### Cantower XVI

### **Hodics as Science II**

July 1st 2003

# 16.1 "Where does the Beginning Begin?"<sup>1</sup>

Control of meaning is the issue in chapter 16 of *Insight*. My task, as I see it, is to gently introduce you to the meaning of that first word, *Control*. The mention of "first word" may bring to your mind - unless you are beginning with this *Cantower*, which is a possibility I am going to try to cope with - the first word of metaphysics, which I will not repeat here, since it would discourage beginners! But I can give an initial meaning to that first word - the first word of metaphysics, the first word of this essay - by description.

Let us begin with the first word of the essay, *Control*, which I shall re-write as *Kontrol*. This is a simple device, which I have found convenient over the years, to draw attention to the push for subjectivity. It only works when there is a "c" in the relevant word: so *Dialectic* becomes *Dialectik*. The "k" pushes you to think of the subject that you are, that I am. So, here, **you** are the issue, as a **Kontrol** of meaning.

Can you tolerate me taking tennis or piano-playing as illustrations? A teacher in either area would want you to become a kontrol of meaning in that area. Pick your own illustration: do you "know your way" round your own kitchen, your own town? Notice immediately that the question has different answers depending on the level at which you are envisaging that question. '"Knowing your way" round Manhattan has a different meaning for the mayor and for the mafia: at least one would like to think so! Knowing your way round Chopin is an illustration dear to my molecules, since I have been addicted to Chopin from my early teens. I once watched and listened to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>I am recalling the quotation from Eric Voegelin final work, with which I began *Cantower I*.

elderly Horowitz sitting at a piano talking about Chopin. He had no music score before him: but he could begin and stop anywhere, magnificently. The Williams sisters have come to dominate tennis in the past few years: they are marvelous Kontrols of tennismeaning. Just how marvelous and magnificently? You have to have some parallel in your own life to sense the achievement, and even with a decent parallel we lesser mortals have only a crude suspicion of the delicacy of sensability involved in either of the illustrative controls.

The crude suspicion can be helped on, of course, by becoming an earnest beginner. After a month or a year you can get through the first page of the famous Nocturne in E flat without tripping, you can return a gentle tennis-serve. You have begun to take in, or perhaps rather be taken in by, Chopin or tennis. And if you are more than a beginner in this search for the Black Tower,<sup>2</sup> then the phrase "take in" has resonances of molecular meaning for you.

But let me not get overly complex. What of the other first word, the first word of metaphysics? In a simplified form it contains seven letters (or nine symbols), just as the standard presentation of a Western scale, c d e f g a b, contains seven letters. The nine symbols, in right order (like the scale letters) are f ( p c b z u q ) . You are surely "familiar" with the eight letters of the Western scale in their musical meaning, if only from the *Sound of Music* song that gives the old teaching version: doh, re, me, fa, so, la, te, bringing us back, or forward, to doh. What of the seven letters (or nine symbols) in their metaphysical meaning? "If we appeal to the immemorial convictions of common sense or to the actual division of scientific departments, all the evidence favours the affirmation of different explanatory genera". So, the six letters p, c, b, z, u, q make immediate sense to you: four clearly point to the natural sciences, and the last two can be figured out easily: there are departments of 'uman studies, of understanding

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The topic of the last section of *Cantower IV*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>*Insight*, 441[467].

humans, and then there is regularly a department of religious studies, a questionable department in some people's eyes, a department regarding fundamental questing in other people's eyes: so, "q" suits a double purpose. Then there is the first letter "f", the first letter of function. The brackets simply give the unifying meaning, "function of".

The different levels of commonsense realities are recognized as "functions of", functioning by their properties. If you stop at physics things, then you just have f(p), physics things have properties that are studied in physics. May I complicate the symbolism slightly by adding a subscript? Then we can say, in better symbolization, that physics things are  $f(p_i)$ . The "i" ranges over the various properties discovered or to be discovered by physics: you may have heard or read of the fundamental forces?

Let us shift our attention to our friends from *Cantower II*, the sunflowers. Then we have to think in terms of f(p, c, b), and you may add in subscripts. No great mystery so far?

Well, yes: if you have struggled through the previous *Cantower* you must admit obscurity, challenges. But the key point is that *that* admission is not mysterious, or at least is to become non-mysterious in a more mature culture.<sup>4</sup> What I mean by that is that, yes, the first word of metaphysics can be regarded as mysterious. If you have had a shot at reading *Lack in the Beingstalk* you will have noticed that neither Fr. Fred Crowe<sup>5</sup> nor the publisher's reader<sup>6</sup> of my original version of *Phenomenology and Logic* took to my simple first word. Yet it simply present the old doctrine of "the chain of being", with a difference.

But it is a difference that makes all the difference for the rescuing of metaphysics from commonsense eclecticism or disrepute. The difference - and now I am introducing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>An issue to be reflected on in section 1 of *Cantower XVII*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Crowe's view of my symbolization goes back to its first introduction in the early seventies. See *Lack in the Beingstalk*, pp. 45-6, 62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See *Lack in the Beingstalk*, pp. 136ff.

you gently to the first section of chapter 16 of *Insight* - is that the symbolism, as you grow to understand it even a little, helps you to distinguish *this* from *that*: it nudges you towards clear-headed and clear-hearted "dichotomies". So, naming the forms of the four fundamental forces in physics is just that, naming. Such naming is a slim step towards description, itself possibly the beginning of a scientific effort. The beginning and the achievement of that effort are brutally distinguishable: have a shot at reading an examination in Quantum Electrodynamics. And, optimistically, we might say that such distinguishing "puts an end to mere disputation. It divides the field of possible knowledge of proportionate being into knowledge of things as related to us and knowledge of things as related to one another". Especially if we have come to grips with some precise meaning of "relations" - which points you towards the second section of chapter 16 of *Insight*!

This is moving us along altogether too fast. Let's get back to the question of clear-heartedness, tying it in with the business of "knowledge of things as related to us". One can, perhaps, get a happy text-book grip on the division of the field of possible knowledge mentioned and even repeat with some examinee's conviction such a thesis as "explanation is of things as related to one another; description is of things as related to us; and so, since we are things, the descriptive relations must be identical with some of the explanatory relations". But, in your heart of hearts, is this just not dancing round in a "bloodless ballet of metaphysical categories" 10?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>*Insight*, 524[548].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>*Insight*, 424[449].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>*Insight*, 394[419].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Insight, 547[570].

Chapter 16 of *Insight* is about turning that seeming bloodless ballet into a hearty "embrace", <sup>11</sup> a hearty nescience, a hearty living. It is not a bloodless ballet, but a bloodwashed battling. <sup>12</sup> And it is the battling that is my primary topic here as it has been from the start of the *Cantowers*: the pilgrimage towards the Dark Tower. The turning into a hearty embrace is the task of the hodic vortex sloping <sup>13</sup> over centuries towards a new global life. But I invite some few ladies - there may be some males ("as males they disliked his air" <sup>14</sup>) - to madly risk the solitary climb?

What is that climb in the present chapter? It is to push forward to a glimpse of a metaphysics that distinguishes but does not destroy. It is to push forward in the task, deeply lonely in the present ethos, of becoming a Kontrol of meaning. What is to happen to the relations of things to us in all this: to the music that "breaks the heart," <sup>15</sup> the hushed ripple of the tide, the smile of a friend, erectile nakedness? They are to be lifted to the subtle ecstasy of a larger art of living.

This, certainly, is not a common view of chapter 16 of *Insight*, if indeed there are any serious views about it. A few years ago I had a conversation about the chapter with a relatively senior and deeply sincere Lonergan scholar. He was hugely puzzled by this chapter: what did it add, where did it go? He had asked Lonergan about it and got somewhat the same reply as I got in the seventies when I asked Lonergan about his

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>*Insight*, 417[442].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>I had best quote fully from the relevant context in *Process. Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders*, p. 162-3: "The third stage of global meaning, with its mutual mediations of an academic presence3, is a distant probability, needing painfilled solitary reaching towards a hearing of hearing, a touching of touching, "in the far ear", "sanscreed", making luminously present - in focal darkdream - our bloodwashed bloodstream. It is a new audicity, a new hapticity, to which we must aspire, for which we must pray".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>The sloping is described in *Cantower VIII*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>I am quoting from Patrick Kavanagh's song, "If ever you go to Dublin Town".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>George Steiner, Errata: An Examined Life, 73.

possible interest in publishing what is now *Topics in Education*. "I was just trying to work out a few things". Well, yes: thank you very much!

I am, at seventy one, just trying to work out a few things. Despite my long struggle towards being a Kontrol of meaning, I regularly fall into a basic error regarding communication. It is not an error that occurred when I was lecturing in physics in my twenties. Then, if I did mention stuff from a graduate class in an undergraduate class, it was mentioned only as a project: "you will be pushing this forward when you get into non-Abelian gauge theories next year". Of courses, I try to do that here, by biographical references ("the first two sections of chapter 8 of *Insight* took me the winter of 1964-5 to figure out"), by analogy with doing physics, by appealing to a peculiar perspective on normative adult growth. ("we can become strangers to ourselves of last week"). It is the analogy with physics that I am appealing to at the moment precisely in the sense that there are, in some universities, reasonably good undergraduate degrees in physics. The equivalent in metaphysics does not exist.

I am speaking here, sadly, not of philosophy in Oxford or Harvard, but of philosophy and theology as they are being taught by so-called disciples of Lonergan. My spies send me depressing course outlines, in the main representing unsatisfactory meshing, and messing, of descriptions of Lonergan's work with current opinions. In the absence of such courses, how can there be community in the zone of serious metaphysics? But surely, you may say, there are groups discussing *Insight* with some seriousness. If there are, I am pleased, and would be happy to hear of them, to hear of their difficulties and achievements with the various bridges of meaning involved: for instance, the "bridge of size" of chapter five, without the crossing of which much of the meaning of the rest of the book is massively distorted. Needless to say, this statement will raise the hackles on some readers - are you one of them? At all events I

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>A topic treated in "Features of Generalized Empirical Method", *Creativity and Method*, edited by Matthew Lamb, Marquette University Press, 1980..

stick impolitely with my claim, my doctrine, regarding present Lonergan studies. "Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company".<sup>17</sup>

The discomforting analogy with physics leaves me with a problem. If I were trying to work out a few things in physics, I would be quite well aware that a hundred others around the globe were probably trying to work out the same few things: indeed, I would be in regular contact with them, sharing - it is now standard practice - published versions of working papers. But what am I trying to work out as I write these *Cantowers*? It is a double effort. I am obviously trying to work Lonergan studies out of a rut of commonsense eclecticism into the vortex that represents Lonergan's greatest achievement. But to that primary objective there must be added the normal climb of adult growth. The project is a decade long, taking me up to the edge of my eightieth birthday. McShane has no "finished mental edifice, as though his mind had become dull, or his brain exhausted". <sup>18</sup> On the contrary, I edge towards a fresh beginning, a lodge, a house, a home: "Late in life, with indomitable courage, we will continue to say that we are going to do what we have not yet done: we are going to build a house". <sup>19</sup>

But does this building need to be a solitary thing? I find, for instance, no companionship of serious interest in the Epilodge, the reality of an ultimate intimate re-molecularization of *sapiens*.

Still, refined thin-aired climbing illuminates lower ridges: in the previous *Cantower* I noted how contemporary struggles with general relatively and gauge theory throws light on Newton's confused climb. Besides this, there are two other good reasons for climbing and expressing that climb. First, if one is to continue to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Method in Theology, 299.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>I quote the concluding page of *Insight*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Space*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, 61.

move towards becoming an Integral Kontrol, then one must speak to oneself with all the subtle meanings of the word "speak". Secondly, one is in fact not alone: there are others daft enough to seek integral enlightenment. And if you are not one of them - they are a rare and crazy breed - you may still be brought to admire the search for such integral enlightenment. At all events, there is the significance of leaving footprints in the sands of time.

But this first section, on beginning again, is already too long. As I wandered Manhattan's meanings in the Summer of 2002 I mused over the relevance of metaphysics and hodics. Not a cheerful musing. There was the quite positive perspective expressed in the last paragraph: others would turn this way to travel or admire. And there was the major negative perspective: the need to protect ordinary daily meanings from the common nonsense that poses as profundity, philanthropy, philosophy: ultimately a massive hodic task. So let's get on with it.

I may claim, then, that these next six *Cantowers* are all beginnings, all introductions to the reading of the corresponding five chapters and Epilogue of *Insight*. I will continue my climb, and those around me on the slopes should be able to detect shifts of meaning that startle me as I move slowly on in adulthood, in THEN wisdom. But my focal interest is "to serve and protect". I wish to give a refreshing slant on tackling each of the parts of *Insight* that I write about. That slant will obviously include the negative aspect of the relevance of metaphysics. There are some extraordinarily nonsensical views both of reading and of *Insight* around.

The context of the effort, yours and mine, are the two works, *Insight* and *Method in Theology*. That is no surprise: the hodic enterprise requires eventually the lifting of *Insight* into the vortex movement, in particular the lifting of key parts of chapters 17 and 16, respectively, into the specialties called dialectic and foundations. More about that in section 16.4. Section 16. 2 will add some contextualizing reflections on Thomas Kuhn. Originally, I had thought of devoting much more space to the movement

associated with him, more or less as I had thought of a 100 page musing on Stephen Gould as part of the previous *Cantower*. But eventually such elaboration seemed quite out of place. So, some few relevant and indeed cheeky things will be said about the Kuhn phenomenon in section 16.2, and in section 16.5 I will return to Gould's work with brief indications of the metaphysical context, fruit of the deepening of metaphysics invited by chapter 16, a metaphysics adequate to a critical sublation of present evolution theory.

Section 16.3 will principally tackle the second section of chapter 16 of *Insight*, taking up some of the questions raised in the present section, questions for instance about the metaphysician in the world of music or in the woods, at any age. Let a houseman, A.E. Housman, help us - me at seventy, you perhaps at twenty, in our aging, with two quiet poems.

"Loveliest of trees, the cherry now Is hung with bloom along the bough, And stands about the woodland ride Wearing white for Eastertide.

Now, of my threescore years and ten,
Twenty will not come again,
And take from seventy springs a score,
It only leaves me fifty more.

And since to look at things in bloom

Fifty springs are little room

About the woodlands I will go

To see the cheery hung with snow."20

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>A.E. Housman (1859 - 1936), "Loveliest of trees, the cheery now", written in 1896.

"When I was one-and-twenty

I heard a wise man say,

'Give crowns and pounds and guineas

But not your heart away;

Give pearls away and rubies

But keep your fancy free.'

But I was one-and-twenty,

No use to talk to me.

When I was one-and-twenty

I heard him say again,

The heart out of the bosom

Was never given in vain;

'Tis paid with sighs a plenty

And sold for endless rue.'

And I am two-and-twenty,

And oh, 'tis true, 'tis true."21

# 16.2 Kuhn, Lonergan, Paradigms<sup>22</sup>

I had envisaged, some months ago, Kuhn's place in this *Cantower* as paralleling that of Gould in the previous one. But the more I pondered Kuhn and the tradition associated with him the less viable the parallel became. The result of my change of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Housman, 1986: "When I was one-and-twenty".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>As you will see, I am not entering into the mess of meanings of paradigms below, not indeed into the Kuhn business in any serious fashion. On meanings of 'paradigm' see Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm", *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, edited by Imre Lakotos and Alan Musgrave, Cambridge University Press, 1974, 59-89.

perspective is this short cheeky section.

Of course, there is, in a sense, no serious change in my perspective.<sup>23</sup> Kuhn's book, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, came out in 1962. It became "probably the best-known academic book of the second half of the twentieth century."<sup>24</sup> I would have been surprised about that future fame at the time: in the mid-sixties I didn't bother referring to it in my Oxford work, *The Concrete Logic of Discovery of Statistical Science, with special reference to problems of evolution theory.*<sup>25</sup> It seemed to me that Norman Hanson and W.W. Sawyer had a better sense of creative discontinuities than Kuhn.<sup>26</sup> At that stage in my struggle with science and philosophy I was relatively at home in the investigation of such discontinuities. I had been reading passages like the following for eight years, and I quote it fully as a context to be savored in our brief reflections here on Kuhn.

"The possible revision of standards sets a logical puzzle. How, one may ask, can one reach new laws except through measurements based on old standards? How can the new laws be correct if the old standards are wrong? How can incorrect laws lead to the correction of old standards? Behind such questions there lies a mistaken presupposition. Science does not advance by deducing new conclusions from old premises. Deduction is an operation that occurs only in the field of concepts and propositions. But the advance of science, as we have seen, is a circuit: from data to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>This comment will amuse those who have been reading along since the *Bacchus Page*, the conclusion of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, where strange and self-estranging changes in perspective are of the essence of adult growth. My ramblings above about Kuhn and company have that self-estranging meaning.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Steve Fuller, *Thomas Kuhn. A Philosophic History for our Time*, The University of Chicago Press, 2000, 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Published as *Randomness, Statistics and Emergence*, Gill, Macmillan and Notre Dame, 1970. Referred to here as Randomness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>See the index to *Randomness*, *Statistics and Emergence*.

inquiry, from inquiry to insight, from insight to the formulation of premises and the deduction of their implications, from such formulation to material operations which yield fresh data and in the limit generate the new insights named a higher viewpoint. A basic revision, then, is a leap. At a stroke, it is a grasp of the insufficiency both of the old laws and of the old standards. At a stroke, it generates both the new laws and the new standards. Finally, by the same verification, it establishes that both the new laws and the new standards satisfy the data".<sup>27</sup>

On the other hand Kuhn, as late as 1987, was to write:

"Normal science alters the way in which terms attach to nature. What characterizes revolutions is not, therefore, simple change in the way referents are determined, but change of a still more restricted sort. How best to characterize that restricted sort of change is among the problems that currently occupy me, and I have no full solution." <sup>28</sup>

I would claim, perhaps to your annoyance, that Kuhn never got near the beginnings of a solution. A person may stumble into generalized empirical method, as Aristotle did, but you cant go far in seriously working in it without the process becoming luminous, self-luminous. "I don't know what I'm doing but I've discovered that when I understand I ask questions, get insights, from which and through which I generate those inner realities called concepts". Kuhn, fundamentally, did not know what he was doing, and his extrinsicist conceptualism blocked him from discovering that Scotus and company were wrong. That doesn't prevent him or Lakatos or whoever from using the word "insight' or typing question-marks. But it probably prevents them

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>*Insight*, 166[190].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Road since Structure*. *Philosophical Essays 1970-93*, *with an autobiographical Interview*, edited by James Conant and John Haugeland, The University of Chicago Press, 2000, in an essay by Kuhn, "What are Scientific Revolutions?", 29. I will refer to this book as Kuhn, 2000.

from considering question-types as a serious index entry.<sup>29</sup>

But might you not follow up that clue, in a re-education of a Kuhnian, "a physicist turned historian for philosophic purposes. The philosophy I knew and had been exposed to, and the people in my environment to talk to, were all of them out of the English logical empiricism tradition, in one way or another. This was a tradition which by and large had no use to the continental and particularly the German philosophical tradition. I think, in some sense or other, I can be described as in some part having reinvented that tradition for myself. And clearly its not the same, and there are all sorts of ways in which it goes in other directions and past and so forth - there's a whole body of work there that I don't even know very well. But when people say, didn't Heidegger say that, or something of that sort, yes, he probably did, and I haven't read it, and if I had I'd like to think this was going to help bridge the gap." 30

I too are interested in bridging the gap: it is a deep "existential gap" <sup>31</sup> but perhaps there is a superficial way that might be opened from the obvious in language, all languages. Kuhn moved, in the post-*Structure* period, into reflections on the language of science. "If I am right, the central characteristic of scientific revolutions is that they alter the knowledge of nature that is intrinsic to the language itself and that is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>The book cited in the previous reference has no index, but I find it entertaining to note that the previous "Kuhnian" book cited, by Fuller, has as index entries under *Q*, *quantum mechanics* and *Quine*. So much for the interest of a philosophic history of our times; so much for our times. Checking indices on psychology, education, philosophy, children, etc was an exercise I regularly gave to my first-year philosophy students. A more elaborate exercise that I can recommend is to check the text luminously for conceptualist phrases, "analyzing concepts", "understanding concepts", etc. And then there are the full revealing sentences: "Though I no longer speak of anything as vague and general as 'language change,' I do talk of change of concepts and their names, in conceptual vocabulary, and in the structured conceptual lexicon that contains both concepts and their names".(Kuhn, in his reply to contributors at a conference in May, 1990; Kuhn, 2000, 229).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Kuhn, 2000, 320-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>A context here is the discussion of *exigence* in *Phenomenology and Logic* .

thus prior to anything quite describable as description or generalization, scientific or everyday .... Violation or distortion of a previously unproblematic scientific language is the touchstone for revolutionary change".<sup>32</sup>

So, I am led to twistedly assert that index-treatment of question-types is a sign of a violation or distortion of a previously unproblematic language: the question-types were both unproblematic and significant for Aristotle; question-structured writing was the heart of Aquinas. For consistency, both the European and the German traditions should revise language to exclude what linguistic theorists name the wh-structures. More simply, we need to ban the innovation that is "?". Kuhn, like Popper, or indeed the tradition since Scotus, has a core view of science as conceptual structures that are verifiable or falsifiable empirically. Who needs question marks? But then the last symbol of that sentence suggests that *this* revolution just doesn't cut it, doesn't fit the linguistic facts.

But enough of Kuhn, or perhaps what may be considered a caricature of Kuhn. Why has his view been such a success? I do not wish to go there: Fuller tells the story. One thing is clear. In the language of police-thrillers, Kuhn had a Rabbi: James Bryant Conant (1893-1976), president of Harvard, 1933-53.<sup>33</sup> Fuller describes at some length both the resultant support and the concomitant tunnel-vision, the "embushelment: the Closing of the Western mind".<sup>34</sup> It is an entertaining read, but with its own closed conceptualist limitations. Fuller's push for a larger historical perspective, however, does adds support to a thesis of these *Cantowers*, the need for a full and earnest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Kuhn, 2000, 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>One gets a sense of the concrete context by bearing in mind that Conant, as well as introducing Kuhn to the historical study of science, was also "director of the National Defense Research Committee during World War II (which supervised the construction of the first atomic bomb), and chairman of the anti-Communist Committee on the Present Danger in the 1950s. (Fuller, 5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>This is the title of the first section of his chapter 1, itself titled "The Pilgrimage from Plato to Nato".

Remembrance of Things Past.

Lonergan's remembrance of Aristotle, and of Butterfield, and of the scientific self is in a quite different ballpark. Comparison with Kuhn is really a waste of time: unless it is the *Comparison* that belongs within the serious meta-paradigm-shifting structure described on page 250 of *Method*. But even without that hodic enterprise, there is lurking in Lonergan - if one merges the two sets of canons of inquiry - a magnificent heuristic of the history of paradigm shifts in science and its language that screams for substantiation. And Lonergan's view of a third order inquiry, a precise self-attentive methodology which relates to scientific method as zoology does to animals, is a world apart from Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. And then there is, of course, functional specialization, the ultimate scientific strategy for efficiently, adequately, beautifully, "Remembering the Future".

### 16.3 Relations

Above I made the claim that the relations of things to us "are to be lifted to the subtle ecstacy of a larger living" <sup>36</sup> by metaphysics. I would hope to substantiate that claim for you in some preliminary but satisfying fashion here, and in so doing give you a better notion of metaphysics as concrete, non-abstractive, a type of luminous presence in life.

This section is not, then, a summary indication of the corresponding dense section of *Insight*. It is more a summary indication of a possible life-style to be cultivated or not according to your intentions and talent. As I brooded over it this past month I did so regularly in the pre-dawn light, watching the patterns of late-summer leaves emerging out of the shifting dark. My sunflowers outside were also watching,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup>See, for example, Imre Lakatos, "Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 69(1968), 149-86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>See above, page 4, around note 15.

heads turned expectantly towards autonomic conjugation with the sun.<sup>37</sup> And my own efforts were towards a like, but radically unlike, autonomic conjugation: the flowers pirouetted on photons, I pirouetted on a different ingestion of photons, phantasms with autonomic luminousness.<sup>38</sup> The micro-cell-seeds of light-flecked leaves were caressed by my attendant interest, not that I might pursue botany at that early hour, nor that I might exclude "quod visum placet"<sup>39</sup>, but that I might enlarge my autonomy by what is dully called generalized empirical method<sup>40</sup> and, in this enlargement, that I might find better words to write to you of what doing the metaphysics of the relations of things to us is like. Especially when such enlargement reaches, in layered but spontaneous mediations, within a constitutive meaning nourished by Hopkins and Smetana, by the early landscape painters of China<sup>41</sup> and delicate haikus of Japan,<sup>42</sup> by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>The context here is *Cantower II*, "Sunflowers, Speak to us of Growing".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Recall *Cantower IX*, "Position, Poisition, Protopossession", which treats of the degrees of luminousness that are to be cultivated over a long life. The cultivation itself is to be luminous; it belongs to a new culture, remote from the best of present achievement. See note 55 below, on the position of Seamus Heaney.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>"What pleases seeing". I am recalling here the morning presence of Thomas Aquinas, and think of suggesting to you the reflections on his views of art by Umberto Ecco, in his Latin work on the subject.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup>The precise late definition of this by Lonergan is worth recalling now as indicative of a double reaching of the subject for meaning: "generalized empirical method operates on a combination of both the data of sense and the data of consciousness. It does not treat of objects without taking into account the corresponding operations of the subject; it does not treat of the subject's operations without taking into account the corresponding objects" (*A Thrid Collection*, 141). There is reach for a integral luminousness of both subject and object that is evidently heuristic. You might be interested in revisiting the AA', BB', of the canon of parsimony (*Insight*, 81[104] against this background.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>I am thinking especially of traditions of tree-painting that emerged before the end of the first millennium A.D., of such painters as Ching Hao (around 900) and Fan K'uan (around 1000) and Ma Yuan (around 1200). Wei Yen (lived until about 800; his legendary tree-paintings did not survive) was written about both by the poet Tu Fu and by Mi Fei, and perhaps here one can think of tree-tasting on a par with Proust's tea-tasting. How long does it take to taste a pine, an oak, a willow, a cherry tree ...

the evolutionary perspective associated with Darwin, by the final exercise of contemplation of Ignatius.<sup>43</sup>

The richness of the metaphysical study of the relations of things to us depends on the richness of those relations in us.<sup>44</sup> It is the data of the study, lifted in its heart,

everlasting life? So, from Tu Fu we have of Wei Yen, "When he lays down his brush, the pines look as if their tops were swaying in a steady breeze". And Mi Fei writes of Wei Yen's *Pine Tree*: "A pine with a thousand branches and ten thousand needles, which it must have taken a year to finish". I am quoting from Max Loehr, *The Great Painters of China*, Phaidon Press, Oxford, 1980,78. Loehr goes on to say "Mi Fei's persuasive estimate of the time it took Wei Lei to complete his *Pine Tree* supplies a corrective to the notion of rapidly dashed off conceits. To work with single-minded concentration for a whole year on the image of a tree requires not only skill and sustained inspiration, but also faith, or conviction. He must have been convinced that to explore as thoroughly as he did the appearance of that tree was somehow important. He may have thought of capturing its soul or its vital essence". And a little later, after commenting on tree-worship in China, Loehr quotes Chu Hsi (1130-1200): "Living plants and trees have a *shen* [spirit] of themselves, or else they would, of course, not be able to live". Are there lessons here for the leisured poise of a new culture, learning from trees and sunflowers how to grow?

<sup>42</sup>One sights an autumn leaves descent with changed nerves if one has intussuscepted a haiku such as "I thought I saw the fallen leaf returning to its branch only to find it was a butterfly". I used this once as a symbol of the transition from the longer cycle of decline to the third stage of meaning: see the Preface to *Searching for Cultural Foundations*. Later Jaime Barrera of Bogota gave me a translation which captures better the haiku's mood: "A fallen leaf to a branch / look like returning / the butterfly". The original Japanese is reproduced as the final page of the book *Process: Introducing Themselves to Young (Christian) Minders* (available on this Website). It reads, in Roman lettering, Rakka eda ni / Kaeru to mireba / Kocho Kana".

<sup>43</sup>The final contemplation of Ignatius' *Exercises* orients one towards the universe in suggestive detail, "attending to the plants, how they vegetate". One's exercising obviously matures as one climbs through th position to a poisition, and beyond, in one's reach for *the field*. (See note XX on 'the field'). A key leap is from a muddled naive realism to an affirmation and acceptance of the glory of "the real world", the world invisible. One's contemplation is enhanced, and pushed in that direction of the real, in so far as one has grappled with the photosynthesis of vegetation.

<sup>44</sup>Seamus Heaney is probably the most internationally-known contemporary Irish poet. He incarnates the richness I speak of, but within the limits of a cultural horizon that is not metaphysically luminous in the sense intended above. He is not, in my sense, a metaphysical poet, nor was John Donne: generalized empirical method is a foreign land to him, and it is not a land one enters

heart-held, a Helden-Arbeit. What may be called the everyday relating is, in a sense, a flawed relating, perhaps heavily axial, instrumentalized, betraying its eschological terminal.<sup>45</sup> But the patterned neuro-molecules can tremble and dance, nudge each other in the heat of wisdom towards a strange cosmic alignment. The pussy-willow becomes an inner poem-poise, and the rose-bush twines around the timeless or even the Incarnate God.<sup>46</sup> So, the patterned neuromolecule feels "awe, fascination, the uncanny.

inadvertently. His case may help to heighten your sensability of the distant goal of a new culture, but its appreciation requires a book, not a footnote. We met Seamas Heaney already in *Cantower VIII*, where he was one of candidates for the dialectic operation. Instead of sending you back, perhaps it is just as well to repeat here a relevant footnote (note 48): "Heaney is in quite precise trouble. We are asking here about something called a vis cogitativa, what we may call an estimative sense, sensibility's capacity for discerning the harmful and the beneficial. Heaney's book, *The Redress of Poetry*, floats continually round and in and with this reality and this topic. There is "the official linguistic censor with whom another part of you is secretly in league" (63). He parallels the deer's finding proper course with "the break out of innate capacity which marks att true lyric activity" (69), of the poet, "forever at the ready, always in good linguistic shape, limber and fit to go intelligently with the impulse"(81), of "a kind of pre-verbal register to which the poetic voice had to be tuned"(112). Dylan "Thomas's poems retain a turning, humming resonance, something that seemed to be generated less by the movement of the iambic pentameter than by the circulation of the blood"(133), part of "any poet's undermusic" (134), "a kind of veteran knowledge". Elizabeth "Bishop creates the delightful illusion of access to a pristine, pre-linguistic state" (168). We are dealing, evidently, with a conversion incarnated in the good poet, including Heaney. But what is that conversion, what is it of? Do you notice that we, and Heaney, are force by the "final chapter" of page 250 of *Method* to go beyond metaphor to the enlarged control of meaning suggested by "the first word of metaphysics" (see *Cantower V*, section 2)? See also A Brief History of Tongue on the fuller heuristics of "the tongues of poets redressing our poise"(122).

<sup>45</sup>Of the many contexts and references relevant here perhaps the most helpful is a drawing attention to Lonergan's notion of *the field*: "The field is *the* universe, but my horizon defines *my* universe. Both are relevant to metaphysics: for metaphysics deals with *ens*, with *omnia*, with the universe. The field regards metaphysics as such, but the horizon regards metaphysics as possible-to-me, relevant-to-me" (*Phenomenology and Logic*, 199). The distant field, eternally designed, invites later post-axial mes to a compact harmonious envisagement of cosmic glory: but we, now, can stretch our horizons towards it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>I am thinking of Eliot's rose-garden, and the poet Joseph Plunkett's "I see His blood upon the rose", and thorns that grew in Jerusalem.

It is an openness to the world, to adventure, to greatness, to goodness, to majesty". 47

Evidently I am speaking here of my Proustian or Hopkinesque self-taste, taste of tea-leaves, *Leaves of Grass* and willow, inner-sited, reaching round the histo-globe, embraced. I speak of cosmic molecular things in relation to me in a massive concrete inclusiveness, a fossil fresh future in *The Little Prince*'s flower. Am I perhaps, proposing some doctrines of a metaphysics of art? Could the metaphysics of my art be, then, just a Just lift of my art, global grown, and my art's desire? The lift of leaves leaves nothing out, but adds "the glory and the freshness of a dream". 50

But might I not say somewhat the same of my science? My sunflowers ask that they be understood: "see how we work".<sup>51</sup> What is my science but my relating, my listening, to things as they relate to me and to one another, quarks and quasars and questioners, a tumble of fellow-travelers? And my science, like my art, can glow with a new luminousness in the hearth and home of transcendental method.<sup>52</sup> It can do so systematically, in a system that is "quite a homely affair",<sup>53</sup> an affair of the heart. And

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>Topics in Education, 214.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>I am adding the context of chapter 3 of *Lack in the Beingstalk*, especially section 2, "From Big Bang to Coloured Flowers": I quote Antoine de Saint Exupery: "...Then one morning, exactly at sunrise, she suddenly showed herself.... the little prince could not restrain his admiration: 'Oh! How beautiful you are!... 'Am I not?' The flower responded, sweetly 'And I was born at the same moment as the sun"'(*Lack*, 89).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>Cantowers II and X already subtly raised the full issue of justice, the *Justitia Dei* of the final theses of *De Verbo Incarnato*, to appear in volume 8 as *The Incarnate Word*. It lurks in the wordplay on Son and sun, sunflower and Sonflower.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Wordsworth recalled in a relevant context, *Insight*, 532[556].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>Cantower II pushes towards a fresh psychology of the study of plants, a break with the present establishment's commitment to axial decay.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>*Method in Theology*, 14, 350-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup>Method in Theology, 350.

my metascience becomes a fuller inner light, telling me with new distinctions and precisions how to meet my fellow travelers: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be adventurous, be responding. And these imperatives become less and less named slogans, and more and more precise and subtle identifications of the elements of my capacity-for-performance<sup>54</sup> where the performance can ingest the universe and give to that universe a new level

of life in the unity $^{55}$  of a single viewer's hearty view, character eyes.

And the ingesting reveals the deeper oddity of the view and the capacity, as well as of the viewed: an oddity that can be named an exigence.<sup>56</sup> So the system that is a self-possession of a man or a woman may grow in unity and coherence, sweeping up the great company of materiality that dances above and below molecular rhythms into such an incarnate system as Thomas arrived at. "It is fundamental to his system. *Omnia Deum appetunt*. And intellect isn't an exception to it. *Omnia Deum appetunt*. *Prima Pars*, q. 44, a. 4."<sup>57</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>The single topic, capacity-for-performance, touched on here and in other *Cantowers*, is perhaps a good symbol of the need for metaphysics and the challenge of metaphysics. It lurks in the lengthy note to the first section of chapter 14 of Insight; it cries out for a metaphysics on Insight 464[489]; the cry can be heard by lifting the discussion of potentia activa (Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 121-28) into a full new metaphysical context: a task for a later day.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>See the conclusion of section 4.4 of chapter 16 of *Insight*. In *Cantower XXIV* we will envisage how the ingesting leads to an infesting: "Infesting History with Hodology".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>See *Phenomenology and Logic*, the index under *Exigence*. There are also the unpublished *De Ente Supernaturale*, 83 pages class notes of 1946. (A translation by Michael Shields, *On Supernatural Being*, 151pp., is available at the Lonergan Research Institute, Toronto) We are here on the edge of the topic capacity-for-performance whose metaphysics pulls in the problems associated with *potentia activa* (See *Verbum. Word and idea in Aquinas*, 12-28), and natural potency: "we may ask whether this neglect of natural potency has not some bearing on unsatisfactory conceptions of obediential potency" (*Verbum*, 149).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>Phenomenology and Logic, 354.

## **16.4** Searchings for a Full Metaphysics

Some of you may well now have the sense that the reflection on relations just given has little to do with the corresponding section of chapter 16 of *Insight*. Some may even think that this is radically subjective - and it is! - having little to do with the sober and objective project of reaching an adequate metaphysics, "the conception, affirmation and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being". <sup>58</sup> I am, they may say, twisting Lonergan's quest for a culturally-invariant perspective on being into a being-related to me, being-for-me project. <sup>59</sup> What do you think? Can you detect some sleight of hand, slight of mind, in section 16.3?

What is this sober and objective process of reaching an adequate metaphysics? It is "a slow, if not bloody entrance" <sup>60</sup> It is a drama in which "our imaginations and intelligence must collaborate in representing the projected course of action that is to be submitted to reflection and criticism, to evaluation and decision … outlining how we might behave before others and charging the outline with an artistic transformation of a more elementary aggressivity and affectivity". <sup>61</sup>

But the project and the outline begin in obscure confusion, and "one's understanding gradually works round and up a spiral of viewpoint"<sup>62</sup>, in oscillations of obscurity and discouragements, only slowly reaching some precisions on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>*Insight*, 391[416]..

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>You should find it interesting to put this effort into the context of the discussion of subjectivity and the existential gap etc in *Phenomenology and Logic*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup>Insight, 186[210].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup>*Insight*, 189[212]. The entire paragraph here need re-digestion in the present context, and then location in the context of the "scientific moment" of metaphysics described in section 6 of *Cantower IX*, and re-contextualized by *Cantower XVIII*. It will be further contextualized in *Cantower XXV*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup>Insight, 186[210].

distinctions, relations, and dichotomies, that make the mist-reaching a little more comprehended, a little more bearable. "The characters in this drama of living are molded by the drama itself" <sup>63</sup> and contemporarily, axially, that drama is securely truncated. <sup>64</sup> Truncation stands massively on the side of an established communal failure, so that the unidentified yearning for luminosity "tends to be shouldered out of the busy day", <sup>65</sup> needing perhaps the pre-dawn light or the "tranquility of darkness, the solitude of loneliness". <sup>66</sup>

So Lonergan arrives after a quarter of a century at a luminosity that dominates his dancing digits as he drives towards the end of *Insight*, writing boldly, compendiously, doctrinally, inadequately, of metaphysics as science and its "implementation".<sup>67</sup> His doctrine, still essentially incomplete, was of a way of life that sublated the searchings of East and West for enlightenment, sublating Zen and Ken struggles towards a yet-undefined Then Enlightenment that would locate implementation properly at the heart of metaphysics.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup>Insight, 188[211].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> The neglected subject does not know himself. The truncated subject not only does not know himself but also is unaware of his ignorance"(Lonergan, A Second Collection, 73). A massive problem of those attracted to Lonergan's work is that this culture of psychothymic ignorance twists the challenge of difficult exercises of self-attention into a swift identification through perhaps only a few instances of noticing patterns in questioning.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup>Insight, 625[648].

<sup>66</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup>*Insight*, 521[545], 524[547]. Regarding inadequate expression, contrast the discussion of implementation of metaphysics in Manhattan in *Cantower XIV* with the presentation of Insight chapter 14 in terms of major and minor premises that deal with the reorientation of common sense and science. There are, however, deeper inadequacies that have to do with the emergent need for more subtle linguistic feed-back (see Method in Theology, 88, n. 34)

 $<sup>^{68}</sup>$ Cantower I raises the problem of Lonergan's orientation towards a theoretic of the future; Cantower V pushes forward the perspective of structured fantasy.

Thirteen years after that writing of chapter 16, the tree-seed <sup>69</sup> of the defining ground of his minding, eventually to give rise to another type of doctrinal inadequacy of expression. But at least the unpleasant doctrine was out, inviting the big frogs of restricted ponds to swim in the larger pond of all human striving in the arts and the sciences. The major and miner premises of implementation now may merge, slowly, bloodily, in the minding of Manhattan and the Milky Way. <sup>70</sup> For that merging, the meaning of chapter 16 of *Insight* has to gradually, spirally, grow, in the centuries to come: it is to become a culture, a luminous presence at the heart of global being. It will remain, certainly, a minority presence, but the dynamics of its mediation - to be glimpsed, perhaps, a little better through our next *Cantower*'s reflections of the three basic three words, W1,W2, W3 - are quite beyond present fantasy.

And I wonder whether there is any value of enlarging my doctrinal pointing here, regarding 'searchings for a full metaphysics"? The searching of Lonergan led him from metaphysics as science and as a dialectic to what I call hodics, and metaphysics as science becomes the fruit of fantasy, a categorial reach into future communities of town and gown, farm and factory. To name the structure is no better than naming the periodic table in the face of the challenge of building a specific chemical factory. What is clear, however, is that the searching is now communal, facing a Giants Causeway task of remedying the *Lack in the Beingstalk*. Obviously, I am referring here to my previous lengthier delineation of searchings for a full metaphysics and that reference, and others, surely show the silliness of a further summary of what is already a series of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup>You will have noticed that the dominant imaging in this *Cantower* is botanical, seeds of trees and leaves. I would draw your attention to Lonergan's discussion of myth, metaphysics and allegory in chapter 17 of Insight. And there is the place of metaphor. "For just as it is true that nearly all we say is metaphor, so also it is true that metaphor is revised and contracted myth and that myth is anticipated and expanded metaphor"(Insight, 545[568-9]).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup>The minding of Manhattan was a topic in the second half of *Cantower XIV*; the Minding of the Milky Way is a topic for the final *Cantowers*, reaching for an exchatology.

doctrinal summaries.

It is clearer to me now, at this stage in the *Cantowers*, that what is needed is the emergence, from a community of evolutionary sports, of details of the climb round crags and up ice-cliffs. That community must eventually become the community of triple discernment that I wrote of earlier, discernments of discernments of discernments that sublates Ignatius' simpler view. There will always be the need for simple discernment, but a new culture can lead to new and subtle mediations of such simple discernment. Our present crisis, especially in Lonergan studies, is to acknowledge the need for the mediations, an acknowledgment of the unpleasant doctrine of withdrawal. May I repeat again a favorite quotation from *Method?* "Doctrines that are embarrassing will not be mentioned in polite company". The aspect of doctrine that is an emergent embarrassment in these *Cantowers* is a doctrine about taking a stand, some humble form of the "scientific moment" of *Cantower IX*. What are my categories?

It is massively unlikely that I, you, share the categories to which Lonergan climbed in three quarters of a century of lonely genius, but can you share, operatively, the hodic formula? Perhaps you have found enough in his nudge towards identifying your own loneliness, a quest and a range of questions, a strategy of struggling for commonsense understand that you can share with others, a strategy of teaching that is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup>I introduced this notion at the conclusion of chapter 1 of The Redress of Poise. It parallels the notion of three orders of consciousness that Lonergan expresses in a unpublished 1965 draft of a first chapter of Method (see Darlene O'Leary, Lonergan's Practical View of History, Axial Press, Halifax, Chapter 2). The development of this would be an essential feature of the new foundations, quote beyond this essay much less a footnote. Roughly, methodology discusses the evolution of methods. Methods are a thematization of particular semi-spontaneous strategies: e.g history as done in a particular generation, or mathematics as done in a decade. I have occasionally used the parallel that methodology is to methods what zoology is to animals. The shift to the used of the word 'discernment' calls attention to the commitment involved in the layers, the "scientific moment" I mention regularly since Cantower IX, section 5. It also nudges the study of spiritual exercises beyond simple piety or restricted interpretation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup>Method in Theology, 299.

not serial killing? You may, then, go the popular way: but struggle for luminousness with regard to its limitations. And that struggle will be helped - there is to emerge an evolutionary statistics of it - by the growing presence of a community of climbers who share, not doctrinally but in a new pedagogy of foundations, their categorial journeys with a fresh adequacy of fed-back expression. The climb of that community has its analogue in successful scientific endeavor: chapter four of *Lack in the Beingstalk* picked up on Husserl's doctorate work on the Calculus of Variations as such an analogue, but analogues are legion. Still, that is a quite foreign legion, a desert lunacy, to those who, in their cultural living, have been "molded by the drama ... through the discipline and play of education" that is now conventional in theology, philosophy, the humanities.

The minor and major surrender of desire are cloaked by truncated sophistications, breeding a common culture that is in fact an "ooze of abnormality". <sup>74</sup> So, there can be massive erudition, even in the hard sciences, even in Lonergan studies, "but no personal experience of the intellectual pattern of experience, of what is to live the way a theorist lives.... they are not familiar, strictly and accurately, with any field of theoretical objects. They have a very inadequate notion of what a theory is, yet, at the same time they really are not in the world of community, they do not apprehend the concrete, the individual, the particular, as they really are; their apprehension is mediated by universal norms, laws, criteria, classifications, serial types, and so on. They are lost in some no man's land between the world of theory and the world of common sense". <sup>75</sup>

This is a lostness and an apprehension quite alien to the post-axial concrete intention that is to be an incarnate hodic presence. There is no short route for those who

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup>Insight, 188[212].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup>Insight, 237[262].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup>Topics in Education, 121.

would foster that global presence, satisfying a world-ethic imperative cry.<sup>76</sup> But I have zoomed round this topic all to often, unheard. It is not a welcome message, and the majority of my readers of this and other expressions of it may well consider me deludedly arrogant. So our cherry tree and rose are ground to dust. Or, more subtly, swift truncated probing identifies and disregards.

All is said, done

But silence erupts

Brilliant, stacatto sparks

Probing, rubber-clad surgeon's fingers.

Animal, vegetable or mineral?

Love once belonged, voids

The agonized counterpart

The difference to me - personalise

The score - rose and dust.

Let me die my own fool's death."<sup>77</sup>

## 16.5 Gould, Kuhn, and Company.

A central issue is truncated axiality as evolutionary paradigm, <sup>78</sup> and perhaps a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup>The cry comes into focus in section 3 of *Cantower XVIII*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup>Sujutha Bala Subramanian, *Modern Indian Poetry in English*, edited by P.Lal, Writers Workshop Books, Calcutta, 1969, 19. I am quoting this from a previous use in Process. Introducing Themselves to Young Christian Minders, 173, at the conclusion of my last chapter of the book. That final chapter is a relevant context for locating chapters 15,16, and 17 of Insight.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup>The identification of this paradigm shift throws light on the difficulty of implementing - or even getting any attention for - Lonergan's other major cultural contribution, the shift of economics from prescience to science. One could argue plausibly that the micro- and meso-autonomy that it points to requires for its support a serious shifting to the third stage of meaning, the second time of the temporal subject. It would seem to be a matter of mutual mediation.

final dichotomizing would do more good than harm as we swing towards the more modest climbings of beginnings.

The fundamental paradigm shift in human evolution is the paradigm that focuses on the two times of temporal subjectivity to bring forth a clear spandrelclearing either/or. The first time of the temporal subject is a time dominated by spontaneity, by desire reaching out to noise abroad desire without even the suspicion of the control of writing much less the control of grammar. Between the pre-adolescent stumblings of spontaneity and the later emergence of a Kontrol Tower there is a long Toynbeesque Ecumenic cycling of decline that generates the cry within history, the cry for a new embrace of suffering and stupidity and sinfilled ways, an embrace of an understanding to be bred by a turn to, round, in, the idea. Within that sin-rained suffering, certainly, there are moments of light, lifts of vertical finality, but the grammar of general bias takes colonial control of stupidity. The human group, except for pockets of ancient spontaneity or fresh rebellion, becomes linguistically colonized and so mentally handicapped. Ancient spontaneity - or its cousin, relatively untainted common sense - cannot bring forth a luminous either/or of luminosity, of a second time of humanity when the hod is held heartily by met-hod. Truncated subjectivity, an unpunctuated equilibrium of eons, can dishearten the heart into talk as technique, all the more sweetly vicious when it steps in the steps of some master without walking in his or her shoes.

The shift becomes a shift from a mis-interpreted Aristotelian or medieval method to a postmodern multi-tiered muddle. It is a shift from content to method, but there is no serious theoretic content and the method is committedly - or subtly - self-neglecting and dark, yet sometimes pickily precise. There is identifiable, indeed, the contrast between the light and the dark in John the Evangelist, <sup>79</sup> but the churches of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup>I refer here to Lonergan's discussion of this in *De Deo Trino*, *Pars Dogmatica*, Gregorian University Press, 1964, 281-92.

sacred and the profane are not capable of the identification. Church and State and Academy can stand on ceremony and wave a local flag, and the norm of truly living becomes the liturgy of a Hollywood Awards' night. So there is "The Specter of Catastrophic Mass Extinction" discussed so narrowly by Gould in his final chapter, "Tiers of Time and Trials of Extrapolationism, With an Epilog on the Interaction of General Theory with Contingent History". Of Gould climbs, or crawls eruditely, to a misshapen view of contingency that meshes with his reverence for Darwin. My arrogance is matched by his:

"If, however, as the central thesis of this book maintains and the Zeitgeist of our dawning millennium no longer rejects, we cannot validate the actuality of mammalian success by general principles, but only as a happy (albeit entirely sensible) contingency of the historical process with innumerable alternatives that didn't happen to attain expression (despite their equal plausibility before the fact), then we must face the philosophical question of whether we have surrendered too much in developing a more complex and nuanced view of causality in the history of life".<sup>81</sup>

In *Cantower XIV* I pointed to his quite evident gross lack of nuance,<sup>82</sup> whatever about his complexity, and I might well have done the same for Kuhn in the present essay had I not thought the better of it. I look back on Lonergan's long essay of Insight now and ponder over the inclusions of comparisons and contrasts. In his new hodic view such would be the stuff of the dialectic component of the new science. The way forward is a way of direct speech, layered down from foundational fantasy and pedagogy to street-talk and street-smarts. And perhaps there is no harm in putting in a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup>Gould, 1296-1343.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup>Gould, 1332.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup>The third last note in this *Cantower* points to a richer context for a critique of Gould's efforts. *Cantower XIX* on "Ultimates", of course, throws his ramblings about contingency into a quite uncomfortable light.

bit of Beckett's Dublin street-smarts, quoted before: especially since it, literally, got a mark of approval from Lonergan when he came to read it in the early 1980s. While I have on occasion drawn parallels between the two works of Joyce, Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, and the two works, respectively, Insight and Method of Theology, I would like to think of Beckett's remarks as referring to Insight, even thought they were made about Joyce's climb to Finnegans Wake.

"Here is direct expression - pages and pages of it. And if you don't understand it, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is because you are too decadent to receive it. You are not satisfied unless form is so strictly divorced from content that you can comprehend the one almost without bothering to read the other. This rapid skimming and absorption of the scant cream of sense is made possible by what I call a continuous process of copious intellectual salivation.. The form that is an arbitrary and independent phenomenon can fulfil no higher function than that of a stimulus for a tertiary or quartary conditioned reflex of dribbling comprehension". 83

The tragedy of much of the present following of Lonergan is that a truncated culture allows it or constrains it, in good conscience,<sup>84</sup> to adopt his names without his aims, his slogans without his footsloggings. But the sapling of history may now grow in hodic ground, spinning out toxins in the slopes and cycles of the Dark Tower, releasing all the flowers of the mountains.<sup>85</sup> And the tree of history, in its cosmic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup>I quoted this passage originally on p. 67 of Lonergan's Challenge to the University and the Economy. The quotation is from Samuel Beckett, "Dante, Bruno; Vico, Joyce", Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress, A New Direction Book, New York, 1972, 13 (first published in 1929). Lonergan marked this passage heavily: his marked copy is the one I put on the Website.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup>A context here is Lonergan's discussion of two general types, the clever and wicked, the righteous and stupid, in "Healing and Creating in History". So, I am assuming that the followers are not wicked, but that their stupidity is a deep axial stupefaction, deep enough to be blameless. In Ireland we have a way of talking about the class of righteous and stupid as those "that mean well".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup>The implicit references here are to *Cantowers IV*, *V* and *VIII*.

surround of background radiation and the Lyman-alpha forest, <sup>86</sup> grows in holy ground. <sup>87</sup> Within that remote but totally concrete view there is a larger view of luck, and to the luck of Darwin's emergence is added the greater luck of Lonergan with his "particular struggles and insights" that lifted his mind to a glimpse of the second time of subjectivity: and so I would unhesitatingly replace the name of Darwin in Gould's final paragraph with that of Lonergan, whose horizon was dashingly closer to the field and the forest and the "psychic force sweeping living human bodies to joyful, courageous, whole-hearted performance", <sup>88</sup> the butterfly beyond the leaf.

"And what a stunning piece of good fortune, that this actuality came to us with all the grace, the moral weight, and the intellectual power of Darwin's particular struggles and insights, clothing the structure of his thought in that apotheosis of human achievement - wisdom, which the Book of Proverbs, citing the same icon that Darwin would borrow more than two millennia later, called Etz Chayim, the tree of life. 'Length of days is in her right hand,' for 'she is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her; and happy is every one that retaineth her'." 89

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup>An astronomers' metaphor for absorption lines in Quaser spectra that relate to the character of intergalactic space.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup>The precise character, indeed characters in the sense of intimacy of personhood, of the holiness is expressed compendiously in the four forms of the Anthropic Principle which I treat of in Lack in the Beingstalk, 103-105.

<sup>88</sup> Insight, 723[745].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup>Gould, 1343.