section 1: how does it fit in effectively with will-to the ongoing genesis of human meaning? Further, the issue is more existential in that it is a question of How do I and it fit in? Section 2 gives you a glimpse of the possibility of luminous deliberation in that context.

The present difficulty is to come to grips with the faintness of that glimpse, the feebleness of the description. The difficulty is an echo of the same faintness with respect to the final section 8 of chapter 7 of *Insight*. How is that difficulty to be faced by

you, by the human group?

That is the problem of deliberation that emerges in this final section. I have, of course, my suggested answer: it is the reason for these 117 *Cantowers*. And the answer, too, can be faintly and feebly glimpsed, described. The answer, within theology, was thus feebly and ineffectually described by Lonergan in the 1960s.²⁷ I described it for the broader culture, perhaps just as ineffectually, last year.²⁸ Last year, too, I added²⁹ the context of "Satire and Humour", a context which sits in the middle of the five subsections of the third section of chapter 18 of *Insight*. And now I add this further short expression of a context that weaves together the other four sub-sections of the corresponding section 3. The issue is impotence, ineffective striving, self-imposed and group-imposed conditions of "effete"³⁰ reflection that show no support for Warsaw ghettos in a world at war.

Lonergan writes that "the elements in the problem are basically simple"³¹: indeed yes, they are, as simple as missing the beam in one's own eye: if there are "illusory causes to fascinate unwary wills"³², my cause is not one of them. I, alone or with my group, am bent on the evident good of feeding the poor or founding a theatre, on promoting this poetry or that painting, on teaching these classes or evangelizing those natives.

²⁹In *Cantower XI*.

³⁰The context is *Method in Theology*, 99. There is the larger pointing of the first four chapters of *Topics in Education* that needs sublation into the richer context of the Latin works.

³¹*Insight*, 630[653].

 $^{32}Ibid.$

²⁷Published in *Gregorianum* 50 (1969), 485-505, which became chapter 5 of *Method in Theology*.

²⁸I am thinking particularly of the third chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics: A Fresh Pragmatism*.

Now I have nothing against feeding the poor or teaching chemistry. But if you are reading this then you have some interest in the culture of your bent, and it is the culture of any bent that is the core issue. Your bent may even be considered by you as a core bent, a central theological advance, a global economic reform: and still, the culture of that bent is the present issue. The corresponding section 18.3 in *Insight* begins with the sentence, "The difference between essential and effective freedom is the difference between a dynamic structure and its operational range". I wish to change the meaning of that sentence and so colour your reading of the entire section.

My contention is that a dynamic structure has emerged in slight idea, but that its eventual operational range is the totality of cultures, however slimly reflective. You may well say that this is nothing new, that this has been the contention since *Cantower I*. But what is different and discomforting here is the "Practical Reflection" to which you are invited. In section 5 of *Cantower IX* I pin-pointed the key moment, "the scientific moment", in dialectic, indeed in the entire hodic enterprise. Here I wish to bring you towards your own version of that moment.³³ From my point of view I wish to persuade you, "cajole"³⁴ you "to genuineness and openness"³⁵; I wish to bring you towards *getting with it* on the analogy of Meyer or Mendeleev persuading the community of chemistry to settle into the hodic table as the way of chemistry. By the mid-1870s only freaks and strange amateurs were outside the new culture of chemistry, odd enough not to be embarrassed. What I am talking about now is, not a culture of chemistry, but a culture of cultures. The parallel "operational range" in hodic culture is to be a molecular presence, a neurodynamic twist to the estimative sense.

When I write thus of "is to be" I am evidently not writing of these next decades:

³³*Cantower XXV* will offer a fuller context for that reaching.

³⁴Insight, 398[423].

³⁵Insight, 624[647].

I am writing of the sloping and the cycling that will so slowly raise consciousness to this "still higher integration of human living".³⁶

Here a digression is doubly necessary. The drive of chapter 18 of *Insight* is towards the thesis of the need for a higher integration of human living. That drive looks back to the need, reached in the conclusion of chapter seven, the need for a cosmopolis, and looks forward to the meeting of that need by a "higher integration". The key transition paragraph, in chapter 20, is worth quoting fully.

"It was to this point that we were brought by our study of common sense and by its revelation of the scotosis of the dramatic subject and of the threefold bias of the practical subject. Then we appealed to a higher viewpoint, to an X named cosmopolis; and we indicated some of its features. But if the need of some cosmopolis makes manifest the inadequacy of common sense to deal with the issue, on a deeper level it makes manifest the inadequacy of man. For the possibility of a cosmopolis is conditioned by the possibility of a critical human science, and a critical human science is conditioned by the possibility of a correct and accepted philosophy."³⁷

My digression is doubly necessary. I am going here in a direction that seems to differ from Lonergan's. That direction has a first, relatively superficial, benefit, of getting us away from debates about the drive of *Insight*, debates that erupted at its first appearance and that carried forward through the Florida conference of 1970: Lonergan is hustling us towards theism, even towards Roman theism. Here I am nudging you - hustling you if you like - towards a quite secular solution to the problem of the non-existence of a critical human science. The deeper, second, benefit, of my direction is reached by pausing over the character, characters, of the hustle. It is not my hustle, but history's.

I would note four aspects of history's hustle.

³⁶Insight, 632[655].

³⁷*Insight*, 690[712].

First, it is not terribly important to track back to the beginnings of that hustle: so, one could put a lot of energy and disagreement into a question like, When did "the longer cycle of decline"³⁸ start? Conveniently, one may think of the hustle as associated with the fragmentations of the last millennium, whether they be separations within scholarship or states or religions. There is the hustle, too, of convergences, a global networking altogether more subtle than the internet. Etc etc. One can push for a larger perspective, as I have done - a necessity of staying sane in a wretched century - so reaching a perspective on axiality and on a pre-adolescence of humanity that grounds long-term optimism. At all events, I do not wish to attempt some summary of something I have written about for over thirty years. The dynamics of human questing has forced on us a eightfold fragmentation of cultural reflection, and the fragments hustle us towards their own ordering.

In the second place, that ordering shares the first six properties that Lonergan identifies with the heuristic structure of the solution to the problem of evil.

"First, then, the solution is one. For there is one God, one world order, and one problem that is both individual and social". Such is Lonergan's first property. Here, I slide God out of the picture: there is one world in a cultural disorder that eats up the heart of the individual and the soul of society. There is one uniquely-plausible solution of global reach.

That solution has the second property of being universally accessible and permanent. Hodic collaboration may well generate subdivisions, but it is here to stay, reaching beyond particular classes and particular times.

It its in harmonious continuity with the world order, a ferment of emergent probability which is not a divine afterthought but a fact about the form of history.

It has, as a fourth property, the character of being quite human: not an addition of some mythology of change of genus, but the addition of a mess made by the genus

³⁸See Insight 7.8.

that invites the genus to a change of art and heart.

That change, fifthly, requires new conjugate forms of intellect, will, and sensitivity. Those new forms have been our topic now for eighteen *Cantowers*, perhaps best imagined and thought of as the fresh molecular structuring spoken of in *Cantower IV*, or as the less oddball "Fresh Pragmatism" of the third chapter of *Pastkeynes Pastmodern Economics*.

Finally, the sixth property: the change involves the introduction of those forms that are to be "habits that are operative throughout living",³⁹ a collaborative bent from before kindergarten to beyond coffin. The character, characters, of that introduction, that implementation, that global unity and beauty of the human group, is the home-going home-growing of history's hustling "passionateness of being".⁴⁰

So, I am led to my third aspect of history's hustle. Lonergan carries on in that section of chapter 20 of *Insight* from a seventh to a thirty first property of his envisaged solution: properties that are identified as supernatural. That further list does not belong here. But it is not a matter of denying its value: it is a matter of going another way. Nor am I saying that this other way is the way Lonergan would have gone had he identified functional specialization in the 1940s instead of in the 1960s. The issue is far too complex for the corner of an essay. A few points may help.

Evidently, I do not have the same interest in an apologetic twist that Lonergan had fifty years ago. I am interested in the properties and the potential and the promotion of a very practical solution to the global mess of stupidity and malice. That practical solution has emerged in history. What of the solution about which Lonergan writes? That solution also emerged - I use the past tense - in history: and again, as I mentioned above, let's not fuss too much in the present context about tracking back to

³⁹Insight,697[719].

⁴⁰B. Lonergan,"Mission and the Spirit", A *Third Collection*, 29.

beginnings.⁴¹ The solution to the problem of humanity's inadequacy has been with us, operative in us, through a portion, if not all, of human history. Within that history there has emerged the self- appropriation that I have named hodic. Whether one wishes to call it a development of Christian philosophy is another matter, and indeed a matter of fact, that can be viewed as of importance to its emergence and implementation.

De facto, the precise meaning of *is* and the idea of hodic collaboration both emerged out of the Hebrew-Christian tradition. But it seems more important culturally and psychologically to acknowledge that there are two times of the humanity's quest, two times separated by an axial period in which we live.⁴² A central importance of this perspective is that it gives secular grounds for hope, grounds that twine round facts of revelation. So, here, it can be envisaged as swinging round the twenty five characteristics of Lonergan's heuristic to merge with the 31st-placed property: "the antecedent willingness of hope has to advance from a generic reinforcement of the pure desire to an adapted and specialized auxiliary ever ready to offset every interference either with intellect's unrestricted finality or with its essential detachment".⁴³

I will only refer here, once again, to the sweep of Lonergan's identification of that interference.⁴⁴ It suits my purpose rather to fix your eyes and awes on its neighbourly pettinesses, nicely disguised faces of general bias and commonsense

⁴¹Tracking back and forward to the "two ends" of creation in Trinitarian fashion is a goal of the total enterprise, though of course the core of the enterprise is delineating the vortex process of the communal tracking. Here our concern is with the general ethics of that vortex tracking.

⁴²Lonergan, *De Deo Trino, Pars Systematica*, Gregorian Press, 1964, 199.

⁴³*Insight*, 726[747]. One need to add here reflections on the significance of leisure and of the centrality of the **Tomega** principle introduced in *Cantower IV*.

⁴⁴See note 30 above.

eclecticism, mixtures of cleverness and wickedness or of goodness and stupidity.⁴⁵

"Is my proposal utopian? It asks merely for an interdisciplinary theory that at first will be denounced as absurd, then will be admired to be true but obvious and insignificant, and perhaps finally be regarded as so important that its adversaries will claim that they themselves discovered it".⁴⁶ But the opposition I am thinking of now is not the sweeping opposition of thinkers of various camps but the opposition - perhaps even an admiring opposition, as surely Lonergan followers are - that takes a writing or a research or a classroom stand against history's hustle. To this I shall return after the next paragraph.

The fourth and final aspect of history's hustle can be quite briefly described as history's anti-foundationalism. History takes a stand, or lays in wait, against Aristotle and Aquinas, Descartes and Husserl: there are no secure axioms. History invites a humble humdrum re-cycling of the confusion of our efforts, identified as best or worst or mediocre as we muddle along. In the file that contains Lonergan's identification, in February 1965, of the cycling process there are notes from the beginning of Aquinas' *Summa Theologica.*⁴⁷ I like to think, though it can be written off without bother as a flight of fancy, that Lonergan, startled by some version of my claim, went back to Aquinas to ponder that genius' view of foundations. And I like to think that from that vortex view there blossomed his opposition of a simple and a complex manner of conceiving foundations.

"The simple manner is to conceive foundations as a set of premises, of logically

⁴⁵I am recalling Lonergan's reflections on the views of Russell and Popper in his essay, "Healing and Creating in History", *Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation Analysis*, edited by F.Lawrence, P.Byrne, C.Hefling Jr., University of Toronto Press, 1999, 97-98.

⁴⁶*Ibid*, 106.

⁴⁷Available in Darlene O'Leary, *Lonergan's Practical View of History*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2002, chapter two.

first propositions".⁴⁸ The complex manner settles for "an ongoing developing process which aims at decreasing the darkness and increasing the light and keeps adding discovery to discovery. Then, what is paramount is control of the process"⁴⁹, a control towards which history hustles. "This control of the emergent probability of the future can be exercised not only by the individual in choosing his career and in forming his character, not only by adults in educating the younger generation, but also by mankind in its consciousness of its responsibility to the future of mankind".⁵⁰

And that curious "not only... but also" leads me back to the previous topic, the possibility of pettiness in the individual's choice, character, and choice of character. Notice the twist here, related to the odd twist in the quotation from Lonergan. We are both, I presume, interested in humanity's grip on humanity's responsibility and education. What is the character, what is our character, of that interest? One can read chapter 18 *with interest*, or the whole book: but is that a reading with the will to progress? What, really, is the existential meaning of the strange challenge of Lonergan, "one has not only to read *Insight* but also to discover oneself in oneself"? Is it not a matter of reaching for a sufficiently cultured self, tuned in spirited appetite to the driving rhythms of an unfinished symphony?

So, you and I may turn now in our own ways to discern pettinesses, disguised pettinesses, that block that tuning. I use the word "discern" to bring to mind the sublation of Ignatius of Loyola's reflections on discernment. That sublation was first introduced by me in the essay "The Value of Lonergan's Economics for Lonergan Students", where I wrote of the discernments of discernments of discernments,⁵¹ a

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, 270.

⁴⁸*Method in Theology*, 269.

⁵⁰*Insight*, 227[252-3].

⁵¹Chapter one of *The Redress of Poise*, conclusion. Available on the Website.

triplicity which was given some sense in the first section of the previous *Cantower*. Here my focus is on an elementary existential meaning⁵² best conveyed by recalling what was for me a very impressive distraction in one of Lonergan's lectures on economics in the spring of 1978, when he spoke of the search for perfection: you reach for perfection by struggling to remove the largest obstacle to it in your life.⁵³ I am thinking here, you must know, of your life as cultural: but if your life is integral, Dogenesque, then that is not some separate life, and if it is separate and can be discerned as such then you may already be on the way to pinning down your obstacle.

So, there is the existential context with its existential gaps: "Insofar as you are beyond your own horizon, your own reality is hidden from you, and if it is hidden from you, that is not entirely without any fault on your part".⁵⁴ There are then the broader contexts that you have read about, but perhaps not read yourself into. There is a positive context of discernment in whatever glimpse you have of the strange project of these *Cantowers*, the reach for the Tower⁵⁵ or the Bower⁵⁶, for Poise or Protopossession,⁵⁷ for a home in hodic method.⁵⁸ There is a negative context read about and round about: the general bias that eats your soul in a commonsense eclecticism of

⁵⁴*Phenomenology and Logic*, 283.

⁵⁵In the final section of *Cantower IV*.

⁵⁶The drive of *Cantower V*.

⁵⁷The topic of *Cantower IX*.

⁵⁸Method in Theology, 14, 350.

⁵²See note 5 above.

⁵³The strategy parallels that of cleansing one's belief-structures which Lonergan describes in chapter 20 of *Insight*.

research, teaching, writing.⁵⁹

There is, finally, that fullest context, a *Shobogenzo* sought or found but still a seed. It is the theist context that will occupy us in the next *Cantower* on Ultimates, a context which perhaps is already yours but trapped in a prior culture. It is, for the Christian, the context of a boggling intimacy - the topic of *Cantower XX* - that calls global culture to a *theoria* which is identically a person. Christianity itself, in its cultivation of directions of morality and mysticism, has prejudiced us against that identification, an identification that calls us to reach for an inner word of the Word's company.⁶⁰ "History, heredity, personal experience, all combine to rivet my prejudice upon me. Under their influence, I gradually outdistance the disturbing echo of His words, spoken without reservation to me as to everyone else who should believe in Him, until at last I hear it no more".⁶¹

⁶⁰The topic is the high and difficult theology of a ground reason for the incarnation of Word: that we might move to an intelligible emanation in us by which we speak our word of the Divine Word, thus wafting forward luminously to the "annotaste of throat" that I wrote of in *Cantower II*. See Lonergan, *De Deo Trino. Pars Systematica*, Gregorian University Press, 1964, 256, and the questions leading up to that point.

⁵⁹Need I add that this context needs discomforting, perhaps dreadfilled, ingestion. (See *Phenomenology and Logic* on dread, 284-8. +++). I am not thinking here of the flirtation or marriage with cunning that regularly goes with thesis writing. I am thinking more of the 'settling **down**' that can occur in one's cultural living "by taking care not to lose the common touch, by maintaining one's sense of reality"(*Insight*, 417[). One now has the chair of Moses, teaching say, introductory philosophy or business ethics or Christology. Are you teaching self-appropriation without exercises, dodging generalized empirical method? Are you settled in the vague descriptive context of *Method in Theology*? Are you following the line of least resistance by surveying opinions with the odd silly comparative connection to Lonergan? Lonergan, of course, is not relevant: what is relevant is the mutual self-mediation of students and teacher that would remove both from the schizothymia of present culture and lift them into history's hustle.

⁶¹R.H.J. Stuart, *The Inward Vision*, London, 1929, 113. I pick up this quotation from a previous context, relevant here: the conclusion of chapter 2, "Ultimate Concern", P. McShane, *Music That Is Soundless. A Fine Way for the Lonely Bud A*, Axial Press, Halifax, 2002.